# ☹ 1AC Versions

## Regular 1AC

**Debate is not a safe space – minoritized debaters are constantly told they are too loud or too angry or too emotional, constantly told to be happy, to stop complaining, to just do “real debate”.**

#### Exclusive forms of argumentation have made debate technocratic and elitist – it desensitizes debaters to violence and racism, and teaches us to care more about nuclear war than solving the structural violence within our own community. Thus, the role of the judge is to vote for the debater who better performatively and metholodgically provides a resistance strategy for the oppressed.

**Fine 13** Todd; Founder of project Khalid and coaches the debate team at Washington Latin Public Charter School in Washington, D.C. and is Vice President of the High School D.C. Urban Debate League and writes for the huff post; “Qatar Conference on Scholastic Debate Examines Activity's Role in Empowerment”; Huffington Post; 3/10/13 @ 5:12 am; Accessed 2/17/15 @ 12:43 pm; [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol\_b\_2429645.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol_b_2429645.html%7dAvP)

Meanwhile, the National Association of Urban Debate Leagues (NAUDL), a nonprofit headquartered in Chicago, has supported the expansion of this policy format into urban school districts across the country, with large nonprofit leagues in Atlanta, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, and other cites. Because the sponsors are mostly college debaters, many of them now accomplished lawyers, who believe in the "**policy debate**" format **and its transformative power as an intense**, total **experience**, the association has largely focused on the establishment of leagues based exclusively on this policy format. These developments, combined, have created an inverse bell curve of wealth in the policy debate community, with a handful of elite schools and a growing cohort of extremely poor schools being all that remains. Middle class suburban schools and rural schools, overwhelmed by the rising costs of travel to far-away tournaments as the total numbers in policy debate dwindle, are hard to find at all.This unusual socioeconomic makeup has prompted more than just a culture shock, but a highly-contested and ongoing ideological war in the debate rounds themselves. Poorer schools, largely black and other **minority**, now often **argue that debate itself reflects the racism and inequalities of** the broader **society. The year-long national topics**, which **serve the highly-specific technical needs of the elite national circuit, are often "critiqued" as symptomatic of a training system that forms cynical technocrats who will tolerate injustice as part of a never-ending, brutal game where real consequences are always "debatable."** As the American economy continues to flounder and urban schools face heavy challenges and criticisms, **these violent communication collisions in** debate **rounds are causing some** young **participants to question the possibility of ever addressing racism or structural inequality** in America. Yet, without some direct link between Urban Debate Leagues and activism itself, **even these** potent and uncomfortable **challenges** float without resolution and **are reduced to a win/loss statement** written by a judge on a ballot. In exasperation, many of the urban league debaters, and their coaches, now argue that **policy debate** can only **ha[s]ve value as a** fierce **training ground for blacks to gain survival skills to engage a hopelessly irredeemable America.**

#### AND, spaces like debate are oriented around bodies that inhabit them. A chair becomes molded around a body’s shape if that body constantly sits in it. When I sink into a chair, if I fit into the mold, I do not notice the points of tension between my body and the chair.

#### Bodies sink into chairs in the same way bodies sink into institutions – whiteness coheres spaces in certain shapes. Bodies that fit in the space’s orientation do not notice friction, while bodies that don’t fit experience tension. This is why debate tournaments are full of white guys in suits, because when people of color or womxn enter the cafeteria they are immediately marked as out of place.

**Ahmed 07** Sara Ahmed "A Phenomenology of Whiteness" Goldsmiths College, University of London 2007 www.rainbow-season.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Feminist\_Theory-2007-Ahmed-149-68.pdf

But how does whiteness hold its place? In this section I explore how whiteness ‘holds’ through habits. **Public spaces take shape through the habitual actions of bodies,** such that **the contours of space could be described as habitual**. I turn to the concept of habits to theorize not so much how bodies acquire their shape, but how **spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that ‘inhabit’ them**. We could think about the ‘habit’ in the ‘in-habit’. Weneed to examine not only how bodies become white, or fail to do so, but also how spaces can take on the very ‘qualities’ that are given to such bodies. In a way, we can think about the habitual as a form of inheritance. It is not so much that we inherit habits, although we can do so: rather **the habitual can be thought of as a bodily and spatial form of inheritance**. As Pierre Bourdieu (1977) shows us, **we** **can link habits to what is** unconscious, and **routine**, or what becomes **‘second nature’**.3 To describe whiteness as a habit, as second nature, is to suggest that whiteness is what bodies do, where the body takes the shape of the action. Habits are not ‘exterior’ to bodies, as things that can be ‘put on’ or ‘taken off’. If habits are about what bodies do, in ways that are repeated, then they might also shape what bodies can do. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body is a body that acts in the world, where actions bring other things near. As he puts it: **my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a** certain existing or possible **task**. And indeed **its spatiality is not**, like that of external objects or like that of ‘spatial sensations’, **a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation**. **If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of the body trails behind them** like the tail of a comet. **It is not that I am unaware of** the whereabouts of **my shoulder or back**, **but these are** simply **swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table**. (2002: 114–5, emphasis in original) Here, **the directedness of the body towards an action** (which we have discovered also means **an orientation towards certain** kinds of **objects**) **is how the body ‘appears’**.4 **The body is ‘habitual’** not only in the sense that it performs actions repeatedly, but **in the sense that when it performs such actions, it does not command attention**, apart from at the ‘surface’ where it ‘encounters’ an external object (such as the hands that lean on the desk or table, which feel the ‘stress’ of the action). In other words, the body is habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as it does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action encounters. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body does not get in the way of an action: it is behind the action. I want to suggest here that **whiteness** **could be understood as ‘the behind’**. **White bodies are habitual** insofar as **they ‘trail behind’ actions: they do not get ‘stressed’ in their encounters** with objects or others, **as their whiteness ‘goes unnoticed’**. Whiteness would be what lags behind; **white bodies do not have to face their whiteness; they are not orientated ‘towards’ it**, and **this ‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere**, as that which bodies are orientated around. When bodies ‘lag behind’, then they extend their reach. It becomes possible to talk about the whiteness of space given the very accumulation of such ‘points’ of extension. Spaces acquire the ‘skin’ of the bodies that inhabit them. What is important to note here is that it is not just bodies that are orientated. **Spaces also take shape by being orientated around some bodies**, more than others. **We can** also **consider ‘institutions’ as orientation devices**, **which take the shape of ‘what’ resides within them**. After all, institutions provide collective or public spaces. When we describe institutions as ‘being’ white (institutional whiteness), we are pointing to how institutional spaces are shaped by the proximity of some bodies and not others: **white bodies gather**, **and cohere to form the edges of such spaces**. When I walk into university meetings that is just what I encounter. Sometimes I get used to it. At one conference we organize, four black feminists arrive. They all happen to walk into the room at the same time. Yes, we do notice such arrivals. The fact that we notice such arrivals tells us more about what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives. Someone says: ‘**it is like walking into a sea of whiteness**’. This phrase comes up, and it hangs in the air. The speech act becomes an object, which gathers us around. So yes they walk into the room, and I notice that they were not there before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already inhabited. I look around, and re-encounter the sea of whiteness. As many have argued, whiteness is invisible and unmarked, as the absent centre against which others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation (Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993). **Whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit** **it**, **or those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it**, even when they are not it (see Ahmed, 2004b). **Spaces are orientated ‘around’ whiteness**, insofar **as whiteness is not seen**. We do not face **whiteness**; it **‘trails behind’ bodies**, as what is **assumed** **to be given. The effect of this ‘around whiteness’ is the institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness’, which makes non-white bodies feel uncomfortable,** exposed, **visible, different, when they take up this space**. The institutionalization of whiteness involves work: **the institution comes to have a body as an effect** of this work. It is important that we do not reify institutions, by presuming they are simply given and that they decide what we do. Rather, **institutions become given**, **as an effect of the repetition of decisions** made over time, **which shapes** the surface of **institutional spaces**. Institutions involve the accumulation of **past decisions about how to allocate resources, as well as ‘who’ to recruit**. Recruitment functions as a technology for the reproduction of whiteness. We can recall that Althusser’s model of ideology is based on recruitment: ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by the very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey you there.’ (1971: 163, emphasis in original) The subject is recruited by turning around, which immediately associates recruitment with following a direction, as the direction that takes the line of an address. To recruit can suggest both to renew and to restore. The act of recruitment, of bringing new bodies in, restores the body of the institution, which depends on gathering bodies to cohere as a body. **Becoming a ‘part’ of an institution**, which we can consider the demand to share in it, or even have a share of it, hence **requires** not only that one inhabits its buildings, but also **that we follow its line**: we might start by saying ‘we’; by mourning its failures and rejoicing in its successes; by reading the documents that circulate within it, creating vertical and horizontal lines of communication; by the chance encounters we have with those who share its grounds. To be recruited is not only to join, but to sign up to a specific institution: to inhabit it by turning around as a return of its address. Furthermore, recruitment creates the very ego ideal of the institution, what it imagines as the ideal that working ‘at’ the institution means working towards or even what it imagines expresses its ‘character’. As scholars in critical management studies have shown us, organizations tend to recruit in their own image (Singh, 2002). The ‘hey you’ is not just addressed to anybody: some bodies more than others are recruited, those that can inherit the ‘character’ of the organization, by returning its image with a reflection that reflects back that image,what we could call a ‘good likeness’. It is not just that there is a desire for whiteness that leads to white bodies getting in. Rather **whiteness is what the institution is orientated ‘around’, so that even bodies that might not appear white still have to inhabit whiteness**, if they are to get ‘in’. **Institutions** too **involve orientation devices, which keep things in place**. The affect of such placement could be described as a form of comfort. **To be orientated,** or **to be at home in the world, is also to feel** a certain **comfort: we might only notice comfort** as an affect when we lose it, **when we become uncomfortable**. The word **‘**comfort’ suggests well-being and satisfaction, but it can also suggest an ease and easiness. Comfort is about an encounter between more than one body, which is the promise of a ‘sinking’ feeling. **To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins**. **One fits**, **and by fitting the surfaces of bodies disappears from view. White bodies are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape**. **The bodies and spaces ‘point’ towards each other, as a ‘point’ that is not seen as it is also ‘the point’ from which we see**. In other words, **whiteness may function as a form of public comfort by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken** their **shape**. **Those spaces are** lived as **comfortable as they allow bodies to fit in**; the surfaces of social space are already impressed upon by the shape of such bodies. We can think of the chair beside the table. It might acquire its shape by the repetition of some bodies inhabiting it: we can almost see the shape of bodies as ‘impressions’ on the surface. So spaces extend bodies and bodies extend spaces. The impressions of the surface function as traces of such extensions. The surfaces of social as well as bodily space ‘record’ the repetition of acts, and the ‘passing by’ of some and not others.

#### This creates friction – bodies are stopped and interrogated when they do not fit in the orientation of the space. Feminine speech in spaces of white supremacy becomes the incessant nag. This inequality makes debate impossible – unconscious and informal mechanisms of exclusion mean that participants aren’t on an even playing field.  Even when minoritarian subjects do speak, they are not heard – addressing this social inequality is a prerequisite for further deliberation.

Fraser 90 Fraser 90 \*Edited for ableist rhetoric Nancy, Prof of Political and Social Science at the New School, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” Social Text 25/26, p.63-65

Habermas's account of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere stresses its claim to be open and accessible to all. Indeed, this idea of open access is one of the central meanings of the norm of publicity. Of course, we know, both from the revisionist history and from Habermas's account, that the bourgeois public's claim to full accessibility was not in fact realized. **Women of all classes and ethnicities were excluded from official political participation** precisely **on the basis of ascribed gender status,** while plebeian men were formally excluded by property qualifications. Moreover, in many cases, women and men of racialized ethnicities of all classes were excluded on racial grounds. Now, what are we to make of this historical fact of the non-realization in practice of the bourgeois public sphere's ideal of open access? One approach is to conclude that the ideal itself remains unaffected, since it is possible in principle to overcome these exclusions. And, in fact, it was only a matter of time before formal exclusions based on gender, property, and race were eliminated. This is convincing enough as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The question of open access cannot be reduced without remainder to the presence or absence of formal exclusions. It requires us to **look** also **at the process of discursive interaction within formal**ly inclusive public **arenas**. Here we should recall that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere requires bracketing inequalities of status. This public sphere was to be an arena in which interlocutors would set aside such characteristics as differences in birth and fortune and speak to one another as if they were social and economic peers. The operative phrase here is "as if." In fact, the social inequalities among the interlocutors were not eliminated, but only bracketed. But were they really effectively bracketed? The revisionist historiography suggests they were not. Rather, discursive interaction within **the bourgeois public sphere was governed by** protocols of style and **decorum that were** themselves correlates and **markers of status inequality. These functioned** informally **to marginalize women and** members of the **plebeian classes and** **to prevent them from participating** as peers. Here we are talking about informal impediments to participatory parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate. That these constitute a more serious challenge to the bourgeois conception of the public sphere can be seen from a familiar contemporary example. Feminist research has documented a syndrome that many of us have observed in faculty meetings and other mixed sex deliberative bodies: **men tend to interrupt women more than women interrupt men**; **men** also tend to **speak more than women**, taking more turns and longer turns; and **women's interventions are** more often **ignored** or not responded to than men's**.** In response to the sorts of experiences documented in this research, an important strand of feminist political theory has claimed that **deliberation can serve as a mask for domination**. Theorists like Jane Mansbridge have argued that "**the transformation of 'I' into 'we'** brought about **through political deliberation** can easily **mask** subtle **forms of control.** Even **the language people use** as they reason together usually **favors one way of seeing things** and discourages others. **Subordinate groups** sometimes **cannot find the right** **voice or** **words to express their thoughts**, and **when they do, they discover they are not heard. [They] are** silenced, **encouraged to** keep their wants inchoate, and heard to **say 'yes' when what they have said is 'no.**''""6 Mansbridge rightly notes that many of these feminist insights into ways in which deliberation can serve as a mask for domination extend beyond gender to other kinds of unequal relations, like those based on class or ethnicity. They alert us to the ways in which **social inequalities** can **infect deliberation, even in the absence of any formal exclusions.** Here I think we encounter a very serious difficulty with the bourgeois conception of the public sphere. Insofar as **the bracketing of social inequalities in deliberation means proceeding as if they don't exist when they do**, this does not foster participatory parity. On the contrary, **such bracketing** usually **works to** **the** advantage of dominant groups in society and to the **disadvantage of subordinates.** In most cases, it would be more appropriate to unbracket inequalities in the sense of explicitly thematizing them-a point that accords with the spirit of Habermas's later "communicative ethics." The misplaced faith in the efficacy of bracketing suggests another flaw in the bourgeois conception. This conception assumes that a public sphere is or can be a space of zero degree culture, so utterly bereft of any specific ethos as to accommodate with perfect neutrality and equal ease interventions expressive of any and every cultural ethos. But this assumption is counterfactual, and not for reasons that are merely accidental. In stratified societies, unequally empowered social groups tend to develop unequally valued cultural styles. The result is the development of powerful informal pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of subordinated groups both in everyday life contexts and in official public spheres.7 Moreover, these pressures are amplified, rather than mitigated, by the peculiar political economy of the bourgeois public sphere. In this public sphere, the media that constitute the material support for the circulation of views are privately owned and operated for profit. Consequently, subordinated social groups usually lack equal access to the material means of equal participation.'" Thus, political economy enforce structurally what culture accomplishes informally. If we take these considerations seriously, then we should be led to entertain serious doubts about a conception of the public sphere that purports to bracket, rather than to eliminate, structural social inequalities. We should question whether it is possible even in principle for interlocutors to deliberate as if they were social peers in specially designated discursive arenas, when these discursive arenas are situated in a larger societal context that is pervaded by structural relations of dominance and subordination. What is at stake here is the autonomy of specifically political institutions vis-,i-vis the surrounding societal context. Now, one salient feature that distinguishes liberalism from some other political-theoretical orientations is that liberalism assumes the autonomy of the political in a very strong form. Liberal political theory assumes that it is possible to organize a democratic form of political life on the basis of socio-economic and socio-sexual structures that generate systemic inequalities. For liberals, then, the problem of democracy becomes the problem of how to insulate political processes from what are considered to be non-political or pre-political processes, those characteristic, for example, of the economy, the family, and informal everyday life. The problem for liberals, thus, is how to strengthen the barriers separating political institutions that are supposed to instantiate relations of equality from economic, cultural, and socio-sexual institutions that are premised on systemic relations of inequality.'9 Yet the weight of circumstance suggests that **in order to have a public sphere** in which interlocutors can deliberate as peers, it is not sufficient merely to bracket social inequality. Instead, **it is a necessary condition for participatory parity that systemic social inequalities be eliminated.** This does not mean that everyone must have exactly the same income, but it does require the sort of rough equality that is inconsistent with systemically-generated relations of dominance and subordination. Pace liberalism, then, political democracy requires substantive social equality.20 So far, I have been arguing that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere is inadequate insofar as it supposes that social equality is not a necessary condition for participatory parity in public spheres. What follows from this for the critique of actually existing democracy? One task for critical theory is to render visible the ways in which societal inequality infects formally inclusive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction within them.

#### AND, this affective orientation of institutions depletes the energy of marginalized bodies. Bodies that don’t fit in the orientation of the space are forced to go against the flow of the institution, which causes psychic exhaustion, forced every day to spend energy getting up in the morning to keep fighting.

**Ahmed 13** Sara Ahmed "Feeling Depleted" November 17, 2013 Feminist Kill-Joy https://feministkilljoys.com/2013/11/17/feeling-depleted/

I am currently preparing a new lecture that I will be giving in Vienna next week, “Diversity work as Emotional Work.” I will be drawing on some old material that I published in On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional life (2012). It is interesting going back because you arrive with a slightly different lens, and you notice things even in your own interview transcripts that you just hadn’t noticed before. I have so enjoyed it: that reminder that projects are never over, that our materials are as full of life as we are. Or maybe more full of life, because **sometimes we** can **feel depleted**. And that is what I am thinking about right now: feeling depleted. It is not that feelings are themselves being depleted (the rather economic model of emotions that is evident for instance in some uses of the concept of “compassion fatigue,” in which is it is assumed that emotions in being used are being used up) but that we can feel depleted. By saying “feeling depleted,” I am talking about a material as well as somatic phenomena: of **not having the energy to keep going in the face of what you come up against**. Thinking back to my project on diversity work, I realise now how much of the account I offered was of **the uneven distribution of energy, of how some bodies become depleted because of institutional requirements and how this depletion “registers” at a bodily level how institutions become stuck**. What do I mean by diversity work here? I am drawing on the model I offered in the conclusion of On Being Included. Firstly, diversity work can refer to work that has the explicit aim of transforming an institution; and secondly, diversity work can be what is required, or what we do, when we do not quite inhabit the norms of an institution. These two senses often meet in a body: **those who do not quite inhabit the norms of the institution are often those given the task of transforming those norms**. Some of us are given diversity as a task – becoming members of equality and diversity committees – because we are perceived as being diversity. When **diversity becomes an invitation** perhaps what is at stake is not so much who you are but who you are not: not white, not male, not straight, not able-bodied. If you are more than one of these “nots” you might end up on more than one committee! Embodying diversity can thus require additional work; the depletion of the energy of diversity workers is part of the embodied and institutional history of diversity. In an earlier blog “It is tiring, all that whiteness,” I alluded to this phenomena (here). I described the experience of relief of entering a room and not encountering what you usually encounter, all that whiteness: When you inhabit a “sea of brownness” as a person of colour you might realize the effort of your previous inhabitance, as the effort of not noticing what is around you. It is like how you can feel the “weight” of tiredness most acutely as the tiredness leaves you. To become conscious of how things leave you is to become conscious of those things. We might become even more aware of whiteness as wearing, when we leave the spaces of whiteness. When something is wearing, it is not always that you feel worn done. **Feeling worn down can be a** retrospective **realization that you** havebeen or **are being worn down**. **It might be that in order to inhabit certain spaces we have to block recognition of just how wearing they are**: when **the feeling catches us**, it might beat the point **when it is just “too much.”** **You are shattered. Feeling worn down**: I think feminist **killjoys are familiar with this feeling, that sense of coming up against the same thing, whatever you say or do**. We have, I think, in face of this feeling to think about how to protect ourselves (and those around us) from being diminished. Audre Lorde taught us that **caring for one self can be** “**an act of political warfare**” as a form of self-preservation not self-indulgence (1988: 131). There are “those of us,” she reminds us, who were “never meant to survive” (1978: 32). The relations we develop to restore, to replete, are world making. **With each other we find ways of becoming re-energised in the face of the ongoing reality of what causes our sense of depletion** (I am willing to use the language of causality here, causality as contact zone). **We can recognize each other, find each other, create spaces of relief, spaces that might be breathing spaces, spaces in which we can be inventive**. In Willful Subjects I reflected further on how tiredness (and depletion) can be unevenly distributed. In my discussion of habit and attunement in chapter 2, I drew on William James who quotes from the work of M. Léon Dumont to describe how over time a garment begins to cling more and more to the body that wears it. I think institutions could be thought of as rather like old garments: they acquire the shape of those who tend to wear them, such that they become easier to wear when you have that shape. Privilege could be thought of in these terms: another sense of wearing. Another of Dumont’s examples is the reduction over time of the force required to work a locking mechanism. The more you use a mechanism, the less effort is required; repetition smooths the passage of the key through the hole. James describes this reduction of force or effort as essential to the phenomenon of habituation. I would claim that the lessening of effort is essential to the phenomenon of privilege. If less effort is required to unlock the door for the key that fits the lock, so too **less effort is required to pass through an institution for bodies that fit**. I think of **social privilege as an energy saving device**: less effort is required to pass through. For other some bodies so much more effort is required to get through, to stand up; to stay standing. Sometimes you can only stand up by standing firm. Sometimes you can only hold on by becoming stubborn. A social standing can thus be a material standing. Audre Lorde once wrote: “In order to withstand the weather, we had to become stone” (1984: 160). It would be hard to overestimate the power of Lorde’s description. Social forms of oppression can be experienced as weather. They press and pound against the surface of a body; a body can surface or survive by hardening. For some bodies to stand is to withstand. We can be exhausted by the labour of standing. If social privilege is like an energy saving device, no wonder that not to inherit privilege can be so trying. There is a politics to exhaustion. **Feeling depleted can be a measure of just what we are up against**. Diversity work is emotional work because in part it is work that has to be repeated, again and again. **You encounter a brick wall.** Even when a new diversity policy is adopted somehow things stay in place; they keep their place. I have many examples of these “wall encounters” that I shared in my book, On Being Included. **To those who do not come against it, the wall does not appear: the institution seems open, committed and diverse**: as happy as its mission statement, as willing as its equality statement. Things appear fluid. I have said this before: **things are fluid if you are going the way things are flowing**. We can reflect on the significance of frustration here: it is not only that the wall keeps its place, but those who don’t come against it, don’t notice it. **This can be profoundly alienating as an institutional experience. No wonder that when the wall keeps its place, it is you that becomes sore**. One more thing: I wrote this blog when I was feeling depleted. And in that fact is another political lesson: sometimes we can feel less depleted by writing about being depleted or even just sharing that sense of being depleted with others.

#### This is a form of psychological violence – alienation and isolation within debate deplete the energy of minoritized bodies who are held up as symbols of diversity when they do well and experience microaggressions when they don’t.

#### Thus, we advocate the methodology of the killjoy – a symbol of willful deviance that refuses the requirement to be happy or complicit within systems of oppression. Our affective analysis contests hegemonic structures of deliberation that marginalize the oppressed, and kills the joy of white comfortability

**Ahmed 10** Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010

**Killjoys** To be unseated by the table of happiness might be to threaten not simply that table, but what gathers around it, what gathers on it. When you are unseated, you can even get in the way of those who are seated, those who want more than anything to keep their seats. To threaten the loss of the seat can be to kill the joy of the seated. How well we recognise the figure of the feminist killjoy! How she makes sense! Let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. One feminist project could be to **give the killjoy back her voice**. Whilst hearing feminists as **killjoys might be a form of dismissal, there is an agency that this dismissal** rather ironically **reveals**. We can respond to the accusation with a "yes." The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, of how happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods (a social good is what causes happiness, given happiness is understood as what is good). As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely "it is always easy to describe as happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others]."[[4](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end4)] Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. **To be involved in political activism is** thus **to be involved in a struggle against happiness**. Even if we are struggling for different things, even if we have different worlds we want to create, we might share what we come up against. Our activist archives are thus unhappy archives. Just think of the labor of critique that is behind us: feminist **critiques of** the figure of **"the happy housewife;"** Black critiques of themyth of **"the happy slave";** queer critiques of the sentimentalisation of heterosexuality as **"domestic bliss."** **The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made**. We inherit this horizon. **To be willing to go against a social order**, which is protected as a moral order, **a happiness order is to be willing to cause unhappiness**, even if unhappiness is not your cause. To be willing to cause unhappiness might be about how we live an individual life (not to choose "the right path" is readable as giving up the happiness that is presumed to follow that path). Parental responses to coming out, for example, can take the explicit form not of being unhappy about the child being queer but of *being unhappy about the child being unhappy*.[[5](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end5)] Even if you do not want to cause the unhappiness of those you love, a queer life can mean living with that unhappiness. Tobe willing to cause unhappiness can also be how we immerse ourselves in collective struggle, as we work with and through others who share our points of alienation. Those who are unseated by the tables of happiness can find each other. So, yes, let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject "in the room" hence "brings others down" not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but **by exposing how happiness is sustained** by erasing the signs of not getting along. Feminists do **kill joy** in a certain sense: they **disturb the** very **fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places**. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by what is supposed to cause happiness, but **our failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others**. We can consider the relationship between the negativity of the figure of the feminist killjoy and how **certain bodies are "encountered" as being negative**. Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angryor dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end6)] To be recognizedas a feministis to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty. You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, thatwe may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). There is a desire to believe that women become feminists *because* they are unhappy. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about. Feminist consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away. My point here would be that feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as *about* the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy *about*. Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described *as* unhappy. We must learn. The word "wretched" has its own genealogy, coming from wretch, meaning a stranger, exile, banished person. Wretched in the sense of "vile, despicable person" was developed in Old English and is said to reflect "the sorry state of the outcast." Can we rewrite the history of happiness from the point of view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very happiness of the familiar. Phenomenology helps us explore how the familiar is that which is not revealed. A queer phenomenology shows how the familiar is not revealed to those who can inhabit it. For queers and others the familiar is revealed to you, because you do not inhabit it. To be "estranged from" can be what enables a "consciousness of." This is why being a killjoy can be a knowledge project, a world-making project. Feminist Tables A feminist call might be a call to anger, to develop a sense of rage about collective wrongs. And yet, it is important that we do not make feminist emotion into a site of truth: as if it is always clear or self-evident that our anger is right. When anger becomes righteous it can be oppressive; to assume anger makes us right can be a wrong. Weknow how easily a politics of happiness can be displaced into a politics of anger: the assumption of a right to happiness can convert very swiftly into anger toward others (immigrants, aliens, strangers) who have taken the happiness assumed to be "by right" to be ours. It is precisely that we cannot defend ourselves against such defensive use of emotion that would be my point. Emotions are not always just, even those that seem to acquire their force in or from an experience of injustice. Feminist emotions are mediated and opaque; they are sites of struggle, and we must persist in struggling withthem.[[8](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end8)] After all, feminist spaces are emotional spaces, inwhich the experience of solidarity is hardly exhaustive. As feminists we have our own tables. If we are unseated by the family table, it does not necessarily follow that we are seated together. We can place the figure of the feminist killjoy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman, explored so well by Black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde[[9](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end9)] and bell hooks[[10](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end10)]. The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. She might not even have to make any such point to kill joy. Listen to the following description from bell hooks: "a group of white feminist activists who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters the room. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory."[[11](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end11)] It is not just that feelings are "in tension," but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its enjoyment and solidarity. The body of color is attributed as the cause of becoming tense, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. As a feminist of color you do not even have to say anything to cause tension! The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. We learn from this example how histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an atmosphere, or in the tangibility of the bodies that seem to get in the way. Atmospheres might become shared if there is agreement in where we locate the points of tension. A history can be preserved in the very stickiness of a situation. To speak out of anger as a woman of color is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension; your anger is what threatens the social bond. As Audre Lorde describes: "When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are 'creating a mood of helplessness,' 'preventing white women from getting past guilt,' or 'standing in the way of trusting communication and action.'"[[12](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end12)] The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The woman of color must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on. The figure of the angry black woman is a fantasy figure that produces its own effects. Reasonable, thoughtful arguments are dismissed as anger (which of course empties anger of its own reason), which makes you angry, such that your response becomes read as the confirmation of evidence that you are not only angry but also unreasonable! To make this point in another way, theanger of feminists of color is attributed. You might be angry *about* how racism and sexism diminish life choices for women of color. Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But then in being heard as angry, your speech is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x. You become angry at the injustice of being heard as motivated by anger, which makes it harder to separate yourself from the object of your anger. You become entangled with what you are angry about because you are angry about how they have entangled you in your anger. In becoming angry about that entanglement, you confirm their commitment to your anger as the truth "behind" your speech, which is what blocks your anger, stops it from getting through. You are blocked by not getting through. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo's wonderful prose poem, *Our Sister Killjoy*, where the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back with "her friends," two black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates. "But to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn't it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess's obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers."[[13](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end13)] Power speaks here in this moment of hesitation. Do you go along with it? What does it mean not to go along with it? To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward. **Maintaining public comfort requires that certain bodies "go along with it." To refuse to go along with it, to refuse the place in which you are placed, is to be seen as causing trouble, as making others uncomfortable**. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom. Feelings can get stuck to certain bodies in the very way we describe spaces, situations, dramas. And bodies can get stuck depending on the feelings with which they get associated. **Getting in the Way** A killjoy: the one who gets in the way of other people's happiness. Or just the one who is in the way—you can be in the way of *whatever*, if you are already perceived as being in the way. Your very arrival into a room is a reminder of histories that "get in the way" of the occupation of that room. How many feminist stories are about rooms, about who occupies them, about making room? When to arrive is to get in the way, what happens, what do you do? The figure of the killjoy could be rethought in terms of the politics of willfulness. I suggested earlier that an activist archive is an unhappiness archive, one shaped by the struggles of those who are willing to struggle against happiness. We might redescribe this struggle in terms of those who are willing to be willful. An unhappiness archive is a willfulness archive. Let's go back: let's listen to what and who is behind us. Alice Walker describes a "womanist" in the following way: "A black feminist or feminist of color... Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or *willful* behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered 'good' for one... Responsible. In charge. Serious."[[14](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end14)] Julia Penelope describes lesbianism as willfulness: "The lesbian stands against the world created by the male imagination. What **willfulness** we possess when we claim our lives!"[[15](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end15)] Marilyn Frye's radical feminism uses the adjective willful: "The willful creation of new meaning, new loci of meaning, and new ways of being, together, in the world, seems to be in these mortally dangerous times the best hope we have."[[16](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end16)] Willfulness as audacity, willfulness as standing against, willfulness as creativity. We can make sense of how willfulness comes up, if we consider a typical definition of willfulness: "asserting or disposed to assert one's own will against persuasion, instruction, or command; governed by will without regard to reason; determined to take one's own way; obstinately self-willed or perverse" (OED). To be called obstinate or perverse because you are not persuaded by the reason of others? Is this familiar to you? Have you heard this before? **When you are charged with willfulness it is as if your being is an insistence on being, a refusal to give way, to give up, to give up your way**. Can what we are charged with become a charge in Alice Walker's sense, a way of being in charge? If we are charged with willfulness, **we can** accept and **mobilize this charge**. **We have to become willful**, perhaps, **to keep going the way we are going, if the way you are going is perceived to be "the wrong way."** We all know the experience of "going the wrong way" in a crowd. Everyone seems to be going the opposite way than the way you are going. **No one person has to push or shove for you to feel the collective momentum of the crowd as a pushing and shoving**. For you **to keep going you have to push harder than** any of those **individuals** who are **going the right way**. **The body "going the wrong way" is** the one that is experienced as **"in the way"** of the will that is acquired as momentum**.** For some bodies mere persistence, "to continue steadfastly," requires great effort, an effort that might appear to others as stubbornness or obstinacy, as insistence on going against the flow. **You have to become insistent to go against the flow; you are judged to be going against the flow because you are insistent**. A life paradox: **you have to become what you are judged as being**. It is crucial that we don't assume that willfulness is simply about lonely individuals going against the tide of the social. At the same time, we can note how the social can be experienced as a force: you can feel a force most directly when you attempt to resist it. It is the experience of "coming up against" that is named by willfulness, which is why **a willful politics needs to be a collective politics**. The collective here is not assumed as a ground. Rather, **willfulness is a collecting together, of those struggling for a different ground for existence**. **You need to be supported when you are not going the way things are flowing**. This is why I think ofa feminist queer politics as a politics of tables: tables give support to gatherings, and we need support when we live our lives in ways that are experienced by others as stubborn or obstinate. A flow is an effect of bodies that are going the same way. To go is also to gather. A flow can be an effect of gatherings of all kinds: gatherings of tables, for instance, as kinship objects that support human gatherings. How many times have I had the experience of being left waiting at a table when a straight couple walks into the room and is attended to straight away! For some, you have to become insistent to be the recipient of a social action, you might have to announce your presence, wave your arm, saying: "Here I am!" For others, it is enough just to turn up because you have already been given a place at the table *before you take up your place*. Willfulness describes the uneven consequences of this differentiation. An attribution of willfulness involves the attribution of negative affect to those bodies that get in the way, those bodes that "go against the flow"in the way they are going. The attribution of **willfulness is** thus effectively a charge of **killing joy**. Conversations are also flows; they are saturated. We hear this saturation as atmosphere.To be attributed as willful is to be the one who "ruins the atmosphere." A colleague says to me she just has to open her mouth in meetings to witness eyes rolling as if to say, "oh here she goes." My experience as a feminist daughter in a conventional family taught me a great deal about rolling eyes. You already know this. However you speak, the one who speaks up as a feminist is usually viewed as "causing the argument," as the one who is disturbing the fragility of peace. To be willful is to provide a point of tension. Willfulness is stickiness: it is an accusation that sticks. If to be attributed as willful is to be the cause of the problem, then we can claim that willfulness as a political cause. Queer feminist histories are full of self-declared willful subjects. Think of the Heterodoxy Club that operated in Greenwich Villagein the early 20th century, a clubfor unorthodox women. They described themselves as "this little band of willful women," as Judith Schwarz reveals in her wonderful history of this club.[[17](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end17)] A heterodoxy is "not in agreement with accepted beliefs, or holding unorthodox opinions." **To be willful is to be willing to announce your disagreement**, and to put yourself behind a disagreement. To enact a disagreement might even mean **to become disagreeable**. Feminism we might say is the creation of some rather disagreeable women. **Political histories of striking** and of demonstrations **are histories of those willing to put their bodies in the way, to turn their bodies into blockage points that stop the flow of human traffic, as well as the wider flow of an economy**. **When willfulness becomes a style of politics, it** means not only being willing not to go with the flow, but also ***being willing to cause*** *its* ***obstruction***. One could think of a hunger strike as the purest form of willfulness: a body whose agency is expressed by being reduced to obstruction, where the obstruction to others is self-obstruction, the obstruction of the passage into the body. Histories of willfulness are histories of those who are willing to put their bodies in the way. Political forms of consciousness can also be thought of as willfulness: not only is it hard to speak about what has receded from view, but you have to be willing to get in the way of that recession. An argument of second-wave feminism (one shared with Marxism and Black politics) that I think is worth holding onto is the argument that political consciousness is achieved: **raising consciousness is a crucial aspect of collective political work**. Raising consciousness is difficult as consciousness is consciousness of what recedes. Ifthe point of a recession is that it gives some the power to occupy space (occupation is reproduced by the concealment of the signs of occupation), then raising consciousness is a resistance to an occupation. Take the example of racism. **It can be willful even to name racism**: as if the talk about divisions is what is **divisive**. Given that racism recedes from social consciousness, **it appears as if the ones who "bring it up" are bringing it into existence**. We learned that the very talk of racism is experienced as an intrusion from the figure of the angry black woman: as if it is her anger about racism that causes feminist estrangement. To recede is to go back or withdraw. To concede is to give way, to yield. People of color are often asked to concede to the recession of racism: we are asked to "give way" by letting it "go back." Not only that: more than that. We are often asked to embody a commitment to diversity. We are asked to smile in their brochures. The smile of diversity is a way of not allowing racism to surface; it is a form of political recession. Racism is very difficult to talk about as racism can operate to censor the very evidence of its existence. Those who talk about racism are thus heard as creating rather than describing a problem. The stakes are indeed very high: to talk about racism is to occupy a space that is saturated with tension. History is saturation. One of the findings of a research project I was involved with on diversity was that because racism saturates everyday and institutional spaces, people of color often make strategic decisions *not to use* the language of racism.[[18](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end18)] If you already pose a problem, or appear "out of place" in the institutions of whiteness, there can be "good reasons" not to exercise what is heard as a threatening vocabulary.[[19](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end19)] Not speaking about racism can be a way of inhabiting the spaces of racism. You minimize the threat you already are by softening your language and appearance, by keeping as much distance as you can from the figure of the angry person of color. Of course, as we know, just to walk into a room can be to lose that distance, because that figure gets there before you do. When you use the very language of racism you are heard as "going on about it," as "not letting it go." It is as if talking about racism is what keeps it going. Racism thus often enters contemporary forms of representation as a representation of a past experience. Take the film *Bend it Like Beckham* (2002, dir. Gurinder Chada): the film is very much premised on the freedom to be happy, as the freedom of the daughter, Jesminder, to do whatever makes her happy (in her case playing football—her idea of happiness is what puts her in proximity to a national idea of happiness). Her father's memory of racism gets in the way of her happiness. Consider two speeches he makes in the film, the first one takes place early on, and the latter at the end: When I was a teenager in Nairobi, I was the best fast bowler in our school. Our team even won the East African cup. But when I came to this country, nothing. And these bloody gora in the club house made fun of my turban and sent me off packing... She will only end up disappointed like me. When those bloody English cricket players threw me out of their club like a dog, I never complained. On the contrary, I vowed that I would never play again. Who suffered? Me. But I don't want Jess to suffer. I don't want her to make the same mistakes her father made, accepting life, accepting situations. I want her to fight. And I want her to win. In the first speech, the father says she *should not play* in order not to suffer like him. In the second, he says she *should play* in order not to suffer like him. The desire implicit in both speech acts is the avoidance of the daughter's suffering, which is expressed in terms of the desire that she does not repeat his own. The second speech suggests that the refusal to play a national game is the "truth" behind the migrant's suffering: you suffer because you do not play the game, where not playing is read as self-exclusion. To let Jess be happy he lets her go. By implication, not only is he letting her go, he is also letting go of his own suffering, the unhappiness caused by accepting racism, as the "point" of his exclusion. I would suggest that the father is represented in the first speech as melancholic: as refusing to let go of his suffering, as incorporating the very object of own loss. His refusal to let Jess go is readable as a symptom of melancholia: as a stubborn attachment to his own injury.[[20](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end20)] As he says: "who suffered? Me." Bad feeling thus originates with the migrant who won't let go of racism as a script that explains suffering. The melancholic migrant holds onto the unhappy objects of difference, such as the turban, or at least the memory of being teased about the turban, as that which ties it to a history of racism. It is as if you should let go of the pain of racism by *letting go of racism as a way of remembering that pain*. I would even say that racism becomes readable as what the melancholic migrant is attached *to*, as an attachment to injury that allows migrants to justify their refusal to participate in the national game ("the gora in their club house"). Even **to recall an experience of racism**, or to describe an experience as racism, **can be to get in the way of the happiness of others**. Consciousness of racism becomes understood as a kind of false consciousness, as consciousness of that which is no longer. Racism is framed as a memory that if it were kept alive would just leave us exhausted. The task of citizenship becomes one of conversion: if racism is preserved *only* in our memory and consciousness, then racism would "go away" if only we too would declare it gone. **The** **narrative implicit here is** not that we "invent racism," but **that we preserve its power to govern social life by not getting over it**. The moral task is thus "to get over it," as if when you are over it, it is gone. **Conclusion: A Killjoy Manifesto** Audre Lorde teaches us how quickly **the freedom to be happy is** translated into **the freedom to look away from what compromises your happiness**.[[21](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end21)] The history of feminist critiques of happiness could be translated into a manifesto: ***Don't look over it: don't get over it****.* Not to get over it is a form of disloyalty. **Willfulness is** a kind of **disloyalty**: think of Adrienne Rich's call for us to be disloyal to civilization. ***We are not over it, if it has not gone. We are not loyal, if it is wrong***.[[22](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end22)] **Willfulness could be rethought as a style of politics: *a refusal to look away from what has already been looked over****.* The ones who point out that racism, sexism, and heterosexism are actual are charged with willfulness; they refuse to allow these realities to be passed over. Even talking about injustices, violence, power, and subordination in a world that uses "happy diversity" as a technology of social description can mean becoming the obstacle, as the ones who "get in the way" of the happiness of others. Your talk is heard as laboring over sore points, as if you are holding onto something—an individual or collective memory, a *sense* of a history as unfinished—because you are sore. People often say that political struggle against racism is like banging your head against a brick wall. The wall keeps its place so it is you that gets sore. We might need to stay as sore as our points. Of course that's not all we say or we do. We can recognise not only that we are not the cause of the unhappiness that has been attributed to us, but also the effects of being attributed *as* the cause. We can talk about being willful subjects, feminist killjoys, angry black women; we can claim those figures back; we can talk about those conversations we have had at dinner tables or in seminars or meetings. We can laugh in recognition of the familiarity of inhabiting that place, even if we do not inhabit the same place (and we do not). There can be joy in killing joy. Kill joy, we can and we do. Be willful, we will and we are.

#### A killjoy kills the joy of oppressive institutions and refuses the requirements of happiness that are forced upon them. This disorients the subconscious orientation of the institution – calling out sexism at debate tournaments kills the joy of the white male debaters; the Zapatista movement congregated around a Brown Mestiza identity to kill the joy of white supremacy; it is an internal rejection of the paradigm of complicity in happiness – embracing an orientation outside of the institution.

#### This contextualizes three net benefits:

#### Collectivization – our method is an act of self love that opens up spaces of solidarity and connects minoritized bodies together. Our methodology supports bottom up movements that refuse humanizing politics. These spaces of solidarity can resolve psychological violence because we refuse the internal demands to be happy in spaces that oppress us

**Ahmed 14** Sara Ahmed "Selfcare as Warfare" feministkilljoys https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/08/25/selfcare-as-warfare/ August 25 2014

“Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.” This is a revolutionary, extraordinary sentence. It is a much loved, much cited sentence. It is an arrow, which acquires its sharpness from its own direction. It is from the epilogue to Audre Lorde’s *A Burst of Light*, a piece of writing so profound, so moving, that it never fails to teach me, often by leaving me undone, beside myself. This writing is made up of fragments or notes put together as Audre Lorde learns that she has liver cancer, that her death could only be arrested; as she comes to feel that diagnosis in her bones. The expression “a burst of light” is used for when she came to feel the fragility of her body’s situation: “that inescapable knowledge, in the bone, of my own physical limitation.” *A Burst of Light* is an account of how the struggle for survival is a life struggle and a political struggle. Some of us, Audre Lorde notes were never meant to survive. To have some body, to be a member of some group, to be some, can be a death sentence. **When you are not supposed to live**, as you are, where you are, with whom you are with, **then survival is a radical action**; a refusal not to exist until the very end; a refusal not to exist until you do not exist. **We have to work out how to survive in a system that decides life for some requires the death or removal of others**. Sometimes: to survive in a system is to survive a system. We can be inventive, we have to be inventive, Audre Lorde suggests, to survive. Some of us. Others: not so much. **When a whole world is organised to promote your survival**, from health to education, from the walls designed to keep your residence safe, from the paths that ease your travel, **you do not have become so inventive to survive**. You do not have to be seen as the recipient of welfare because the world has promoted your welfare. The benefits you receive are given as entitlements, perhaps even as birth rights. **Racial capitalism is a health system**: **a drastically unequal distribution of bodily vulnerabilities**. Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes racism thus: “the state-sanctioned or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” (2007: 28) Being poor, being black, puts your life at risk. Your heath is compromised when you do not have the external resources to support a life in all of its contingencies. And then of course, you are deemed responsible for your own ill-heath, for your own failure to look after yourself better. When you refer to structures, to systems, to power relations, to walls, you are assumed to be making others responsible for the situation you have failed to get yourself out of. “You should have tried harder.” Oh, the violence and the smugness of this sentence, this sentencing. We are used to these logics; we are so used to them that we have names for them (neo-liberalism, post-racialism among others) and we have to keep hearing them. Throughout *A Burst of Light* Audre Lorde compares her experience of battling with cancer (and she is willing to use this militaristic language, she is willing to describe this situation *as war*) to her experience of battling against anti-black racism. The comparison is effective, showing us how racism can be an attack on the cells of the body, an attack on the body’s immune system; the way in which your own body experiences itself as killing itself, death from the outside in. A world against you can be experienced as your body turning against you. You might be worn down, worn out, by what you are required to take in. To care for oneself: how to live for, to be for, one’s body when you are under attack. Let’s return to our quote. Lorde says **self-care is** *not* self-indulgence but **self-preservation**. Some have to look after themselves because their are not looked after: their being is not cared for, supported, protected. I have in my own work been thinking of social privilege as a support system: compulsory heterosexuality, for instance, is an elaborate support system. It is how some relationships are nurtured and valued, becoming a means of organising not just one’s own time, but a way of sharing time and significance: how a we has something; how a we loses something. How you lose as well as what you lose can even become a confirmation of the worth of what you had. I think of one of the saddest scenes I have seen is from the first of the three films that make up *If these Walls Could Talk 2*. We start with the quiet intimacy of two women, Abbie and Edith, lovers, lesbians, life-long partners. Abbie falls. Things happen; shit happens. And then we are in the hospital waiting room. Edith is waiting. Another woman arrives, upset, and says: “they just took my husband in, he had a heart attack.” Edith comforts her. The comfort is not returned: when Edith explains why she is there – “my friend fell off a tree, we think she had a stroke” – the woman asks “is your husband still alive?” When Edith replies, “I never had a husband”, the woman says, “That’s lucky, because you won’t have the heart break of losing one.” This is how heterosexuality can work as a support system, how some broken hearts matter; how some do not. When a relationship is not recognised you are left alone with your grief. No wonder so many of our histories are broken, fragile histories. Privilege is a buffer zone, how much you have to fall back on when you lose something. Privilege does not mean we are invulnerable: things happen, shit happens. Privilege can however reduce the costs of vulnerability, so if things break down, if you break down, you are more likely to be looked after. When support is a question of access you have a support system. I think in this statement that self-care is not self-indulgence we can hear a defence; Audre Lorde is defending self-care. What from? From who? From, one might suspect, the dismissal of self-care as an indulgence. Self-indulgence tends to mean: being soft on one’s self, but also can mean “”yielding to one’s inclinations.” Now recently I have heard much feminist work be dismissed (this is my feminist killjoy blog, and I have no intention or wish to cite these dismissals, you will just have to take my words for it) on these sort of terms. Feminism: being too soft, too safe, too focused on individual suffering. I have heard feminism be dismissed as a form of self-indulgence. I want to suggest something before I am ready to firm up a strong argument. This is a hunch, if you like: some critiques of neoliberalism have allowed a dismissal of feminism in these kind of terms. Of course, feminists have offered some of the sharpest and strongest critiques of neoliberal rationalities. And we have also had some very important feminist critiques of feminist neoliberalism. For example, Catherine Rottenburg persuasively shows how some feminist subjects (the one we might see in a book like Sheryl Sandberg’s *Lean in*) is “simultaneously neoliberal, not only because she disavows the social, cultural and economic forces producing this inequality, but also because she accepts full responsibility for her own well-being and self-care, which is increasingly predicated on crafting a felicitous work–family balance based on a cost-benefit calculus” (2013: 1). Neoliberal feminists do identify as feminists (Sandberg’s first chapter is entitled “internalising the revolution”) but in such a way that feminism is repackaged as being about upward mobility for some women, those who accept responsibilities for their “own well-being and self-care,” a way some women thus distance themselves from others. I have no doubt that we need to engage in critiques of such forms of neoliberalism and accept that feminism can become co-opted as a white woman’s upward mobility fantasy. Feminism in neoliberal hands becomes just another form of career progression: a way of moving “up,” not by not recognising ceilings (and walls) but by assuming these ceilings (and walls) can disappear through individual persistence. And race equality also has neoliberal modes: say in the film *Bend* *it* *like* *Beckham*, when Jess moves “up” by putting the experience of racism behind her, as if you will not be affected by racism when you are good enough (for further discussion see [here](https://feministkilljoys.com/2013/08/31/bend-it-happy-multiculturalism/)). And note: this rhetoric is similar to that used by anti-feminists and racists: those who say we talk about sexism and racism as a way of not being responsible for the places we do not go; those who say our investment in these very terms is how we excluded ourselves by insisting on being excluded; those who say we should just “get on with it” rather than “going on about it.” When race and gender equality become neoliberal techniques they can become techniques for concealing inequalities. Audre Lorde, who is with us today through the words she left for us, gave us a strong critique of neo-liberalism, even if she did not use that term. Her work is full of insight into how structural inequalities are deflected by being made the responsibility of individuals (who in being given the capacity to overcome structures are assumed to fail when they do not overcome them). Her work explores how self-care can become a technique of governance: the duty to care for one’s self often written as a duty to care for one’s own happiness, flourishing, well-being. Indeed, in *The Cancer Journals*, Audre Lorde offers a powerful critique of how happiness becomes a narrative of self-care. Faced with medical discourse that attributes cancer to unhappiness and survival or coping to being happy or optimistic she suggests: “looking on the bright side of things is a euphemism used for obscuring certain realities of life, the open consideration of which might prove threatening to the status quo” (1997: 76). To obscure or to take cover by looking on the bright side is to avoid what might threaten the world as it is. Lorde moves from this observation to a wider critique of happiness as an obscurant: “Let us seek ‘joy’ rather than real food and clean air and a saner future on a liveable earth! As if happiness alone can protect is from the results of profit-madness” (76). Lorde suggests that the very idea that our first responsibility is for our own happiness must be resisted by political struggle, which means resisting the idea that our own resistance is a failure to be responsible for happiness: “Was I really fighting the spread of radiation, racism, woman-slaughter, chemical invasion and our food, pollution of our environment, and the abuse and psychic destruction of your young, merely to avoid dealing with my first and greatest responsibility to be happy?” (76). I think Audre Lorde has given us the answer to her question. And she offers us another answer in her question: to assume your primary responsible is to your own happiness might be how you end up not fighting against injustice. We have something to work out here. Audre Lorde writes persuasively about how self-care can become an obscurant, how caring for oneself can lead you away from engaging in certain kinds of political struggle. And yet, in *A Burst of Light*, she defends self-care as not about self-indulgence, but self-preservation. **Self-care becomes warfare.** This kind of self-care is **not about one’s own happiness**. It is **about finding ways to exist in a world that is diminishing**. Already: we have been given some tools to sharpen our understanding of how neo-liberalism can be used as a tool. There are differences that matter, differences that matter relating to differences of power. Neoliberalism sweeps up too much when all forms of self-care become symptoms of neo-liberalism. When feminist, queer and anti-racist work that involves sharing our feelings, our hurt and grief, recognising that power gets right to the bone, is called neo-liberalism, we have to hear what is not being heard. When feminism involves **recognising the suffering of** say, **an individual woman of colour at the hands of a** sexist, **heterosexist**, **and racist system** that is indifferent to the suffering it causes and that **is called neoliberalism, you would be repeating rather than challenging this structural indifference**. And you also negate other “other histories” that are at stake in her struggle for her suffering to matter. **Those who do not have to struggle for their own survival can** very easily and rather quickly **dismiss those who** have to struggle **for survival** **as “indulging themselves.”** As feminism teaches us: talking about personal feelings is not necessarily about deflecting attention from structures. If anything, I would argue the opposite: not addressing certain histories that hurt, histories that get to the bone, how we are affected by what we come up against, is one way of deflecting attention from structures (as if our concern with our own pain or suffering is what stops certain things from just “going away”). Not the only way, but one way. If you have got a model that says an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety, by trying to work out ways she can keep on going or ways she can participate in something without having to experience more trauma (by asking for trigger warnings in a classroom, for instance) is participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up “the ladder” in a company then I think there is something wrong with your model. Sometimes, **“coping with” or “getting by”** or “making do” **might appear as** a way of **not attending to structural inequalities, as benefiting from a system by adapting to it**, even if you are not privileged by that system,even if you are damaged by that system. Perhaps we need to ask: who has enough resources not to have to become resourceful? When you have less resources you might have to become more resourceful. Of course: the requirement to become more resourceful is part of the injustice of a system that distributes resources unequally. Of course: becoming resourceful is not system changing even if it can be life changing (although maybe, just maybe, a collective refusal not to not exist can be system changing). **But to assume people’s ordinary ways of coping with injustices implies** some sort of **failure on their part** – or even an identification with the system – **is an**other **injustice** they have to cope with. **The more resources you have the easier it is to** make such a **critique** of **those whose response to injustice is to become more resourceful**. You might not be trying to move up, to project yourself forward; you might simply be trying not to be brought down. Heavy, heavy histories. Wearing, worn down. **Even if it’s system change we need**, that we fight for, **when the system does not change, when the walls come up, those hardenings of history into physical barriers in the present, you have to manage; to cope**. Your choices are compromised when a world is compromised. It is not surprising: some recent anti-feminist, anti-queer and anti-intersectionality (intersectionality as code for people of colour) statements from the “white male left” rest on charging us with being individualistic, as indulging ourselves, as being concerned with ourselves and our own damaged “identities.” I wonder if Audre Lorde might have had to insist that self-care was not self-indulgence because she had heard this charge. I wonder. I have read recently some critiques of feminists for calling out individuals for sexism and racism because those critiques neglect (we neglect) structures. Really? Or is that **when we talk about sexism and racism you hear us as talking about individuals**? Are you suddenly concerned with structures because you do not want to hear how you as an individual might be implicated in the power relations we critique? I noted in my book, *On Being Included* (2012) how there can be a certain safety in terms like “institutional racism” in a context where individuals have disidentified from institutions they can see themselves as not “in it” at all. And how interesting: the individual disappears at the very moment he is called to account. He will probably reappear as the saviour of the left. You can hear, no doubt, my tiredness and cynicism. I do not apologise for it. I am tired of it. Some of the glib dismissals of “call out culture” make my blood boil. I say glib because they imply it is easy to call people out, or even that it has become a new social norm. I know, for instance, how hard it is to get sexual harassment taken seriously. Individuals get away with it all the time. They get away with it because of the system. It is normalised and understood as the way things are. Individual women have to speak out, and testify over and over again; and still there is a system in place, a system that is working, that stops women from being heard. In a case when a woman is harassed by an individual man, she has to work hard to call him out. She often has to keep saying it because he keeps doing it. **Calling out an individual matters, even when the system is also what is bruising: the violence directed against you by somebody is a violence that leaves a trace** upon you whether that trace is visible or not. And: **there is a system which creates him, supports him, and gives him a sense that he has a right to do what he does. To challenge him is to challenge a system**. I read one anti-feminist article that implied feminists are being individualistic, when they call out individual men, because that calling out is what stops us working more collectively for radical transformation. Collectivity: can work for some individuals as a means for disguising their own interest as collective interest. **When collectivity requires you to bracket your experience of oppression it is not a collectivity worth fighting for.** And I have watched this happen with feminist despair: when women speak out about sexual harassment and sexual violence they are heard as compromising the whole thing: a project, a centre, a revolution. And the individuals they speak of are then presented as the ones who have to suffer the consequences of feminist complaint, the one’s whose damage is generalised (if “he” is damaged “we” are damaged). When her testimony is heard as damaging the possibility of revolting against a system, a system is reproduced. I will say it again: the individual seems to disappear at the moment he is called to account. We are the ones who then appear as individuals, who are assumed to be acting as individuals or even as being individualistic, while he disappears into a collective. From my study of will and willfulness, I learnt how those who challenge power are often judged as promoting themselves, as putting themselves first, as self-promotional. And maybe: the judgment does find us somewhere. We might have to promote ourselves when we are not promoted by virtue of our membership of a group. We might have to become assertive just to appear. For others, you appear and you are attended to right away. A world is waiting for you to appear. The one who can quickly disappear when called to account can then quickly re-appear when on the receiving end of an action that is welcomed or desired. I think of these differences as how we become assembled over and by tables. Two women seated together at a table, let’s say. Sometimes you might have to wave your arm, your willful arm, just to be noticed. Without a man at the table you tend not to appear. For others, to be seated is not only to be seen, *but to be seen to.* You can take up a place at the table when you have already been given a place. You do not have to become self-willed if your will is accomplished by the general will. This is why **the general dismissal of** feminism as **identity politics** (and there is a history to how identity politics becomes a dismissal) needs to be treated as a form of conservatism: it **is an attempt to conserve power by assuming those who challenge power are just concerned with or about themselves**. An individual is one who is not dividable into parts. In *Willful Subjects* (2014), I tied the history of the individual as the one who does not have to divide himself to a patriarchal, colonial and capitalist history. He can be an individual, not divided into parts, because others become his parts: they become his arms, his feet, his hands, limbs that are intended to give support to his body. When a secretary becomes his right hand, his right hand is freed. Your labour as support for his freedom. This is how the question of support returns us to bodies, to how bodies are supported. Willful parts are those who are unwilling to provide this support. So how quickly **those who resist their subordination are judged as being individualistic as well as willful**. In refusing to support him, by becoming his parts, we have become self-willed; in refusing to care for him, we are judged as caring for ourselves, where this “for” is assumed as only and lonely. Self-care: that can be an act of political warfare. **In directing our care towards ourselves** we are redirecting care away from its proper objects, we are not caring for those we are supposed to care for; **we are not caring for the bodies deemed worth caring about**. And that is why **in queer, feminist and anti-racist work self-care is about the creation of community**, [fragile communities](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/06/14/fragility/), **assembled out of the experiences of being shattered**. We **reassemble ourselves through the ordinary**, everyday and often painstaking **work of looking after ourselves; looking after each other**. This is why when we have to insist, I matter, we matter, we are transforming what matters. Women’s lives matter; black lives matter; queer lives matter; disabled lives matter; trans lives matter; the poor; the elderly; the incarcerated, matter. For those who have to insist they matter to matter: selfcare is warfare. Thank you Audre Lorde for your survival. Always.

#### This is a survival strategy net benefit – even if we need to work on macro structural change, we need to be able to survive in those structures in the mean time.

#### b. Possibility – our method opens up space to use a diversity of tactics to resist oppression – the question is not one of solvency but of possibility, focusing not just on the outcome but with the decision to act.

**Jordan 14** Taryn; Phd Candidate in women’s studies @ GSU; “The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage”; ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University

**The** **politics of impossibility is a way to name our era of neoliberal individualist**, postrace and post-feminist time. In other words we live in a post – post impossible political reality; **I see the possibility in impossibility** a**[i]s a larger political strategy that is interested in a strategic reorganization of society towards liberatory pursuits**. To understand **what is possible** in the impossibility **is to become comfortable with the possibility of failure. One must not think only of the outcome of an action instead the possibility** in impossible politics **is focused upon the decision to act, with the intention that action may result in something, but knowing deep inside it may result in failure or something else entirely. Hence the need for a politics of impossibility that is expansive in its interventions in our current moment**; it **requires a diversity of tactics for non-beings within a complex web of relationality and kinship**. I find our era of impossibility, with all of its sharp edges and devastating reality, hopeful; it is not too soon... or too late to begin to think of the implications of a politics that calls into question the very foundation of the nationstate.

#### AND – our Affective emotional analysis is key to disrupt universal and transcendental notions of humanity – our creation of spaces of solidarity deconstruct the individualistic subjecthood

**Braidotti 06** Rosi; Utrecht University and Birkbeck College; Affirmation versus VuInerabiIity: On Contemporary Ethical Debates; 2006; <https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/12987BF52DF1C537852574800056A6F8/$FILE/symposium_2006_0010_0001_0245_0264.pdf>; accessed 12/3/16

At the core of this ethical project is **a positive vision of the subject as a radically immanent, intensive body,** that is, **an assemblage of forces or flows, intensities, and passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration commonly known as an "individual" self**. This intensive and dynamic entity is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and undergo constant though non-destructive fluxes of transformation. It is the body's degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation. **Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode. The emphasis on "existence" implies a commitment to duration and conversely a rejection of self-destruction**. Positivity is buHt into this program through the idea of thresholds of sustainability. Thus, **an ethically empowering option increases one's potentia and creates joyful energy in the process.** **The conditions that can encourage such a quest are not only historical; they concern processes of transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity.** Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground on which to negotiate the interests and the eventual conflicts. It is important to see that this fundamentally positive vision of the ethicaI subject does not deny conflicts, tension, or even violent disagreements between different subjects. The legacy of Hegel's critique of Spinoza is still looming large here, notably the criticism that a Spinozist approach lacks a theory of negativity, which may adequately account for the complex logistics of interaction with others. **It is simply not the case that the positivity of desire cancels or denies the tensions of conflicting interests. It merely displaces the grounds on which the negotiations take place.** The Kantian imperative of not doing to others what you would not want done to you is not rejected as much as enlarged. In terms of the ethics of conatus, in fact, the harm that you do to others is immediately reflected in the harm you do to yourself, in terms of loss of potentia, positivity, self-awareness, and inner freedom. **Moreover, the "others" in question are non-anthropomorphic and include planetary forces**. **This move away from the Kantian vision of an ethics that obliges people, and especially women, natives, and others to act morally in the name of a transcendent standard or universal rule is not a simple one.** I defend it as a forceful answer to the complexities of our historical situation; **it is a move towards radical immanence against all Platonizing and classical humanistic denials of embodiment, mater, and the flesh.** What is at risk, however, in nomadic ethics is the notion of containment of the other. This is expressed by a number of moral thinkers in the Continental tradition, such as Jessica Benjamin (1988) in her radicalization of Irigaray's horizontal transcendence, Lyotard in the "differend" (1983) and his notion of the "unattuned," and Butler (2004) in her emphasis on "precarious life." They stress that moral reasoning 10- cates the constitution of subjectivity in the interrelation to others, which is a form of exposure, availability, and vulnerability. This recognition entails the necessity of containing the other, the suffering and the enjoyment of others in the expression of the intensity of our affective streams. An embodied and connecting containment as a moral category could emerge from this, over and against the hierarchical forms of containment implied by Kantian forms of universal morality.

## Short Version

#### Debate is not a safe space – minoritized bodies are constantly told they are too loud or too angry or too emotional, constantly told to be happy, to stop complaining, to just do “real debate”.

#### Exclusive forms of argumentation have made debate technocratic and elitist – it desensitizes debaters to violence and racism, and teaches us to care more about nuclear war than solving the structural violence within our own community. Thus, the role of the judge is to vote for the debater who better performatively and metholodgically provides a resistance strategy for the oppressed.

**Fine 13** Todd; Founder of project Khalid and coaches the debate team at Washington Latin Public Charter School in Washington, D.C. and is Vice President of the High School D.C. Urban Debate League and writes for the huff post; “Qatar Conference on Scholastic Debate Examines Activity's Role in Empowerment”; Huffington Post; 3/10/13 @ 5:12 am; Accessed 2/17/15 @ 12:43 pm; [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol\_b\_2429645.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol_b_2429645.html%7dAvP)

Meanwhile, the National Association of Urban Debate Leagues (NAUDL), a nonprofit headquartered in Chicago, has supported the expansion of this policy format into urban school districts across the country, with large nonprofit leagues in Atlanta, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, and other cites. Because the sponsors are mostly college debaters, many of them now accomplished lawyers, who believe in the "**policy debate**" format **and its transformative power as an intense**, total **experience**, the association has largely focused on the establishment of leagues based exclusively on this policy format. These developments, combined, have created an inverse bell curve of wealth in the policy debate community, with a handful of elite schools and a growing cohort of extremely poor schools being all that remains. Middle class suburban schools and rural schools, overwhelmed by the rising costs of travel to far-away tournaments as the total numbers in policy debate dwindle, are hard to find at all.This unusual socioeconomic makeup has prompted more than just a culture shock, but a highly-contested and ongoing ideological war in the debate rounds themselves. Poorer schools, largely black and other **minority**, now often **argue that debate itself reflects the racism and inequalities of** the broader **society. The year-long national topics**, which **serve the highly-specific technical needs of the elite national circuit, are often "critiqued" as symptomatic of a training system that forms cynical technocrats who will tolerate injustice as part of a never-ending, brutal game where real consequences are always "debatable."** As the American economy continues to flounder and urban schools face heavy challenges and criticisms, **these violent communication collisions in** debate **rounds are causing some** young **participants to question the possibility of ever addressing racism or structural inequality** in America. Yet, without some direct link between Urban Debate Leagues and activism itself, **even these** potent and uncomfortable **challenges** float without resolution and **are reduced to a win/loss statement** written by a judge on a ballot. In exasperation, many of the urban league debaters, and their coaches, now argue that **policy debate** can only **ha[s]ve value as a** fierce **training ground for blacks to gain survival skills to engage a hopelessly irredeemable America.**

#### AND, spaces like debate are oriented around bodies that inhabit them. A chair becomes molded around a body’s shape if that body constantly sits in it. When I sink into a chair, if I fit into the mold, I do not notice the points of tension between my body and the chair.

#### Bodies sink into chairs in the same way bodies sink into institutions – whiteness coheres spaces in certain shapes. Bodies that fit in the space’s orientation do not notice friction, while bodies that don’t fit experience tension. This is why debate tournaments are full of white guys in suits, because when people of color or womxn enter the cafeteria they are immediately marked as out of place.

**Ahmed 07** Sara Ahmed "A Phenomenology of Whiteness" Goldsmiths College, University of London 2007 www.rainbow-season.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Feminist\_Theory-2007-Ahmed-149-68.pdf

But how does whiteness hold its place? In this section I explore how whiteness ‘holds’ through habits. **Public spaces take shape through the habitual actions of bodies,** such that **the contours of space could be described as habitual**. I turn to the concept of habits to theorize not so much how bodies acquire their shape, but how **spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that ‘inhabit’ them**. We could think about the ‘habit’ in the ‘in-habit’. Weneed to examine not only how bodies become white, or fail to do so, but also how spaces can take on the very ‘qualities’ that are given to such bodies. In a way, we can think about the habitual as a form of inheritance. It is not so much that we inherit habits, although we can do so: rather **the habitual can be thought of as a bodily and spatial form of inheritance**. As Pierre Bourdieu (1977) shows us, **we** **can link habits to what is** unconscious, and **routine**, or what becomes **‘second nature’**.3 To describe whiteness as a habit, as second nature, is to suggest that whiteness is what bodies do, where the body takes the shape of the action. Habits are not ‘exterior’ to bodies, as things that can be ‘put on’ or ‘taken off’. If habits are about what bodies do, in ways that are repeated, then they might also shape what bodies can do. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body is a body that acts in the world, where actions bring other things near. As he puts it: **my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a** certain existing or possible **task**. And indeed **its spatiality is not**, like that of external objects or like that of ‘spatial sensations’, **a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation**. **If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of the body trails behind them** like the tail of a comet. **It is not that I am unaware of** the whereabouts of **my shoulder or back**, **but these are** simply **swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table**. (2002: 114–5, emphasis in original) Here, **the directedness of the body towards an action** (which we have discovered also means **an orientation towards certain** kinds of **objects**) **is how the body ‘appears’**.4 **The body is ‘habitual’** not only in the sense that it performs actions repeatedly, but **in the sense that when it performs such actions, it does not command attention**, apart from at the ‘surface’ where it ‘encounters’ an external object (such as the hands that lean on the desk or table, which feel the ‘stress’ of the action). In other words, the body is habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as it does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action encounters. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body does not get in the way of an action: it is behind the action. I want to suggest here that **whiteness** **could be understood as ‘the behind’**. **White bodies are habitual** insofar as **they ‘trail behind’ actions: they do not get ‘stressed’ in their encounters** with objects or others, **as their whiteness ‘goes unnoticed’**. Whiteness would be what lags behind; **white bodies do not have to face their whiteness; they are not orientated ‘towards’ it**, and **this ‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere**, as that which bodies are orientated around. When bodies ‘lag behind’, then they extend their reach. It becomes possible to talk about the whiteness of space given the very accumulation of such ‘points’ of extension. Spaces acquire the ‘skin’ of the bodies that inhabit them. What is important to note here is that it is not just bodies that are orientated. **Spaces also take shape by being orientated around some bodies**, more than others. **We can** also **consider ‘institutions’ as orientation devices**, **which take the shape of ‘what’ resides within them**. After all, institutions provide collective or public spaces. When we describe institutions as ‘being’ white (institutional whiteness), we are pointing to how institutional spaces are shaped by the proximity of some bodies and not others: **white bodies gather**, **and cohere to form the edges of such spaces**. When I walk into university meetings that is just what I encounter. Sometimes I get used to it. At one conference we organize, four black feminists arrive. They all happen to walk into the room at the same time. Yes, we do notice such arrivals. The fact that we notice such arrivals tells us more about what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives. Someone says: ‘**it is like walking into a sea of whiteness**’. This phrase comes up, and it hangs in the air. The speech act becomes an object, which gathers us around. So yes they walk into the room, and I notice that they were not there before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already inhabited. I look around, and re-encounter the sea of whiteness. As many have argued, whiteness is invisible and unmarked, as the absent centre against which others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation (Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993). **Whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit** **it**, **or those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it**, even when they are not it (see Ahmed, 2004b). **Spaces are orientated ‘around’ whiteness**, insofar **as whiteness is not seen**. We do not face **whiteness**; it **‘trails behind’ bodies**, as what is **assumed** **to be given. The effect of this ‘around whiteness’ is the institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness’, which makes non-white bodies feel uncomfortable,** exposed, **visible, different, when they take up this space**. The institutionalization of whiteness involves work: **the institution comes to have a body as an effect** of this work. It is important that we do not reify institutions, by presuming they are simply given and that they decide what we do. Rather, **institutions become given**, **as an effect of the repetition of decisions** made over time, **which shapes** the surface of **institutional spaces**. Institutions involve the accumulation of **past decisions about how to allocate resources, as well as ‘who’ to recruit**. Recruitment functions as a technology for the reproduction of whiteness. We can recall that Althusser’s model of ideology is based on recruitment: ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by the very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey you there.’ (1971: 163, emphasis in original) The subject is recruited by turning around, which immediately associates recruitment with following a direction, as the direction that takes the line of an address. To recruit can suggest both to renew and to restore. The act of recruitment, of bringing new bodies in, restores the body of the institution, which depends on gathering bodies to cohere as a body. **Becoming a ‘part’ of an institution**, which we can consider the demand to share in it, or even have a share of it, hence **requires** not only that one inhabits its buildings, but also **that we follow its line**: we might start by saying ‘we’; by mourning its failures and rejoicing in its successes; by reading the documents that circulate within it, creating vertical and horizontal lines of communication; by the chance encounters we have with those who share its grounds. To be recruited is not only to join, but to sign up to a specific institution: to inhabit it by turning around as a return of its address. Furthermore, recruitment creates the very ego ideal of the institution, what it imagines as the ideal that working ‘at’ the institution means working towards or even what it imagines expresses its ‘character’. As scholars in critical management studies have shown us, organizations tend to recruit in their own image (Singh, 2002). The ‘hey you’ is not just addressed to anybody: some bodies more than others are recruited, those that can inherit the ‘character’ of the organization, by returning its image with a reflection that reflects back that image,what we could call a ‘good likeness’. It is not just that there is a desire for whiteness that leads to white bodies getting in. Rather **whiteness is what the institution is orientated ‘around’, so that even bodies that might not appear white still have to inhabit whiteness**, if they are to get ‘in’. **Institutions** too **involve orientation devices, which keep things in place**. The affect of such placement could be described as a form of comfort. **To be orientated,** or **to be at home in the world, is also to feel** a certain **comfort: we might only notice comfort** as an affect when we lose it, **when we become uncomfortable**. The word **‘**comfort’ suggests well-being and satisfaction, but it can also suggest an ease and easiness. Comfort is about an encounter between more than one body, which is the promise of a ‘sinking’ feeling. **To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins**. **One fits**, **and by fitting the surfaces of bodies disappears from view. White bodies are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape**. **The bodies and spaces ‘point’ towards each other, as a ‘point’ that is not seen as it is also ‘the point’ from which we see**. In other words, **whiteness may function as a form of public comfort by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken** their **shape**. **Those spaces are** lived as **comfortable as they allow bodies to fit in**; the surfaces of social space are already impressed upon by the shape of such bodies. We can think of the chair beside the table. It might acquire its shape by the repetition of some bodies inhabiting it: we can almost see the shape of bodies as ‘impressions’ on the surface. So spaces extend bodies and bodies extend spaces. The impressions of the surface function as traces of such extensions. The surfaces of social as well as bodily space ‘record’ the repetition of acts, and the ‘passing by’ of some and not others.

#### This creates friction – bodies are stopped and interrogated when they do not fit in the orientation of the space. Feminine speech in spaces of white supremacy becomes the incessant nag. This inequality makes debate impossible – unconscious and informal mechanisms of exclusion mean that participants aren’t on an even playing field.  Even when minoritarian subjects do speak, they are not heard – addressing this social inequality is a prerequisite for further deliberation.

Fraser 90 Fraser 90 Nancy, Prof of Political and Social Science at the New School, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” Social Text 25/26, p.63-65

Habermas's account of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere stresses its claim to be open and accessible to all. Indeed, this idea of open access is one of the central meanings of the norm of publicity. Of course, we know, both from the revisionist history and from Habermas's account, that the bourgeois public's claim to full accessibility was not in fact realized. **Women of all classes and ethnicities were excluded from official political participation** precisely **on the basis of ascribed gender status,** while plebeian men were formally excluded by property qualifications. Moreover, in many cases, women and men of racialized ethnicities of all classes were excluded on racial grounds. Now, what are we to make of this historical fact of the non-realization in practice of the bourgeois public sphere's ideal of open access? One approach is to conclude that the ideal itself remains unaffected, since it is possible in principle to overcome these exclusions. And, in fact, it was only a matter of time before formal exclusions based on gender, property, and race were eliminated. This is convincing enough as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The question of open access cannot be reduced without remainder to the presence or absence of formal exclusions. It requires us to **look** also **at the process of discursive interaction within formal**ly inclusive public **arenas**. Here we should recall that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere requires bracketing inequalities of status. This public sphere was to be an arena in which interlocutors would set aside such characteristics as differences in birth and fortune and speak to one another as if they were social and economic peers. The operative phrase here is "as if." In fact, the social inequalities among the interlocutors were not eliminated, but only bracketed. But were they really effectively bracketed? The revisionist historiography suggests they were not. Rather, discursive interaction within **the bourgeois public sphere was governed by** protocols of style and **decorum that were** themselves correlates and **markers of status inequality. These functioned** informally **to marginalize women and** members of the **plebeian classes and** **to prevent them from participating** as peers. Here we are talking about informal impediments to participatory parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate. That these constitute a more serious challenge to the bourgeois conception of the public sphere can be seen from a familiar contemporary example. Feminist research has documented a syndrome that many of us have observed in faculty meetings and other mixed sex deliberative bodies: **men tend to interrupt women more than women interrupt men**; **men** also tend to **speak more than women**, taking more turns and longer turns; and **women's interventions are** more often **ignored** or not responded to than men's**.** In response to the sorts of experiences documented in this research, an important strand of feminist political theory has claimed that **deliberation can serve as a mask for domination**. Theorists like Jane Mansbridge have argued that "**the transformation of 'I' into 'we'** brought about **through political deliberation** can easily **mask** subtle **forms of control.** Even **the language people use** as they reason together usually **favors one way of seeing things** and discourages others. **Subordinate groups** sometimes **cannot find the right** **voice or** **words to express their thoughts**, and **when they do, they discover they are not heard. [They] are** silenced, **encouraged to** keep their wants inchoate, and heard to **say 'yes' when what they have said is 'no.**''""6 Mansbridge rightly notes that many of these feminist insights into ways in which deliberation can serve as a mask for domination extend beyond gender to other kinds of unequal relations, like those based on class or ethnicity. They alert us to the ways in which **social inequalities** can **infect deliberation, even in the absence of any formal exclusions.** Here I think we encounter a very serious difficulty with the bourgeois conception of the public sphere. Insofar as **the bracketing of social inequalities in deliberation means proceeding as if they don't exist when they do**, this does not foster participatory parity. On the contrary, **such bracketing** usually **works to** **the** advantage of dominant groups in society and to the **disadvantage of subordinates.** In most cases, it would be more appropriate to unbracket inequalities in the sense of explicitly thematizing them-a point that accords with the spirit of Habermas's later "communicative ethics." The misplaced faith in the efficacy of bracketing suggests another flaw in the bourgeois conception. This conception assumes that a public sphere is or can be a space of zero degree culture, so utterly bereft of any specific ethos as to accommodate with perfect neutrality and equal ease interventions expressive of any and every cultural ethos. But this assumption is counterfactual, and not for reasons that are merely accidental. In stratified societies, unequally empowered social groups tend to develop unequally valued cultural styles. The result is the development of powerful informal pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of subordinated groups both in everyday life contexts and in official public spheres.7 Moreover, these pressures are amplified, rather than mitigated, by the peculiar political economy of the bourgeois public sphere. In this public sphere, the media that constitute the material support for the circulation of views are privately owned and operated for profit. Consequently, subordinated social groups usually lack equal access to the material means of equal participation.'" Thus, political economy enforce structurally what culture accomplishes informally. If we take these considerations seriously, then we should be led to entertain serious doubts about a conception of the public sphere that purports to bracket, rather than to eliminate, structural social inequalities. We should question whether it is possible even in principle for interlocutors to deliberate as if they were social peers in specially designated discursive arenas, when these discursive arenas are situated in a larger societal context that is pervaded by structural relations of dominance and subordination. What is at stake here is the autonomy of specifically political institutions vis-,i-vis the surrounding societal context. Now, one salient feature that distinguishes liberalism from some other political-theoretical orientations is that liberalism assumes the autonomy of the political in a very strong form. Liberal political theory assumes that it is possible to organize a democratic form of political life on the basis of socio-economic and socio-sexual structures that generate systemic inequalities. For liberals, then, the problem of democracy becomes the problem of how to insulate political processes from what are considered to be non-political or pre-political processes, those characteristic, for example, of the economy, the family, and informal everyday life. The problem for liberals, thus, is how to strengthen the barriers separating political institutions that are supposed to instantiate relations of equality from economic, cultural, and socio-sexual institutions that are premised on systemic relations of inequality.'9 Yet the weight of circumstance suggests that **in order to have a public sphere** in which interlocutors can deliberate as peers, it is not sufficient merely to bracket social inequality. Instead, **it is a necessary condition for participatory parity that systemic social inequalities be eliminated.** This does not mean that everyone must have exactly the same income, but it does require the sort of rough equality that is inconsistent with systemically-generated relations of dominance and subordination. Pace liberalism, then, political democracy requires substantive social equality.20 So far, I have been arguing that the bourgeois conception of the public sphere is inadequate insofar as it supposes that social equality is not a necessary condition for participatory parity in public spheres. What follows from this for the critique of actually existing democracy? One task for critical theory is to render visible the ways in which societal inequality infects formally inclusive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction within them.

#### AND, this affective orientation of institutions depletes the energy of marginalized bodies. Bodies that don’t fit in the orientation of the space are forced to go against the flow of the institution, which causes psychic exhaustion, forced every day to spend energy getting up in the morning to keep fighting. This is a form of psychological violence – alienation and isolation within debate deplete the energy of minoritized bodies who are held up as symbols of diversity when they do well and experience microaggressions when they don’t.

#### Thus, we advocate the methodology of the killjoy – a symbol of willful deviance that refuses the requirement to be happy or complicit within systems of oppression. Our affective analysis contests hegemonic structures of deliberation that marginalize the oppressed, and kills the joy of white comfortability

**Ahmed 10** Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010

**Killjoys** To be unseated by the table of happiness might be to threaten not simply that table, but what gathers around it, what gathers on it. When you are unseated, you can even get in the way of those who are seated, those who want more than anything to keep their seats. To threaten the loss of the seat can be to kill the joy of the seated. How well we recognise the figure of the feminist killjoy! How she makes sense! Let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. One feminist project could be to **give the killjoy back her voice**. Whilst hearing feminists as **killjoys might be a form of dismissal, there is an agency that this dismissal** rather ironically **reveals**. We can respond to the accusation with a "yes." The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, of how happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods (a social good is what causes happiness, given happiness is understood as what is good). As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely "it is always easy to describe as happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others]."[[4](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end4)] Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. **To be involved in political activism is** thus **to be involved in a struggle against happiness**. Even if we are struggling for different things, even if we have different worlds we want to create, we might share what we come up against. Our activist archives are thus unhappy archives. Just think of the labor of critique that is behind us: feminist **critiques of** the figure of **"the happy housewife;"** Black critiques of themyth of **"the happy slave";** queer critiques of the sentimentalisation of heterosexuality as **"domestic bliss."** **The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made**. We inherit this horizon. **To be willing to go against a social order**, which is protected as a moral order, **a happiness order is to be willing to cause unhappiness**, even if unhappiness is not your cause. To be willing to cause unhappiness might be about how we live an individual life (not to choose "the right path" is readable as giving up the happiness that is presumed to follow that path). Parental responses to coming out, for example, can take the explicit form not of being unhappy about the child being queer but of *being unhappy about the child being unhappy*.[[5](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end5)] Even if you do not want to cause the unhappiness of those you love, a queer life can mean living with that unhappiness. Tobe willing to cause unhappiness can also be how we immerse ourselves in collective struggle, as we work with and through others who share our points of alienation. Those who are unseated by the tables of happiness can find each other. So, yes, let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject "in the room" hence "brings others down" not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but **by exposing how happiness is sustained** by erasing the signs of not getting along. Feminists do **kill joy** in a certain sense: they **disturb the** very **fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places**. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by what is supposed to cause happiness, but **our failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others**. We can consider the relationship between the negativity of the figure of the feminist killjoy and how **certain bodies are "encountered" as being negative**. Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angryor dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end6)] To be recognizedas a feministis to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty. You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, thatwe may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). There is a desire to believe that women become feminists *because* they are unhappy. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about. Feminist consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away. My point here would be that feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as *about* the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy *about*. Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described *as* unhappy. We must learn. The word "wretched" has its own genealogy, coming from wretch, meaning a stranger, exile, banished person. Wretched in the sense of "vile, despicable person" was developed in Old English and is said to reflect "the sorry state of the outcast." Can we rewrite the history of happiness from the point of view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very happiness of the familiar. Phenomenology helps us explore how the familiar is that which is not revealed. A queer phenomenology shows how the familiar is not revealed to those who can inhabit it. For queers and others the familiar is revealed to you, because you do not inhabit it. To be "estranged from" can be what enables a "consciousness of." This is why being a killjoy can be a knowledge project, a world-making project. Feminist Tables A feminist call might be a call to anger, to develop a sense of rage about collective wrongs. And yet, it is important that we do not make feminist emotion into a site of truth: as if it is always clear or self-evident that our anger is right. When anger becomes righteous it can be oppressive; to assume anger makes us right can be a wrong. Weknow how easily a politics of happiness can be displaced into a politics of anger: the assumption of a right to happiness can convert very swiftly into anger toward others (immigrants, aliens, strangers) who have taken the happiness assumed to be "by right" to be ours. It is precisely that we cannot defend ourselves against such defensive use of emotion that would be my point. Emotions are not always just, even those that seem to acquire their force in or from an experience of injustice. Feminist emotions are mediated and opaque; they are sites of struggle, and we must persist in struggling withthem.[[8](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end8)] After all, feminist spaces are emotional spaces, inwhich the experience of solidarity is hardly exhaustive. As feminists we have our own tables. If we are unseated by the family table, it does not necessarily follow that we are seated together. We can place the figure of the feminist killjoy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman, explored so well by Black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde[[9](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end9)] and bell hooks[[10](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end10)]. The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. She might not even have to make any such point to kill joy. Listen to the following description from bell hooks: "a group of white feminist activists who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters the room. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory."[[11](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end11)] It is not just that feelings are "in tension," but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its enjoyment and solidarity. The body of color is attributed as the cause of becoming tense, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. As a feminist of color you do not even have to say anything to cause tension! The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. We learn from this example how histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an atmosphere, or in the tangibility of the bodies that seem to get in the way. Atmospheres might become shared if there is agreement in where we locate the points of tension. A history can be preserved in the very stickiness of a situation. To speak out of anger as a woman of color is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension; your anger is what threatens the social bond. As Audre Lorde describes: "When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are 'creating a mood of helplessness,' 'preventing white women from getting past guilt,' or 'standing in the way of trusting communication and action.'"[[12](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end12)] The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The woman of color must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on. The figure of the angry black woman is a fantasy figure that produces its own effects. Reasonable, thoughtful arguments are dismissed as anger (which of course empties anger of its own reason), which makes you angry, such that your response becomes read as the confirmation of evidence that you are not only angry but also unreasonable! To make this point in another way, theanger of feminists of color is attributed. You might be angry *about* how racism and sexism diminish life choices for women of color. Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But then in being heard as angry, your speech is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x. You become angry at the injustice of being heard as motivated by anger, which makes it harder to separate yourself from the object of your anger. You become entangled with what you are angry about because you are angry about how they have entangled you in your anger. In becoming angry about that entanglement, you confirm their commitment to your anger as the truth "behind" your speech, which is what blocks your anger, stops it from getting through. You are blocked by not getting through. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo's wonderful prose poem, *Our Sister Killjoy*, where the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back with "her friends," two black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates. "But to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn't it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess's obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers."[[13](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end13)] Power speaks here in this moment of hesitation. Do you go along with it? What does it mean not to go along with it? To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward. **Maintaining public comfort requires that certain bodies "go along with it." To refuse to go along with it, to refuse the place in which you are placed, is to be seen as causing trouble, as making others uncomfortable**. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom. Feelings can get stuck to certain bodies in the very way we describe spaces, situations, dramas. And bodies can get stuck depending on the feelings with which they get associated. **Getting in the Way** A killjoy: the one who gets in the way of other people's happiness. Or just the one who is in the way—you can be in the way of *whatever*, if you are already perceived as being in the way. Your very arrival into a room is a reminder of histories that "get in the way" of the occupation of that room. How many feminist stories are about rooms, about who occupies them, about making room? When to arrive is to get in the way, what happens, what do you do? The figure of the killjoy could be rethought in terms of the politics of willfulness. I suggested earlier that an activist archive is an unhappiness archive, one shaped by the struggles of those who are willing to struggle against happiness. We might redescribe this struggle in terms of those who are willing to be willful. An unhappiness archive is a willfulness archive. Let's go back: let's listen to what and who is behind us. Alice Walker describes a "womanist" in the following way: "A black feminist or feminist of color... Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or *willful* behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered 'good' for one... Responsible. In charge. Serious."[[14](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end14)] Julia Penelope describes lesbianism as willfulness: "The lesbian stands against the world created by the male imagination. What **willfulness** we possess when we claim our lives!"[[15](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end15)] Marilyn Frye's radical feminism uses the adjective willful: "The willful creation of new meaning, new loci of meaning, and new ways of being, together, in the world, seems to be in these mortally dangerous times the best hope we have."[[16](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end16)] Willfulness as audacity, willfulness as standing against, willfulness as creativity. We can make sense of how willfulness comes up, if we consider a typical definition of willfulness: "asserting or disposed to assert one's own will against persuasion, instruction, or command; governed by will without regard to reason; determined to take one's own way; obstinately self-willed or perverse" (OED). To be called obstinate or perverse because you are not persuaded by the reason of others? Is this familiar to you? Have you heard this before? **When you are charged with willfulness it is as if your being is an insistence on being, a refusal to give way, to give up, to give up your way**. Can what we are charged with become a charge in Alice Walker's sense, a way of being in charge? If we are charged with willfulness, **we can** accept and **mobilize this charge**. **We have to become willful**, perhaps, **to keep going the way we are going, if the way you are going is perceived to be "the wrong way."** We all know the experience of "going the wrong way" in a crowd. Everyone seems to be going the opposite way than the way you are going. **No one person has to push or shove for you to feel the collective momentum of the crowd as a pushing and shoving**. For you **to keep going you have to push harder than** any of those **individuals** who are **going the right way**. **The body "going the wrong way" is** the one that is experienced as **"in the way"** of the will that is acquired as momentum**.** For some bodies mere persistence, "to continue steadfastly," requires great effort, an effort that might appear to others as stubbornness or obstinacy, as insistence on going against the flow. **You have to become insistent to go against the flow; you are judged to be going against the flow because you are insistent**. A life paradox: **you have to become what you are judged as being**. It is crucial that we don't assume that willfulness is simply about lonely individuals going against the tide of the social. At the same time, we can note how the social can be experienced as a force: you can feel a force most directly when you attempt to resist it. It is the experience of "coming up against" that is named by willfulness, which is why **a willful politics needs to be a collective politics**. The collective here is not assumed as a ground. Rather, **willfulness is a collecting together, of those struggling for a different ground for existence**. **You need to be supported when you are not going the way things are flowing**. This is why I think ofa feminist queer politics as a politics of tables: tables give support to gatherings, and we need support when we live our lives in ways that are experienced by others as stubborn or obstinate. A flow is an effect of bodies that are going the same way. To go is also to gather. A flow can be an effect of gatherings of all kinds: gatherings of tables, for instance, as kinship objects that support human gatherings. How many times have I had the experience of being left waiting at a table when a straight couple walks into the room and is attended to straight away! For some, you have to become insistent to be the recipient of a social action, you might have to announce your presence, wave your arm, saying: "Here I am!" For others, it is enough just to turn up because you have already been given a place at the table *before you take up your place*. Willfulness describes the uneven consequences of this differentiation. An attribution of willfulness involves the attribution of negative affect to those bodies that get in the way, those bodes that "go against the flow"in the way they are going. The attribution of **willfulness is** thus effectively a charge of **killing joy**. Conversations are also flows; they are saturated. We hear this saturation as atmosphere.To be attributed as willful is to be the one who "ruins the atmosphere." A colleague says to me she just has to open her mouth in meetings to witness eyes rolling as if to say, "oh here she goes." My experience as a feminist daughter in a conventional family taught me a great deal about rolling eyes. You already know this. However you speak, the one who speaks up as a feminist is usually viewed as "causing the argument," as the one who is disturbing the fragility of peace. To be willful is to provide a point of tension. Willfulness is stickiness: it is an accusation that sticks. If to be attributed as willful is to be the cause of the problem, then we can claim that willfulness as a political cause. Queer feminist histories are full of self-declared willful subjects. Think of the Heterodoxy Club that operated in Greenwich Villagein the early 20th century, a clubfor unorthodox women. They described themselves as "this little band of willful women," as Judith Schwarz reveals in her wonderful history of this club.[[17](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end17)] A heterodoxy is "not in agreement with accepted beliefs, or holding unorthodox opinions." **To be willful is to be willing to announce your disagreement**, and to put yourself behind a disagreement. To enact a disagreement might even mean **to become disagreeable**. Feminism we might say is the creation of some rather disagreeable women. **Political histories of striking** and of demonstrations **are histories of those willing to put their bodies in the way, to turn their bodies into blockage points that stop the flow of human traffic, as well as the wider flow of an economy**. **When willfulness becomes a style of politics, it** means not only being willing not to go with the flow, but also ***being willing to cause*** *its* ***obstruction***. One could think of a hunger strike as the purest form of willfulness: a body whose agency is expressed by being reduced to obstruction, where the obstruction to others is self-obstruction, the obstruction of the passage into the body. Histories of willfulness are histories of those who are willing to put their bodies in the way. Political forms of consciousness can also be thought of as willfulness: not only is it hard to speak about what has receded from view, but you have to be willing to get in the way of that recession. An argument of second-wave feminism (one shared with Marxism and Black politics) that I think is worth holding onto is the argument that political consciousness is achieved: **raising consciousness is a crucial aspect of collective political work**. Raising consciousness is difficult as consciousness is consciousness of what recedes. Ifthe point of a recession is that it gives some the power to occupy space (occupation is reproduced by the concealment of the signs of occupation), then raising consciousness is a resistance to an occupation. Take the example of racism. **It can be willful even to name racism**: as if the talk about divisions is what is **divisive**. Given that racism recedes from social consciousness, **it appears as if the ones who "bring it up" are bringing it into existence**. We learned that the very talk of racism is experienced as an intrusion from the figure of the angry black woman: as if it is her anger about racism that causes feminist estrangement. To recede is to go back or withdraw. To concede is to give way, to yield. People of color are often asked to concede to the recession of racism: we are asked to "give way" by letting it "go back." Not only that: more than that. We are often asked to embody a commitment to diversity. We are asked to smile in their brochures. The smile of diversity is a way of not allowing racism to surface; it is a form of political recession. Racism is very difficult to talk about as racism can operate to censor the very evidence of its existence. Those who talk about racism are thus heard as creating rather than describing a problem. The stakes are indeed very high: to talk about racism is to occupy a space that is saturated with tension. History is saturation. One of the findings of a research project I was involved with on diversity was that because racism saturates everyday and institutional spaces, people of color often make strategic decisions *not to use* the language of racism.[[18](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end18)] If you already pose a problem, or appear "out of place" in the institutions of whiteness, there can be "good reasons" not to exercise what is heard as a threatening vocabulary.[[19](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end19)] Not speaking about racism can be a way of inhabiting the spaces of racism. You minimize the threat you already are by softening your language and appearance, by keeping as much distance as you can from the figure of the angry person of color. Of course, as we know, just to walk into a room can be to lose that distance, because that figure gets there before you do. When you use the very language of racism you are heard as "going on about it," as "not letting it go." It is as if talking about racism is what keeps it going. Racism thus often enters contemporary forms of representation as a representation of a past experience. Take the film *Bend it Like Beckham* (2002, dir. Gurinder Chada): the film is very much premised on the freedom to be happy, as the freedom of the daughter, Jesminder, to do whatever makes her happy (in her case playing football—her idea of happiness is what puts her in proximity to a national idea of happiness). Her father's memory of racism gets in the way of her happiness. Consider two speeches he makes in the film, the first one takes place early on, and the latter at the end: When I was a teenager in Nairobi, I was the best fast bowler in our school. Our team even won the East African cup. But when I came to this country, nothing. And these bloody gora in the club house made fun of my turban and sent me off packing... She will only end up disappointed like me. When those bloody English cricket players threw me out of their club like a dog, I never complained. On the contrary, I vowed that I would never play again. Who suffered? Me. But I don't want Jess to suffer. I don't want her to make the same mistakes her father made, accepting life, accepting situations. I want her to fight. And I want her to win. In the first speech, the father says she *should not play* in order not to suffer like him. In the second, he says she *should play* in order not to suffer like him. The desire implicit in both speech acts is the avoidance of the daughter's suffering, which is expressed in terms of the desire that she does not repeat his own. The second speech suggests that the refusal to play a national game is the "truth" behind the migrant's suffering: you suffer because you do not play the game, where not playing is read as self-exclusion. To let Jess be happy he lets her go. By implication, not only is he letting her go, he is also letting go of his own suffering, the unhappiness caused by accepting racism, as the "point" of his exclusion. I would suggest that the father is represented in the first speech as melancholic: as refusing to let go of his suffering, as incorporating the very object of own loss. His refusal to let Jess go is readable as a symptom of melancholia: as a stubborn attachment to his own injury.[[20](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end20)] As he says: "who suffered? Me." Bad feeling thus originates with the migrant who won't let go of racism as a script that explains suffering. The melancholic migrant holds onto the unhappy objects of difference, such as the turban, or at least the memory of being teased about the turban, as that which ties it to a history of racism. It is as if you should let go of the pain of racism by *letting go of racism as a way of remembering that pain*. I would even say that racism becomes readable as what the melancholic migrant is attached *to*, as an attachment to injury that allows migrants to justify their refusal to participate in the national game ("the gora in their club house"). Even **to recall an experience of racism**, or to describe an experience as racism, **can be to get in the way of the happiness of others**. Consciousness of racism becomes understood as a kind of false consciousness, as consciousness of that which is no longer. Racism is framed as a memory that if it were kept alive would just leave us exhausted. The task of citizenship becomes one of conversion: if racism is preserved *only* in our memory and consciousness, then racism would "go away" if only we too would declare it gone. **The** **narrative implicit here is** not that we "invent racism," but **that we preserve its power to govern social life by not getting over it**. The moral task is thus "to get over it," as if when you are over it, it is gone. **Conclusion: A Killjoy Manifesto** Audre Lorde teaches us how quickly **the freedom to be happy is** translated into **the freedom to look away from what compromises your happiness**.[[21](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end21)] The history of feminist critiques of happiness could be translated into a manifesto: ***Don't look over it: don't get over it****.* Not to get over it is a form of disloyalty. **Willfulness is** a kind of **disloyalty**: think of Adrienne Rich's call for us to be disloyal to civilization. ***We are not over it, if it has not gone. We are not loyal, if it is wrong***.[[22](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end22)] **Willfulness could be rethought as a style of politics: *a refusal to look away from what has already been looked over****.* The ones who point out that racism, sexism, and heterosexism are actual are charged with willfulness; they refuse to allow these realities to be passed over. Even talking about injustices, violence, power, and subordination in a world that uses "happy diversity" as a technology of social description can mean becoming the obstacle, as the ones who "get in the way" of the happiness of others. Your talk is heard as laboring over sore points, as if you are holding onto something—an individual or collective memory, a *sense* of a history as unfinished—because you are sore. People often say that political struggle against racism is like banging your head against a brick wall. The wall keeps its place so it is you that gets sore. We might need to stay as sore as our points. Of course that's not all we say or we do. We can recognise not only that we are not the cause of the unhappiness that has been attributed to us, but also the effects of being attributed *as* the cause. We can talk about being willful subjects, feminist killjoys, angry black women; we can claim those figures back; we can talk about those conversations we have had at dinner tables or in seminars or meetings. We can laugh in recognition of the familiarity of inhabiting that place, even if we do not inhabit the same place (and we do not). There can be joy in killing joy. Kill joy, we can and we do. Be willful, we will and we are.

#### A killjoy kills the joy of oppressive institutions and refuses the requirements of happiness that are forced upon them. This disorients the subconscious orientation of the institution – calling out sexism at debate tournaments kills the joy of the white male debaters; the Zapatista movement congregated around a Brown Mestiza identity to kill the joy of white supremacy; it is an internal rejection of the paradigm of complicity in happiness – embracing an orientation outside of the institution.

#### Net Benefit is Collectivization – our method is an act of self love that opens up spaces of solidarity and connects minoritized bodies together. Our methodology supports bottom up movements that refuse humanizing politics. These spaces of solidarity can resolve psychological violence because we refuse the internal demands to be happy in spaces that oppress us

**Ahmed 14** Sara Ahmed "Selfcare as Warfare" feministkilljoys https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/08/25/selfcare-as-warfare/ August 25 2014

“Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.” This is a revolutionary, extraordinary sentence. It is a much loved, much cited sentence. It is an arrow, which acquires its sharpness from its own direction. It is from the epilogue to Audre Lorde’s *A Burst of Light*, a piece of writing so profound, so moving, that it never fails to teach me, often by leaving me undone, beside myself. This writing is made up of fragments or notes put together as Audre Lorde learns that she has liver cancer, that her death could only be arrested; as she comes to feel that diagnosis in her bones. The expression “a burst of light” is used for when she came to feel the fragility of her body’s situation: “that inescapable knowledge, in the bone, of my own physical limitation.” *A Burst of Light* is an account of how the struggle for survival is a life struggle and a political struggle. Some of us, Audre Lorde notes were never meant to survive. To have some body, to be a member of some group, to be some, can be a death sentence. **When you are not supposed to live**, as you are, where you are, with whom you are with, **then survival is a radical action**; a refusal not to exist until the very end; a refusal not to exist until you do not exist. **We have to work out how to survive in a system that decides life for some requires the death or removal of others**. Sometimes: to survive in a system is to survive a system. We can be inventive, we have to be inventive, Audre Lorde suggests, to survive. Some of us. Others: not so much. **When a whole world is organised to promote your survival**, from health to education, from the walls designed to keep your residence safe, from the paths that ease your travel, **you do not have become so inventive to survive**. You do not have to be seen as the recipient of welfare because the world has promoted your welfare. The benefits you receive are given as entitlements, perhaps even as birth rights. **Racial capitalism is a health system**: **a drastically unequal distribution of bodily vulnerabilities**. Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes racism thus: “the state-sanctioned or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” (2007: 28) Being poor, being black, puts your life at risk. Your heath is compromised when you do not have the external resources to support a life in all of its contingencies. And then of course, you are deemed responsible for your own ill-heath, for your own failure to look after yourself better. When you refer to structures, to systems, to power relations, to walls, you are assumed to be making others responsible for the situation you have failed to get yourself out of. “You should have tried harder.” Oh, the violence and the smugness of this sentence, this sentencing. We are used to these logics; we are so used to them that we have names for them (neo-liberalism, post-racialism among others) and we have to keep hearing them. Throughout *A Burst of Light* Audre Lorde compares her experience of battling with cancer (and she is willing to use this militaristic language, she is willing to describe this situation *as war*) to her experience of battling against anti-black racism. The comparison is effective, showing us how racism can be an attack on the cells of the body, an attack on the body’s immune system; the way in which your own body experiences itself as killing itself, death from the outside in. A world against you can be experienced as your body turning against you. You might be worn down, worn out, by what you are required to take in. To care for oneself: how to live for, to be for, one’s body when you are under attack. Let’s return to our quote. Lorde says **self-care is** *not* self-indulgence but **self-preservation**. Some have to look after themselves because their are not looked after: their being is not cared for, supported, protected. I have in my own work been thinking of social privilege as a support system: compulsory heterosexuality, for instance, is an elaborate support system. It is how some relationships are nurtured and valued, becoming a means of organising not just one’s own time, but a way of sharing time and significance: how a we has something; how a we loses something. How you lose as well as what you lose can even become a confirmation of the worth of what you had. I think of one of the saddest scenes I have seen is from the first of the three films that make up *If these Walls Could Talk 2*. We start with the quiet intimacy of two women, Abbie and Edith, lovers, lesbians, life-long partners. Abbie falls. Things happen; shit happens. And then we are in the hospital waiting room. Edith is waiting. Another woman arrives, upset, and says: “they just took my husband in, he had a heart attack.” Edith comforts her. The comfort is not returned: when Edith explains why she is there – “my friend fell off a tree, we think she had a stroke” – the woman asks “is your husband still alive?” When Edith replies, “I never had a husband”, the woman says, “That’s lucky, because you won’t have the heart break of losing one.” This is how heterosexuality can work as a support system, how some broken hearts matter; how some do not. When a relationship is not recognised you are left alone with your grief. No wonder so many of our histories are broken, fragile histories. Privilege is a buffer zone, how much you have to fall back on when you lose something. Privilege does not mean we are invulnerable: things happen, shit happens. Privilege can however reduce the costs of vulnerability, so if things break down, if you break down, you are more likely to be looked after. When support is a question of access you have a support system. I think in this statement that self-care is not self-indulgence we can hear a defence; Audre Lorde is defending self-care. What from? From who? From, one might suspect, the dismissal of self-care as an indulgence. Self-indulgence tends to mean: being soft on one’s self, but also can mean “”yielding to one’s inclinations.” Now recently I have heard much feminist work be dismissed (this is my feminist killjoy blog, and I have no intention or wish to cite these dismissals, you will just have to take my words for it) on these sort of terms. Feminism: being too soft, too safe, too focused on individual suffering. I have heard feminism be dismissed as a form of self-indulgence. I want to suggest something before I am ready to firm up a strong argument. This is a hunch, if you like: some critiques of neoliberalism have allowed a dismissal of feminism in these kind of terms. Of course, feminists have offered some of the sharpest and strongest critiques of neoliberal rationalities. And we have also had some very important feminist critiques of feminist neoliberalism. For example, Catherine Rottenburg persuasively shows how some feminist subjects (the one we might see in a book like Sheryl Sandberg’s *Lean in*) is “simultaneously neoliberal, not only because she disavows the social, cultural and economic forces producing this inequality, but also because she accepts full responsibility for her own well-being and self-care, which is increasingly predicated on crafting a felicitous work–family balance based on a cost-benefit calculus” (2013: 1). Neoliberal feminists do identify as feminists (Sandberg’s first chapter is entitled “internalising the revolution”) but in such a way that feminism is repackaged as being about upward mobility for some women, those who accept responsibilities for their “own well-being and self-care,” a way some women thus distance themselves from others. I have no doubt that we need to engage in critiques of such forms of neoliberalism and accept that feminism can become co-opted as a white woman’s upward mobility fantasy. Feminism in neoliberal hands becomes just another form of career progression: a way of moving “up,” not by not recognising ceilings (and walls) but by assuming these ceilings (and walls) can disappear through individual persistence. And race equality also has neoliberal modes: say in the film *Bend* *it* *like* *Beckham*, when Jess moves “up” by putting the experience of racism behind her, as if you will not be affected by racism when you are good enough (for further discussion see [here](https://feministkilljoys.com/2013/08/31/bend-it-happy-multiculturalism/)). And note: this rhetoric is similar to that used by anti-feminists and racists: those who say we talk about sexism and racism as a way of not being responsible for the places we do not go; those who say our investment in these very terms is how we excluded ourselves by insisting on being excluded; those who say we should just “get on with it” rather than “going on about it.” When race and gender equality become neoliberal techniques they can become techniques for concealing inequalities. Audre Lorde, who is with us today through the words she left for us, gave us a strong critique of neo-liberalism, even if she did not use that term. Her work is full of insight into how structural inequalities are deflected by being made the responsibility of individuals (who in being given the capacity to overcome structures are assumed to fail when they do not overcome them). Her work explores how self-care can become a technique of governance: the duty to care for one’s self often written as a duty to care for one’s own happiness, flourishing, well-being. Indeed, in *The Cancer Journals*, Audre Lorde offers a powerful critique of how happiness becomes a narrative of self-care. Faced with medical discourse that attributes cancer to unhappiness and survival or coping to being happy or optimistic she suggests: “looking on the bright side of things is a euphemism used for obscuring certain realities of life, the open consideration of which might prove threatening to the status quo” (1997: 76). To obscure or to take cover by looking on the bright side is to avoid what might threaten the world as it is. Lorde moves from this observation to a wider critique of happiness as an obscurant: “Let us seek ‘joy’ rather than real food and clean air and a saner future on a liveable earth! As if happiness alone can protect is from the results of profit-madness” (76). Lorde suggests that the very idea that our first responsibility is for our own happiness must be resisted by political struggle, which means resisting the idea that our own resistance is a failure to be responsible for happiness: “Was I really fighting the spread of radiation, racism, woman-slaughter, chemical invasion and our food, pollution of our environment, and the abuse and psychic destruction of your young, merely to avoid dealing with my first and greatest responsibility to be happy?” (76). I think Audre Lorde has given us the answer to her question. And she offers us another answer in her question: to assume your primary responsible is to your own happiness might be how you end up not fighting against injustice. We have something to work out here. Audre Lorde writes persuasively about how self-care can become an obscurant, how caring for oneself can lead you away from engaging in certain kinds of political struggle. And yet, in *A Burst of Light*, she defends self-care as not about self-indulgence, but self-preservation. **Self-care becomes warfare.** This kind of self-care is **not about one’s own happiness**. It is **about finding ways to exist in a world that is diminishing**. Already: we have been given some tools to sharpen our understanding of how neo-liberalism can be used as a tool. There are differences that matter, differences that matter relating to differences of power. Neoliberalism sweeps up too much when all forms of self-care become symptoms of neo-liberalism. When feminist, queer and anti-racist work that involves sharing our feelings, our hurt and grief, recognising that power gets right to the bone, is called neo-liberalism, we have to hear what is not being heard. When feminism involves **recognising the suffering of** say, **an individual woman of colour at the hands of a** sexist, **heterosexist**, **and racist system** that is indifferent to the suffering it causes and that **is called neoliberalism, you would be repeating rather than challenging this structural indifference**. And you also negate other “other histories” that are at stake in her struggle for her suffering to matter. **Those who do not have to struggle for their own survival can** very easily and rather quickly **dismiss those who** have to struggle **for survival** **as “indulging themselves.”** As feminism teaches us: talking about personal feelings is not necessarily about deflecting attention from structures. If anything, I would argue the opposite: not addressing certain histories that hurt, histories that get to the bone, how we are affected by what we come up against, is one way of deflecting attention from structures (as if our concern with our own pain or suffering is what stops certain things from just “going away”). Not the only way, but one way. If you have got a model that says an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety, by trying to work out ways she can keep on going or ways she can participate in something without having to experience more trauma (by asking for trigger warnings in a classroom, for instance) is participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up “the ladder” in a company then I think there is something wrong with your model. Sometimes, **“coping with” or “getting by”** or “making do” **might appear as** a way of **not attending to structural inequalities, as benefiting from a system by adapting to it**, even if you are not privileged by that system,even if you are damaged by that system. Perhaps we need to ask: who has enough resources not to have to become resourceful? When you have less resources you might have to become more resourceful. Of course: the requirement to become more resourceful is part of the injustice of a system that distributes resources unequally. Of course: becoming resourceful is not system changing even if it can be life changing (although maybe, just maybe, a collective refusal not to not exist can be system changing). **But to assume people’s ordinary ways of coping with injustices implies** some sort of **failure on their part** – or even an identification with the system – **is an**other **injustice** they have to cope with. **The more resources you have the easier it is to** make such a **critique** of **those whose response to injustice is to become more resourceful**. You might not be trying to move up, to project yourself forward; you might simply be trying not to be brought down. Heavy, heavy histories. Wearing, worn down. **Even if it’s system change we need**, that we fight for, **when the system does not change, when the walls come up, those hardenings of history into physical barriers in the present, you have to manage; to cope**. Your choices are compromised when a world is compromised. It is not surprising: some recent anti-feminist, anti-queer and anti-intersectionality (intersectionality as code for people of colour) statements from the “white male left” rest on charging us with being individualistic, as indulging ourselves, as being concerned with ourselves and our own damaged “identities.” I wonder if Audre Lorde might have had to insist that self-care was not self-indulgence because she had heard this charge. I wonder. I have read recently some critiques of feminists for calling out individuals for sexism and racism because those critiques neglect (we neglect) structures. Really? Or is that **when we talk about sexism and racism you hear us as talking about individuals**? Are you suddenly concerned with structures because you do not want to hear how you as an individual might be implicated in the power relations we critique? I noted in my book, *On Being Included* (2012) how there can be a certain safety in terms like “institutional racism” in a context where individuals have disidentified from institutions they can see themselves as not “in it” at all. And how interesting: the individual disappears at the very moment he is called to account. He will probably reappear as the saviour of the left. You can hear, no doubt, my tiredness and cynicism. I do not apologise for it. I am tired of it. Some of the glib dismissals of “call out culture” make my blood boil. I say glib because they imply it is easy to call people out, or even that it has become a new social norm. I know, for instance, how hard it is to get sexual harassment taken seriously. Individuals get away with it all the time. They get away with it because of the system. It is normalised and understood as the way things are. Individual women have to speak out, and testify over and over again; and still there is a system in place, a system that is working, that stops women from being heard. In a case when a woman is harassed by an individual man, she has to work hard to call him out. She often has to keep saying it because he keeps doing it. **Calling out an individual matters, even when the system is also what is bruising: the violence directed against you by somebody is a violence that leaves a trace** upon you whether that trace is visible or not. And: **there is a system which creates him, supports him, and gives him a sense that he has a right to do what he does. To challenge him is to challenge a system**. I read one anti-feminist article that implied feminists are being individualistic, when they call out individual men, because that calling out is what stops us working more collectively for radical transformation. Collectivity: can work for some individuals as a means for disguising their own interest as collective interest. **When collectivity requires you to bracket your experience of oppression it is not a collectivity worth fighting for.** And I have watched this happen with feminist despair: when women speak out about sexual harassment and sexual violence they are heard as compromising the whole thing: a project, a centre, a revolution. And the individuals they speak of are then presented as the ones who have to suffer the consequences of feminist complaint, the one’s whose damage is generalised (if “he” is damaged “we” are damaged). When her testimony is heard as damaging the possibility of revolting against a system, a system is reproduced. I will say it again: the individual seems to disappear at the moment he is called to account. We are the ones who then appear as individuals, who are assumed to be acting as individuals or even as being individualistic, while he disappears into a collective. From my study of will and willfulness, I learnt how those who challenge power are often judged as promoting themselves, as putting themselves first, as self-promotional. And maybe: the judgment does find us somewhere. We might have to promote ourselves when we are not promoted by virtue of our membership of a group. We might have to become assertive just to appear. For others, you appear and you are attended to right away. A world is waiting for you to appear. The one who can quickly disappear when called to account can then quickly re-appear when on the receiving end of an action that is welcomed or desired. I think of these differences as how we become assembled over and by tables. Two women seated together at a table, let’s say. Sometimes you might have to wave your arm, your willful arm, just to be noticed. Without a man at the table you tend not to appear. For others, to be seated is not only to be seen, *but to be seen to.* You can take up a place at the table when you have already been given a place. You do not have to become self-willed if your will is accomplished by the general will. This is why **the general dismissal of** feminism as **identity politics** (and there is a history to how identity politics becomes a dismissal) needs to be treated as a form of conservatism: it **is an attempt to conserve power by assuming those who challenge power are just concerned with or about themselves**. An individual is one who is not dividable into parts. In *Willful Subjects* (2014), I tied the history of the individual as the one who does not have to divide himself to a patriarchal, colonial and capitalist history. He can be an individual, not divided into parts, because others become his parts: they become his arms, his feet, his hands, limbs that are intended to give support to his body. When a secretary becomes his right hand, his right hand is freed. Your labour as support for his freedom. This is how the question of support returns us to bodies, to how bodies are supported. Willful parts are those who are unwilling to provide this support. So how quickly **those who resist their subordination are judged as being individualistic as well as willful**. In refusing to support him, by becoming his parts, we have become self-willed; in refusing to care for him, we are judged as caring for ourselves, where this “for” is assumed as only and lonely. Self-care: that can be an act of political warfare. **In directing our care towards ourselves** we are redirecting care away from its proper objects, we are not caring for those we are supposed to care for; **we are not caring for the bodies deemed worth caring about**. And that is why **in queer, feminist and anti-racist work self-care is about the creation of community**, [fragile communities](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/06/14/fragility/), **assembled out of the experiences of being shattered**. We **reassemble ourselves through the ordinary**, everyday and often painstaking **work of looking after ourselves; looking after each other**. This is why when we have to insist, I matter, we matter, we are transforming what matters. Women’s lives matter; black lives matter; queer lives matter; disabled lives matter; trans lives matter; the poor; the elderly; the incarcerated, matter. For those who have to insist they matter to matter: selfcare is warfare. Thank you Audre Lorde for your survival. Always.

#### This is a survival strategy net benefit – even if we need to work on macro structural change, we need to be able to survive in those structures in the meantime.

## Cruel Optimism Version

#### Exclusive forms of argumentation have made debate technocratic and elitist – it desensitizes debaters to violence and racism, and teaches us to care more about nuclear war than solving the structural violence within our own community. Thus, the role of the judge is to vote for the debater who better performatively and metholodgically provides a resistance strategy for the oppressed.

**Fine 13** Todd; Founder of project Khalid and coaches the debate team at Washington Latin Public Charter School in Washington, D.C. and is Vice President of the High School D.C. Urban Debate League and writes for the huff post; “Qatar Conference on Scholastic Debate Examines Activity's Role in Empowerment”; Huffington Post; 3/10/13 @ 5:12 am; Accessed 2/17/15 @ 12:43 pm; [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol\_b\_2429645.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/todd-fine/qatar-conference-on-schol_b_2429645.html%7dAvP)

Meanwhile, the National Association of Urban Debate Leagues (NAUDL), a nonprofit headquartered in Chicago, has supported the expansion of this policy format into urban school districts across the country, with large nonprofit leagues in Atlanta, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, and other cites. Because the sponsors are mostly college debaters, many of them now accomplished lawyers, who believe in the "**policy debate**" format **and its transformative power as an intense**, total **experience**, the association has largely focused on the establishment of leagues based exclusively on this policy format. These developments, combined, have created an inverse bell curve of wealth in the policy debate community, with a handful of elite schools and a growing cohort of extremely poor schools being all that remains. Middle class suburban schools and rural schools, overwhelmed by the rising costs of travel to far-away tournaments as the total numbers in policy debate dwindle, are hard to find at all.This unusual socioeconomic makeup has prompted more than just a culture shock, but a highly-contested and ongoing ideological war in the debate rounds themselves. Poorer schools, largely black and other **minority**, now often **argue that debate itself reflects the racism and inequalities of** the broader **society. The year-long national topics**, which **serve the highly-specific technical needs of the elite national circuit, are often "critiqued" as symptomatic of a training system that forms cynical technocrats who will tolerate injustice as part of a never-ending, brutal game where real consequences are always "debatable."** As the American economy continues to flounder and urban schools face heavy challenges and criticisms, **these violent communication collisions in** debate **rounds are causing some** young **participants to question the possibility of ever addressing racism or structural inequality** in America. Yet, without some direct link between Urban Debate Leagues and activism itself, **even these** potent and uncomfortable **challenges** float without resolution and **are reduced to a win/loss statement** written by a judge on a ballot. In exasperation, many of the urban league debaters, and their coaches, now argue that **policy debate** can only **ha[s]ve value as a** fierce **training ground for blacks to gain survival skills to engage a hopelessly irredeemable America.**

#### AND, spaces like debate are oriented around bodies that inhabit them. A chair becomes molded around a body’s shape if that body constantly sits in it. When I sink into a chair, if I fit into the mold, I do not notice the points of tension between my body and the chair.

#### Bodies sink into chairs in the same way bodies sink into institutions – whiteness coheres spaces in certain shapes. Bodies that fit in the space’s orientation do not notice friction, while bodies that don’t fit experience tension. This is why debate tournaments are full of white guys in suits, because when people of color or womxn enter the cafeteria they are immediately marked as out of place.

**Ahmed 07** Sara Ahmed "A Phenomenology of Whiteness" Goldsmiths College, University of London 2007 www.rainbow-season.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Feminist\_Theory-2007-Ahmed-149-68.pdf

But how does whiteness hold its place? In this section I explore how whiteness ‘holds’ through habits. **Public spaces take shape through the habitual actions of bodies,** such that **the contours of space could be described as habitual**. I turn to the concept of habits to theorize not so much how bodies acquire their shape, but how **spaces acquire the shape of the bodies that ‘inhabit’ them**. We could think about the ‘habit’ in the ‘in-habit’. Weneed to examine not only how bodies become white, or fail to do so, but also how spaces can take on the very ‘qualities’ that are given to such bodies. In a way, we can think about the habitual as a form of inheritance. It is not so much that we inherit habits, although we can do so: rather **the habitual can be thought of as a bodily and spatial form of inheritance**. As Pierre Bourdieu (1977) shows us, **we** **can link habits to what is** unconscious, and **routine**, or what becomes **‘second nature’**.3 To describe whiteness as a habit, as second nature, is to suggest that whiteness is what bodies do, where the body takes the shape of the action. Habits are not ‘exterior’ to bodies, as things that can be ‘put on’ or ‘taken off’. If habits are about what bodies do, in ways that are repeated, then they might also shape what bodies can do. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body is a body that acts in the world, where actions bring other things near. As he puts it: **my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a** certain existing or possible **task**. And indeed **its spatiality is not**, like that of external objects or like that of ‘spatial sensations’, **a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation**. **If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of the body trails behind them** like the tail of a comet. **It is not that I am unaware of** the whereabouts of **my shoulder or back**, **but these are** simply **swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table**. (2002: 114–5, emphasis in original) Here, **the directedness of the body towards an action** (which we have discovered also means **an orientation towards certain** kinds of **objects**) **is how the body ‘appears’**.4 **The body is ‘habitual’** not only in the sense that it performs actions repeatedly, but **in the sense that when it performs such actions, it does not command attention**, apart from at the ‘surface’ where it ‘encounters’ an external object (such as the hands that lean on the desk or table, which feel the ‘stress’ of the action). In other words, the body is habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as it does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action encounters. For Merleau-Ponty, the habitual body does not get in the way of an action: it is behind the action. I want to suggest here that **whiteness** **could be understood as ‘the behind’**. **White bodies are habitual** insofar as **they ‘trail behind’ actions: they do not get ‘stressed’ in their encounters** with objects or others, **as their whiteness ‘goes unnoticed’**. Whiteness would be what lags behind; **white bodies do not have to face their whiteness; they are not orientated ‘towards’ it**, and **this ‘not’ is what allows whiteness to cohere**, as that which bodies are orientated around. When bodies ‘lag behind’, then they extend their reach. It becomes possible to talk about the whiteness of space given the very accumulation of such ‘points’ of extension. Spaces acquire the ‘skin’ of the bodies that inhabit them. What is important to note here is that it is not just bodies that are orientated. **Spaces also take shape by being orientated around some bodies**, more than others. **We can** also **consider ‘institutions’ as orientation devices**, **which take the shape of ‘what’ resides within them**. After all, institutions provide collective or public spaces. When we describe institutions as ‘being’ white (institutional whiteness), we are pointing to how institutional spaces are shaped by the proximity of some bodies and not others: **white bodies gather**, **and cohere to form the edges of such spaces**. When I walk into university meetings that is just what I encounter. Sometimes I get used to it. At one conference we organize, four black feminists arrive. They all happen to walk into the room at the same time. Yes, we do notice such arrivals. The fact that we notice such arrivals tells us more about what is already in place than it does about ‘who’ arrives. Someone says: ‘**it is like walking into a sea of whiteness**’. This phrase comes up, and it hangs in the air. The speech act becomes an object, which gathers us around. So yes they walk into the room, and I notice that they were not there before, as a retrospective reoccupation of a space that I already inhabited. I look around, and re-encounter the sea of whiteness. As many have argued, whiteness is invisible and unmarked, as the absent centre against which others appear only as deviants, or points of deviation (Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993). **Whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit** **it**, **or those who get so used to its inhabitance that they learn not to see it**, even when they are not it (see Ahmed, 2004b). **Spaces are orientated ‘around’ whiteness**, insofar **as whiteness is not seen**. We do not face **whiteness**; it **‘trails behind’ bodies**, as what is **assumed** **to be given. The effect of this ‘around whiteness’ is the institutionalization of a certain ‘likeness’, which makes non-white bodies feel uncomfortable,** exposed, **visible, different, when they take up this space**. The institutionalization of whiteness involves work: **the institution comes to have a body as an effect** of this work. It is important that we do not reify institutions, by presuming they are simply given and that they decide what we do. Rather, **institutions become given**, **as an effect of the repetition of decisions** made over time, **which shapes** the surface of **institutional spaces**. Institutions involve the accumulation of **past decisions about how to allocate resources, as well as ‘who’ to recruit**. Recruitment functions as a technology for the reproduction of whiteness. We can recall that Althusser’s model of ideology is based on recruitment: ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by the very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey you there.’ (1971: 163, emphasis in original) The subject is recruited by turning around, which immediately associates recruitment with following a direction, as the direction that takes the line of an address. To recruit can suggest both to renew and to restore. The act of recruitment, of bringing new bodies in, restores the body of the institution, which depends on gathering bodies to cohere as a body. **Becoming a ‘part’ of an institution**, which we can consider the demand to share in it, or even have a share of it, hence **requires** not only that one inhabits its buildings, but also **that we follow its line**: we might start by saying ‘we’; by mourning its failures and rejoicing in its successes; by reading the documents that circulate within it, creating vertical and horizontal lines of communication; by the chance encounters we have with those who share its grounds. To be recruited is not only to join, but to sign up to a specific institution: to inhabit it by turning around as a return of its address. Furthermore, recruitment creates the very ego ideal of the institution, what it imagines as the ideal that working ‘at’ the institution means working towards or even what it imagines expresses its ‘character’. As scholars in critical management studies have shown us, organizations tend to recruit in their own image (Singh, 2002). The ‘hey you’ is not just addressed to anybody: some bodies more than others are recruited, those that can inherit the ‘character’ of the organization, by returning its image with a reflection that reflects back that image,what we could call a ‘good likeness’. It is not just that there is a desire for whiteness that leads to white bodies getting in. Rather **whiteness is what the institution is orientated ‘around’, so that even bodies that might not appear white still have to inhabit whiteness**, if they are to get ‘in’. **Institutions** too **involve orientation devices, which keep things in place**. The affect of such placement could be described as a form of comfort. **To be orientated,** or **to be at home in the world, is also to feel** a certain **comfort: we might only notice comfort** as an affect when we lose it, **when we become uncomfortable**. The word **‘**comfort’ suggests well-being and satisfaction, but it can also suggest an ease and easiness. Comfort is about an encounter between more than one body, which is the promise of a ‘sinking’ feeling. **To be comfortable is to be so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish where one’s body ends and the world begins**. **One fits**, **and by fitting the surfaces of bodies disappears from view. White bodies are comfortable as they inhabit spaces that extend their shape**. **The bodies and spaces ‘point’ towards each other, as a ‘point’ that is not seen as it is also ‘the point’ from which we see**. In other words, **whiteness may function as a form of public comfort by allowing bodies to extend into spaces that have already taken** their **shape**. **Those spaces are** lived as **comfortable as they allow bodies to fit in**; the surfaces of social space are already impressed upon by the shape of such bodies. We can think of the chair beside the table. It might acquire its shape by the repetition of some bodies inhabiting it: we can almost see the shape of bodies as ‘impressions’ on the surface. So spaces extend bodies and bodies extend spaces. The impressions of the surface function as traces of such extensions. The surfaces of social as well as bodily space ‘record’ the repetition of acts, and the ‘passing by’ of some and not others.

**The orientation of the institution of debate takes the form of forced political hope. Political productivity is a fantasy -- the promise of debate keeps us working within a liberal institution, wasting our time in this place with the naïve hope that we will someday become policy makers to change the world. Debate forces us to embody an affective hope in the political sphere, a relationship of cruel optimism that causes psychological violence.**

**Berlant 07** Lauren Berlant “Cruel Optimism: On Marx, Loss and the Sense” 33-36 2007

**When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking** **about** a cluster of **promises we want someone** or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as **proximity to the object means proximity to** the cluster of things that the object **promises**, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. **In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean** that **they** all **feel optimistic**: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, **the subject leans toward promises contained within the** present moment of the encounter with their **object**.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. **What's cruel** about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, **is** that the **subjects** who have x in their lives **might** **not well endure the loss** **of** **their** **object** or scene of desire, even though **its presence threatens their well-being**, **because** whatever **the** content of the **attachment** is, the continuity of the form of it **provides** something of the continuity of **the** **subject's sense of** **what it means to keep** on living on and to look forward to **being in the world**. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. **Cruel optimism is** the condition of **maintaining** an **attachment** to a problematic object. One more thing: the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But **the condition of projected possibility**, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) **creates a fake** present **moment of intersubjectivity** in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is **made** **possible by the** **fantasy** of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under **the** condition, and **illusion**, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe **is** thus **an** indirect, unstable, physically **impossible** but phenomenologically vitalising **movement** of rhetorical animation **that permits subjects to suspend themselves** in the **optimism of** a potential **occupation of the same psychic space of others**, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that the conditions of the lush **submerging** of **one consciousness into another require a double negation**: **of the speaker's boundaries**, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; **and of the spoken of, who is** more or less a powerful mute placeholder **providing** an **opportunity for the speaker's imagination** of her/his/their flourishing. Of course **psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible**. **It is** a wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, **a transaction that affirms you without**, again, **necessarily feeling** **good** or accurate (it might idealise, **it might affirm** your **monstrosity**, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. **Political depression persists in affective judgments of** the world's **intractability** - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - **modes of** what might be called **detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in** the problem of **the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities** that can **no longer** be said to be **doing their work**, and **which** indeed **make obstacles to the desires that animate them**; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." **Cruel optimism** **is**, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as **an analytic lever** it is an incitement to inhabit and **to track** the affective **attachment to** what we call **'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless**, and at the same time, **find their conditions of possibility within it**. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ **Cruel optimism is** in this sense a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about the reasons people are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but choose **to ride the wave of the system** of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, **and** to **misrecognise that** promise **as** an **achievement**. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.

#### AND, this affective orientation of institutions depletes the energy of marginalized bodies. Bodies that don’t fit in the orientation of the space are forced to go against the flow of the institution, which causes psychic exhaustion, forced every day to spend energy getting up in the morning to keep fighting. This is a form of psychological violence – alienation and isolation within debate deplete the energy of minoritized bodies who are held up as symbols of diversity when they do well and experience microaggressions when they don’t.

#### Thus, we advocate the methodology of the killjoy – a symbol of willful deviance that refuses the requirement to be happy or complicit within systems of oppression. Our affective analysis contests hegemonic structures of deliberation that marginalize the oppressed, and kills the joy of white comfortability

**Ahmed 10** Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010

**Killjoys** To be unseated by the table of happiness might be to threaten not simply that table, but what gathers around it, what gathers on it. When you are unseated, you can even get in the way of those who are seated, those who want more than anything to keep their seats. To threaten the loss of the seat can be to kill the joy of the seated. How well we recognise the figure of the feminist killjoy! How she makes sense! Let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. One feminist project could be to **give the killjoy back her voice**. Whilst hearing feminists as **killjoys might be a form of dismissal, there is an agency that this dismissal** rather ironically **reveals**. We can respond to the accusation with a "yes." The figure of the feminist killjoy makes sense if we place her in the context of feminist critiques of happiness, of how happiness is used to justify social norms as social goods (a social good is what causes happiness, given happiness is understood as what is good). As Simone de Beauvoir described so astutely "it is always easy to describe as happy a situation in which one wishes to place [others]."[[4](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end4)] Not to agree to stay in the place of this wish might be to refuse the happiness that is wished for. **To be involved in political activism is** thus **to be involved in a struggle against happiness**. Even if we are struggling for different things, even if we have different worlds we want to create, we might share what we come up against. Our activist archives are thus unhappy archives. Just think of the labor of critique that is behind us: feminist **critiques of** the figure of **"the happy housewife;"** Black critiques of themyth of **"the happy slave";** queer critiques of the sentimentalisation of heterosexuality as **"domestic bliss."** **The struggle over happiness provides the horizon in which political claims are made**. We inherit this horizon. **To be willing to go against a social order**, which is protected as a moral order, **a happiness order is to be willing to cause unhappiness**, even if unhappiness is not your cause. To be willing to cause unhappiness might be about how we live an individual life (not to choose "the right path" is readable as giving up the happiness that is presumed to follow that path). Parental responses to coming out, for example, can take the explicit form not of being unhappy about the child being queer but of *being unhappy about the child being unhappy*.[[5](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end5)] Even if you do not want to cause the unhappiness of those you love, a queer life can mean living with that unhappiness. Tobe willing to cause unhappiness can also be how we immerse ourselves in collective struggle, as we work with and through others who share our points of alienation. Those who are unseated by the tables of happiness can find each other. So, yes, let's take the figure of the feminist killjoy seriously. Does the feminist kill other people's joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject "in the room" hence "brings others down" not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but **by exposing how happiness is sustained** by erasing the signs of not getting along. Feminists do **kill joy** in a certain sense: they **disturb the** very **fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places**. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that feminists might not be happily affected by what is supposed to cause happiness, but **our failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others**. We can consider the relationship between the negativity of the figure of the feminist killjoy and how **certain bodies are "encountered" as being negative**. Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angryor dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end6)] To be recognizedas a feministis to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty. You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, thatwe may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). There is a desire to believe that women become feminists *because* they are unhappy. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about. Feminist consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away. My point here would be that feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as *about* the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy *about*. Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described *as* unhappy. We must learn. The word "wretched" has its own genealogy, coming from wretch, meaning a stranger, exile, banished person. Wretched in the sense of "vile, despicable person" was developed in Old English and is said to reflect "the sorry state of the outcast." Can we rewrite the history of happiness from the point of view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very happiness of the familiar. Phenomenology helps us explore how the familiar is that which is not revealed. A queer phenomenology shows how the familiar is not revealed to those who can inhabit it. For queers and others the familiar is revealed to you, because you do not inhabit it. To be "estranged from" can be what enables a "consciousness of." This is why being a killjoy can be a knowledge project, a world-making project. Feminist Tables A feminist call might be a call to anger, to develop a sense of rage about collective wrongs. And yet, it is important that we do not make feminist emotion into a site of truth: as if it is always clear or self-evident that our anger is right. When anger becomes righteous it can be oppressive; to assume anger makes us right can be a wrong. Weknow how easily a politics of happiness can be displaced into a politics of anger: the assumption of a right to happiness can convert very swiftly into anger toward others (immigrants, aliens, strangers) who have taken the happiness assumed to be "by right" to be ours. It is precisely that we cannot defend ourselves against such defensive use of emotion that would be my point. Emotions are not always just, even those that seem to acquire their force in or from an experience of injustice. Feminist emotions are mediated and opaque; they are sites of struggle, and we must persist in struggling withthem.[[8](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end8)] After all, feminist spaces are emotional spaces, inwhich the experience of solidarity is hardly exhaustive. As feminists we have our own tables. If we are unseated by the family table, it does not necessarily follow that we are seated together. We can place the figure of the feminist killjoy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman, explored so well by Black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde[[9](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end9)] and bell hooks[[10](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end10)]. The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. She might not even have to make any such point to kill joy. Listen to the following description from bell hooks: "a group of white feminist activists who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood, but the atmosphere will noticeably change when a woman of color enters the room. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory."[[11](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end11)] It is not just that feelings are "in tension," but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its enjoyment and solidarity. The body of color is attributed as the cause of becoming tense, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. As a feminist of color you do not even have to say anything to cause tension! The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. We learn from this example how histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an atmosphere, or in the tangibility of the bodies that seem to get in the way. Atmospheres might become shared if there is agreement in where we locate the points of tension. A history can be preserved in the very stickiness of a situation. To speak out of anger as a woman of color is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension; your anger is what threatens the social bond. As Audre Lorde describes: "When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are 'creating a mood of helplessness,' 'preventing white women from getting past guilt,' or 'standing in the way of trusting communication and action.'"[[12](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end12)] The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The woman of color must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on. The figure of the angry black woman is a fantasy figure that produces its own effects. Reasonable, thoughtful arguments are dismissed as anger (which of course empties anger of its own reason), which makes you angry, such that your response becomes read as the confirmation of evidence that you are not only angry but also unreasonable! To make this point in another way, theanger of feminists of color is attributed. You might be angry *about* how racism and sexism diminish life choices for women of color. Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But then in being heard as angry, your speech is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x. You become angry at the injustice of being heard as motivated by anger, which makes it harder to separate yourself from the object of your anger. You become entangled with what you are angry about because you are angry about how they have entangled you in your anger. In becoming angry about that entanglement, you confirm their commitment to your anger as the truth "behind" your speech, which is what blocks your anger, stops it from getting through. You are blocked by not getting through. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo's wonderful prose poem, *Our Sister Killjoy*, where the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back with "her friends," two black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates. "But to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn't it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess's obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers."[[13](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end13)] Power speaks here in this moment of hesitation. Do you go along with it? What does it mean not to go along with it? To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward. **Maintaining public comfort requires that certain bodies "go along with it." To refuse to go along with it, to refuse the place in which you are placed, is to be seen as causing trouble, as making others uncomfortable**. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom. Feelings can get stuck to certain bodies in the very way we describe spaces, situations, dramas. And bodies can get stuck depending on the feelings with which they get associated. **Getting in the Way** A killjoy: the one who gets in the way of other people's happiness. Or just the one who is in the way—you can be in the way of *whatever*, if you are already perceived as being in the way. Your very arrival into a room is a reminder of histories that "get in the way" of the occupation of that room. How many feminist stories are about rooms, about who occupies them, about making room? When to arrive is to get in the way, what happens, what do you do? The figure of the killjoy could be rethought in terms of the politics of willfulness. I suggested earlier that an activist archive is an unhappiness archive, one shaped by the struggles of those who are willing to struggle against happiness. We might redescribe this struggle in terms of those who are willing to be willful. An unhappiness archive is a willfulness archive. Let's go back: let's listen to what and who is behind us. Alice Walker describes a "womanist" in the following way: "A black feminist or feminist of color... Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or *willful* behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered 'good' for one... Responsible. In charge. Serious."[[14](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end14)] Julia Penelope describes lesbianism as willfulness: "The lesbian stands against the world created by the male imagination. What **willfulness** we possess when we claim our lives!"[[15](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end15)] Marilyn Frye's radical feminism uses the adjective willful: "The willful creation of new meaning, new loci of meaning, and new ways of being, together, in the world, seems to be in these mortally dangerous times the best hope we have."[[16](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end16)] Willfulness as audacity, willfulness as standing against, willfulness as creativity. We can make sense of how willfulness comes up, if we consider a typical definition of willfulness: "asserting or disposed to assert one's own will against persuasion, instruction, or command; governed by will without regard to reason; determined to take one's own way; obstinately self-willed or perverse" (OED). To be called obstinate or perverse because you are not persuaded by the reason of others? Is this familiar to you? Have you heard this before? **When you are charged with willfulness it is as if your being is an insistence on being, a refusal to give way, to give up, to give up your way**. Can what we are charged with become a charge in Alice Walker's sense, a way of being in charge? If we are charged with willfulness, **we can** accept and **mobilize this charge**. **We have to become willful**, perhaps, **to keep going the way we are going, if the way you are going is perceived to be "the wrong way."** We all know the experience of "going the wrong way" in a crowd. Everyone seems to be going the opposite way than the way you are going. **No one person has to push or shove for you to feel the collective momentum of the crowd as a pushing and shoving**. For you **to keep going you have to push harder than** any of those **individuals** who are **going the right way**. **The body "going the wrong way" is** the one that is experienced as **"in the way"** of the will that is acquired as momentum**.** For some bodies mere persistence, "to continue steadfastly," requires great effort, an effort that might appear to others as stubbornness or obstinacy, as insistence on going against the flow. **You have to become insistent to go against the flow; you are judged to be going against the flow because you are insistent**. A life paradox: **you have to become what you are judged as being**. It is crucial that we don't assume that willfulness is simply about lonely individuals going against the tide of the social. At the same time, we can note how the social can be experienced as a force: you can feel a force most directly when you attempt to resist it. It is the experience of "coming up against" that is named by willfulness, which is why **a willful politics needs to be a collective politics**. The collective here is not assumed as a ground. Rather, **willfulness is a collecting together, of those struggling for a different ground for existence**. **You need to be supported when you are not going the way things are flowing**. This is why I think ofa feminist queer politics as a politics of tables: tables give support to gatherings, and we need support when we live our lives in ways that are experienced by others as stubborn or obstinate. A flow is an effect of bodies that are going the same way. To go is also to gather. A flow can be an effect of gatherings of all kinds: gatherings of tables, for instance, as kinship objects that support human gatherings. How many times have I had the experience of being left waiting at a table when a straight couple walks into the room and is attended to straight away! For some, you have to become insistent to be the recipient of a social action, you might have to announce your presence, wave your arm, saying: "Here I am!" For others, it is enough just to turn up because you have already been given a place at the table *before you take up your place*. Willfulness describes the uneven consequences of this differentiation. An attribution of willfulness involves the attribution of negative affect to those bodies that get in the way, those bodes that "go against the flow"in the way they are going. The attribution of **willfulness is** thus effectively a charge of **killing joy**. Conversations are also flows; they are saturated. We hear this saturation as atmosphere.To be attributed as willful is to be the one who "ruins the atmosphere." A colleague says to me she just has to open her mouth in meetings to witness eyes rolling as if to say, "oh here she goes." My experience as a feminist daughter in a conventional family taught me a great deal about rolling eyes. You already know this. However you speak, the one who speaks up as a feminist is usually viewed as "causing the argument," as the one who is disturbing the fragility of peace. To be willful is to provide a point of tension. Willfulness is stickiness: it is an accusation that sticks. If to be attributed as willful is to be the cause of the problem, then we can claim that willfulness as a political cause. Queer feminist histories are full of self-declared willful subjects. Think of the Heterodoxy Club that operated in Greenwich Villagein the early 20th century, a clubfor unorthodox women. They described themselves as "this little band of willful women," as Judith Schwarz reveals in her wonderful history of this club.[[17](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end17)] A heterodoxy is "not in agreement with accepted beliefs, or holding unorthodox opinions." **To be willful is to be willing to announce your disagreement**, and to put yourself behind a disagreement. To enact a disagreement might even mean **to become disagreeable**. Feminism we might say is the creation of some rather disagreeable women. **Political histories of striking** and of demonstrations **are histories of those willing to put their bodies in the way, to turn their bodies into blockage points that stop the flow of human traffic, as well as the wider flow of an economy**. **When willfulness becomes a style of politics, it** means not only being willing not to go with the flow, but also ***being willing to cause*** *its* ***obstruction***. One could think of a hunger strike as the purest form of willfulness: a body whose agency is expressed by being reduced to obstruction, where the obstruction to others is self-obstruction, the obstruction of the passage into the body. Histories of willfulness are histories of those who are willing to put their bodies in the way. Political forms of consciousness can also be thought of as willfulness: not only is it hard to speak about what has receded from view, but you have to be willing to get in the way of that recession. An argument of second-wave feminism (one shared with Marxism and Black politics) that I think is worth holding onto is the argument that political consciousness is achieved: **raising consciousness is a crucial aspect of collective political work**. Raising consciousness is difficult as consciousness is consciousness of what recedes. Ifthe point of a recession is that it gives some the power to occupy space (occupation is reproduced by the concealment of the signs of occupation), then raising consciousness is a resistance to an occupation. Take the example of racism. **It can be willful even to name racism**: as if the talk about divisions is what is **divisive**. Given that racism recedes from social consciousness, **it appears as if the ones who "bring it up" are bringing it into existence**. We learned that the very talk of racism is experienced as an intrusion from the figure of the angry black woman: as if it is her anger about racism that causes feminist estrangement. To recede is to go back or withdraw. To concede is to give way, to yield. People of color are often asked to concede to the recession of racism: we are asked to "give way" by letting it "go back." Not only that: more than that. We are often asked to embody a commitment to diversity. We are asked to smile in their brochures. The smile of diversity is a way of not allowing racism to surface; it is a form of political recession. Racism is very difficult to talk about as racism can operate to censor the very evidence of its existence. Those who talk about racism are thus heard as creating rather than describing a problem. The stakes are indeed very high: to talk about racism is to occupy a space that is saturated with tension. History is saturation. One of the findings of a research project I was involved with on diversity was that because racism saturates everyday and institutional spaces, people of color often make strategic decisions *not to use* the language of racism.[[18](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end18)] If you already pose a problem, or appear "out of place" in the institutions of whiteness, there can be "good reasons" not to exercise what is heard as a threatening vocabulary.[[19](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end19)] Not speaking about racism can be a way of inhabiting the spaces of racism. You minimize the threat you already are by softening your language and appearance, by keeping as much distance as you can from the figure of the angry person of color. Of course, as we know, just to walk into a room can be to lose that distance, because that figure gets there before you do. When you use the very language of racism you are heard as "going on about it," as "not letting it go." It is as if talking about racism is what keeps it going. Racism thus often enters contemporary forms of representation as a representation of a past experience. Take the film *Bend it Like Beckham* (2002, dir. Gurinder Chada): the film is very much premised on the freedom to be happy, as the freedom of the daughter, Jesminder, to do whatever makes her happy (in her case playing football—her idea of happiness is what puts her in proximity to a national idea of happiness). Her father's memory of racism gets in the way of her happiness. Consider two speeches he makes in the film, the first one takes place early on, and the latter at the end: When I was a teenager in Nairobi, I was the best fast bowler in our school. Our team even won the East African cup. But when I came to this country, nothing. And these bloody gora in the club house made fun of my turban and sent me off packing... She will only end up disappointed like me. When those bloody English cricket players threw me out of their club like a dog, I never complained. On the contrary, I vowed that I would never play again. Who suffered? Me. But I don't want Jess to suffer. I don't want her to make the same mistakes her father made, accepting life, accepting situations. I want her to fight. And I want her to win. In the first speech, the father says she *should not play* in order not to suffer like him. In the second, he says she *should play* in order not to suffer like him. The desire implicit in both speech acts is the avoidance of the daughter's suffering, which is expressed in terms of the desire that she does not repeat his own. The second speech suggests that the refusal to play a national game is the "truth" behind the migrant's suffering: you suffer because you do not play the game, where not playing is read as self-exclusion. To let Jess be happy he lets her go. By implication, not only is he letting her go, he is also letting go of his own suffering, the unhappiness caused by accepting racism, as the "point" of his exclusion. I would suggest that the father is represented in the first speech as melancholic: as refusing to let go of his suffering, as incorporating the very object of own loss. His refusal to let Jess go is readable as a symptom of melancholia: as a stubborn attachment to his own injury.[[20](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end20)] As he says: "who suffered? Me." Bad feeling thus originates with the migrant who won't let go of racism as a script that explains suffering. The melancholic migrant holds onto the unhappy objects of difference, such as the turban, or at least the memory of being teased about the turban, as that which ties it to a history of racism. It is as if you should let go of the pain of racism by *letting go of racism as a way of remembering that pain*. I would even say that racism becomes readable as what the melancholic migrant is attached *to*, as an attachment to injury that allows migrants to justify their refusal to participate in the national game ("the gora in their club house"). Even **to recall an experience of racism**, or to describe an experience as racism, **can be to get in the way of the happiness of others**. Consciousness of racism becomes understood as a kind of false consciousness, as consciousness of that which is no longer. Racism is framed as a memory that if it were kept alive would just leave us exhausted. The task of citizenship becomes one of conversion: if racism is preserved *only* in our memory and consciousness, then racism would "go away" if only we too would declare it gone. **The** **narrative implicit here is** not that we "invent racism," but **that we preserve its power to govern social life by not getting over it**. The moral task is thus "to get over it," as if when you are over it, it is gone. **Conclusion: A Killjoy Manifesto** Audre Lorde teaches us how quickly **the freedom to be happy is** translated into **the freedom to look away from what compromises your happiness**.[[21](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end21)] The history of feminist critiques of happiness could be translated into a manifesto: ***Don't look over it: don't get over it****.* Not to get over it is a form of disloyalty. **Willfulness is** a kind of **disloyalty**: think of Adrienne Rich's call for us to be disloyal to civilization. ***We are not over it, if it has not gone. We are not loyal, if it is wrong***.[[22](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print_ahmed.htm#end22)] **Willfulness could be rethought as a style of politics: *a refusal to look away from what has already been looked over****.* The ones who point out that racism, sexism, and heterosexism are actual are charged with willfulness; they refuse to allow these realities to be passed over. Even talking about injustices, violence, power, and subordination in a world that uses "happy diversity" as a technology of social description can mean becoming the obstacle, as the ones who "get in the way" of the happiness of others. Your talk is heard as laboring over sore points, as if you are holding onto something—an individual or collective memory, a *sense* of a history as unfinished—because you are sore. People often say that political struggle against racism is like banging your head against a brick wall. The wall keeps its place so it is you that gets sore. We might need to stay as sore as our points. Of course that's not all we say or we do. We can recognise not only that we are not the cause of the unhappiness that has been attributed to us, but also the effects of being attributed *as* the cause. We can talk about being willful subjects, feminist killjoys, angry black women; we can claim those figures back; we can talk about those conversations we have had at dinner tables or in seminars or meetings. We can laugh in recognition of the familiarity of inhabiting that place, even if we do not inhabit the same place (and we do not). There can be joy in killing joy. Kill joy, we can and we do. Be willful, we will and we are.

#### A killjoy kills the joy of oppressive institutions and refuses the requirements of happiness that are forced upon them. This disorients the subconscious orientation of the institution – calling out sexism at debate tournaments kills the joy of the white male debaters; the Zapatista movement congregated around a Brown Mestiza identity to kill the joy of white supremacy; it is an internal rejection of the paradigm of complicity in happiness – embracing an orientation outside of the institution.

#### Net Benefit is Collectivization – our method is an act of self love that opens up spaces of solidarity and connects minoritized bodies together. Our methodology supports bottom up movements that refuse humanizing politics. These spaces of solidarity can resolve psychological violence because we refuse the internal demands to be happy in spaces that oppress us

**Ahmed 14** Sara Ahmed "Selfcare as Warfare" feministkilljoys https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/08/25/selfcare-as-warfare/ August 25 2014

“Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.” This is a revolutionary, extraordinary sentence. It is a much loved, much cited sentence. It is an arrow, which acquires its sharpness from its own direction. It is from the epilogue to Audre Lorde’s *A Burst of Light*, a piece of writing so profound, so moving, that it never fails to teach me, often by leaving me undone, beside myself. This writing is made up of fragments or notes put together as Audre Lorde learns that she has liver cancer, that her death could only be arrested; as she comes to feel that diagnosis in her bones. The expression “a burst of light” is used for when she came to feel the fragility of her body’s situation: “that inescapable knowledge, in the bone, of my own physical limitation.” *A Burst of Light* is an account of how the struggle for survival is a life struggle and a political struggle. Some of us, Audre Lorde notes were never meant to survive. To have some body, to be a member of some group, to be some, can be a death sentence. **When you are not supposed to live**, as you are, where you are, with whom you are with, **then survival is a radical action**; a refusal not to exist until the very end; a refusal not to exist until you do not exist. **We have to work out how to survive in a system that decides life for some requires the death or removal of others**. Sometimes: to survive in a system is to survive a system. We can be inventive, we have to be inventive, Audre Lorde suggests, to survive. Some of us. Others: not so much. **When a whole world is organised to promote your survival**, from health to education, from the walls designed to keep your residence safe, from the paths that ease your travel, **you do not have become so inventive to survive**. You do not have to be seen as the recipient of welfare because the world has promoted your welfare. The benefits you receive are given as entitlements, perhaps even as birth rights. **Racial capitalism is a health system**: **a drastically unequal distribution of bodily vulnerabilities**. Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes racism thus: “the state-sanctioned or extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” (2007: 28) Being poor, being black, puts your life at risk. Your heath is compromised when you do not have the external resources to support a life in all of its contingencies. And then of course, you are deemed responsible for your own ill-heath, for your own failure to look after yourself better. When you refer to structures, to systems, to power relations, to walls, you are assumed to be making others responsible for the situation you have failed to get yourself out of. “You should have tried harder.” Oh, the violence and the smugness of this sentence, this sentencing. We are used to these logics; we are so used to them that we have names for them (neo-liberalism, post-racialism among others) and we have to keep hearing them. Throughout *A Burst of Light* Audre Lorde compares her experience of battling with cancer (and she is willing to use this militaristic language, she is willing to describe this situation *as war*) to her experience of battling against anti-black racism. The comparison is effective, showing us how racism can be an attack on the cells of the body, an attack on the body’s immune system; the way in which your own body experiences itself as killing itself, death from the outside in. A world against you can be experienced as your body turning against you. You might be worn down, worn out, by what you are required to take in. To care for oneself: how to live for, to be for, one’s body when you are under attack. Let’s return to our quote. Lorde says **self-care is** *not* self-indulgence but **self-preservation**. Some have to look after themselves because their are not looked after: their being is not cared for, supported, protected. I have in my own work been thinking of social privilege as a support system: compulsory heterosexuality, for instance, is an elaborate support system. It is how some relationships are nurtured and valued, becoming a means of organising not just one’s own time, but a way of sharing time and significance: how a we has something; how a we loses something. How you lose as well as what you lose can even become a confirmation of the worth of what you had. I think of one of the saddest scenes I have seen is from the first of the three films that make up *If these Walls Could Talk 2*. We start with the quiet intimacy of two women, Abbie and Edith, lovers, lesbians, life-long partners. Abbie falls. Things happen; shit happens. And then we are in the hospital waiting room. Edith is waiting. Another woman arrives, upset, and says: “they just took my husband in, he had a heart attack.” Edith comforts her. The comfort is not returned: when Edith explains why she is there – “my friend fell off a tree, we think she had a stroke” – the woman asks “is your husband still alive?” When Edith replies, “I never had a husband”, the woman says, “That’s lucky, because you won’t have the heart break of losing one.” This is how heterosexuality can work as a support system, how some broken hearts matter; how some do not. When a relationship is not recognised you are left alone with your grief. No wonder so many of our histories are broken, fragile histories. Privilege is a buffer zone, how much you have to fall back on when you lose something. Privilege does not mean we are invulnerable: things happen, shit happens. Privilege can however reduce the costs of vulnerability, so if things break down, if you break down, you are more likely to be looked after. When support is a question of access you have a support system. I think in this statement that self-care is not self-indulgence we can hear a defence; Audre Lorde is defending self-care. What from? From who? From, one might suspect, the dismissal of self-care as an indulgence. Self-indulgence tends to mean: being soft on one’s self, but also can mean “”yielding to one’s inclinations.” Now recently I have heard much feminist work be dismissed (this is my feminist killjoy blog, and I have no intention or wish to cite these dismissals, you will just have to take my words for it) on these sort of terms. Feminism: being too soft, too safe, too focused on individual suffering. I have heard feminism be dismissed as a form of self-indulgence. I want to suggest something before I am ready to firm up a strong argument. This is a hunch, if you like: some critiques of neoliberalism have allowed a dismissal of feminism in these kind of terms. Of course, feminists have offered some of the sharpest and strongest critiques of neoliberal rationalities. And we have also had some very important feminist critiques of feminist neoliberalism. For example, Catherine Rottenburg persuasively shows how some feminist subjects (the one we might see in a book like Sheryl Sandberg’s *Lean in*) is “simultaneously neoliberal, not only because she disavows the social, cultural and economic forces producing this inequality, but also because she accepts full responsibility for her own well-being and self-care, which is increasingly predicated on crafting a felicitous work–family balance based on a cost-benefit calculus” (2013: 1). Neoliberal feminists do identify as feminists (Sandberg’s first chapter is entitled “internalising the revolution”) but in such a way that feminism is repackaged as being about upward mobility for some women, those who accept responsibilities for their “own well-being and self-care,” a way some women thus distance themselves from others. I have no doubt that we need to engage in critiques of such forms of neoliberalism and accept that feminism can become co-opted as a white woman’s upward mobility fantasy. Feminism in neoliberal hands becomes just another form of career progression: a way of moving “up,” not by not recognising ceilings (and walls) but by assuming these ceilings (and walls) can disappear through individual persistence. And race equality also has neoliberal modes: say in the film *Bend* *it* *like* *Beckham*, when Jess moves “up” by putting the experience of racism behind her, as if you will not be affected by racism when you are good enough (for further discussion see [here](https://feministkilljoys.com/2013/08/31/bend-it-happy-multiculturalism/)). And note: this rhetoric is similar to that used by anti-feminists and racists: those who say we talk about sexism and racism as a way of not being responsible for the places we do not go; those who say our investment in these very terms is how we excluded ourselves by insisting on being excluded; those who say we should just “get on with it” rather than “going on about it.” When race and gender equality become neoliberal techniques they can become techniques for concealing inequalities. Audre Lorde, who is with us today through the words she left for us, gave us a strong critique of neo-liberalism, even if she did not use that term. Her work is full of insight into how structural inequalities are deflected by being made the responsibility of individuals (who in being given the capacity to overcome structures are assumed to fail when they do not overcome them). Her work explores how self-care can become a technique of governance: the duty to care for one’s self often written as a duty to care for one’s own happiness, flourishing, well-being. Indeed, in *The Cancer Journals*, Audre Lorde offers a powerful critique of how happiness becomes a narrative of self-care. Faced with medical discourse that attributes cancer to unhappiness and survival or coping to being happy or optimistic she suggests: “looking on the bright side of things is a euphemism used for obscuring certain realities of life, the open consideration of which might prove threatening to the status quo” (1997: 76). To obscure or to take cover by looking on the bright side is to avoid what might threaten the world as it is. Lorde moves from this observation to a wider critique of happiness as an obscurant: “Let us seek ‘joy’ rather than real food and clean air and a saner future on a liveable earth! As if happiness alone can protect is from the results of profit-madness” (76). Lorde suggests that the very idea that our first responsibility is for our own happiness must be resisted by political struggle, which means resisting the idea that our own resistance is a failure to be responsible for happiness: “Was I really fighting the spread of radiation, racism, woman-slaughter, chemical invasion and our food, pollution of our environment, and the abuse and psychic destruction of your young, merely to avoid dealing with my first and greatest responsibility to be happy?” (76). I think Audre Lorde has given us the answer to her question. And she offers us another answer in her question: to assume your primary responsible is to your own happiness might be how you end up not fighting against injustice. We have something to work out here. Audre Lorde writes persuasively about how self-care can become an obscurant, how caring for oneself can lead you away from engaging in certain kinds of political struggle. And yet, in *A Burst of Light*, she defends self-care as not about self-indulgence, but self-preservation. **Self-care becomes warfare.** This kind of self-care is **not about one’s own happiness**. It is **about finding ways to exist in a world that is diminishing**. Already: we have been given some tools to sharpen our understanding of how neo-liberalism can be used as a tool. There are differences that matter, differences that matter relating to differences of power. Neoliberalism sweeps up too much when all forms of self-care become symptoms of neo-liberalism. When feminist, queer and anti-racist work that involves sharing our feelings, our hurt and grief, recognising that power gets right to the bone, is called neo-liberalism, we have to hear what is not being heard. When feminism involves **recognising the suffering of** say, **an individual woman of colour at the hands of a** sexist, **heterosexist**, **and racist system** that is indifferent to the suffering it causes and that **is called neoliberalism, you would be repeating rather than challenging this structural indifference**. And you also negate other “other histories” that are at stake in her struggle for her suffering to matter. **Those who do not have to struggle for their own survival can** very easily and rather quickly **dismiss those who** have to struggle **for survival** **as “indulging themselves.”** As feminism teaches us: talking about personal feelings is not necessarily about deflecting attention from structures. If anything, I would argue the opposite: not addressing certain histories that hurt, histories that get to the bone, how we are affected by what we come up against, is one way of deflecting attention from structures (as if our concern with our own pain or suffering is what stops certain things from just “going away”). Not the only way, but one way. If you have got a model that says an individual woman who is trying to survive an experience of rape by focusing on her own wellbeing and safety, by trying to work out ways she can keep on going or ways she can participate in something without having to experience more trauma (by asking for trigger warnings in a classroom, for instance) is participating in the same politics as a woman who is concerned with getting up “the ladder” in a company then I think there is something wrong with your model. Sometimes, **“coping with” or “getting by”** or “making do” **might appear as** a way of **not attending to structural inequalities, as benefiting from a system by adapting to it**, even if you are not privileged by that system,even if you are damaged by that system. Perhaps we need to ask: who has enough resources not to have to become resourceful? When you have less resources you might have to become more resourceful. Of course: the requirement to become more resourceful is part of the injustice of a system that distributes resources unequally. Of course: becoming resourceful is not system changing even if it can be life changing (although maybe, just maybe, a collective refusal not to not exist can be system changing). **But to assume people’s ordinary ways of coping with injustices implies** some sort of **failure on their part** – or even an identification with the system – **is an**other **injustice** they have to cope with. **The more resources you have the easier it is to** make such a **critique** of **those whose response to injustice is to become more resourceful**. You might not be trying to move up, to project yourself forward; you might simply be trying not to be brought down. Heavy, heavy histories. Wearing, worn down. **Even if it’s system change we need**, that we fight for, **when the system does not change, when the walls come up, those hardenings of history into physical barriers in the present, you have to manage; to cope**. Your choices are compromised when a world is compromised. It is not surprising: some recent anti-feminist, anti-queer and anti-intersectionality (intersectionality as code for people of colour) statements from the “white male left” rest on charging us with being individualistic, as indulging ourselves, as being concerned with ourselves and our own damaged “identities.” I wonder if Audre Lorde might have had to insist that self-care was not self-indulgence because she had heard this charge. I wonder. I have read recently some critiques of feminists for calling out individuals for sexism and racism because those critiques neglect (we neglect) structures. Really? Or is that **when we talk about sexism and racism you hear us as talking about individuals**? Are you suddenly concerned with structures because you do not want to hear how you as an individual might be implicated in the power relations we critique? I noted in my book, *On Being Included* (2012) how there can be a certain safety in terms like “institutional racism” in a context where individuals have disidentified from institutions they can see themselves as not “in it” at all. And how interesting: the individual disappears at the very moment he is called to account. He will probably reappear as the saviour of the left. You can hear, no doubt, my tiredness and cynicism. I do not apologise for it. I am tired of it. Some of the glib dismissals of “call out culture” make my blood boil. I say glib because they imply it is easy to call people out, or even that it has become a new social norm. I know, for instance, how hard it is to get sexual harassment taken seriously. Individuals get away with it all the time. They get away with it because of the system. It is normalised and understood as the way things are. Individual women have to speak out, and testify over and over again; and still there is a system in place, a system that is working, that stops women from being heard. In a case when a woman is harassed by an individual man, she has to work hard to call him out. She often has to keep saying it because he keeps doing it. **Calling out an individual matters, even when the system is also what is bruising: the violence directed against you by somebody is a violence that leaves a trace** upon you whether that trace is visible or not. And: **there is a system which creates him, supports him, and gives him a sense that he has a right to do what he does. To challenge him is to challenge a system**. I read one anti-feminist article that implied feminists are being individualistic, when they call out individual men, because that calling out is what stops us working more collectively for radical transformation. Collectivity: can work for some individuals as a means for disguising their own interest as collective interest. **When collectivity requires you to bracket your experience of oppression it is not a collectivity worth fighting for.** And I have watched this happen with feminist despair: when women speak out about sexual harassment and sexual violence they are heard as compromising the whole thing: a project, a centre, a revolution. And the individuals they speak of are then presented as the ones who have to suffer the consequences of feminist complaint, the one’s whose damage is generalised (if “he” is damaged “we” are damaged). When her testimony is heard as damaging the possibility of revolting against a system, a system is reproduced. I will say it again: the individual seems to disappear at the moment he is called to account. We are the ones who then appear as individuals, who are assumed to be acting as individuals or even as being individualistic, while he disappears into a collective. From my study of will and willfulness, I learnt how those who challenge power are often judged as promoting themselves, as putting themselves first, as self-promotional. And maybe: the judgment does find us somewhere. We might have to promote ourselves when we are not promoted by virtue of our membership of a group. We might have to become assertive just to appear. For others, you appear and you are attended to right away. A world is waiting for you to appear. The one who can quickly disappear when called to account can then quickly re-appear when on the receiving end of an action that is welcomed or desired. I think of these differences as how we become assembled over and by tables. Two women seated together at a table, let’s say. Sometimes you might have to wave your arm, your willful arm, just to be noticed. Without a man at the table you tend not to appear. For others, to be seated is not only to be seen, *but to be seen to.* You can take up a place at the table when you have already been given a place. You do not have to become self-willed if your will is accomplished by the general will. This is whythe general **dismissal of** feminism as **identity politics** (and there is a history to how identity politics becomes a dismissal) needs to be treated as a form of conservatism: it **is an attempt to conserve power by assuming those who challenge power are just concerned with or about themselves**. An individual is one who is not dividable into parts. In *Willful Subjects* (2014), I tied the history of the individual as the one who does not have to divide himself to a patriarchal, colonial and capitalist history. He can be an individual, not divided into parts, because others become his parts: they become his arms, his feet, his hands, limbs that are intended to give support to his body. When a secretary becomes his right hand, his right hand is freed. Your labour as support for his freedom. This is how the question of support returns us to bodies, to how bodies are supported. Willful parts are those who are unwilling to provide this support. So how quickly **those who resist their subordination are judged as being individualistic as well as willful**. In refusing to support him, by becoming his parts, we have become self-willed; in refusing to care for him, we are judged as caring for ourselves, where this “for” is assumed as only and lonely. Self-care: that can be an act of political warfare. **In directing our care towards ourselves** we are redirecting care away from its proper objects, we are not caring for those we are supposed to care for; **we are not caring for the bodies deemed worth caring about**. And that is why **in queer, feminist and anti-racist work self-care is about the creation of community**, [fragile communities](https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/06/14/fragility/), **assembled out of the experiences of being shattered**. We **reassemble ourselves through the ordinary**, everyday and often painstaking **work of looking after ourselves; looking after each other**. This is why when we have to insist, I matter, we matter, we are transforming what matters. Women’s lives matter; black lives matter; queer lives matter; disabled lives matter; trans lives matter; the poor; the elderly; the incarcerated, matter. For those who have to insist they matter to matter: selfcare is warfare. Thank you Audre Lorde for your survival. Always.

#### This is a survival strategy net benefit – even if we need to work on macro structural change, we need to be able to survive in those structures in the meantime.

# Underviews

## Truth Testing Underview

1. Presume aff. Empirics prove – 5% side bias for the neg in elimination rounds.

**Adler 15** Steven Adler "Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels" March 30, 2015 nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

I have gathered data to perform such an analysis: I have recorded the available elimination round data from octas-bid LD tournaments for the 2014-15 season via Tabroom.com, and coded them along three values: whether the Aff or the Neg won; whether the decision was unanimous; and whether the elim took place before quarterfinals, or from quarterfinals on. In sum, this provided me **with a dataset of 216 elimination rounds from the Harvard, Bronx Science, Glenbrooks, Valley, Harvard-Westlake, and St. Mark’s tournaments** (with the exception of Bronx Science, I included data starting with the first full elim—so full trips for Harvard, but full doubles for Valley, despite the occurrence of some run-off rounds prior to that). Among these 216 rounds, **the Affirmative won 98 of them for a win-rate of 45%.** 121 of the 216 rounds were unanimous, for a unanimity-rate of 56%. The percentages of specific decision outcomes are listed in the table below: To determine whether these outcomes are consistent with each judge randomizing on their individual ballot, one must construct an ‘expected’ set of observations according to the randomization process. A naïve randomization might suggest that each judge has a 50-50 chance of voting Aff vs. Neg on their individual ballot, and that therefore the distribution would look something like this: In Lincoln-Douglas, however, there is a strong suspicion that Negatives win more often than 50% of the time, so there is good reason to think that this ‘random’ hit-rate for Neg winning should not be 50%. Indeed, this advantage for Negatives is present in the analysis’s data, so we must adjust the expected randomization rate accordingly (bear with me here, because this will involve a little math). Using the aggregate data, we can calculate the Neg win-rate for these elimination rounds as 54.7%. To win a round as Neg, you could either win on a 3-0 decision or on a 2-1 decision (with three possible combinations of how this 2-1 could occur, depending on which judge sits). Accordingly, if judges were randomizing their ballots, we would need to find a ‘randomization rate’ for a Negative ballot such that x^3 + 3\*x^2\*(1-x) = 0.547, which produces an x value of 0.531. (This math is simpler than it seems: About 15% of the time with this randomization rate you would expect a 3-0 for the Negative, and just under 40% of the time it would produce a 2-1 for the Negative, so it combines to the total Neg win-rate of 54.7%.) So, we now know the rate at which each judge should be ‘randomly’ voting for Neg vs. Aff if it were to construct an overall Neg win-rate of 54.7%, and using that information we can construct what the expected data for the entire set of outcomes would be: You can tell visually that these distributions are very different from one another. Whereas the expected distribution predicts far more 2-1 decisions than 3-0 decisions, in practice 3-0s are quite prevalent. **A 3-0 decision for the Negative is the most likely of any individual outcome, and a 3-0 decision for the Affirmative is nearly as likely as a 2-1 decision in the Aff’s favor**. According to these data and the accompanying Chi-test, **there is a next-to-zero (p < 0.0001) chance that this distribution could be represented by judges randomizing in the ways described above**; this is relatively strong evidence that judges are able to discern winners and that they generally agree with one another on this distinction, or at least more than mere chance would predict. Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment. To evaluate this hypothesis, **I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg w[on]**inning **61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff**. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

Prefer empirics over analytics because they confirm what actually happens in debate – if analytics contradict with empirics, that means the analytic is wrong. And, theoretical justifications for presumption come above substantive justifications – Theory is the highest layer of debate which constrains substantive justifications – if one side is at a theoretical disadvantage that is a side constraint on substantive justifications because their ability to win the round is skewed.

1. Dictionary.com defines “affirm” as “to express agreement with or commitment to uphold; support”. Accept reasonable aff definitions – there are bidirectional definitions of every word and the aff has to choose one. Additionally, **12 dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1)** define “to affirm” as some variation of “to show support for” or “to state positively” – ie not truth testing. This turns constituivism arguments – truth testing isn’t constitutive of debate.
2. There are no constitutive rules of debate – every round is a reconceptualization of what debate is.

Enoch 11 David Enoch “Shmagency Revisited” January 2011 <https://upenn.instructure.com/courses/1205847/files/46456496/download?verifier=u9J6caLjtIICepl0Z28cSIhG3SnJBmK9F5luSmDh> In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan

But **one may** want to reject this initial claim, even with regard to chess. For it may be **suggest**ed **that playing chess does** after all **suffice** for having a reason – **some reason, at least**, perhaps **a weak one**, perhaps one that is outweighed by others – **for checkmating your opponent**. Perhaps there is no need after all for another reason, namely, a reason to be playing chess (or perhaps to play this specific game of chess)? If so, we may proceed to conclude that our merely playing the agency-game suffices for us having a reason to aim at its constitutive aims. As a general thesis, though, this **cannot be true. We can define many cooked-up variations of chess, with slightly different rules, or** perhaps slightly **different ways of winning** (say, you only win if you checkmate your opponent in an even number of moves; or when she still has her queen; or when she looks away; or cases in which you win if you move your castle diagonally three times when your opponent looks away; etc.). **Whenever you** find yourself **play**ing **chess, you** also find yourself (**in sufficiently early stages of the game) play**ing **these cooked-up games** chess\*, chess\*\*, chess\*\*\*, and so on. **But it doesn't seem you have reasons** **to win** at chess\*, or at chess\*\*, or at chess\*\*\*. This is so, presumably, because you don't have a reason to play chess\*, or chess\*\*, or chess\*\*\*. So this little example suffices to show that **it's not in general true that engaging in some activity** – satisfying some relevant descriptive criteria – **suffices for having reason to aim at its constitutive aim**. So if you think that the game of agency is different – if you think, in other words, that playing it suffices for having a reason to play it well, or to achieve its constitutive aims, or some such – then you must be able to come up with an answer to the question: What's so special about agency? Why is this true of agency, even though it's not true in general? I can’t think of an answer to this question (except perhaps in terms of inescapability, to which we will return shortly).

1. Debate should allow a multitude of models of engagement and shouldn’t be limited to one “constitutive” claim.

**Koh and Niemi 15** Ben Koh & Rebar Niemi "How Do I Reach These Kids?: An Affirmation of Polyvocal Debate" September 15, 2015

For as long as there has been debate, there has been the debate about what debate is. We are not against a discussion of what constitutes debate. In fact we are absolutely for it. We argue that this is a crucial debate within debates. **The question should not be “what is debate?” The proper question is “what can debate do?”** **The constitutive feature of debate** that we are most abstractly interested in **is** the precise one that is so often banished by debate pundits – **the possibilities of what it can do**. We do not yet know what debate can do. All are welcome to accept the challenge of forcing debate into a linear and instrumental framework, but be warned it will certainly fail. Debate is a process and a field, not a mechanism. This is the case for polyvocal debate. Our current definition (which is open to redefinition) is that **debate should be** thought of as **a complex assemblage of voices** (the debaters, the judge, audiences, coaches, the authors quoted, and so on), and that **it** **is wrong to limit the possible voices** or the possible enunciations of those voices. Debate is always about multiple voices – multiple ways of sensing/expressing. Even non-sense and non-expression have their own voices. This is not a paradigm. It is a hypothesis about the system of relations that co-creates debate. The power and potential of polyvocal debate is not located in some far-off future. It is right here right now, and it is also capable of contact with the outsides of one perspective on time and space. To paraphrase June Tyson – Don’t you know? It’s after the end of the world. Within the system of relations composed by polyvocal debate, **we always have the ability to ask** “should we believe in something in the first place?” as well as “**if we believe it, what are its normative implications?**” These questions, in whatever form they take, are some of the most primal elements of debate. **Restricting the scope of debate to only some of these questions is a serious loss**. **More absurd is the justification for restriction based on the value of being able to ask and engage with these questions in the first** place. It is wrong to assume that chaos and doubt are bad. It is even worse to argue for a progressive fallacy that chaos and doubt can be removed from debate without debate ceasing to be debate at all. **Debate is not** soccer, or **chess**, or playing the trumpet. Perhaps it can do similar things to those activities, but if so it is because it does not feature the limits that define soccer or chess or playing the trumpet. It is apparently very easy to make assumptions about what education is. Most often this is accomplished without citing a single theorist on the subject of education OR a robust understanding of what education could be outside of “commonsensical” assumptions (which are less common and relatable that they initially seem). As we often like to tell our students – read the literature. We call the kind of education that is often assumed “banking-style education” after Paulo Friere. This is the notion that education is about accumulating knowledge. 100 facts are better than 99 facts. People devalue education because they think of it only in these calculated terms. To the banking conception, the end game of education would not be an increase in self-respect, a commitment to social justice, or a development of communication and empathetic powers. It would be the resume statement of “things I’ve learned.” We must not buy into this conception of education. In debate, the collaborative way voices intertwine builds a world of speech and frames it. No debate performance can be perfectly reproduced. The judge’s interpretation and voice are then added. The desire for absolutely objective or procedurally exact judging is a desire for an impossibility. We should not be afraid of the judge’s voice. We recognize it as one among many. Some judges speak loudly and have particular desires. We do not begrudge them this. What is important is that they acknowledge that theirs is only one voice among the many and one way of sensing among all sense and nonsense. It is not a question of excluding the chaos or even controlling it, but **understanding the value in** hearing **the** **clash of multiple voices**. For nowhere else in school are we given the vibrant opportunity to be as real in the academic space as is in debate; where we are able to read multiple arguments from multiple views from multiple bases. Wemust encourage debate to be an outlet for the chaotic and doubtful elements of our beliefs for it’s an opportunity to bridge debate’s separation from the real world into our own world. Our lives aren’t always smooth unwavering stories. They are often a chaos that is hard to grasp outside the lens of community. Polyvocal debate is inclusive and encouraging of this chaos, of the hard questions and life changing moments of realization. A form of debate that acts as if it can omit doubt is not a true form of debate at all. This isn’t just an argument for “unique educational value” in the banking-sense. Debate should not be thought of as an esoteric extracurricular designed to spice up the resume. Paradigms of debate that stop at the moment of rational justification treat the issue of what world we create for ourselves as an unnecessary step, but this conversation is what must happen in our lives and further what must happen in debate. Polyvocal debate allows for this discussion. **We should not just ask “is deontology true” but further “is it good for me to believe in deontology” or util or contractarianism, etc.** Rationality cannot be trusted to judge itself, but abandoning logic altogether isn’t necessary just yet. It is too easy to take up one side or the other (only truth matters or only the good matters). Debate is harder.The tenets of logic and justification can create questionable conclusions, and **a truly valuable form of debate must allow us to criticize and reevaluate** these **conclusions** to live our lives to the fullest. We must be able to ask if beliefs empower or disempower our lives. We always have the power to ask should we believe it or is it correct, and exercising this capacity is the practice of debate. There are two ways in which we can understand and consider what we ought to believe – what is rationally justifiable, and what is good for us to believe for ourselves. **In our lives we cannot just ask “what do I think is true.” We must always end up asking “is it good for me to believe in what I believe?”** This is how we must act in our own lives outside of just the debate space. When we are faced with a difficult situation be it in our personal lives, work, etc., we are inevitably going to be confronted with moments of seemingly undeniable hopelessness; where despite our best efforts and our thinking, we cannot justify or rationally see a way to be happy or push ourselves through to the other side. Is it good for me to believe that no matter what I will do, that I will get a bad grade in this class? Is it good for me to believe that I will fail in my work? Is it good for me to believe in hopelessness? Our answer is no. Our answer is that **debate helps you learn new questions** as well as new answers. Again and again we’ve heard the articles and arguments that collapse everything to the old questions: education versus fairness, the rules versus innovation and expansion, correct ways of being versus incorrect ones. Bizarrely there are some who like to play with the same questions forever, perpetually flipping bits between one and zero, never writing new code. We are tired of these questions. Perhaps they would be enlivened by new voices. **Polyvocality is the necessary and explosive generation of new questions**. The practice of debate is an educational activity because it is generative and interrogative of voices. Use it for what it’s used for. Education can be praxis – where the abstraction of theory becomes lived abstractness inside the fabric of everyday experience. Where a radical new way of thinking-feeling the world become possible. Where you don’t just learn about quantum physics, but cry at how beautiful the expression of quantum interactions can be and feel blessed to be a part of them, and then teach them to your friends and family. But this is only part of what education is. Education is a becoming that is necessarily political. Often times it is anti-reactionary or anti-conservative, not because it includes some biased political position, but because it is impossible to actually experience learning without it changing you – what you think is right and wrong, what you want to do, and who you think of yourself as. On our view, **this makes education necessarily anti-fascist** (where **fascism is defined as the tendency to over-represent** and prefer **certain ways of being to others** based on normative, intuitive, or ontological claims). No matter your petty political affiliations, **too many people in our world must attempt escape everyday**, live as targets, suffer, and experience domination. **If education is not a force to help us address this, it is not a properly empathetic education**. Even if the educational space of debate allows for slightly more opportunities to escape the everyday and find new connections and places to dwell, this is a greater benefit to everyone than any obedience to respectability politics, norms of conduct, or “correct ways of being” could ever achieve. This is how the world works. We should not abandon the cause of empathy just because we can have that elsewhere. It’s not as if we should not care about others at certain times because we do so in others Debate is foundationally about empathy. Arguments are only persuasive in the ability for their to be foster a shared experience of understanding. Judges vote for arguments that have a particular effect on them – the effect of “being convincing.” Arguments that win send the judge on a path of becoming-convinced. In order for this to happen, the debater must actually get through to the judge on some level, whether intuitively, emotively, via rhetoric, the flow, or explanation. The best debating promotes empathy. Not empathy defined by biased terms – empathy defined by actual contact with actual others, perspectives, and ways of expressing oneself. It is not that young people are in need of moral training or must be told what is right and wrong or that debate should erase and conquer disagreement. Rather, it is that we should strive to learn to live with disagreement. For it is too simple and brute to believe in a monovocal system of thought – that your language is the only Rosetta Stone to translate the world through. Debate must be a place to see how to live with ourselves and live among others. **If being the better debater means being the worse person, we should NOT endorse this conception of better debating**. There is no value to improving a debate related skillset that is not bracketed by being caring and affirming of the world. The argument against education, methodology, and performance debates is that these will somehow sacrifice an essential part of what makes debate debate. This perspective is entirely wrongheaded. What a polyvocal understanding of debate underscores is that what makes debate is multiple voices. Our belief is that it is possible to promote incredible skill, learning, and growth in students and be better debaters while at the same time being better people. Debate is a field where participants of all kinds create real experiences and real change. **Students have the ability to speak their individual truths and have real academic and personal conversation about what creates, sustains, and restricts their worlds** – and **if the current “rules of debate” do not allow for that, we advocate breaking those rules.**

This impact turns truth testing – the meta framework for evaluating role of the ballot debates is “which model is better for debate”, not “what defines debate as an activity”. Prefer our evidence – the authors are people in the LD community which means the evidence is specific to the context of debate which is more contextual than arbitrary dictionary definition of aff and neg.

1. Aff gets RVIs on Counter-interps on Theory and T–(a) Time Skew - theory moots the entirety of the aff and the 2N can go all in on substance and theory or whichever I undercover which kills aff strat. (b) Substantive Education – with no RVIs either the debate collapses to theory and no education anyways, or theory is kicked and there’s a huge deficit to topical discussion.
2. Evaluate T from a question of if this aff specifically is fair. It doesn’t matter what I justify, norm setting is empirically denied – a) people still read NIBs and a prioris all the time and b) bidirectional shells mean debaters read whatever shell is strategic in the round and no norms are set. That’s why we still have plans good/bad debates. And even if norms can be set from in-round theory, this round is not try or die given that there are thousands of debates on any given topic.
3. Reject abstract ethics - pretending that immoral entities are capable of moral action is abstraction that makes ethics impossible. Traditional ethics is an anti black system that only serves to re-entrench white supremacy.

**Curry 13** Dr. Tommy; “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical”

**Traditional**ly we have taken **ethics** to be, as Henry Sedgwick claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action” (1981:1). This rational procedure **is** however **at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue**, as is often done, **that the government**, its citizens, or white people **should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition.** If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In **ethical deliberations** dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to **attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated.** **This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, the only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be anti-ethical**, or a judgment **refusing to write morality onto immoral entities.** In the post-structuralist era, post-colonial thinking about racism specifically, and difference/otherness generally, has given a peculiar ameliorative function to discourse and the performance of “other-ed” identities. In this era, the dominant illusion is that discourse itself , an act that requires as its basis the recognition of the “other” as “similar,” is socially transformative—not only with regard to how the white subject assimilates the similitude of the “other-ed,” but as an actual activity gauged by the recognition by one white person or by a group of white people in any given scenario, is uncritically accepted and encouraged as anti-racist politics.. In actuality **such discourse** appeals, which **necessitate**—become **dependent on—(white) recognition**, function very much like the racial stereotype, in that the concept of the **Black** body being the **expression** **and** **source of** experience and **phenomena** (existential-phenomenological-theorization) **is incarcerated by the conceptualization created the discursive catalyst yearning to be perceived by the white thing seeing the Black**. **Such appeals lend potentiality-hope-faith to** the already present/demonstrated ignorance-racism-interest of the **white** individual, who in large part expresses the historical tone/epistemology of their racial group’s interest. **When morality is defined, not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch.**

1. Fairness is a call for neutrality which maintains the systems of oppression of the squo which perpetuates the unequal playing field that exists. Fairness is not objective and assuming it is ignores how one side started off a whole lot more stacked against.

**Delgado 92** Richard Delgado [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May

**We have** cleverly **built power's view of** the appropriate standard of conduct into **the** very **term fair**. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? **The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party**, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, **predictable arguments about** administrability, **fairness**, stability, and ease of determination **points us away from** what  [\*821]  really counts: **the way** in which **stronger parties have** managed to **inscribe their** views and **interests into "external" culture**, **so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.**

And, we impact to exclusion on a much larger scale where particular categories of debaters can’t engage and are excluded from this discourse – access is a multiplier which outweighs fairness on scope. To clarify, this isn’t a double turn with the reasons our aff is fair because it isn’t making a prescriptive claim about whether fairness is good or is a constraint on arguments.

## Theory Underview

1. This aff is fair –
   1. I’ve opensourced this aff on the caselist meaning you have the literal full text of the aff as it’s read so you could have predicted it and prepared a strategy which means no engagement loss – this is the only aff I’ve read on this topic, if you don’t have a strategy it’s on you
   2. You can engage in many ways, ie you could read reasons why our method reinforces stereotypes, you could read a counter method, you could read capitalism k, afropessimism, critiques of affect theory, policy making, disidentification, faciality, rage bad– our aff opens up a huge section of critical literature - if you couldn’t engage you should’ve gone to the other side of the library
2. Aff gets RVIs on Counter-interps on Theory and T–(a) Time Skew - theory moots the entirety of the aff and the 2N can go all in on substance and theory or whichever I undercover which kills aff strat. (b) Substantive Education – with no RVIs either the debate collapses to theory and no education anyways, or theory is kicked and there’s a huge deficit to topical discussion
3. Evaluate T from a question of if this aff specifically is fair. It doesn’t matter what I justify, norm setting is empirically denied – a) people still read NIBs and a prioris all the time and b) bidirectional shells mean debaters read whatever shell is strategic in the round and no norms are set. That’s why we still have plans good/bad debates. And even if norms can be set from in-round theory, this round is not try or die given that there are thousands of debates on any given topic.
4. If the neg claims there is a topical version of the aff they need to give plan texts in the 1NC that would solve for our method and meet their interpretation– obviously if it existed, we probably would have read it.
5. Empirics prove – 5% side bias for the neg in elimination rounds.

**Adler 15** Steven Adler "Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels" March 30, 2015 nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

I have gathered data to perform such an analysis: I have recorded the available elimination round data from octas-bid LD tournaments for the 2014-15 season via Tabroom.com, and coded them along three values: whether the Aff or the Neg won; whether the decision was unanimous; and whether the elim took place before quarterfinals, or from quarterfinals on. In sum, this provided me **with a dataset of 216 elimination rounds from the Harvard, Bronx Science, Glenbrooks, Valley, Harvard-Westlake, and St. Mark’s tournaments** (with the exception of Bronx Science, I included data starting with the first full elim—so full trips for Harvard, but full doubles for Valley, despite the occurrence of some run-off rounds prior to that). Among these 216 rounds, **the Affirmative won 98 of them for a win-rate of 45%.** 121 of the 216 rounds were unanimous, for a unanimity-rate of 56%. The percentages of specific decision outcomes are listed in the table below: To determine whether these outcomes are consistent with each judge randomizing on their individual ballot, one must construct an ‘expected’ set of observations according to the randomization process. A naïve randomization might suggest that each judge has a 50-50 chance of voting Aff vs. Neg on their individual ballot, and that therefore the distribution would look something like this: In Lincoln-Douglas, however, there is a strong suspicion that Negatives win more often than 50% of the time, so there is good reason to think that this ‘random’ hit-rate for Neg winning should not be 50%. Indeed, this advantage for Negatives is present in the analysis’s data, so we must adjust the expected randomization rate accordingly (bear with me here, because this will involve a little math). Using the aggregate data, we can calculate the Neg win-rate for these elimination rounds as 54.7%. To win a round as Neg, you could either win on a 3-0 decision or on a 2-1 decision (with three possible combinations of how this 2-1 could occur, depending on which judge sits). Accordingly, if judges were randomizing their ballots, we would need to find a ‘randomization rate’ for a Negative ballot such that x^3 + 3\*x^2\*(1-x) = 0.547, which produces an x value of 0.531. (This math is simpler than it seems: About 15% of the time with this randomization rate you would expect a 3-0 for the Negative, and just under 40% of the time it would produce a 2-1 for the Negative, so it combines to the total Neg win-rate of 54.7%.) So, we now know the rate at which each judge should be ‘randomly’ voting for Neg vs. Aff if it were to construct an overall Neg win-rate of 54.7%, and using that information we can construct what the expected data for the entire set of outcomes would be: You can tell visually that these distributions are very different from one another. Whereas the expected distribution predicts far more 2-1 decisions than 3-0 decisions, in practice 3-0s are quite prevalent. **A 3-0 decision for the Negative is the most likely of any individual outcome, and a 3-0 decision for the Affirmative is nearly as likely as a 2-1 decision in the Aff’s favor**. According to these data and the accompanying Chi-test, **there is a next-to-zero (p < 0.0001) chance that this distribution could be represented by judges randomizing in the ways described above**; this is relatively strong evidence that judges are able to discern winners and that they generally agree with one another on this distinction, or at least more than mere chance would predict. Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment. To evaluate this hypothesis, **I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg w[on]**inning **61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff**. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

Prefer empirics over analytics because they confirm what actually happens in debate – if analytics contradict with empirics, that means the analytic is wrong

1. Embracing alternative forms of debate is crucial to combat oppression within our debate space. In round practices of debaters creating multiple layers to escape hard conversations perpetuate an exclusion.

Smith 13, Elijah. A Conversation in Ruins: Race and Black Participation in Lincoln Douglas Debate

It will be uncomfortable, it will be hard, and it will require continued effort but the necessary step in fixing this problem, like all problems, is the community as a whole admitting that such a problem with many “socially acceptable” choices exists in the first place. Like all systems of social control, the reality of **racism in debate is constituted by** the singular **choices that** institutions, **coaches, and students make on a weekly basis**. I have watched countless rounds where **competitors** attempt to win by **rush**ing **to abstractions to distance the conversation from** the **material realit**y that black debaters are forced to deal with every day. One of the students I coached, who has since graduated after leaving debate, had an adult judge write out a ballot that concluded by “hypothetically” defending my student being lynched at the tournament. Another debate concluded with a young man defending that we can kill animals humanely, “just like we did that guy Troy Davis”. **Community norms** would **have competitors do intellectual gymnastics or make up rules** to accuse black debaters of breaking **to escape hard conversations**

but as someone who understands that experience, **the only constructive strategy is to acknowledge the reality of the oppressed, engage the discussion** from the perspective of authors who are black and brown, and then find strategies to deal with the issues at hand. It hurts to see competitive seasons come and go and have high school students and judges spew the same hateful things you expect to hear at a Klan rally**.** A student should not, when presenting an advocacy that aligns them with the oppressed, have to justify why oppression is bad. **Debate is not just a game, but a learning environment with liberatory potential** . Even if the form debate gives to a conversation is not the same you would use to discuss race in general conversation with Bayard Rustin or Fannie Lou Hamer, that is not a reason we have to strip that conversation of its connection to a reality that black students cannot escape.

1. Fairness is a call for neutrality which maintains the systems of oppression of the squo which perpetuates the unequal playing field that exists. Fairness is not objective and assuming it is ignores how one side started off a whole lot more stacked against.

**Delgado 92** Richard Delgado [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May

**We have** cleverly **built power's view of** the appropriate standard of conduct into **the** very **term fair**. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? **The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party**, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, **predictable arguments about** administrability, **fairness**, stability, and ease of determination **points us away from** what  [\*821]  really counts: **the way** in which **stronger parties have** managed to **inscribe their** views and **interests into "external" culture**, **so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.**

And, we impact to exclusion on a much larger scale where particular categories of debaters can’t engage and are excluded from this discourse – access is a multiplier which outweighs fairness

1. Limiting debate to a choice between policies enforces neoliberal conception of politics and history which makes impossible any alternative way of resisting the system – debate should be a space to disrupt our current paradigm of problem solving

**Curtis 13** Neal, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Film, Television and Media Studies at the University of Auckland, “Thought Bubble: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Knowledge,” *new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*, Volume 80-81, 2013, Project MUSE

Thought Bubble The Ernst & Young report quotes one anonymous university Vice-Chancellor declaring: ‘Our major competitor in ten years time will be Google … if we’re still alive!’ This quote supposedly encapsulates changes to our relation to knowledge indicative of the two drivers of change which the report calls ‘digital technologies’ and ‘democratization’. The reason why these two are related is because the report understands democratisation simply in terms of ‘access’ and then assumes the flawed syllogism whereby because digital technologies make knowledge accessible and democracy is about access, therefore all digital technologies are democratic. It would be foolish to suggest that a report citing ‘the Darwinian force of the market’33 could countenance the idea that democracy ought to be measured by something other than consumer-style access, but access in and of itself is not inherently democratic. Much like ‘excellence’ it requires secondary criteria to become a meaningful concept. Admittedly the report does avoid the positivist trap that users of Google can easily fall into, of assuming that knowledge is simply ‘out there’, such that its acquisition is merely a matter of data retrieval. The author of the report does link knowledge to analysis and interpretation, but given that we are asked to bend our knee to ‘the Darwinian force of the market’, one suspects that **analysis** and interpretation **is** of a kind with that found in the pages of the Financial Times and will be limited to debates over best policy within a given system, rather than any ontological engagement with the character and shape of the world itself. The Google model is, however, exemplary of the problem faced by the post-historical university and the nature of its democratic role. Leaving aside the rather obvious point that in the pursuit of profit Google have quite happily aided the Chinese government in their restriction of the democracy movement in that country, the Google model is significant because its success is based on successfully attending to and facilitating the personalisation that has come to define both democracy and knowledge in neoliberal consumer cultures. Google’s success has primarily come from its ability to provide a highly individualised service, partly due to the capacity of its search engine to learn what the user likes and to display results that are closely aligned to preferences indicated through earlier ‘click signals’; but this has also been a path to monetisation as the company is able to claim that it can deliver customers to companies with impressive precision. In an economy increasingly based on information, attention becomes a very rare commodity,34 so the ability to deliver attention to advertisers becomes a highly profitable capability. The capacity for Google to archive click signals affords increasingly successful searches without additional work from the user and provides a profile that companies can attach themselves to in their search for consumers. [End Page 84] While **this mode of information** retrieval **sits well with all the neoliberal markers of value - individuality**, preference, **choice**, **competition**, **immediacy - it gives rise to significant concerns for** both **knowledge** and democracy that must not be ignored. In a fascinating book entitled The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser sets out the implications of the Google algorithm. Initially, while the idea that what is best for one person may not be best for someone else is hardly revolutionary, the idea that a search engine is ‘biased to share our own views’35 has far-reaching consequences. In short, ‘your computer monitor is a kind of one-way mirror, reflecting your own interests while algorithmic observers watch what you click’ (Filter Bubble, p3). Here, access is instant and individualised, but Pariser is concerned that where ‘democracy requires a reliance on shared facts […] we’re being offered parallel but separate universes’ (Filter Bubble, p5). While it is important to argue that “facts” are not enough, shared or not, the problem is accentuated because the search engine, which is now a ‘prediction engine’ (Filter Bubble, p9), has a tendency to search out ‘facts’ you have already indicated a preference for through click signals. Ultimately the cookies and bots that aid personalised web-browsing begin to produce a filter bubble: ‘a unique universe of information for each of us’, but more importantly one that ‘fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information’ (Filter Bubble, p9). In other words, the Google model is one in which we continually receive more of what we already know and have indicated a preference for. Ultimately, the filter bubble is ‘a cozy place, populated by our favourite people and things and ideas’ (Filter Bubble, p12). Pariser notes that while this personalisation flatters users who believe they are in a position of control because the prediction engine appears to be giving them what they want, it increasingly subjects users ‘to a kind of informational determinism in which what you clicked on in the past determines what you see next’ (Filter Bubble, p16). This mode of personalised access means that Google does have great significance for the post-historical university, but that significance does not lie in the claim that Google University is the future as Ernst & Young would have us believe. Rather, the Google model is significant because the two forces of impact and customer service suggest that the post-historical university will increasingly take on the character of a filter bubble. As **research is** increasingly **directed towards** what are described to be **the needs of the current system, and teaching is tailored to satisfying the existing desires and preferences of students refigured as customers**, the university’s role in the global knowledge economy will be to offer more of the same. **The** **university has always had a major role to play in maintaining the cultural status quo and policing knowledge, but it has also historically been a major site for the social production of dissensus which is irreducible to the promotional language of ‘innovation’** and ‘entrepreneurialism’ (or any historical equivalent thereof). Ultimately the sole purpose of the Ernst & Young report is to ensure that the university of the future plays an integral part in the production of an ‘identity loop’ (Filter Bubble, p127), or what we might call a thought bubble that reproduces the truth of market logic. In the face of this doctrinal onslaught the future of the university as a social institution looks bleak, but despite the heavy-handed ideological work that the Ernst & Young report epitomises, **the future cannot be closed off** in the way they hope. As was noted in the introduction, the rationality of markets was shown to be a pseudo-science by the persistence and the effects of what Besley and Hennessey called the ‘psychology of herding’. First of all this produced the hysterical delusion that the business cycle had been overcome, which was then counteracted by the global loss of confidence that brought about the greatest economic crisis in living memory. [End Page 85] The evident role played by these ‘animal spirits’ testifies to the importance of a non-theoretical, non-rational relation to the world, but also to a more profound ontological state of mind that Heidegger refers to as ‘attunement’ or ‘mood’.36 Ordinarily that attunement is an unremarkable and comfortable familiarity, but one that might become a concerted defence in times of crisis. Fluctuations in mood are usually accompanied by stories that tell us something about the world we live in. With regards to the world of economics these are stories that precipitate trust, confidence, euphoria, frenzy, fear, and anxiety.37 These spirits and the stories that shape them are evidence of the continuing hermeneutic condition set out above. Stories make a world of sense, but they are only ever interpretations and remain subject to the vagaries of mood. **The narrative of neoliberal post-history can claim** to be the **rightful representation** of human relations **only because it is underwritten by** gigantic economic, political and social **power that supports** and distributes **its stories, not because** it has discovered **the truth**. In such an environment, academics regularly articulate concern about the utilitarianif notinstrumental mood, of managers and students alike. While the discourses of impact and customer service further support such instrumentality and suggest that the university of the future will increasingly help lock down the narrative of post-history, there is still hope. In keeping with Heidegger’s (in)famous use of Hölderlin’s words: ‘But where danger is, grows/The saving power also’,38 the pressures on students to achieve a certain GPA or class of degree and the demands on them to be socially compliant, still does not eradicate their sense that the world is contestable. In many cases the mood of **students** remains one of scepticism and doubt towards the supposed common sense, coupled with a desire for change. They **remain interested in the big questions** and readily support courses that make great theoretical demands on them. Students tend to be of an age when the sedimented world they have inherited has not yet ossified and all kinds of malformations and reformations remain possible. This means that **an important role can still be played by the university**; not one that is reduced to increasing access to what is already given, but one **that** opens up spaces for this contestation and challenging of the world, for offering up radically alternative ways of living and being-with-others. As was noted in the introduction, the humanities have an especially important role to play in this regard. While traditional humanities disciplines such as philosophy, English, and history have all supported social and political conservatism through, amongst other things, the defence of a canon, these disciplines have also been traditionally concerned with that gap between the meaningful and meaninglessness that defines the human condition**.** Whether a philosophical treatise, a work of literature, or the recovery of a counter-history, work in the humanities has always occupied that space where **the** meaningful totality we call our world suffers a variety of disruptions and is revealed to be inadequate. The humanities are never more alive than when faced with the loss of an established truth and the slipping away of the world. Some of the greatest works in the humanities are riddled with anxiety. It therefore falls on the humanities **in a time of crisis to enable anxiety to work in the name of alternative visions, which is precisely why the humanities are under such** strident **attack within the marketised model**. This is also a role that ought to be taken beyond the campus to form the beginnings of a new contract with a public that has just bailed out private speculators at the expense of public welfare. Turning away from the anxiety generated by the crisis will only encourage more of the same. The public role of the university should be to ensure this anxiety**,** understood as the re-emergence of the questioning that neoliberal post-history continually seeks to suppress, is turned to creative use.

## Cap Underview

1. Movements against capitalism need to focus on racism and sexism and micro political action - the alt fractures essential coalitions to solve anti-racist struggles – empirically proven

West 88 Honorary chair of the Democratic Socialist of America 1988 Cornell-prof @Princeton University, DSA National Politicall Committee and a member of its African American Commission; “Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism”; RACE & ETHNICITY ESERV; <http://race.eserver.org/toward-a-theory-of-racism.html> (year of publication found on Dr. West’s website: <http://www.pragmatism.org/library/west/>)

Socialism and Antiracism: Two Inseparable Yet Not Identical Goals It should be apparent that **racist practices** directed against black, brown, yellow, and red people **are an integral element of U. S. history**, including present day American culture and society. This means not simply that Americans have inherited racist attitudes and prejudices, but, more importantly, that institutional forms of racism are embedded in American society in both visible and invisible ways. These institutional forms exist not only in remnants of de jure job, housing, and educational discrimination and political gerrymandering. They also manifest themselves in a de facto labor market segmentation, produced by the exclusion of large numbers of peoples of color from the socioeconomic mainstream. (This exclusion results from limited educational opportunities, devastated families, a disproportionate presence in the prison population, and widespread police brutality. ) **It also should be evident that past Marxist conceptions of racism have often prevented U. S. socialist movements from engaging in antiracist activity in a serious and consistent manner. In addition, black suspicion of white-dominated political movements (no matter how progressive) as well as the distance between these movements and the daily experiences of peoples of color have made it even more difficult to fight racism effectively**.Furthermore, the disproportionate white middle-class composition of contemporary democratic socialist organizations creates cultural barriers to the participation by peoples of color. Yet this very participation is a vital precondition for greater white sensitivity to antiracist struggle and to white acknowledgment of just how crucial antiracist struggle is to the U. S. socialist movement. Progressive organizations often find themselves going around in a vicious circle. Even when they have a great interest in antiracist struggle, they are unable to attract a critical mass of people of color because of their current predominately white racial and cultural composition. These organizations are then stereotyped as lily white, and significant numbers of people of color refuse to join. **The only effective way the contemporary democratic socialist movement can break out of this circle** (and it is possible because the bulk of democratic socialists are among the least racist of Americans) **is to be sensitized to the critical importance of antiracist struggles**. This conscientization cannot take place either by reinforcing agonized white consciences by means of guilt, nor by presenting another grand theoretical analysis with no practical implications. The former breeds psychological paralysis among white progressives, which is unproductive for all of us; the latter yields important discussions but often at the expense of concrete political engagement. Rather **what is needed is more widespread participation by predominantly white democratic socialist organizations in antiracist struggles**--whether those struggles be for the political, economic, and cultural empowerment of Latinos, blacks, Asians, and Native Americans or antiimperialist struggles against U.S. support for oppressive regimes in South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, and the occupied West Bank. **A major focus on antiracist coalition work will** not only lead democratic socialists to act upon their belief in genuine individuality and radical democracy for people around the world; it also will **put socialists in daily contact with peoples of color in common struggle**. Bonds of trust can be created only within concrete contexts of struggle. This interracial interaction guarantees neither love nor friendship. Yet it can yield more understanding and the realization of two overlapping goals-- democratic socialism and antiracism. While engaging in antiracist struggles, **democratic socialists can also enter into a dialogue on the power relationships and misconceptions that often emerge in multiracial movements for social justice in a racist society**. Honest and trusting **coalition work can help socialists unlearn Eurocentrism** in a self-critical manner and can also demystify the motivations of white progressives in the movement for social justice. We must frankly acknowledge that a democratic socialist society will not necessarily eradicate racism. Yet a democratic socialist society is the best hope for alleviating and minimizing racism, particularly institutional forms of racism. This conclusion depends on a candid evaluation that guards against utopian self-deception. But it also acknowledges the deep moral commitment on the part of democratic socialists of all races to the dignity of all individuals and peoples--a commitment that impels us to fight for a more libertarian and egalitarian society. Therefore **concrete antiracist struggle is both an ethical imperative and political necessity for democratic socialists**. It is even more urgent as once again racist policies and Third World intervention become more acceptable to many Americans. **A more effective democratic socialist movement engaged in antiracist and antiimperialist struggle** can help turn the tide. It depends on how well we

This outweighs –

1. Kills alt solvency – micro political action centered on intersections of identity is necessary to survive in structures of capitalism while we try to destroy them – obscuring race and gender in class analysis makes the movement exclusionary which prevents marginalized bodies from participating which kills solvency
2. Micropolitical action spills upwards to change overarching structural conditions – individual acts of survival or engagement within the system constitute macropolitical change which means don’t arbitrarily privilege macropolitics

## Ethics Underview

1. Reject abstract ethics - pretending that immoral entities are capable of moral action is abstraction that makes ethics impossible. Traditional ethics is an anti black system that only serves to re-entrench white supremacy.

**Curry 13** Dr. Tommy; “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical”

**Traditional**ly we have taken **ethics** to be, as Henry Sedgwick claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action” (1981:1). This rational procedure **is** however **at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue**, as is often done, **that the government**, its citizens, or white people **should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition.** If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In **ethical deliberations** dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to **attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated.** **This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, the only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be anti-ethical**, or a judgment **refusing to write morality onto immoral entities.** In the post-structuralist era, post-colonial thinking about racism specifically, and difference/otherness generally, has given a peculiar ameliorative function to discourse and the performance of “other-ed” identities. In this era, the dominant illusion is that discourse itself , an act that requires as its basis the recognition of the “other” as “similar,” is socially transformative—not only with regard to how the white subject assimilates the similitude of the “other-ed,” but as an actual activity gauged by the recognition by one white person or by a group of white people in any given scenario, is uncritically accepted and encouraged as anti-racist politics.. In actuality **such discourse** appeals, which **necessitate**—become **dependent on—(white) recognition**, function very much like the racial stereotype, in that the concept of the **Black** body being the **expression** **and** **source of** experience and **phenomena** (existential-phenomenological-theorization) **is incarcerated by the conceptualization created the discursive catalyst yearning to be perceived by the white thing seeing the Black**. **Such appeals lend potentiality-hope-faith to** the already present/demonstrated ignorance-racism-interest of the **white** individual, who in large part expresses the historical tone/epistemology of their racial group’s interest. **When morality is defined, not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch.**

1. Abstract ethics requires a view from nowhere which allows the white male body to take the dominant position. Embodied experience is necessary.

**Yancy 08** Prof of Philosophy Duquesne University “Black Bodies, White Gazes *THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2008

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write froma place of lived embodied experience a site of exposure. **In philosophy**, the only thing that we are taught to expose is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone’s “inferior” reasoning power. **The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory**, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so **we are told**, **to reason from nowhere**. Hence, **the white philosopher/**author **presumes to speak for all of “us” without** the slightest **mention of his or her “raced” identity**. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:  Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "**whiteness**" **of** my **authorship**. This whiteness of authorship **is,** for us**, a form of authority**; **to speak** (apparently) **from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering,** though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: **it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting** or apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.(1998, 6)  To **theorize the Black body one must "turn to the** [Black] **body as the radix for** interpreting **racial experience**" (Johnson [1993, 600]). It is important to note that **this** particular strategy also **functions as a lens through which to** theorize and **critique whiteness**; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where **the Black body's** subjectivity, its ***lived* reality**, **is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary**, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body." These instantiations are **embedded within** and evolve out of **the** complex **social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction** through complex acts of erasure **vis-à-vis Black people.** These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value"(Snead 1994,

# 1AR – Extensions

## ROB Extension

Extend the Role of the Judge is to affirm the best strategy to resist oppression – Fine 13 says that current debate practices make debate technocratic because of what arguments are valued which teaches debaters to ignore real life violence– our model of debate empowers people to make real world change – prefer

1. Context – The evidence is making a prescriptive claim about the debate community which means it’s the most applicable to the activity that we are in – that’s the most important justification because even if something is good in abstract, that doesn’t mean it should be the topic of debate

2. Portable skills – The goal of debate is to teach us to be better people, our model of debate teaches us skills that allows us to fight oppression when we leave debate which outweighs on duration

## v. K extensions

Extend the Role of the Judge is to affirm the best strategy to resist oppression – **Fine 13** says that focusing on material realities are key to avoid abstraction and to create real change

1. Context – The evidence is making a prescriptive claim about the debate community which means it’s the most applicable to the activity that we are in – that’s the most important justification because even if something is good in abstract, that doesn’t mean it should be the topic of debate

Extend **Ahmed 07** – Spaces operate based on habit formations – repetition of orientations of bodies that inhabit them. Bodies that don’t fit in them experience friction and are forced with expectations – when women debate they are expected to be submissive and if they aren’t they are dismissed as nagging. Extend **Ahmed 13** – This creates unequal energy distribution – marginalized bodies are forced to expel energy just to exist in spaces that aren’t made for them. This means **we are a prior question** to the alternative because only we give people energy to get up and keep fighting.

Extend **Ahmed 10** – We affirm the resolution through the methodology of the killjoy to disorient the orientation of debate - an internal rejection of the paradigm of happiness placed on marginalized bodies. Net benefit is collectivization – we create affective spaces of solidarity to come together to resolve psychological violence of debate. *The 1NC focuses on liberation from macro structures, but we need to learn how to survive within those structures in the meantime*

## v. Theory Case Extensions

Extend the Role of the Judge is to affirm the best strategy to resist oppression – **Fine 13** says that focusing on material realities are key to avoid abstraction and to create real change which is an independent reason to drop you for reading theory because it reproduces exclusionary norms.

Extend **Ahmed 07** – Spaces operate based on habit formations – repetition of orientations of bodies that inhabit them. This is how whiteness coheres itself – spaces begin to accommodate\* bodies that exist within them, and begin to take their shape. Ahmed 13 says that this creates unequal energy distribution – marginalized bodies are forced to expel energy. This creates psychological violence and disincentives bodies from engaging in movements to create change.

Extend **Ahmed 10** – We affirm the resolution through the methodology of the killjoy to disorient the orientation of debate. This methodology is an internal rejection of the paradigm of happiness placed on marginalized bodies, which creates spaces of solidarity to resolve the psychological violence created by isolation within debate.

## Survival Strategy Extensions

The method of the killjoy is a survival strategy – a way to exist within spaces that oppress us by creating affective spaces of solidarity to resolve the psychological violence that comes from alienation in debate. Even if it’s structural change we need, we need to be able to survive in the first place.

## Institutions Extensions

**Extend Ahmed 07 –** Institutions operate based on the repetition of affective relationships between bodies – the University, for example, is more than concrete and buildings but rather complex relations that structure whose bodies fit into institutions versus those that don’t – to be inside the university is to be comfortable within that web of relations. The killjoy is an affective methodology that creates new structures of relation that disrupt the institution. Because it creates new affective relationship, it isn’t the same institution.

## Case > Extinction

Psychological violence outweighs extinction (a) probability – tons of alt causality and alt solvency to extinction scenarios – alternative actors will intervene and its never happened before even but psychological violence is happening right now (b) cyclical harm – women and people of color experience social extinction every day which builds up to outweigh the magnitude of extinction and *(c) independent reps DA to extinction – extinction scenarios are used to mask every day institutionalized violence against people of color and obscure mass oppression*

# Frontlines – Theory

## Condo Bad

Conditionality is a voting issue - makes the 1AR impossible because I’ll have to generate new offense against the CP but you’ll just kick out of it if I undercover it – that’s the worst impact under the role of the ballot because (a) forces me to jump through hoops to actually engage in a discussion about how to resolve oppression which makes debate exclusionary because we’ll never genuniely talk about material inequalities and (b) means you don’t have to defend your speech act and can just kick out of it which makes debate unsafe because you don’t have to defend oppressive arguments — also kills fairness because the 1ar is time crunched and the 2N will exploit 1ar time tradeoffs and go for what I undercover, definitionally killing fairness.

## PICs Bad

Counterplans that are aff inclusive are voting issues– 1) prevents us from engaging on in depth discussion over competing liberation strategies that revolve around competing methods and instead allows the 1N to hijack the aff’s method and make one small modification, forcing the debate to minute differences instead of core controversy. 2) Kills 1AR ability to engage because moots 6 minutes of AC offense – infinite amount of things you can PIC out of which is worst harm under the ROB because we’ll never find the best liberation strategy – also kills fairness because you’ll be very prepped on the tiny net benefit debate but it’s impossible for me to predict and prep out every possible thing you could PIC out of and I can’t use case to answer it which means I’ll always lose on the substance of the PIC.

## A2 New 2N Underview Answers

You can do impact weighing in the 2NR but don’t allow new 2NR responses – All of the warrants and implications in the underview are very clear – allowing new responses kills aff strategy because you’ll sandbag till the 2NR and I’ll have no time in the 2AR to answer it. This also forces judge intervention because they’ll have to evaluate new arguments that were barely compared.

## A2 TVA

1. Topical version of the aff doesn’t exist – The killjoy is a figure of deviancy that we affirm as a resistance strategy in this round, it isn’t something that exists within public colleges and universities and it can’t solve the prefiat aspect of the aff
2. Even if there is a topical version, if we defend it you won’t engage in the aff but will instead read tons of DAs and try to outweigh – means not defending a policy is key

*[If no plan text]* Overview – they claim there is a topical version of the aff but didn’t give a plan text or explain what it would be – they functionally read a CP without a CP text which means it’s impossible to evaluate and you should err on the side of no TVA

### A2 No competitive setting

1. The role of the ballot indicates that a competitive setting is key because it teaches us what we value in debate
2. This is offense and the whole point of the aff – when women bring up problems they are told to calm down or leave debate
3. Only the ballot forces teams to confront oppression within the debate space – Louisville movement proves

**Reid Brinley 08** Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, 2008, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF ‘ACTING BLACK’: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,”

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. The Louisville Project has not convinced the debate community to change its normative practice. Given the adversarial nature of tournament competition, opposing teams seem most concerned with developing viable strategies to beat Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a resolution of conflict between the Louisville team and other community members. Yet, it seems that attempts to engage the structural barriers that maintain the lack of community diversity seems to not have substantially increased racial and ethnic inclusion. That **the Louisville team shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate community to significantly increase its discussion of the problem**. In other words, the Project may not directly result in sweeping changes in the policy debate community, it did create a rhetorical controversy that forced the issue of racial exclusion and privilege onto the community’s agenda. Thus, I argue that the tournament round is a critical plateau from which to force a reflexive conversation about the normative practices of debate that might operate to maintain racial exclusion and privilege.

### A2 SSD

1. Just because I can read it when I’m neg doesn’t mean I shouldn’t read it on the aff – reading it on neg can’t solve the exclusive discursive spaces that operate when we are aff
2. Psychological trauma DA – forcing debaters to defend the resolutions that are structurally built against their identity and to role play as their oppressor causes psychological trauma

## A2 Can’t Weigh Case

1. Even if I can’t weigh case I can still cross apply arguments – they are just arguments that you can respond to – ie we both have competing interpretations of debate as an institution and how it should look, you should be forced to defend yours against my model
2. Unfairness is inevitable – some debaters have more money or coaches or prep or are just better at debate and the judge is still able to evaluate whether arguments are true or not

# Frontlines – Case Answers

## A2 Ballot Commodification

1. No link – we don’t rely on the ballot for solvency – it’s not a question of personal affirmation, our method is good whether or not we get the ballot. It’s just a question of what the judge should value when evaluating the debate – Fine 13 says it should be a methods debate, whoever wins their method should win.
2. Non unique – if we commodify the ballot then the ballot will always be commodified because it endorses something
3. Only the ballot forces teams to confront oppression within the debate space – Louisville movement proves

**Reid Brinley 08** Dr. Shanara Reid Brinkley, 2008, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF ‘ACTING BLACK’: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE,”

Zompetti’s fears are fairly reasonable. The Louisville Project has not convinced the debate community to change its normative practice. Given the adversarial nature of tournament competition, opposing teams seem most concerned with developing viable strategies to beat Louisville inside the tournament round. Such a competitive atmosphere may not allow a resolution of conflict between the Louisville team and other community members. Yet, it seems that attempts to engage the structural barriers that maintain the lack of community diversity seems to not have substantially increased racial and ethnic inclusion. That **the Louisville team shifts the discussion on racial inclusion into actual debate competition forces the broader debate community to significantly increase its discussion of the problem**. In other words, the Project may not directly result in sweeping changes in the policy debate community, it did create a rhetorical controversy that forced the issue of racial exclusion and privilege onto the community’s agenda. Thus, I argue that the tournament round is a critical plateau from which to force a reflexive conversation about the normative practices of debate that might operate to maintain racial exclusion and privilege.

## A2 Can’t Control Emotions

1. This isn’t responsive – our advocacy is how we orient ourselves towards those emotions – instead of trying to hide them which creates psychological violence – we embrace them
2. Not true – you control expression of emotions – ie you are forced to pretend to be happy and not complain within oppressive systems

## A2 Invisible Committee

1. No alternative – we need to communicate resistance strategies in order to create spaces of solidarity – our aff resolves because it’s just about creating spaces of relief
2. Co-option is inevitable – the state coopts any radical resistance which means it shouldn’t be a question of how to hide from the state but rather caring for ourselves

## A2 Kill Solidarity

1. Not true – our method isn’t killing individual debaters’ joy –it’s about disrupting the institutions that create affective requirements to be happy – by refusing the requirement to be happy, we create spaces of solidarity

## A2 Not Happy ☹

There’s a distinction between happiness and joy – joy is an affective relation of space that allows white male bodies to ignore oppression - killing joy is refusing to be silent or complicit within structures of oppression – when women bring up sexism, they are dismissed as nagging and killing the joy of white males. Happiness is a physical/psychological feeling – you can be happy while killing joy.

## A2 Some People Can’t Speak Out

1. Our method solves – the killjoy doesn’t require speaking out but rather includes many different tactics to survive and resist oppressive systems.

**Ahmed 17** Sara Ahmed "Introduction to Killjoys@Work Panel, March 14, Cambridge" Published on feministkilljoys.com on March 28, 2017 https://feministkilljoys.com

Why the killjoy? She tends to come up whenever feminists speak up. **To name sexual harassment, to account for the whiteness of the curriculum, to talk of domestic violence, to say they cut, we bleed, is to get in the way of happiness of others**. So much happiness depends upon turning away from what compromises unhappiness. When violence disappears from view, and violence is often reproduced by not coming into view; then to speak of violence is to make violence appear. And then you do appear violent, as if you are forcing something unpleasant onto others, even being mean to others. I think of the killjoy as a kind of feminist memory. It is not just that we remember being her, those times at family tables, those dinners ruined, when we are wound up by someone who is winding up; though she is for many of us that. It is not just that we become her when as women of colour we bring up racism at the feminist table, or the atmosphere noticeable changes when we enter the room, turning up can bring racism up; though she is for many of us that too. As a figure she acquired her potency from a feminist history, a history not only of those who have been charged with unhappiness but those who have been willing to receive that charge. When we receive that charge, we don’t necessarily become unhappy or unhappier. I still remember when I first began giving talks about feminist killjoys how the atmosphere would become electric. I could almost hear a sizzle, snap, snap. Even though she brings up a difficult history, a painful history, she seems to pick us up. Feminism: how pick each other up. I have two conclusions in the book, **a killjoy** survival kit, followed by a killjoy manifesto. The sequence does matter: **we must first survive**. Audre Lorde once said that there were **some of us who were not meant to survive**. For Lorde, for some of us, survival is politically ambitious; you **have to be inventive to survive**. A manifesto might be how feminism survives. It is not that the feminist killjoy has a manifesto. **The feminist killjoy is a manifesto**. **She makes violence manifest**; **she brings violence that is already in the room to surface** because of what she says, becauseof what she does. **To suggest that the** feminist **killjoy is a manifesto is not to say that we have obligation to speak out**. **We are not all in the same position**; **we cannot all afford to speak out**. **Killing joy** thus **requires a communication system**: **we have to find other ways for the violence to become manifest**. **We might need to use guerrilla tactics, and we have a feminist history to draw upon here; you can write names of harassers on books; graffiti on walls; turn bodies into art; put red ink in the water**. **We might even stop citing “white men” when we write our books**. Yes we are willing to be that blunt. **Sexism makes it hard to speak about sexism. Racism makes it hard to speak about racism**. **The harder it is, the more creative we have to become**. **We wiggle about, we create room**. A kitchen table becomes a feminist of colour press. Some of you might have heard **Angela Davis** speaking in London on Saturday. She made yet another important contribution to our collective feminist survival. I really liked how she **stressed that it is from activism that we generate new feminist ideas**. She also stressed how much we receive from the work that has already been done; we receive rights yes, access to worlds, yes, at least for some; possibilities, yes, possibilities of living together, of being together. **We** also **receive**, I think, **energy that passes through each of us like a jolt**, switching us on. It is from difficult experiences, of being bruised by structures that are not even revealed to others, that **we acquire the energy to go on**. The more we expose the weight of history, the heavier it becomes. We snap. Feminist snap: those moments we do not take it anymore; the work we have to do so that we do not take it anymore.

## A2 Static Subject

1. No link – we don’t define what a killjoy is – it’s constantly changing – no where in the aff do we say what it means to be a killjoy or who can or can’t
2. Cross apply Ahmed 17 – Self reflexivity net benefit – the killjoy can kill feminist joy if it becomes exclusionaru – the figure of the angry black women can kill exclusionary white feminism which means the method can resolve itself
3. **Turn – the killjoy isn’t essentialist – it opens up spaces to contest the hegemonic categories of identity**

**Ahmed 15** Sara Ahmed “Under the Skin”, http://feministkilljoys.com/2015/03/04/under-the-skin/, March 4, 2015

I hear this often: how can we initiate a dialogue, say between radical feminists and trans feminists? Can’t we just be seated at the same time, to talk this out, to talk this through? Can’t we just be reasonable: there are two sides, let’s hear them both? **The only starting point is this: no one at a table has the right to decide in advance who counts as “women.” It is not up to us to decide who is and is not “women” in advance of a conversation**.[[1]](http://feministkilljoys.com/" \l "_ftnref1) **When people use criteria to decide who counts, that criteria has already become a technique for exclusion** because it is not a criteria that will be shared by others. This is why the criteria being used to exclude trans women from “women” keep changing:44 when content (a woman is x) is being used as an end (you are not x), ideas have already become weapons. Any way of saying you do not belong here, in this category, but also in this room, this shelter, in this group, any way of saying, if you arrive my safety will be compromised, any way of saying seems to be what ends up being said. You might think: but what if there is truth in the criteria? **You might point** **to** the **biological facts**. Well **biology is contingent**, mutable and variable. There are **some** who **hold onto rigid ideas of biological** **sex**, but **feminists historically have not been among them**! In some cases, I have heard people refer to “biology 101” or scientific basis of female and male sex difference to claim trans women are not “biologically women.” I want to rebuke: biology 101? Well patriarchy wrote that textbook and pass them a copy of Anne Fausto-Sterling’sSexing the Body (2000) or Andrea Dworkin’s Woman Hating, a radical feminist text that supports transsexuals having access to surgery and hormones and challenges what she calls “the traditional biology of sexual difference” based on “two discrete biological sexes” (1972: 181, 186). **There is no point in being gender critical if you are going to leave** this **traditional biology intact** as biology is already invested in meaning and value, as feminists have shown us for generations; it is invested in value because **the desire to see two sexes** (“it’s a girl, “it’s a boy”) not only **creates a system of alignment** (“if not one, then the other”) but does not see the immense heterogeneity and variability of biological existence. To **be gender critical whilst assuming two discrete biological sexes is to tighten rather than loosen a gender system**. Radical feminists have been among those who have shown us this! What is going on in this anti-trans work is the desire to exclude and police the boundaries of “women” on whatever basis can be found (hence the target is a moving target). This policing has a point; it is pointed. It surfaces as questions as well as assertions: you are not who you are say you are; we know better than you who you are. In our collective feminist histories the policing of who are “women” has been about how a specific group of women have secured their right to determine who belongs within feminism (whiteness has been a key mechanism for policing feminism). **The policing of the boundaries of “women” has always been disastrous for feminism**. And just remember this too, **feminism is possible because of a premise that is a promise: we do not have to live by other people’s assignments**.

## A2 Transphobic

1. No link – we don’t define what a killjoy or what a woman is – it’s open and changing, there aren’t restrictions – force them to quote lines from the 1AC to prove why we defend a biological definition of women
2. Turn - queer folks can use the figure of the killjoy to kill trans-exclusionary joy – our method solves

**Cowan 14** T. L. Cowan "Transfeminist Kill/Joys Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance" TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly \* Volume 1, Number 4 \* November 2014 Duke Press

T his essay considers an affective trope that I have come to recognize as “**the transfeminist kill/joy**”: **a set of proliferating dialectics expressed as the rage**1 **that comes into being through living the violent effects of transphobia and transmisogyny and the practice of transformational love as a struggle for existence**.2 While **the transfeminist kill/joy might certainly be understood as a politicize aesthetic and form of social action that extends well beyond (cis)gender feminist politics and social life,3 here I read for the poetics of killing trans-absent or transexcluding feminist joy**. In this discussion of recent transfeminist critical creative work, I trace how **the transfeminist kill/joy works both to spoil feelings of political and social well-being or pleasure that are contingent upon the tacit absence or explicit exclusion of trans women in feminist conceptual and physical spaces and to restructure, claim, and repair feminist happiness** through what Chela Sandoval (2000: 180) has called “a hermeneutics of love.” In my framing of the “**transfeminist kill/joy**,” I hope to signal, as does Sara Ahmed (2010) in her original framing of the feminist killjoy, that **the mere presence or arrival of perceived difference can be understood as “threaten[ing] the social bond” (68) within privileged feminist scenarios**.4 While Ahmed frames the killing of feminist joy (67) mostly in terms of women of color in white feminist spaces, and certainly racism and transphobia and trans-misogyny are not interchangeable,5 I suggest that **trans-absent or trans-excluding feminist political and social scenarios can be understood to experience a similar threat to the “organic enjoyment and solidarity”** (67) **of the** (perceived homogeneity of the) **group** **when forced to deal with the presence** or proximity of **trans women, since this arrival “exposes not only the unreliableness of the body as a source of their identities and politics, but also the fallacy of women’s universal experiences and oppressions**” (Koyama 2006: 704). Put in the terms of Ahmed’s earlier work (2006), **the transfeminist kill/joy is an assemblage of affects that reorients feminist happiness toward rather than against trans women**,6 and **uses anger and love to resist a feminism designed exclusively for non-trans women**, not necessarily feminism by all non-trans women.7 Central to my exploration of the transfeminist kill/joy are the following questions: How do I (or can I) inhabit a transfeminist criticality without falling into the patriarchal trap of “recycling the most threadbare of cliche´s: the angry, man-hating lesbian” (Salamon 2008: 125)?8 Is it possible to inscribe the trope of the transfeminist kill/joy without reinscribing the trope of the straw feminist as demonic other? Rather than holding steady in a paranoid position, assured that “no time could be too early for having-already-known, for its having alreadybeen-inevitable, that something bad would happen” (Sedgwick 2003: 132), can this essay, along with the work of the kill/joys I study here, imagine a different inevitability, a reparative temporality constituted by the hopeful inevitability of love?

1. **Turn – the killjoy isn’t essentialist – it opens up spaces to contest the hegemonic categories of binary gender identity**

Ahmed 15 Sara Ahmed “Under the Skin”, http://feministkilljoys.com/2015/03/04/under-the-skin/, March 4, 2015

I hear this often: how can we initiate a dialogue, say between radical feminists and trans feminists? Can’t we just be seated at the same time, to talk this out, to talk this through? Can’t we just be reasonable: there are two sides, let’s hear them both? **The only starting point is this: no one at a table has the right to decide in advance who counts as “women.” It is not up to us to decide who is and is not “women” in advance of a conversation**.[[1]](http://feministkilljoys.com/#_ftnref1) **When people use criteria to decide who counts, that criteria has already become a technique for exclusion** because it is not a criteria that will be shared by others. This is why the criteria being used to exclude trans women from “women” keep changing:44 when content (a woman is x) is being used as an end (you are not x), ideas have already become weapons. Any way of saying you do not belong here, in this category, but also in this room, this shelter, in this group, any way of saying, if you arrive my safety will be compromised, any way of saying seems to be what ends up being said. You might think: but what if there is truth in the criteria? **You might point** **to** the **biological facts**. Well **biology is contingent**, mutable and variable. There are **some** who **hold onto rigid ideas of biological** **sex**, but **feminists historically have not been among them**! In some cases, I have heard people refer to “biology 101” or scientific basis of female and male sex difference to claim trans women are not “biologically women.” I want to rebuke: biology 101? Well patriarchy wrote that textbook and pass them a copy of Anne Fausto-Sterling’sSexing the Body (2000) or Andrea Dworkin’s Woman Hating, a radical feminist text that supports transsexuals having access to surgery and hormones and challenges what she calls “the traditional biology of sexual difference” based on “two discrete biological sexes” (1972: 181, 186). **There is no point in being gender critical if you are going to leave** this **traditional biology intact** as biology is already invested in meaning and value, as feminists have shown us for generations; it is invested in value because **the desire to see two sexes** (“it’s a girl, “it’s a boy”) not only **creates a system of alignment** (“if not one, then the other”) but does not see the immense heterogeneity and variability of biological existence. To **be gender critical whilst assuming two discrete biological sexes is to tighten rather than loosen a gender system**. Radical feminists have been among those who have shown us this! What is going on in this anti-trans work is the desire to exclude and police the boundaries of “women” on whatever basis can be found (hence the target is a moving target). This policing has a point; it is pointed. It surfaces as questions as well as assertions: you are not who you are say you are; we know better than you who you are. In our collective feminist histories the policing of who are “women” has been about how a specific group of women have secured their right to determine who belongs within feminism (whiteness has been a key mechanism for policing feminism). **The policing of the boundaries of “women” has always been disastrous for feminism**. And just remember this too, **feminism is possible because of a premise that is a promise: we do not have to live by other people’s assignments**.

1. The category of “woman” is assigned and commanded onto bodies – it is not about being born female but rather anyone who exists under the sign of woman.

**Ahmed 17** Sara Ahmed 2017 Duke University Press “Living a Feminist Life”

We should be asking ourselves the same sorts of questions when we write our texts, when we put things together, as we do in living our lives. **How to dismantle the world that is built to accommodate only some bodies?** **Sexism is one such accommodating system**. **Feminism requires supporting women in a struggle to exist in this world**. **What do I mean by women** here? **I am referring to all those who travel under the sign women**. **No feminism** **worthy of its name would use the sexist idea “women born women” to create the edges of feminist community**, **to render trans women into “not women,”** or “not born women,” or into men.7 **No one is born a woman; it as an assignment** (not just **a sign**, but also **a task or an imperative**, as I discuss in part I) **that can shape us; make us; and break us**. **Many women who were assigned female at birth, let us remind ourselves, are deemed not women in the right way, or not women at all**, perhaps **because of how they do or do not express themselves** (they are too good at sports, not feminine enough because of their bodily shape, comportment, or conduct, not heterosexual, not mothers, and so on). **Part of the difficulty of the category of women is what follows residing in that category, as well as what follows not residing in that category because of the body you acquire, the desires you have, the paths you follow or do not follow**. **There can be violence at stake in being recognizable as women; there can be violence at stake in not being recognizable as women.**

# Frontlines – Truth Testing

### O/V

1. **Fraser 90** is a DA to truth testing – they prevent questioning of identity or reps in debate which excludes those who are visible and creates an unsafe debate space. Aff is a prior question – objective deliberation over the truth or falsity of the resolution is impossible because of social inequality. Outweighs on magnitude – there’s no material impact to debate being incoherent but an exclusionary debate spaces prevents people from getting any possible benefit from debate
2. Reject constituitivism claims – The only thing constitutive of debate is the lack of a static gridlocked identity – constituitivism destroys the value of debate as an open and constantly changing activity defined by the voices in it – constituitivism inevitably excludes certain bodies by presenting itself as neutral, and allows debaters to avoid debating about the effects of their model of debate
3. Evaluate this debate modestly – I have offense under constituitivism as well as reasons why my model of debate is pragmatically better while they only have offense under constituitivism – if there’s a sufficient risk that constituitivism is wrong or a bad framework to evaluate ROBs, then that is sufficient to evaluate through my ROB

Prefer our role of the ballot –

1. Even if I lose truth testing, that doesn’t take out the aff – we can just test the truth of the 1AC, you have no reasons why testing the truth of the resolution is uniquely good
2. **Fraser 90** is a DA to truth testing – they prevent questioning of identity or reps in debate which excludes those who are visible and creates an unsafe debate space. Implications -
   1. Truth is inaccessible to those who can’t access the space and means aff is a prior question – objective deliberation over the truth or falsity of the resolution is impossible because of social inequality. Accessibility outweighs because it’s a prerequisite to debate.
   2. Incoherence is nonunique – Genuine deliberative spaces are already impossible, thus debate is incoherent either way. Try or die for the aff because we open up deliberative spaces.
3. The whole aff impact turns this – the Ahmed 07 evidence indicates that institutions create orientation based on the repetition of actions within the institution until they become naturalized and we can no longer question them – that’s the definition of truth testing – saying debate is this certain way and we can’t question it
4. Reject constituitivism claims –
   1. The only thing constitutive of debate is the lack of a static gridlocked identity – constituitivism destroys the value of debate as an open and constantly changing activity defined by the voices in it – constituitivism inevitably excludes certain bodies by presenting itself as neutral, and allows debaters to avoid debating about the effects of their model of debate
   2. The whole aff impact turns this – the Ahmed 07 evidence indicates that institutions create orientation based on the repetition of actions within the institution until they become naturalized and we can no longer question them – that’s the definition of truth testing – saying debate is this certain way and we can’t question it which is hegemonic
   3. Only constitutive feature of debate is for the judge to give the ballot to the better debater. We have forwarded what it means to be better debater, they will forward one too, they should be forced to defend that model.

## A2 Constitutive rules of debate

1. Dictionary.com defines “affirm” as “to express agreement with or commitment to uphold; support”. Prefer aff definitions – there are bidirectional definitions of every word and the aff has to choose one. Additionally, **12 dictionaries[[2]](#footnote-2)** define “to affirm” as some variation of “to show support for” or “to state positively” – ie not truth testing – which means my model of debate is more constituitive of debate
2. They are just asserting warrantless claims – to determine the constitutive natures of activities you need expert analysis but there is no governing body that can define the rules of what debate is which means no way to define what is constitutive of debate – truth testing definitively isn’t constitutive of debate
3. This is circular, it begs the question of what you have the jurisdiction to vote on – empirically proven, judges vote on non T affs all the time and nothing happens – the topic is not a rule unlike speech times
4. Empirically denied - Debate doesn’t become incoherent if we don’t affirm the truth of the resolution – ie policy debate is a coherent model of debate that does not follow truth testing.
5. Debate should allow a multitude of models of engagement and shouldn’t be limited to one “constitutive” claim.

**Koh and Niemi 15** Ben Koh & Rebar Niemi "How Do I Reach These Kids?: An Affirmation of Polyvocal Debate" September 15, 2015

For as long as there has been debate, there has been the debate about what debate is. We are not against a discussion of what constitutes debate. In fact we are absolutely for it. We argue that this is a crucial debate within debates. **The question should not be “what is debate?” The proper question is “what can debate do?”** **The constitutive feature of debate** that we are most abstractly interested in **is** the precise one that is so often banished by debate pundits – **the possibilities of what it can do**. We do not yet know what debate can do. All are welcome to accept the challenge of forcing debate into a linear and instrumental framework, but be warned it will certainly fail. Debate is a process and a field, not a mechanism. This is the case for polyvocal debate. Our current definition (which is open to redefinition) is that **debate should be** thought of as **a complex assemblage of voices** (the debaters, the judge, audiences, coaches, the authors quoted, and so on), and that **it** **is wrong to limit the possible voices** or the possible enunciations of those voices. Debate is always about multiple voices – multiple ways of sensing/expressing. Even non-sense and non-expression have their own voices. This is not a paradigm. It is a hypothesis about the system of relations that co-creates debate. The power and potential of polyvocal debate is not located in some far-off future. It is right here right now, and it is also capable of contact with the outsides of one perspective on time and space. To paraphrase June Tyson – Don’t you know? It’s after the end of the world. Within the system of relations composed by polyvocal debate, **we always have the ability to ask** “should we believe in something in the first place?” as well as “**if we believe it, what are its normative implications?**” These questions, in whatever form they take, are some of the most primal elements of debate. **Restricting the scope of debate to only some of these questions is a serious loss**. **More absurd is the justification for restriction based on the value of being able to ask and engage with these questions in the first** place. It is wrong to assume that chaos and doubt are bad. It is even worse to argue for a progressive fallacy that chaos and doubt can be removed from debate without debate ceasing to be debate at all. Debate is not soccer, or chess, or playing the trumpet. Perhaps it can do similar things to those activities, but if so it is because it does not feature the limits that define soccer or chess or playing the trumpet.

This impact turns truth testing. Prefer our evidence – the authors are people in the LD community which means the evidence is specific to the context of debate which is more contextual than arbitrary dictionary definition of aff and neg. *Also, solves their truth testing good arguments – they can still read Truth testing, they just need to justify why it’s a good model of debate instead of saying It’s what debate is.*

1. There are no constitutive rules of debate – every round is a reconceptualization of what debate is.

Enoch 11 David Enoch “Shmagency Revisited” January 2011 <https://upenn.instructure.com/courses/1205847/files/46456496/download?verifier=u9J6caLjtIICepl0Z28cSIhG3SnJBmK9F5luSmDh> In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan

But **one may** want to reject this initial claim, even with regard to chess. For it may be **suggest**ed **that playing chess does** after all **suffice** for having a reason – **some reason, at least**, perhaps **a weak one**, perhaps one that is outweighed by others – **for checkmating your opponent**. Perhaps there is no need after all for another reason, namely, a reason to be playing chess (or perhaps to play this specific game of chess)? If so, we may proceed to conclude that our merely playing the agency-game suffices for us having a reason to aim at its constitutive aims. As a general thesis, though, this **cannot be true. We can define many cooked-up variations of chess, with slightly different rules, or** perhaps slightly **different ways of winning** (say, you only win if you checkmate your opponent in an even number of moves; or when she still has her queen; or when she looks away; or cases in which you win if you move your castle diagonally three times when your opponent looks away; etc.). **Whenever you** find yourself **play**ing **chess, you** also find yourself (**in sufficiently early stages of the game) play**ing **these cooked-up games** chess\*, chess\*\*, chess\*\*\*, and so on. **But it doesn't seem you have reasons** **to win** at chess\*, or at chess\*\*, or at chess\*\*\*. This is so, presumably, because you don't have a reason to play chess\*, or chess\*\*, or chess\*\*\*. So this little example suffices to show that **it's not in general true that engaging in some activity** – satisfying some relevant descriptive criteria – **suffices for having reason to aim at its constitutive aim**. So if you think that the game of agency is different – if you think, in other words, that playing it suffices for having a reason to play it well, or to achieve its constitutive aims, or some such – then you must be able to come up with an answer to the question: What's so special about agency? Why is this true of agency, even though it's not true in general? I can’t think of an answer to this question (except perhaps in terms of inescapability, to which we will return shortly).

1. Best case scenario they win that debate becomes incoherent – now it’s just a question of which is more important – coherence of debate versus accessibility for marginalized bodies. We outweigh –
   1. Magnitude – debate becoming incoherent doesn’t have tangible impacts while exclusion prevents people from getting any benefit from debate
   2. We hijack the internal link – if people are excluded then debate becomes less coherent as an activity
   3. Verifiability – people have different conceptions of what coherence is – ie policy debaters, which means it’s impossible to verify your impact while its verifiable that people don’t have access to the neg model of debate. Also means you should reject constitutive claims because it becomes a question of judge preference.

## A2 Ballot commodification

1. No link – we don’t rely on the ballot for solvency – it’s not a question of personal affirmation. It’s just a question of what the judge should value when evaluating the debate – Fine 13 says it should be a debate over methods to resist oppression, whoever has the best method wins
2. Non unique – if we commodify the ballot then the ballot will always be commodified because it endorses something

## A2 Ballot is Binary

1. Nonunique – “the better resistance strategy” is also binary – our ROB allows for a winner and a loser

## A2 Branse

1. This presupposes that our ROB is a question of the judge’s subjective and arbitrary interpretation of what is valuable in debate which is false – we have won that our model is best for debate which means the judge should vote on it
2. Nonunique – YES we agree that every model of debate is arbitrarily chosen – even truth testing! That’s a reason you should force them to justify why truth testing is a good model
3. Judge intervention is inevitable – judges are terrible at flowing and are usually on FB and not paying attention which means every decision is pretty arbitrary
4. Turn – Ahmed 07 says that institutions are oriented and cohered in ways that make practices within them seem natural and inevitable but are actually just results of the ways the space operates to continue to reproduce itself. That’s the reason debate claims that judges only can vote on only the most textual affirmation of the resolution, because whiteness operates to bring it back to a nodal point of comfort and exclude anything that makes it disorienting – this is an impact turn to breaking the rules of debate.
5. Practice rules are form of domination because they say that rules created by dominant groups can never be overridden even if there are pragmatic benefits and only one type of debate is ok. They are a way to win without justifying your interpretation.
6. No impact to rule determining nature of an action – all actions just happen in real life
7. The action I take doesn’t become incoherent just because it doesn’t mean aff
8. **Fairness** – there are infinitely more ways to negate the truth of the resolution than to prove the resolution true – their interp allows NIBs and a prioris. Discourse solves - Both of us have the same burden to access the ballot, ie proving our discourse is good. And, fairness turns Nardin – fairness is constitutive to debate as a competitive activity with a winner or loser. Outweighs textuality – debate would still be debate without the words affirm or negate but it would be incoherent without fairness.

## A2 Jurisdiction

1. We agree – the judge only has the jurisdiction to vote for the better debater – we just contextualize what it means to be the better debater – ie what ideas and skills are valued – those that resist oppression – the idea of the better debate doesn’t make sense absent our ROB
2. This is circular, it begs the question of what the judge has the jurisdiction to vote on – empirically proven, judges vote on non T affs all the time and nothing happens

## A2 Rickert

1. Authoritarian judges are inevitable – whatever the role of the ballot is, the judge is always in a position of power exercising personal discretion over the round – even under truth testing, they are asserting their preference
2. ROB contestation and debate solves – we can debate over the role of the ballot, it’s not the judge just asserting themselves in a position of power but rather us deciding what it is – this evidence is in the context of a teacher telling students what to do, not debate

## A2 Mouffe

1. Turn – our ROB is not uncontestable – our model of debate allows for ROB contestation – that’s a net benefit to our model of debate while you just assert truth testing as constitutive of debate which prevents contestation
2. Turn – truth testing is not neutral, that’s our argument – truth testing presents itself as neutral but actually prioritizes certain voices
3. No justification for why violence is exclusion – begs the question of a normative framework which is unjustified – prefer systemic violence impacts over individual acts of exclusion because that’s the most material impact in debate

## A2 Need a fair stasis point

1. Our aff solves – there’s no reason why the resolution is the best stasis point, the aff is a great stasis point to debate about
2. Turn – hard debate is good debate – if my aff is a little harder to engage then it forces you to delve into the literature base – pigeonholing is inevitable, every aff pigeonholes the negative into certain strategies, which means it’s just a question of what we pigeonhole you into researching – we give you a lot of great nuanced critical literature like Ks of affect theory – you can engage
3. Engagement is inevitable – it’s a debate, no matter what I say you’ll respond to it

## A2 Floating Impacts

1. We meet – our argument isn’t just racism is bad but rather a model of debate in which debaters who better deconstruct structural violence are rewarded with a ballot is the best model of debate – we tie the impact to the ballot and contextualize what it means to be the better debater

## A2 Fiat is Illusory

1. This makes no sense – fiat is illusory, that doesn’t justify TT – it’s a question of what the ballot endorses
2. Turn – fiat is illusory, that means the only thing that matters are individual acts of resistance we can take in this round which only the aff meets

## A2 Frege

1. This is just laughable – yes, if I make an argument, I am asserting the truth value of that argument – but there’s no internal link for why that means truth testing is a good or true model of debate

## A2 No FW Under TT

1. This is a joke – you can’t read truth testing and then not provide a framework for evaluating offense under truth testing because there is actually no way to resolve competing pieces of offense which triggers presumption – conceded Adler 15 means it’s harder to affirm so you should presume affirmative

# Frontlines – CPs

### A2 CP: Be Happy within Systems of Oppression

1. Permutation – do both – it’s not competitive – the text of our advocacy is “we advocate the methodology of the killjoy – a symbol of willful deviance that refuses the requirement to be happy or complicit within systems of oppression” – you can still be happy within systems of oppression
2. Turn - There’s a distinction between happiness and joy – joy is an affective relation of space that allows white male bodies to ignore oppression - killing joy is refusing to be silent or complicit within structures of oppression – when women bring up sexism, they are dismissed as nagging and killing the joy of white males. Happiness is a physical/psychological feeling – you can be happy while killing joy.
3. Alt can’t solve case – this is literally our argument – telling people they need to be happy within systems of oppression is a bad thing because it places the burden on marginalized bodies to just deal with their violence – also means youre the definition of misogyny – ie saying “just be happy”

## A2 Womanism CP

1. Turn – policing individual words is bad – Prevents people from engaging in the movement because they are worried about being offensive or using the wrong language which destroys coalitions against oppressive system and means the alt has no chance of solving oppression
2. Permutation – do both – the figure of the womanist is the figure of the killjoy – being willful against systems of oppression

**Ahmed 10** Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010

Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angryor dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end6)] To be recognizedas a feministis to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty. You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, thatwe may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). There is a desire to believe that women become feminists *because* they are unhappy. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about. Feminist consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away. My point here would be that feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as *about* the unhappiness of feminists, rather than being what feminists are unhappy *about*. Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described *as* unhappy. We must learn. The word "wretched" has its own genealogy, coming from wretch, meaning a stranger, exile, banished person. Wretched in the sense of "vile, despicable person" was developed in Old English and is said to reflect "the sorry state of the outcast." Can we rewrite the history of happiness from the point of view of the wretch? If we listen to those who are cast as wretched, perhaps their wretchedness would no longer belong to them. The sorrow of the stranger might give us a different angle on happiness not because it teaches us what it is like or must be like to be a stranger, but because it might estrange us from the very happiness of the familiar. Phenomenology helps us explore how the familiar is that which is not revealed. A queer phenomenology shows how the familiar is not revealed to those who can inhabit it. For queers and others the familiar is revealed to you, because you do not inhabit it. To be "estranged from" can be what enables a "consciousness of." This is why being a killjoy can be a knowledge project, a world-making project. Feminist Tables A feminist call might be a call to anger, to develop a sense of rage about collective wrongs. And yet, it is important that we do not make feminist emotion into a site of truth: as if it is always clear or self-evident that our anger is right. When anger becomes righteous it can be oppressive; to assume anger makes us right can be a wrong. Weknow how easily a politics of happiness can be displaced into a politics of anger: the assumption of a right to happiness can convert very swiftly into anger toward others (immigrants, aliens, strangers) who have taken the happiness assumed to be "by right" to be ours. It is precisely that we cannot defend ourselves against such defensive use of emotion that would be my point. Emotions are not always just, even those that seem to acquire their force in or from an experience of injustice. **Feminist emotions are mediated and opaque; they are sites of struggle, and we must persist in struggling with them**.[[8](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end8)] After all, feminist spaces are emotional spaces, in which the experience of **solidarity is hardly exhaustive**. As feminists we have our own tables. If we are unseated by the family table, it does not necessarily follow that we are seated together. **We can place the figure of the feminist killjoy alongside the figure of the angry Black woman**, explored so well by Black feminist writers such as Audre Lorde[[9](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end9)] and bell hooks[[10](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end10)]. **The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy**; **she may even kill feminist joy**, for example, **by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics**. She might not even have to make any such point to kill joy. Listen to the following description from bell hooks: "**a group of white feminist activists** who do not know one another may be present at a meeting to discuss feminist theory. They **may feel bonded on the basis of shared womanhood**, **but the atmosphere** **will** noticeably **change when a woman of color enters the room**. The white woman will become tense, no longer relaxed, no longer celebratory."[[11](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end11)] It is not just that feelings are "in tension," but that the tension is located somewhere: in being felt by some bodies, it is attributed as caused by another body, who comes to be felt as apart from the group, as getting in the way of its enjoyment and solidarity. **The body of color is attributed as the cause of becoming tense**, which is also the loss of a shared atmosphere. As a feminist of color you do not even have to say anything to cause tension! The mere proximity of some bodies involves an affective conversion. We learn from this example how histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an atmosphere, or in the tangibility of the bodies that seem to get in the way. Atmospheres might become shared if there is agreement in where we locate the points of tension. A history can be preserved in the very stickiness of a situation. To speak out of anger as a woman of color is then to confirm your position as the cause of tension; your anger is what threatens the social bond. As Audre Lorde describes: "When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are 'creating a mood of helplessness,' 'preventing white women from getting past guilt,' or 'standing in the way of trusting communication and action.'"[[12](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end12)] The exposure of violence becomes the origin of violence. The woman of color must let go of her anger for the white woman to move on. The figure of the angry black woman is a fantasy figure that produces its own effects. Reasonable, thoughtful arguments are dismissed as anger (which of course empties anger of its own reason), which makes you angry, such that your response becomes read as the confirmation of evidence that you are not only angry but also unreasonable! To make this point in another way, theanger of feminists of color is attributed. You might be angry *about* how racism and sexism diminish life choices for women of color. Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But then in being heard as angry, your speech is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x. You become angry at the injustice of being heard as motivated by anger, which makes it harder to separate yourself from the object of your anger. You become entangled with what you are angry about because you are angry about how they have entangled you in your anger. In becoming angry about that entanglement, you confirm their commitment to your anger as the truth "behind" your speech, which is what blocks your anger, stops it from getting through. You are blocked by not getting through. Some bodies become blockage points, points where smooth communication stops. Consider Ama Ata Aidoo's wonderful prose poem, *Our Sister Killjoy*, where the narrator Sissie, as a black woman, has to work to sustain the comfort of others. On a plane, a white hostess invites her to sit at the back with "her friends," two black people she does not know. She is about to say that she does not know them, and hesitates. "But to have refused to join them would have created an awkward situation, wouldn't it? Considering too that apart from the air hostess's obviously civilized upbringing, she had been trained to see the comfort of all her passengers."[[13](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end13)] Power speaks here in this moment of hesitation. Do you go along with it? What does it mean not to go along with it? To create awkwardness is to be read as being awkward. **Maintaining public comfort requires that certain bodies "go along with it."** **To refuse to go along with it,** to refuse the place in which you are placed, **is to be seen as causing trouble, as making others uncomfortable**. There is a political struggle about how we attribute good and bad feelings, which hesitates around the apparently simple question of who introduces what feelings to whom. Feelings can get stuck to certain bodies in the very way we describe spaces, situations, dramas. And bodies can get stuck depending on the feelings with which they get associated. **Getting in the Way** A killjoy: the one who gets in the way of other people's happiness. Or just the one who is in the way—you can be in the way of *whatever*, if you are already perceived as being in the way. Your very arrival into a room is a reminder of histories that "get in the way" of the occupation of that room. How many feminist stories are about rooms, about who occupies them, about making room? When to arrive is to get in the way, what happens, what do you do? **The figure of the killjoy could be rethought in terms of the politics of willfulness**. I suggested earlier that an activist archive is an unhappiness archive, one shaped by the struggles of those who are willing to struggle against happiness. We might redescribe **this struggle in terms of those who are willing to be willful. An unhappiness archive is a willfulness archive**. Let's go back: **let's listen to what and who is behind us**. **Alice Walker describes a "womanist" in the following way: "A black feminist or feminist of color... Usually referring to outrageous, audacious, courageous or *willful* behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth than is considered 'good' for one... Responsible. In charge. Serious**."[[14](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end14)] Julia Penelope describes lesbianism as willfulness: "The lesbian stands against the world created by the male imagination. **What willfulness we possess when we claim our lives**!"[[15](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end15)] Marilyn Frye's radical feminism uses the adjective willful: "The willful creation of new meaning, new loci of meaning, and new ways of being, together, in the world, seems to be in these mortally dangerous times the best hope we have."[[16](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm#end16)] Willfulness as audacity, willfulness as standing against, willfulness as creativity. We can make sense of how willfulness comes up, if we consider a typical definition of willfulness: "asserting or disposed to assert one's own will against persuasion, instruction, or command; governed by will without regard to reason; determined to take one's own way; obstinately self-willed or perverse" (OED). To be called obstinate or perverse because you are not persuaded by the reason of others? Is this familiar to you? Have you heard this before?

1. **Turn – feminism is key to create inclusive spaces of solidarity against white supremacy – historically proven**

**hooks 2k** bell hooks "FEMINISM IS FOR EVERYBODY Passionate Politics" South End Press, Cambridge, MA 2000 <https://excoradfeminisms.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/bell_hooks-feminism_is_for_everybody.pdf>

In many ways they were following in the footsteps of their abolitionist ancestors who had demanded that everyone (white women and black people) be given the right to vote, but, when faced with the possibility that black males might gain the right to vote while they were denied it on the basis of gender, they chose to ally themselves with men, uniting under the rubric of white supremacy. Contemporary white females witnessing the militant demand for more rights for black people chose that moment to demand more rights for themselves. Some of these individuals claim that it was working on behalf of civil rights that made them aware of sexism and sexist oppression. Yet if this was the whole picture one might think their newfound political awareness of difference would have carried over into the way they theorized contemporary feminist movement. They entered the movement erasing and denying difference, not playing race alongside gender, but eliminating race from the picture. Foregrounding gender meant that white women could take center stage, could claim the movement as theirs,even as they called on all women to join. **The utopian vision of sisterhood evoked in a feminist movement that initially did not take racial difference or anti-racist struggle seriously did not capture the imagination of most black women/women of color**. Individual black women who were active in the movement from its inception for the most part stayed in their place. When the feminist movement began racial integration was still rare. Many black people were learning how to interact with whites on the basis of being peers for the first time in their lives. No wonder individual black women choosing feminism were reluctant to introduce their awareness of race. It must have felt so awesome to have white women evoke sisterhood in a world where they had mainly experienced white women as exploiters and oppressors. A **younger generation of black females/women of color in the late '70s and early '80s challenged white female racism**. Unlike our older black women allies we had for the most part been educated in predominantly white settings. Most of us had never been in a subordinated position in relation to a white female. Most of us had not been in the workforce. We had never been in our place. We were better positioned to critique racism and white supremacy within the women's movement. Individual white women who had attempted to organize the movement around the banner of common oppression evoking the notion that women constituted a sexual class/ caste were the most reluctant to acknowledge differences among women, differences that overshadowed all the common experiences female shared. Race was the most obvious difference. In the '70s I wrote the first draft of Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. I was 19 years old. I had never worked a full-time job. I had come from a racially segregated small town in the south to Stanford University. While I had grown up resisting patriarchal thinking, college was the place where I embraced feminist politics. It was there as the only black female present in feminist classrooms, in consciousness-raising, that I began to engage race and gender theoretically. It was there that I began to demand recognition of the way in which racist biases were shaping feminist thinking and call for change. At other locations individual black women/women of color were making the same critique. In those days white women who were unwilling to face the reality of racism and racial difference accused us of being traitors by introducing race. Wrongly they saw us as deflecting focus away from gender. In reality, we were demanding that we look at the status of females realistically, and that realistic understanding serve as the foundation for a real feminist politic. Our intent was not to diminish the vision of sisterhood. **We sought to put in place a concrete politics of soli- darity that would make genuine sisterhood possible**. We knew that **there could no real sisterhood between white women and women of color** ifwhite women were not able to divest of white supremacy, **if feminist movement were not fundamentally anti-racist**. Critical interventions around race did not destroy the women's movement; it became stronger. Breaking through denial about race helped women face the reality of difference on all levels. And **we** were finally **put**ting **in place a movement that did not place the** class **interests of** privileged women, especially **white women**, **over that of all other women**. We put in place a vision of sisterhood where all our realities could be spoken. There has been no contemporary movement for social justice where individual participants engaged in the dialectical exchange that occurred among feminist thinkers about race which led to the re-thinking of much feminist theory and practice. **The fact that participants in the feminist movement could face critique** and challenge **while** **still remaining wholeheartedly committed to** a vision of justice, of **liberation**, **is a testament to the movement's** strength and **power**. It shows us that **no matter how misguided feminist thinkers have been** in the past, the will to change, **the will to create the context for struggle and liberation, remains stronger than the need to hold on to wrong beliefs** and assumptions. For years I witnessed the reluctance of white feminist thinkers to acknowledge the importance of race. I witnessed their refusal to divest of white supremacy, their unwillingness to acknowledge that an anti-racist feminist movement was the only political foundation that would make sisterhood be a reality. And **I witnessed the revolution in consciousness that occurred as individual women began** to break free of denial, **to break free of white supremacist thinking**. **These** awesome **changes restore my faith in feminist movement and strengthen the solidarity** I feel towards all women. Overall feminist thinking and **feminist theory has benefited from all critical interventions on the issue of race.** The only problematic arena has been that of translating theory into practice. While individual white women have incorporated an analysis of race into much feminist scholarship, these insights have not had as much impact on the day to day relations between white women and women of color. Anti-racist interactions between women are difficult in a society that remains racially segregated. Despite diverse work settings a vast majority of folks still socialize only with people of their own group. Racism and sexism combined create harmful barriers between women. So far feminist strategies to change this have not been very useful. **Individual white women and women of color who have worked through difficulties to make the space where bonds of love and political solidarity can emerge need to share the methods and strategies that we have successfully employed**. Almost no attention is given the relationship between girls of different races. Biased feminist scholarship which attempts to show that white girls are somehow more vulnerable to sexist conditioning than girls of color simply perpetuates the white supremacist assumption that white females require and deserve more attention to their concerns and ills than other groups**.** Indeed while girls of color may express different behavior than their white counterparts they are not only internalizing sexist conditioning, they are far more likely to be victimized by sexism in ways that are irreparable. **Feminist movement, especially the work of visionary black activists, paved the way for a reconsideration of race and racism that has had positive impact on our society as a whole**. **Rarely do mainstream social critiques acknowledge this fact**. As a feminist theorist who has written extensively about the issue of race and racism within feminist movement, I know that **there remains much that needs to be challenged and changed, but it is equally important to celebrate the enormous changes that have occurred**. **That celebration**, understanding our triumphs and using them as models, **means that they can become the sound foundation for the building of a mass-based anti-racist feminist movement.**

1. Womxnism is a subset of feminism – CP isn’t mutually exclusive – this is the small print of your evidence

Hayat **14** Fatema Hayat. What is a Womanist?. https://progressivepupil.wordpress.com/2014/03/04/what-is-a-womanist/

Alice Walker, a poet and activist, who is mostly known for her award-winning book The Color Purple, coined the term Womanist in her 1983 book In Search of Our Mothers’ Garden: Womanist Prose. Walker defined a womanist as “Womanish, the opposite of girlish…Being grown up…A Black Feminist or Feminist of Color…A woman who loves other women, sexually and/or non-sexually. Appreciates and prefers women’s culture, women’s emotional flexibility (values tears as natural counterbalance of laughter), and women’s strength. Sometimes loves individual men, sexually and/or non-sexually”. The complete text of the definition can be seen here. There are other simpler definitions for the term such as the one used by The American Heritage Dictionary, which recognized the word in 1993 and defined it as“ Having or expressing a belief in or respect for women and their talents and abilities beyond the boundaries of race and class; exhibiting feminism that is inclusive especially of Black American Culture”. Now that we know what it is to be a Womanist. How is it different from Feminism? And why is the Womanism Movement important? The feminist movement traditionally was a middle class white women’s movement and rarely included women of color. In its first wave in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the movement fought for suffrage rights for white women, and later in its second wave the focus was on cultural and social rights which involved sexuality, family laws, workplace, and reproductive rights. Although Feminism addresses and fights for gender equality, it rarely addressed equality and justice for black women. It was never involved in the civil rights movement to help guarantee black women social equality. Unfortunately, there have also been some claims that some members of the feminist movement were racist. Justine Tally mentions in her article Why ‘Womanism? : The Genesis of a New Word and What It Means, “many early so-called feminists supported racist eugenics initiatives, including sterilization of minority women”. Photo courtesy of alicewalkerfilm.com Photo courtesy of alicewalkerfilm.com During that period, women of Color or African American women were not only suffering from political and social inequality similar to their white sisters, but they were also racially oppressed due to the color of their skin and ethnicity. The white wom[x]en of the feminist movement failed to recognize this aspect, it did not encompass the realities and perspectives of the African American Wom[x]en’s suffering from slavery and segregation. This is why many women of color couldn’t associate with Feminism and found representation and identified with the new term “Wom[x]anist”. Another difference between Feminism and Womanism is that some feminists present men as the enemy in their fight for equality in a patriarchal world. It can be seen as a separatist movement, unlike wom[x]anism that emphasizes women’s relationships with men and the importance of family who are “committed to the survival and wholeness of entire people, male and female” (Alice Walker). Wom[x]anism not only fights for the gender equality but for justice against racial oppression against African American men and women. Finally, **Womanism is not against the Feminist Movement**, **but as Alice Walker states** in her famous quote, **it is just a darker shade that included and represented other wom[x]en’s perspectives and voices**. “**Womanism is simply another shade of feminism. It helps give visibility to the experience of black women and other women of color who have always been at the forefront of the feminist movement yet marginalized and rendered invisible in historical texts and the media**”.

### A2 Wilderson NB / PIC out of white women

**1. Turn – feminism is key to create inclusive spaces of solidarity against white supremacy – historically proven**

**hooks 2k** bell hooks "FEMINISM IS FOR EVERYBODY Passionate Politics" South End Press, Cambridge, MA 2000 https://excoradfeminisms.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/bell\_hooks-feminism\_is\_for\_everybody.pdf

In many ways they were following in the footsteps of their abolitionist ancestors who had demanded that everyone (white women and black people) be given the right to vote, but, when faced with the possibility that black males might gain the right to vote while they were denied it on the basis of gender, they chose to ally themselves with men, uniting under the rubric of white supremacy. Contemporary white females witnessing the militant demand for more rights for black people chose that moment to demand more rights for themselves. Some of these individuals claim that it was working on behalf of civil rights that made them aware of sexism and sexist oppression. Yet if this was the whole picture one might think their newfound political awareness of difference would have carried over into the way they theorized contemporary feminist movement. They entered the movement erasing and denying difference, not playing race alongside gender, but eliminating race from the picture. Foregrounding gender meant that white women could take center stage, could claim the movement as theirs,even as they called on all women to join. **The utopian vision of sisterhood evoked in a feminist movement that initially did not take racial difference or anti-racist struggle seriously did not capture the imagination of most black women/women of color**. Individual black women who were active in the movement from its inception for the most part stayed in their place. When the feminist movement began racial integration was still rare. Many black people were learning how to interact with whites on the basis of being peers for the first time in their lives. No wonder individual black women choosing feminism were reluctant to introduce their awareness of race. It must have felt so awesome to have white women evoke sisterhood in a world where they had mainly experienced white women as exploiters and oppressors. A **younger generation of black females/women of color in the late '70s and early '80s challenged white female racism**. Unlike our older black women allies we had for the most part been educated in predominantly white settings. Most of us had never been in a subordinated position in relation to a white female. Most of us had not been in the workforce. We had never been in our place. We were better positioned to critique racism and white supremacy within the women's movement. Individual white women who had attempted to organize the movement around the banner of common oppression evoking the notion that women constituted a sexual class/ caste were the most reluctant to acknowledge differences among women, differences that overshadowed all the common experiences female shared. Race was the most obvious difference. In the '70s I wrote the first draft of Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. I was 19 years old. I had never worked a full-time job. I had come from a racially segregated small town in the south to Stanford University. While I had grown up resisting patriarchal thinking, college was the place where I embraced feminist politics. It was there as the only black female present in feminist classrooms, in consciousness-raising, that I began to engage race and gender theoretically. It was there that I began to demand recognition of the way in which racist biases were shaping feminist thinking and call for change. At other locations individual black women/women of color were making the same critique. In those days white women who were unwilling to face the reality of racism and racial difference accused us of being traitors by introducing race. Wrongly they saw us as deflecting focus away from gender. In reality, we were demanding that we look at the status of females realistically, and that realistic understanding serve as the foundation for a real feminist politic. Our intent was not to diminish the vision of sisterhood. **We sought to put in place a concrete politics of soli- darity that would make genuine sisterhood possible**. We knew that **there could no real sisterhood between white women and women of color** ifwhite women were not able to divest of white supremacy, **if feminist movement were not fundamentally anti-racist**. Critical interventions around race did not destroy the women's movement; it became stronger. Breaking through denial about race helped women face the reality of difference on all levels. And **we** were finally **put**ting **in place a movement that did not place the** class **interests of** privileged women, especially **white women**, **over that of all other women**. We put in place a vision of sisterhood where all our realities could be spoken. There has been no contemporary movement for social justice where individual participants engaged in the dialectical exchange that occurred among feminist thinkers about race which led to the re-thinking of much feminist theory and practice. **The fact that participants in the feminist movement could face critique** and challenge **while** **still remaining wholeheartedly committed to** a vision of justice, of **liberation**, **is a testament to the movement's** strength and **power**. It shows us that **no matter how misguided feminist thinkers have been** in the past, the will to change, **the will to create the context for struggle and liberation, remains stronger than the need to hold on to wrong beliefs** and assumptions. For years I witnessed the reluctance of white feminist thinkers to acknowledge the importance of race. I witnessed their refusal to divest of white supremacy, their unwillingness to acknowledge that an anti-racist feminist movement was the only political foundation that would make sisterhood be a reality. And **I witnessed the revolution in consciousness that occurred as individual women began** to break free of denial, **to break free of white supremacist thinking**. **These** awesome **changes restore my faith in feminist movement and strengthen the solidarity** I feel towards all women. Overall feminist thinking and **feminist theory has benefited from all critical interventions on the issue of race.** The only problematic arena has been that of translating theory into practice. While individual white women have incorporated an analysis of race into much feminist scholarship, these insights have not had as much impact on the day to day relations between white women and women of color. Anti-racist interactions between women are difficult in a society that remains racially segregated. Despite diverse work settings a vast majority of folks still socialize only with people of their own group. Racism and sexism combined create harmful barriers between women. So far feminist strategies to change this have not been very useful. **Individual white women and women of color who have worked through difficulties to make the space where bonds of love and political solidarity can emerge need to share the methods and strategies that we have successfully employed**. Almost no attention is given the relationship between girls of different races. Biased feminist scholarship which attempts to show that white girls are somehow more vulnerable to sexist conditioning than girls of color simply perpetuates the white supremacist assumption that white females require and deserve more attention to their concerns and ills than other groups**.** Indeed while girls of color may express different behavior than their white counterparts they are not only internalizing sexist conditioning, they are far more likely to be victimized by sexism in ways that are irreparable. **Feminist movement, especially the work of visionary black activists, paved the way for a reconsideration of race and racism that has had positive impact on our society as a whole**. **Rarely do mainstream social critiques acknowledge this fact**. As a feminist theorist who has written extensively about the issue of race and racism within feminist movement, I know that **there remains much that needs to be challenged and changed, but it is equally important to celebrate the enormous changes that have occurred**. **That celebration**, understanding our triumphs and using them as models, **means that they can become the sound foundation for the building of a mass-based anti-racist feminist movement.**

Prefer this evidence

1. Empirical – our evidence talks about specific movements in the 1960s and 70s in which white women were able to create coalitions with women of color to deconstruct white supremacy, while your evidence is all really theoretical about the ontological nature of identity which means our is most applicable to our movement
2. Default to our authors on this question – Ahmed and hooks are two women of color who are part of the feminist movement fighting against racism and sexism which means you should prefer their experience over men who never claim to be part of the movement
3. Extend Koerner 12 – we shouldn’t define identity based on negativity ie social death because affirming the positivity of identity and reclaiming the affective beauty of race allows radical revolution against static identities – a couple of implications
   1. Takes out the fundamental assumption behind your offense, ie social death
   2. DA to the CP – you re-enforce static categories by defining the movement based on its racial barriers
4. CP solves literally zero of the net benefits – Wilderson would agree with 0% of the CP because he would say that black women are ungendered and the CP can’t solve for black men
5. Intersectionality net benefit to the aff
   1. Your movement excludes transgender white women and impoverished white women which means you only look at race instead of the many different markers of privilege
   2. Black white binary DA – your offense excludes consideration of Asian women and Indigenous women for example which means only the aff can resolve
6. CP can’t solve because you alienate a huge part of the movement which kills any chance of success because it weakens your movement

## A2 Word PICs

### General

1. Turn – Policing individual words is bad, critiques of speech produce reactionary politics in which change is focused on language directly trading off with efforts to change material problems.

Brown 01Wendy Brown, Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *politi­cal* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institu­tions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and man­dates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility to­ward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legis­lated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspi­rations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rational­ization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here [is] we greet a persistent political para­dox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conserva­tive as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of histori­cally specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, [and] how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, vio­lence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to ad­dress those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorienta­tion [or] , rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

1. TURN – Preventing the use of representations precludes the possibility of giving them new meaning. You lock in oppressive power structures within language.

Butler 97 Judith Butler, 97, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38

This story underscores the limits and risks of resignification as a strategy of opposition. I will not propose that the pedagogical recirculation of examples of hate speech always defeats the project of opposing and defusing such speech, but I want to underscore the fact that such terms carry connotations that exceed the purposes for which they may be intended and can thus work to afflict and defeat discursive efforts to oppose such speech. **Keeping** such **terms unsaid** and unsayable can also work to **lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that** might **shift their** context and **purpose. That** such **language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through** the arduous effort it takes to direct **the course of its repetition**. It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: **it** **is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might** then **begin to exercise agency** at all. **A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life.** This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. **The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose** (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); **but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we** might still **call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is** partially **open**.

1. Turn – absolute theories of the meaning of words prevents real critique and change – Words have many different meanings in different contexts. The K’s attempt to police language is dehumanizing and should be rejected.

Ross 06Kelley L., Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College, “Against the theory of sexist language”, May 26, 2006, <http://www.friesian.com/language.htm>

Such defensiveness and bad faith accompanies the widely held conviction that the theory of "sexist language" and the program to institute "gender neutral" language are absolutely fundamental to the social and political project of feminism, to the point where mere criticism of the theory or the project can themselves be condemned as "sexual harassment" and subject to attempts at legal sanction. **The theory of "sexist language,"** however, is no credit to feminism, for it **is deeply flawed both in its understanding of the nature of language and in its understanding of how languages change over time**. Since the ideology that there is "sexist language" seeks, indeed, to change linguistic usage as part of the attempt to change society and forms of thought, the latter is particularly significant. That the public and the intelligentsia have not been alerted and alarmed long ago that the project of "non-sexist language" is a clear example of what George Orwell called "New Speak," and is thus the reflex of a totalitarian ideology, continues to be alarming in its own right. Nor can we be reassured of the innocence of the goal when the feminist motto, "the personal is political," itself embodies a totalitarian rejection of privacy, private life, and the domain of civil society -- a Marxist politicization of all human existence. Nevertheless, the treatment here focuses on the linguistic issues, rather the ideological background, for which other pages at this site can be consulted. First of all, **the theory of "sexist language"** seems to **say that words cannot have more than one meaning: if "man" and "he" in some usage mean males, then they cannot mean both males and females in other usage** (i.e. nouns and pronouns can have both masculine and common gender). Although univocal meanings were once the ideal of philosophical schools like Logical Positivism, **this** view **is absurd** enough as a rule for natural languages (where equivocal meanings and ambiguity emerge through usage) that there is usually a more subtle take on it: that the use of "man" or "he" to refer to males and to both males and females means that maleness is more fundamental than femaleness, "subordinating" femaleness to maleness, just as in the Book of Genesis the first woman, Eve, is created from Adam's rib for the purpose of being his companion. Now, the implication of the Biblical story may well be precisely that Adam is more fundamental than Eve, but the Bible did not create the language, Hebrew, in which it is written. If we are going to talk about the linguistic structure of Hebrew as distinct from the social ideology of the Bible, it is one thing to argue that the system of grammatical gender allowed the interpretation of gender embodied in the story of Adam and Eve and something very much different to argue that such an interpretive meaning necessarily underlies the original grammar of Hebrew -- or Akkadian, Arabic, Greek, French, Spanish, English, Swahili, etc. -- or that such a system of grammatical gender requires such an interpretation. **What a language** **with its gender system means is what people use it to mean**. **It is** an **evil** principle **to think that we can tell other people what they mean** by what they say, **because of some theory we have** that makes it mean something in particular to us, even when they obviously mean something else. Nevertheless, there is now a common principle, in feminism and elsewhere (especially flourishing in literary criticism), that meaning is only in the response of the interpreter, not in the mind of the speaker, even if the speaker is to be sued or charged with a crime for the interpreter having the response that they do. There is also on top of this the Marxist theory of "false consciousness," which holds that "true" meaning follows from the underlying economic structure, today usually just called the "power" relationships. Most people are unaware of the power relationships which produce the concepts and language that they use, and so what people think they mean by their own statements and language is an illusion. **The implications** of these principles **are dehumanizing** and totalitarian: **what individual people think** and want **is irrelevant** and to be disregarded, even by laws and political **authorities forcing them** to behave, and **speak**, **in certain ways**. But **they** are principles that make it possible to **dismiss** **the** common sense **view that few people** speaking English **who said "man"** **in statements like "man is a rational animal" were referring exclusively to males**, even though this usage was clear to all, from the context, for centuries before feminism decided that people didn't "really" mean that. But even if some speakers really did mean that, it is actually irrelevant to the freedom of individuals to mean whatever they intend to mean through language in the conventionally available forms that they choose. What was meant by the gender system in the languages that ultimately gave rise to Hebrew is lost in whatever it was that the speakers of those languages were saying to each other; **but** **what we can say about the functioning of gender systems and about language in general is very different from the claims that the theory of "sexist language" makes**.

1. Turn – understanding language as objectively harmful oscures the importance of context and makes us powerless in the face of language – extricating the language from the plan desn’t make the words “go away” – confrontation via the perm is best

Butler 97 Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 13

Indeed, recent effort to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military of, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure. To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effects of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.

### A2 “Womyn”

**1. Turn – the word “womyn” originated at the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival to exclude transgender women**

**Merbruja 15** Luna Merbruja "3 Common Feminist Phrases That (Unintentionally) Marginalize Trans Women" May 12, 2015 everydayfeminism.com/2015/05/feminist-phrases-marginalize-trans-women/

**“Womyn” was created to de-center “man” from the spelling of woman**. It was a feminist and political move to create spaces that focused on women’s issues. In theory, this is a great idea! However, **the implementation hasn’t been so great since trans women are misgendered as men very often in feminist** and political **spaces**. Most **trans women** I know **are** **wary of** spaces labeled **“womyn”** because we know that **we are misunderstood as men**. **This creates unsafe and exclusionary women’s spaces**, and no one wants that, right? …except, sometimes they do. Take **the Michigan’s Womyn Festival** for example. They’re celebrating their 40th anniversary this upcoming August and yet, they **are** still **exclusionary to trans women** after being called out multiple times. They state on their website they’re going to “celebrate our living legacy of badass females coming together for four decades – to build community, to recharge our energies, renew faded inspiration and to sit in the source of our collective power.” In four decades, we’ve had Laverne Cox create a documentary about CeCe McDonald’s wrongful imprisonment for self-defense against a white supremacist, which is building off of Miss Major’s ongoing work to support trans prisoners at the Transgender, Gender Variant, and Intersex Justice Project (TGIJP). We also have Janet Mock’s beautifully vulnerable and critical memoir, Redefining Realness, that brought survival sex work, child sexual abuse, and mixed-race identity issues to national light by making it to the New York Times’ Best Seller’s List. These legacies have shaped and continue to shape liberation for all women. However, the **Michigan’s Womyn Festival doesn’t recognize our lives or contributions as valuable**. This is **what transmisogyny is within feminist communities – where our genders are invalidated by the policing of what women’s bodies and experiences should be, instead of embracing them for what they are.**

**2. Turn – you can’t separate the enforcement of the word “womyn” from its idea – it was used to not include transgender women**

**Wu 16** Gwendolyn Wu "Why Are People Using the Terms ‘Womyn’ and ‘Womxn’ Instead of ‘Women’?" Helloflo March 23, 2016; Activist; Attends UC Santa Barbara

“Womyn” and “womxn” are two of the most commonly used substitutes to avoid using the suffix “-men” at the end of the term, but others like “wimmin,” “wimyn,” and “womin” are also sometimes used. “Women” and “woman” originate from Old English, where “man” was used as a gender fluid pronoun much like “one” and “they” have turned into today. These spellings are closely associated with the feminism movement, with **some choosing to use the term “womxn” over “womyn” due to the latter’s roots in transphobia**. As Tumblr user sanpaguitagirl put it, **the term “womyn” appeared at a festival that celebrated cisgender** (identifying as the same assigned sex at birth) **women’s accomplishments in art and music**. **This festival does not allow men or transgender women to attend**, and some believe **that represents the exclusion of transgender women** (and other identities) from general discourse. It “shows how **a lot of feminist movements have chosen to ignore the many struggles, identities, and intersectionalities of what it means to not only be born as a womxn, but to identify as a womxn**,” according to sanpaguitagirl’s Tumblr response. RELATED ARTICLES What We've Learned From The Legacies of Carrie Fisher And Mary Tyler Moore FEMSPIRATION For These Women The Women's March Was A Way To Shed Light On Their Health Concerns FEMSPIRATION Elizabeth Warren Inspired T-Shirts Raise Over $250,000 for Planned Parenthood FEMSPIRATION While dictionaries do not officially recognize the terms (Google labels “womyn” as nonstandard), they’re often used to promote inclusivity among cis- and transgender women. By avoiding the “-men” or “-man” suffixes, people who use alternate spellings of the word “women” aim to achieve female independence from patriarchal linguistic norms. Some people think that the change in spelling is unnecessary given that they’re not officially part of the English language. However, feminists who use the terms argue that the English language constantly fluctuates with standardized dictionaries adding new words constantly. For instance, “selfie” was the Oxford Dictionary’s Word of the Year in 2013 — just one example of how new words have come into existence constantly. **Womyn Creating Consciousness Collectively**, an organization at Michigan State University, **stated that it was symbolically showing that they do not need men to be complete entities**, as the word suggests. “**We, as womyn, are not a sub-category of men**,” the group wrote on their organization’s website. “We are not included in many of the history books, studies and statistics that are done in male dominated societies, thus they do not apply to us, for in these items we do not exist. In these societies men are the ‘norm’ and women the ‘particular,’ a mere sub-category of the ‘norm,’ of men. The re-spelling of the word ‘woman’ is a statement that we refused to be defined by men. We are womyn and only we have the right to define our relationships with ourselves, society, with other womyn and men.” Ultimately, the development of “womxn,” “**womyn**,” and other terms **symbolize a unique turn in how the second-wave feminism has progressed since its explosion in the 1970s**. While most people have not adopted those terms, it is possible that it will become part of the English lexicon if others continue to use it.

# Frontlines – Ks

## Perms –

Permutation – Do Both – net benefit is the aff

Cross apply **Jordan 14** – we need to combine a diversity of tactics to resist oppression – focusing on one prevents us from changing societal structures which means

Permutation do the aff and then the neg

Permutation do the aff and the alt in all other instances – key to test the strengths of the alt to overcome the links – either the alt isn’t strong enough to overcome and it won’t solve or it is and theres no DA

Permutation do the aff and all non mutually exclusive parts of the alt

### A2 Young – No Perms in a Methods Debate

I get perms in a methods debate

a. You should evaluate the method of the alt alone versus the method of the permutation – key to study the interaction between methods – resistance doesn’t happen alone but happens in conjunction with other strategies – their method prevents any productive analysis of resisting oppression because it forecloses the possibility of a combination of tactics

b. Even if there are tradeoffs, the burden is on you to prove why both methods together is networse than the tradeoff – that’s debate

c. Clash – methods debates teach us to hone in the benefits of different methods – it provides a stable advocacy that the debate centers around, ie the aff method – you should force them to argue against our method to test its advantages and disadvantages to find the best liberation strategy – the perm tests whether the alt disproves the aff by testing competition – if I win the perm then I prove that the neg hasn’t disproved the aff

D. This would allow negs to read method-plus counter methods like “do the aff and endorse a rejection of ableism” which means they’d automatically win which avoids all discussions of the aff

## \*Case Outweighs

The case outweighs – we have justified a particular understanding of power via institutional orientations, which the aff method resolves – psychological violence outweighs

* 1. Duration – psychological violence depletes the energy of bodies which lasts for years

## A2 RC Claims

1. Root cause claims are unproductive and ignores overlapping forms of oppression – only the perm can resolve

**Best 06** Steven Best, “Rethinking Revolution: Animal Liberation, Human Liberation, and the Future of the Left,” 2006, <http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Best_rethinking_revolution.htm>

**The best approach to theorizing hierarchy in its origins, development, and multifaceted, overlapping forms is through a multiperspectival, non-reductionist approach that sees what is unique to and common among various modes of domination**. **There are a plurality of modes and mechanisms of power that have evolved throughout history, and different accounts provide different insights into the workings of power and domination**. According to feminist standpoint theory, **each oppressed group has an important perspective or insight into the nature of society**.[[21]](http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol2/vol2_no3_Best_rethinking_revolution.htm" \l "_edn21) **People of color**, for instance, **can illuminate colonialism and** the pathology of **racism**, **while women can reveal the logic of patriarchy** that has buttressed so many different modes of social power throughout history. While animals cannot speak about their sufferings, it is only from the animal standpoint ―**the standpoint of animal exploitation**― **that one can grasp the nature of speciesism, glean key facets of the pathology of human violence, and illuminate important aspects of misothery (hatred of nature) and the social and environmental crisis society now faces**.

1. Even if you win the thesis of the K, you fail to answer the question of *how, not why –* the aff is a critical starting point to understanding how violence occurs, via what specific instances, and what we do about it, which means it’s a prerequisite to the alt

## A2 Ableism

1. Permutation – Do both – the aff is the alternative – it’s an embrace of deviancy from the white male able bodied norm to disrupt categorizations - the Jordan evidence says that we need to resist oppression through a diversity of tactics instead of limiting ourselves to one. Only an analysis of oppression via the lens of feminist disability studies can solve.

**Hall 02** Kim Q. Hall "Feminism, Disability, and Embodiment" NWSA Journal, Volume 14, Number 3, Fall 2002, pp. vii-xiii (Article) Project Muse Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

Informed by Michel Foucault’s concept of “disciplinary normalization” (1979), **feminist disability studies interrogates the complex web of institutionalized techniques of normalization that sustain patriarchy, white supremacy, class power, “compulsory ablebodiedness,” and compulsory heterosexuality** (McRuer 2002). **These** myriad, **mutually reinforcing techniques of normalization subject bodies that deviate from a white, male, class privileged, ablebodied, and heterosexual norm**. Seemingly unrelated **technologies** such as orthopedic shoes, cosmetic surgery, hearing aids, diet and exercise regimes, prosthetic limbs, anti-depressants, Viagra, and genital surgeries designed to correct intersexed bodies all **seek to transform deviant bodies, bodies that threaten to blur and, thus, undermine organizing binaries of social life** (such as those defi ning dominant conceptions of gender and racial identity) **into docile bodies that reinforce dominant cultural norms of gendered, raced, and classed bodily function and appearance**. **Exposing techniques of normalization that shape experiences of oppression provides a way of understanding the connection between all forms of oppression**. One norm of embodiment that is made explicit in Bloom’s Playboy in Braille concerns the primacy of vision in dominant conceptions of communication and knowledge and in classic feminist critiques of the role of the male gaze in the production of femininity. Feminists such as Luce Irigaray have offered infl uential critiques of the privileged place of sight in the Western philosophical tradition (1993). However, many feminist accounts of the primacy of vision have tended to focus on how a visual economy of sameness and difference consolidates patriarchal power and privilege while leaving disability unaddressed. In her book, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature, Rosemarie Garland Thomson3 describes **the conceptual and phenomenological link between the gaze and the stare in constituting the otherness of femaleness and disability**, noting that **“[i]f the male gaze makes the normative female a sexual spectacle, then the stare sculpts the disabled subject into a grotesque spectacle**” (1997, 26). As Thomson makes clear, **the framework of feminist disability studies offers a way of understanding the dynamics of the gaze and the stare that enhances both feminism and disability studies**. **Feminist disability studies provides a theoretical framework for** expanding an **understanding** of **historical and ideological connections between marginalized embodiments**. In her contribution to this volume Garland-Thomson articulates how **both femaleness and disability have been marked as deviations from “normal human” embodiment**, **deviations that must be contained or eliminated to maintain the perception of existing social hierarchies as natural and inevitable**. Similarly, Barbara Bloom’s Playboy in Braille problematizes the gaze in ways that reveal connections between sighted female readers and male and female blind readers.

1. Critically examining disability alone can’t solve – combining it with a study of feminism and white supremacy is key to understand the complexities of ableist oppression, which means only the perm solves.

**Garland-Thomson 02** Rosemarie Garland-Thomson "Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory" The Johns Hopkins University Press NWSA Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3, Feminist Disability Studies (Autumn, 2002), pp. 1-32. Professor of English ad Bioethics at Emory, focus on disability studies and feminist theory.

Academic feminism is a complex and contradictory matrix of theories, strategies, pedagogies, and practices. One way to think about feminist theory is to say that it investigates how culture saturates the particularities of bodies with meanings and probes the consequences of those meanings. **Feminist theory** is a collaborative, interdisciplinary inquiry and a self-conscious cultural critique that **interrogates** how subjects are multiply interpellated: in other words, **how** the representational **systems of gender, race, ethnicity, ability, sexuality, and class mutually construct, inflect, and contradict one another**. These systems intersect to produce and sustain ascribed, achieved, and acquired identities-both those that claim us and those that we claim for ourselves. **A feminist disability theory introduces the ability/disability system as a category of analysis into this** diverse and diffuse **enterprise**. It aims to extend current notions of cultural diversity and to more fully integrate the academy and the larger world it helps shape. A **feminist disability approach fosters complex understandings of the cultural history of the body**. By considering the ability/disability system, feminist disability theory goes beyond explicit disability topics such as illness, health, beauty, genetics, eugenics, aging, reproductive technologies, prosthetics, and access issues. **Feminist disability theory addresses** such **broad** feminist **concerns** as the unity of the category woman, **the status of the lived body, the politics of appearance, the medicalization of the body, the privilege of normalcy**, multiculturalism, sexuality, **the social construction of identity,** and the commitment to integration. To borrow Toni Morrison's notion that blackness is an idea that permeates American culture, disability too is a pervasive, often unarticulated, ideology informing our cultural notions of self and other (1992). **Disability-like gender-is a concept that pervades all aspects of culture**: its structuring **institutions, social identities, cultural practices, political positions, historical communities, and the shared human experience of embodiment.** **Integrating disability into feminist theory** is generative, **broaden**ing **our collective inquiries, questioning our assumptions, and contributing to feminism's intersectionality**. Introducing a disability analysis does not narrow the inquiry, limit the focus to only women with disabilities, or preclude engaging other manifestations of feminisms. Indeed, **the multiplicity of foci we** now **call feminisms is not a group of fragmented, competing subfields, but rather a vibrant, complex conversation**. In talking about feminist disability theory, I am not proposing yet another discrete feminism, but suggesting instead some ways that thinking about disability transforms feminist theory. Integrating disability does not obscure our critical focus on the registers of race, sexuality, ethnicity, or gender, nor is it additive. Rather, **considering disability shifts the conceptual framework to strengthen our understanding of how these multiple systems intertwine, redefine, and mutually constitute one another**. Integrating disability clarifies how this aggregate of systems operates together, yet distinctly, to support an imaginary norm and structure the relations that grant power, privilege, and status to that norm. Indeed, the cultural function of the disabled figure is to act as a synecdoche for all forms that culture deems non-normative. **We need to study disability in a feminist context to direct our highly honed critical skills toward the dual scholarly tasks of unmasking and reimagining disability, not only for people with disabilities, but for everyone**. As Simi Linton puts it, **studying disability** is "a prism through which one can gain a broader understanding of society and human experience" (1998, 118). It **deepens our understanding of gender and sexuality**, individualism and equality, minority group definitions, **autonomy, wholeness,** independence, **dependence, health, physical appearance, aesthetics, the integrity of the body, community**, and ideas of progress and perfection in every aspect of cultures. A feminist disability theory introduces what Eve Sedgwick has called a "universalizing view" of disability that will replace an often persisting "minoritizing view." Such a view will cast disability as "an issue of continuing, determinative importance in the lives of people across the spectrum" (1990, 1). In other words, **understanding how disability operates as an identity category** and cultural concept **will enhance how we understand what it is to be human, our relationships with one another, and the experience of embodiment**. The constituency for feminist disability studies is all of us, not only women with disabilities: disability is the most human of experiences, touching every family and-if we live long enough-touching us all.

1. Permutation – Do the aff and then the neg – net benefit is collectivization – we create spaces of solidarity to resolve psychological violence to allow people to go out and fight ableism
2. Permutation – Do the aff and the alt in all other instances – key to test the strength of the alt to overcome the links
3. No link - Under the social model of disability, bodies are disabled by society instead of based on physical impairments – for example, people of color are ‘disabled’ by society as a result of their skin color – this means the whole aff is about disability
4. Turn – the killjoy can disorient the space of ableism – in the same way women are dismissed as nagging, people who stutter are dismissed – by refusing to be silent and embracing the figure of the killjoy – we embrace the spaces of deviancy that resolve ableism
5. Turn – the killjoy has a Conviviality net benefit – our method affirms the inherent vulnerabilities our experiences which destabilizes the relationship between debility and capacity which disrupts notions of an able body.

**Puar 09** {Jasbir K; Women's and Gender Studies , Rutgers University , Newark, NJ, USA; “Prognosis time: Towards a geopolitics of affect, debility and capacity”; Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory; Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK; Published online: 04 Oct 2010.; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07407700903034147>;

Out of the numerous possibilities that ‘‘assemblage theory’’ offers, much of it has already begun to transform queer theory, from Elizabeth Grosz’s crucial re-reading of the relations between bodies and prosthetics (which complicates not only the contours of bodies in relation to forms of bodily discharge, but also complicates the relationships to objects, such as cell phones, cars, wheelchairs, and the distinctions between them as capacity-enabling devices) (1994), to Donna Haraway’s cyborgs (1991), to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘‘BwO’’ (Bodies without Organs – organs, loosely defined, rearranged against the presumed natural ordering of bodily capacity) (1987). I want to close by foregrounding the analytic power of **conviviality** that may further complicate how subjects are positioned**, underscoring** instead more **fluid relations between capacity and debility. Conviviality, unlike notions of resistance**, oppositionality, subversion or transgression (facets of queer exceptionalism that unwittingly dovetail with modern narratives of progress in modernity), **foregrounds categories** such as race, gender, and sexuality **as events** – as **encounters – rather than as entities or attributes of the subject. Surrendering certain notions of revolution, identity** politics, **and social change** – the ‘‘big utopian picture’’ that Massumi complicates in the opening epigraph of this essay – **conviviality** instead **always entails an ‘‘experimental step.’’** Why the **destabilization of the subject of identity and a turn to affect matters** is **because affect** – as a bodily matter – **makes identity politics both possible and yet impossible**. In its conventional usage, conviviality means relating to, occupied with, or fond of feasting, drinking, and good company – to be merry, festive, together at a table, with companions and guests, and hence, to live with. As an attribute and function of assembling, however, **conviviality does not lead to a politics of** the **tuniversal or inclusive common**, nor an ethics of individuatedness, **rather the futurity enabled through the open materiality of bodies as a Place to Meet**. We could usefully invoke Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘‘encounter value’’ here, a ‘‘becoming with’’ companionate (and I would also add, incompanionate) species, whereby actors are the products of relating, not pre-formed before the encounter (2008, 16). **Conviviality is an ethical orientation** that rewrites a Levinasian taking up of the ontology of the Other by **arguing that there is no absolute self or other**,15 **rather bodies that come together and dissipate through intensifications and vulnerabilities,** insistently **rendering bare the instability of the divisions between capacity**-endowed **and debility**-laden bodies. These encounters are rarely comfortable mergers but rather entail forms of eventness that could potentially unravel oneself but just as quickly be recuperated through a restabilized self, so that the political transformation is invited, as Arun Saldhana writes, through ‘‘letting yourself be destabilized by the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her difference not as a threat but as a resource to question your own position in the world’’ (2007, 118). **Conviviality is** thus **open to its own dissolution and self-annihilation and less interested in a mandate to reproduce its terms of creation or sustenance, recognizing that political critique must be open to the possibility that it might disrupt and alter the conditions of its own emergence such that it is no longer needed – an openness to something other than what we might have hoped for**. This is my alternative approach to Lee Edelman’s No Future, then, one that is not driven by rejecting the figure of the child as the overdetermined outcome of ‘‘reproductive futurism’’ (2004),16 but rather complicates the very terms of the regeneration of queer critique itself. Thus the challenge before us is how to craft convivial political praxis that does not demand a continual reinvestment in its form and content, its genesis or its outcome, the literalism of its object nor the direction of its drive.

### A2 Freedom of Speech Link

1. No link – we do not defend a liberal individualistic notion of freedom of speech or constitutionality – we don’t defend rights but rather affective spaces of solidarity – this would link to affs that are like “deliberative discourse is key” but that isn’t what we defend
2. No link – the killjoy is not necessarily speech – it is an affective reaction and connection between bodies as well as an internal orientation towards the world
3. Turn – our analysis as to how speech operates with institutions with Ahmed 07 applies to categories of disability as well – feminine speech is dismissed as nagging in the same way people with a stutter or people in a wheelchair would be dismissed

### A2 Social Movements Link

1. No link – the aff method isn’t a question of public protests against oppression but rather affective performances to create spaces of solidarity which resolves the impact
2. No link – no reason we defend public sphere – we exist in spaces between public and private

## A2 Afropessimism

Killing joy is an acceptance of the fact that we don’t have to be happy or complicit in systems of oppression or in spaces – it isn’t just a public outcry but an embrace of the spaces of deviancy

Not public expression

You have conceded our conception of power vis a vis the way space operates – ie spaces contain orientations that cohere around certain bodies to create systems of whiteness and white supremacy – you have just asserted that blackness is ontological but you have done no interaction with the framing of the 1AC which means the aff contextualizes what power is and thus our account can solve for the impacts of the alt.

Permutation – do both – net benefit is the aff – focusing only on antiblackness obscures the ways other types of oppression operate to reproduce violence - Coalitional politics solves better – first: their social death arguments prove why blacks can’t do it alone because they’re so disadvantaged. Second: blacks are outnumbered and a coalition involves more people.

Permutation – do the aff and then the neg – net benefit is Deem 96 – we need to interrogate the ways bodies exist in discursive spaces before we can take action or else that action will necessarily fail

No alt solvency – if blackness is ontological, then destroying the physical structures and institutions of civil society will not do anything to the ontological nature of antiblackness – if the alt solves, that means antiblackness isn’t ontological and you’ve disproved your thesis

No link – we don’t defend civil society, we are an orientation against it – spaciality is just one form that civil society takes which means we are the alt

Permutation – do both - We advocate for a resistance against the neoliberal carceral state through a radical act of self-love which opens up a space to utilize black rage as a tactic against impossibility

**Jordan 14** Taryn; Phd Candidate in women’s studies @ GSU; “The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage”; ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University

In my exploration of what black rage can do in response to social death therein lies a great possibility; the rest of the chapter will explore how **rage in concert with** the **affect of love disrupt the victim narrative of trans\* women must die**. In the case of CeCe McDonald, she utilized **rage as a two-fold device to protect herself, evoking notions of self-love to defend her black and trans\* body from white supremacist and transmisogynist attackers**. Women respond to racism. My **response to racism is anger. I have lived with** that anger, **on** that anger, **beneath** that anger, **on top of that anger. Ignoring that anger, feeding upon that anger, learning to use that anger before it laid my visions to waste**, for most of my life. **Once I did it in silence, afraid of the weight of that anger. My fear of that anger taught me nothing.** Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing, also. (Lorde, pg. 278) - Audre Lorde 1981 Audre Lorde’s words tell us that we should not be afraid of our anger, in fact she exhorts us to learn how to use it lest we ourselves may be destroyed in the process. Clearly in this quote Lorde is discussing the affect of anger specifically; however, what she describes more closely resembles my vision of the function of black rage. For black folks—and the same could be extended to trans\* people—**rage is a mode of survival, a tool of existence that radically shapes our realities**. CeCe utilized a tool most people of color must have in their proverbial back pocket and raged against the bigotry and violence pressed upon her. **To rage or commit violence against those who choose to destroy you is a liberating act, an act of love, to have love for oneself is to take care of the body mentally and physically**. So, the question that bubbles to the surface is, what does it mean for a non-being to radically love themselves, and what if that love means they must rage against those who seek to destroy them? This is the question that I want to interrogate. Thus, I argue that **rage is the affective vehicle for historically marginalized subjects to radically love themselves by disrupting historical narratives of otherness on the skin when faced with violence.** The **rage that ensues** from CeCe’s **confrontation with a white supremacist and transphobic crowd** presents a unique location of analysis of affect, queer, and transgender studies. My interrogation of CeCe McDonald’s case is not an attempt to speak for her; I am using CeCe **McDonald**’s case because it simultaneously **rips apart** the **narrative of a post racial and post feminist society where diversity reigns supreme and makes visible the contradictions and bias inherent to our judicial system with regard to black and transgender bodies**. Narrative of the events of June 5, 2011 in the Case of CeCe McDonald: Around 12:30 am on June 5, 2011, McDonald and four of her friends (all of them black) were on their way to Cub Foods to get some food. As they walked past the Schooner Tavern, at 2901 27th Ave S in Minneapolis, a man and two women (all of them white) began to yell epithets at them. They called McDonald and her friends 'faggots,' 'niggers,' and 'chicks with dicks,' and suggested that McDonald was 'dressed as a woman' in order to 'rape' Dean Schmitz, one of the attackers. As they were shouting, one of the women smashed her drink into the side of McDonald’s face, lacerating her salivary gland and slicing her cheek all the way through. A fight ensued, with more people joining in. What happened during the fight is unclear, but during the incident Dean Schmitz was stabbed; he later died of his injuries (Support CeCe Committee 1). Sara Ahmed’s work on the cultural politics of emotions provides a useful frame through which to think about CeCe’s altercation with Schmitz. She contends: The ordinary becomes that which is already under threat by the imagined other whose proximity becomes a crime against a person as well as place... They are assumed to ‘cause’ injury to the ordinary white subject such that their proximity is read as the origin of feelings (Ahmed 43 - 44). The appearance of CeCe within the proximity of Schmitz and crew rendered CeCe already guilty for merely appearing in space. CeCe’s blackness and trans\* body was immediately registered as an assault to the space of Schmitz, circulating a feeling of being under siege from the harmful others. Ahmed’s ideas of how the ordinary that can become a perceived object of harm is incredibly salient when thinking about CeCe and Schmitz’s encounter. Reading CeCe’s body through Ahmed’s notion of affect in relationship to object situates CeCe McDonald as non-being and not legible to heteropatriarchal power. CeCe’s objecthood was affirmed through the anti-black and transphobic epithets hurled at her that night. Schmitz’s subjectivity was under attack in relation to CeCe’s objecthood; in other words because CeCe is trans\*black and poor, she is not seen as human; instead she is seen as an object of harm to Schmitz who is a subject due to his white skin and cis-gender masculine identity. Ahmed states that “feelings instead take the ‘shape’ of contact we have with objects...,we do not love and hate because objects are good or bad, but rather they seem ‘beneficial’ or ‘harmful’” (Ahmed 5). Clearly in the instance of the attack, Dean Schmitz and crew felt that CeCe was a harmful object, she presented a threat not only to him personally but a blatant attack on his notions of white nationalism. I cannot speak for Dean Schmitz much like I am not the voice for CeCe, but what can be speculated is Schmitz’s insecurity about his white nationalism is connected to the declining wages of whiteness compounded by a shrinking economy. **The fabled promises of whiteness** in the past meant **that a white men would never face juridical charges for the killing of a black body**; white men had the choice of procuring a good job; access to the privileges and protections of the state; easier access to capital; and **the guarantee of social and spatial divisions between white and non white. Regardless of the decline of the informal promises of whiteness, white supremacy is alive and well but in our post-post reality it operates on differing registers and in combination with other forms of discourse based on the bodies of other non-beings.** Through this formulation CeCe became an object of harm—a physical manifestation of all the losses of a real and imagined white past. As a harmful object, CeCe is then incredibly sticky, to borrow Ahmed’s formulation: “[E]motions can move through the movement or circulation of objects. Such objects become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension” (Ahmed 11). The **social tensions attached to the epithets** that were used by Schmitz and crew that night — “'faggots,' 'niggers,' and 'chicks with dicks”— **stuck to CeCe, reinforcing** her **objectivity, and cementing her as an object of hate. She then became saturated with affect, the historical narrative flashing back to a time in American history where a white man controlled the nation and the body of the slave, thus his language solidified racial tensions that boil under the surface of the United States supposed post-racial piety. These abject narratives that equate blackness with criminality, blackness with disposability, and transgender with sexually depravity reinforced her harmfulness as an object, and stuck to CeCe that night.**

Revolutionary affect – our methodology affirms the positivity in difference – refusing the affective requirement of political hope and affirming the potential in deviance. Situating identity as a static position forced from the outside is a concession to systems of domination which reinforces a sad affect and eradicates truly revolutionary power

Koerner 12Michelle Koerner, Professor of Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley, 2012, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson” *Genre*, Volume 44, Number

In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of historyand the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition,a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force.Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to thinkofthis unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self- positing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becomingfurtherinto the open — toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming” — a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encounter unexpected injections ofquotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method — “schizoanalysis**,** micropolitics**,** pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics**,** cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94) — but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions**.** Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother**.** The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It isabove all for this reason that Deleuzeand Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e.**,** the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions**.** According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivityisperhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentialsfor giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.

## A2 Asexuality

1. **No link** – there’s a distinction between joy and desire – the killjoy kills the joy that results from ignoring and being complicit in systems of oppression – this isn’t desire
2. **No link** – even if the aff is about desire, the aff isn’t a question of sexual desire but rather affective desire – there is a distinction between bodies orienting themselves based on affective desire towards certain ends versus libidinal desire
3. **No link** – you can reject desire even if you don’t have desire – that is our argument – marginalized bodies are forced to feel happy even when they aren’t happy, which means we refuse that requirement, not the desire itself
4. **No link** – you say we have to know desire to reject it which excludes ace bodies – that’s not true – our argument is that energy and joy and unevenly distributing so killing the joy of others can resist that
5. **Turn** – this is exactly our argument – marginalized bodies are forced to be happy or forced to be silent in the face of oppression or else they will be dismissed as “complaining” – that’s why asexuality is marginalized – because bodies are forced to be happy in heteronormative relationships or forced to expel desire towards the opposite sex.
6. The killjoy solves – ace people disrupt the orientation of heterosexual spaces and kill the joy of oppressive spaces

## A2 Buddhism

1. Turn – The killjoy is a reorientation of the way we view suffering that allows for inner peace away from the affective orientation of institutions – peace is impossible in a world where you are forced to expel energy just to exist in spaces – the aff is a prior question
2. Alt can’t solve – inaction can’t solve the problems of the squo which means case is a net benefit to the perm
3. Apathy DA – Buddhism prevents questioning of social hierarchy and ensures domination

**Snyder 85** Gary, poet, essayist, lecturer, and environmental activist, described as the "poet laureate of Deep Ecology". “Buddhism and the Possibilities of a Planetary Culture,” Deep Ecology, eds. Devall and Sessions, 1985

Buddhism holds that the universe and all creatures in it are intrinsically in a state of complete wisdom, love, and compassion, acting in natural response and mutual interdependence. The personal realization of this from-the­-beginning state cannot be had for and by one “self”-because it is not fully realized unless one has given the self up and away. In the Buddhist view, that which obstructs the effortless manifestation of this is Ignorance, which projects into fear and needless craving. Historically **Buddhist philosophers have failed to analyze the degree to which ignor­ance and suffering are caused or encouraged by social factors, considering fear and desire to a given facts of the human condition**. Consequently, **the major concern of Buddhist philosophy is epistemology and “psychology” with no attention paid to historical or sociological problems**. Although Mahayana Buddhism has a grand vision of universal salvation, **the actual achievement of Buddhism has been the development of practical systems of meditation** toward the end of liberating a few dedicated individuals from psychological hangups and cultural conditionings. **Institutional Buddhism has been conspic­uously ready to accept or ignore the inequalities and tyrannies of whatever political system** it found itself under. **This can be death to Buddhism**. **because it is death to any meaningful compassion. Wisdom without com­passion feels no pain.**

## A2 Cap

Permutation – Do Both – Killjoys can deconstruct capitalism by disorienting the political economy. Net benefit is the aff

Permutation – do the aff and then the neg – resolving the ways spaces operate is a necessary prerequisite to deconstructing capitalism

Permutation – do the aff and then the alt in all other instances – key to test the solvency of the alt, either the alt is strong enough to overcome the links or the alt is too weak to solve.

The idea of happiness is inherently tied to capital—only our rewriting of unhappiness is able to resist these capitalist notions which means only the permutation can resolve the links and impacts.

**Ahmed 10** Sara 1/1/2010. Professor of Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London. The Promise of Happiness. Duke University Press.

**Happiness becomes**, then, **a way of maximizing** your potential of getting what you want, as well as being what you want to get. Unsurprisingly, positive psychology often uses **economic language to describe happiness as a good**. Heady and Wearing, for example, describe **the** “relatively stable personal **characteristics**” **which account for some people being** generally **happier** than others, **which they call “stocks,”** including social background, personality, and¶ social networks {1991: 49). Happiness gets you more in the bank; happiness depends on other forms of capital **(**background, personality, networks) as well¶ as acquiring or accumulating capital for the individual subject, One of the most recent proponents of positive psychology is Alan Carr,¶ whose work also crosses the border between popular and academic readerships.¶ Carr also describes the project of positive psychology in terms of the twin objectives of understanding and facilitating happiness and subjective well-being (2004: 1). Positive emotions “like pleasure or contentment tell us something good is happening” (12). He argues that happy and unhappy people¶ “have distinctive personality profiles” (16). A happiness profile would be the¶ profile of the kind of person who is most likely to be happy, as we can also see¶ in the following classic description:¶ **happy persons are more likely to be found in the economically prosperous countries**, whose freedom and democracy are held in respect and the political scene is stable. The **happy are more likely to be found in majority groups than among minorities and more often at the top of the ladder than at the bottom**.¶ They are typically married and get on well with families and friends. In respect¶ of their personal characteristics, the happy appear relatively healthy.¶ both physically and mentally. They are active and openminded. They feel they are in control of their lives.Their aspirations concern social and moral matters rather than money making. In matters of politics, the happy tend to the¶ conservative side of middle. (Veenhoven 1991: 16)¶ The face of happiness, at least in this description, looks rather like the face of¶ privilege. Rather than assuming happiness is simply found in “happy persons "¶ **we can consider how claims to happiness make certain forms of personhood valuable. Attributions of happiness might be how social norms and ideals become affective, as if relative proximity to those norms and ideals creates happiness**.¶ Lauren Berlant has called such a fantasy of happiness a “stupid” form¶ of optimism: “the faith that adjustment to certain forms or practices of living¶ and thinking will secure one’s happiness” (2002: 75).¶ For Carr happiness profiles are also profiles of social forms as well as individual¶ persons: he suggests that certain types of families “promote the experience¶ of flow” by optimal levels of clarity, centering, choice, and challenge (62).¶ If certain ways of living promote happiness, then to promote happiness would¶ be to promote those ways of living. Thus **happiness promotion becomes** very quickly **the promotion of certain types of families**. The idea of “flow ” to describe¶ the relationship between happy persons and happy worlds is powerful.¶ Deriving primarily from the work of M ihaly Csikszentmihalyi, flow describes¶ the experience of an individual engaged with the world, or involved with the¶ world, where the world is not encountered as alien, as an obstacle or resistance.¶ “The best moments in our lives” Csikszentmihalyi suggests, “are not¶ the passive, receptive, relaxing times —although such experiences can also be¶ enjoyable, if we have worked hard to attain them. The best moments usually¶ occur when a person’s body or mind is stretched to its limits in a voluntary¶ effort to accomplish something difficult and worthwhile” (1992: 3). He argues¶ that “in the long run optimal experiences add up to a sense of mastery— or perhaps better, **a sense of participation in determining the content of life — that comes as close to what is usually meant by happiness** as anything else we can conceivably imagine,” (4)¶ **When the subjects are not “ in flow” they encounter the world as resistant, as blocking rather than enabling an action. Unhappy subjects** hence **feel alienated from the world as they experience the world as ahen**. I suspect that Csikszentmihalyi¶ can teach us a great deal about the phenomenology of happiness as an intimacy of body and world. What if to flow into the world is not simply under^¶ stood as a psychological attribute? What if the world “houses” some bodies¶ more than others, such that some bodies do not experience that world as resistant?¶ **We might need to rewrite happiness by considering how it feels to be stressed by the very forms of life that enable some bodies to flow into space**.¶ Perhaps the experiences of not following, of being stressed, of not being extended¶ by the spaces in which we reside, can teach us more about happiness

1. Turn – Analyzing oppression from many perspectives is key. Even if capitalism is the root cause, focusing solely on cap cannot resolve our impacts. Implications:
   1. If I win any instance of identity that capitalism cannot account for, it’s a net benefit to the perm. IE the alternative cannot explain why sexual assault happens on college campuses or why there are so few women CEOs – only the affirmative can.
   2. Whiteness DA – saying capitalism is the only thing that matters kills coalitions against capitalism – that’s why the Occupy Wall Street and Bernie Bros movement were all white people.

**Ross 2k** 2000 Marlon; is Professor of English and Associate Director of the Center for Afroamerican and African Studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, New Literary History 31.4; 827-850  
**Touting class** or "economic justice" **as *the* fundamental stance for left identity is** just another way of **telling everybody else to shut up so I can be heard** above the fray.Because of the force of "identity politics," a leftist white person would be leery of claiming to lead Blacks toward the promised land, a leftist straight man leery of claiming to lead women or queers, but, for a number of complex rationalizations, we in the middle class (where all of us writing here currently reside) still have few qualms about volunteering to lead, at least theoretically, the working class toward "economic justice." What Eric calls here "left fundamentalism," I'd call, at the risk of sounding harsh, left paternalism. Of the big identity groups articulated through "identity politics," economic **class remains** the only identity **where a straight white middle-class man can** still **feel comfortable claiming himself a leading political voice, and thus he may** sometimes **overcompensate by screaming that this is the only identity that really matters**--which is the same as **claiming that class is beyond identity**. Partlythis is because **Marxist theory** and Marx himself (a bourgeois intellectual creating the theoretical practice for the workers' revolution) **stage the model for working-class identity as** a sort of **trans-identification, a magical identity that is transferable to those outside the group who commit themselves to it wholeheartedly enough.** If we look back, we realize even this magical quality is not special to a history of class struggle, as whites during the New Negro movements of the early twentieth century felt that they were vanguard race leaders because they had putatively imbibed some essential qualities of Negroness by cross-identifying with the folk and their culture.

1. No link – we don’t focus only on identify politics – we give an account of how spaces operate to produce things material harms – you have not given a reason why we cannot talk about identity in conjunction with capitalism which means perm shields the link.
2. Turn – our conception of space says that certain bodies are allowed economic mobility when they fit into the spacial economy which means only the aff disorientation of space can deconstruct the way capitalism actually operates. Also means the alt cannot solve without the aff.
3. No alt solvency – individual rejections of capitalism cannot solve the overlying structures of capitalism that will continue regardless of an individual rejecting it – capitalism will just fill the void

Only permutation can resolve oppression – the alt fractures essential coalitions to solve anti racist struggles

West 88 Honorary chair of the Democratic Socialist of America 1988 Cornell-prof @Princeton University, DSA National Politicall Committee and a member of its African American Commission; “Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism”; RACE & ETHNICITY ESERV; <http://race.eserver.org/toward-a-theory-of-racism.html> (year of publication found on Dr. West’s website: <http://www.pragmatism.org/library/west/>)

Socialism and Antiracism: Two Inseparable Yet Not Identical Goals It should be apparent that **racist practices** directed against black, brown, yellow, and red people **are an integral element of U. S. history**, including present day American culture and society. This means not simply that Americans have inherited racist attitudes and prejudices, but, more importantly, that institutional forms of racism are embedded in American society in both visible and invisible ways. These institutional forms exist not only in remnants of de jure job, housing, and educational discrimination and political gerrymandering. They also manifest themselves in a de facto labor market segmentation, produced by the exclusion of large numbers of peoples of color from the socioeconomic mainstream. (This exclusion results from limited educational opportunities, devastated families, a disproportionate presence in the prison population, and widespread police brutality. ) **It also should be evident that past Marxist conceptions of racism have often prevented U. S. socialist movements from engaging in antiracist activity in a serious and consistent manner. In addition, black suspicion of white-dominated political movements (no matter how progressive) as well as the distance between these movements and the daily experiences of peoples of color have made it even more difficult to fight racism effectively.** Furthermore, the disproportionate white middle-class composition of contemporary democratic socialist organizations creates cultural barriers to the participation by peoples of color. Yet this very participation is a vital precondition for greater white sensitivity to antiracist struggle and to white acknowledgment of just how crucial antiracist struggle is to the U. S. socialist movement. Progressive organizations often find themselves going around in a vicious circle. Even when they have a great interest in antiracist struggle, they are unable to attract a critical mass of people of color because of their current predominately white racial and cultural composition. These organizations are then stereotyped as lily white, and significant numbers of people of color refuse to join. **The only effective way the contemporary democratic socialist movement can break out of this circle** (and it is possible because the bulk of democratic socialists are among the least racist of Americans) **is to be sensitized to the critical importance of antiracist struggles.** This conscientization cannot take place either by reinforcing agonized white consciences by means of guilt, nor by presenting another grand theoretical analysis with no practical implications. The former breeds psychological paralysis among white progressives, which is unproductive for all of us; the latter yields important discussions but often at the expense of concrete political engagement. Rather **what is needed is more widespread participation by predominantly white democratic socialist organizations in antiracist struggles**--whether those struggles be for the political, economic, and cultural empowerment of Latinos, blacks, Asians, and Native Americans or antiimperialist struggles against U.S. support for oppressive regimes in South Africa, Chile, the Philippines, and the occupied West Bank. **A major focus on antiracist coalition work will** not only lead democratic socialists to act upon their belief in genuine individuality and radical democracy for people around the world; it also will **put socialists in daily contact with peoples of color in common struggle**. Bonds of trust can be created only within concrete contexts of struggle. This interracial interaction guarantees neither love nor friendship. Yet it can yield more understanding and the realization of two overlapping goals-- democratic socialism and antiracism. While engaging in antiracist struggles, **democratic socialists can also enter into a dialogue on the power relationships and misconceptions that often emerge in multiracial movements for social justice in a racist society.** Honest and trusting **coalition work can help socialists unlearn Eurocentrism** in a self-critical manner and can also demystify the motivations of white progressives in the movement for social justice. We must frankly acknowledge that a democratic socialist society will not necessarily eradicate racism. Yet a democratic socialist society is the best hope for alleviating and minimizing racism, particularly institutional forms of racism. This conclusion depends on a candid evaluation that guards against utopian self-deception. But it also acknowledges the deep moral commitment on the part of democratic socialists of all races to the dignity of all individuals and peoples--a commitment that impels us to fight for a more libertarian and egalitarian society. Therefore **concrete antiracist struggle is both an ethical imperative and political necessity for democratic socialists**. It is even more urgent as once again racist policies and Third World intervention become more acceptable to many Americans. **A more effective democratic socialist movement engaged in antiracist and antiimperialist struggl**e can help turn the tide. It depends on how well we

Dismissing the aff as just “identity politics” reproduces capitalism and prevents any change – capitalism is also identity politics because it creates categories of useful bodies

**Ahmed 15** Sara Ahmed feministkilljoys "It is not the time for a party" May 13, 2015 https://feministkilljoys.com/2015/05/13/it-is-not-the-time-for-a-party/

It is devastating. We need to be devastated. A party based on a system of class loyalty has been given permission to rule. A party: how a few reproduce themselves by convincing many they are the many. How a party assumes human rights can be abolished by the act of abolishing an act. A party that is Eugenicist: how a few reproduce their fortune by reproducing themselves; how the few justify their good fortune as deriving from work, or effort, or good will, or character, rather than inheritance; how a few who benefit from the exploitation of many present many as those receiving benefits; how many are ruled by holding onto a distinction created by the rulers between the deserving and the undeserving, assuming that by trying to be more deserving they will be less unsafe. Eugenics becomes a social policy: how you can eliminate others by making it harder for them to exist. Drawing on Francis Galton’s own terms, eugenics is the reproduction of the conditions that enable the reproduction of those deemed “men of a high type.” What conditions. A party: how some are left for dead. **Capitalism** (I won’t add racial as an adjective here, all capitalism is racial as well classed because it depends on making moral distinctions between higher and lower beings) **is identity politics**: how the identities of some are posted because those identities secure access to a world; **how the identities of some disappear by being registered as universal.** No wonder that **any politics based on asserting one’s particulars** against the universal **is called identity politics!** Capitalism is identity politics. **Capitalism is how “the others” become labour** to be used, **or useless; how others become usable is how others become expendable**; how others become expendable is how others become killable. Capitalism is how “the others” become those who have to be welcomed to be at all: **capitalism is Neighbourhood Watch** generalised into a system (that is Neighbourhood Watch extracts its particular logic from a general system – as I tried to argue in my book Strange Encounters (2000)): it is **how the others become loitering**, those who here, there, without a legitimate purpose, **whose proximity registers as crime;** or whose arrival is deemed to endanger property or to lower the value of a neighbourhood; it is how the strangers are those whose entry is understand as damage, **whose entry is unlawful**; **whose life becomes unlawful**; **whose death becomes lawful**. The figure of the bogus asylum seeker and what they used to call in the Australian press the “dole bludger” are “stuck together” to use the terms I introduced in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004). **By sticking together these figures**, through their adherence, **we have** the effect of **coherence: a national body is reproduced around “some bodies**,” as the “who” **who must be defended**. We can understand why and how willfulness too has utility as a judgment: willful **beings are those for whom being is willful, those who are judged to falsify their personhood as persecution with the intent of receiving benefits**. It is a system from which only a few benefit. It is the party. **Capitalism is identity politics: how the few become the** universe/**universal**; it is how **the universal is handy because it makes others into** the hands, **helping hands, those who have to help reproduce the very system that reproduces their own subordination**, or risk becoming unhandy hands, who are grasping at something that is not theirs. **It is time for us to curl our hands into fists.** We should not be handy. It is not the time for a party. It is a time to be angry. We cannot separate a feeling from what a feeling is doing. **To be angry is to enact your relation to a world: anger is action because anger is reaction**. I have written about anger often. I need to write about anger some more. When I wrote The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004) I spoke on anger as key to feminism, in particular, to black feminist and feminist of colour scholarship and activism. I wanted to challenge some of the critiques of “wound culture” within some feminist theory. Let me share some of these words.

### A2 Macro-politics

1. We engage with institutions – we just engage via bottom up instead of top down. Prefer this –
   1. Access – only a few people actually access policy making, Ie congressmen, but our micropolitical action is a method all bodies can use if they can’t access policy making. You theorize the grand structures but not how they materialize in everyday maneuvers
   2. We need all the possible strategies we can to deconstruct capitalism – you should not arbitrarily privilege macro politics and abandon micro politics – evaluate this debate modestly – we have 100% strength on link that we are a good micro political strategy, which means if you have any doubts that macro is the only politics that matters, you should vote on the permutation.
   3. Micro analysis spills upwards to create macro analysis – for example, institutions didn’t just determine that Harambe would be a mean, it was built up by micro instances through facebook
   4. Prioritizing macro prevents any conception of how material action gets actualized into things individuals can do – causes infinite deferral of action to theorization
   5. *Survival strategies are key – the 1NC focuses on liberation from capitalism but we need to understand how to survive within the system in the mean time*

### A2 Scarsdale’s

Turn – Limiting debate to a choice between policies enforces neoliberal conception of politics and history which makes impossible any alternative way of being – debate should be a space to disrupt current paradigms of problem solving

**Curtis 13** Neal, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Film, Television and Media Studies at the University of Auckland, “Thought Bubble: Neoliberalism and the Politics of Knowledge,” *new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics*, Volume 80-81, 2013, Project MUSE

Thought Bubble The Ernst & Young report quotes one anonymous university Vice-Chancellor declaring: ‘Our major competitor in ten years time will be Google … if we’re still alive!’ This quote supposedly encapsulates changes to our relation to knowledge indicative of the two drivers of change which the report calls ‘digital technologies’ and ‘democratization’. The reason why these two are related is because the report understands democratisation simply in terms of ‘access’ and then assumes the flawed syllogism whereby because digital technologies make knowledge accessible and democracy is about access, therefore all digital technologies are democratic. It would be foolish to suggest that a report citing ‘the Darwinian force of the market’33 could countenance the idea that democracy ought to be measured by something other than consumer-style access, but access in and of itself is not inherently democratic. Much like ‘excellence’ it requires secondary criteria to become a meaningful concept. Admittedly the report does avoid the positivist trap that users of Google can easily fall into, of assuming that knowledge is simply ‘out there’, such that its acquisition is merely a matter of data retrieval. The author of the report does link knowledge to analysis and interpretation, but given that we are asked to bend our knee to ‘the Darwinian force of the market’, one suspects that **analysis** and interpretation **is** of a kind with that found in the pages of the Financial Times and will be limited to debates over best policy within a given system, rather than any ontological engagement with the character and shape of the world itself. The Google model is, however, exemplary of the problem faced by the post-historical university and the nature of its democratic role. Leaving aside the rather obvious point that in the pursuit of profit Google have quite happily aided the Chinese government in their restriction of the democracy movement in that country, the Google model is significant because its success is based on successfully attending to and facilitating the personalisation that has come to define both democracy and knowledge in neoliberal consumer cultures. Google’s success has primarily come from its ability to provide a highly individualised service, partly due to the capacity of its search engine to learn what the user likes and to display results that are closely aligned to preferences indicated through earlier ‘click signals’; but this has also been a path to monetisation as the company is able to claim that it can deliver customers to companies with impressive precision. In an economy increasingly based on information, attention becomes a very rare commodity,34 so the ability to deliver attention to advertisers becomes a highly profitable capability. The capacity for Google to archive click signals affords increasingly successful searches without additional work from the user and provides a profile that companies can attach themselves to in their search for consumers. [End Page 84] While **this mode of information** retrieval **sits well with all the neoliberal markers of value - individuality**, preference, **choice**, **competition**, **immediacy - it gives rise to significant concerns for** both **knowledge** and democracy that must not be ignored. In a fascinating book entitled The Filter Bubble, Eli Pariser sets out the implications of the Google algorithm. Initially, while the idea that what is best for one person may not be best for someone else is hardly revolutionary, the idea that a search engine is ‘biased to share our own views’35 has far-reaching consequences. In short, ‘your computer monitor is a kind of one-way mirror, reflecting your own interests while algorithmic observers watch what you click’ (Filter Bubble, p3). Here, access is instant and individualised, but Pariser is concerned that where ‘democracy requires a reliance on shared facts […] we’re being offered parallel but separate universes’ (Filter Bubble, p5). While it is important to argue that “facts” are not enough, shared or not, the problem is accentuated because the search engine, which is now a ‘prediction engine’ (Filter Bubble, p9), has a tendency to search out ‘facts’ you have already indicated a preference for through click signals. Ultimately the cookies and bots that aid personalised web-browsing begin to produce a filter bubble: ‘a unique universe of information for each of us’, but more importantly one that ‘fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information’ (Filter Bubble, p9). In other words, the Google model is one in which we continually receive more of what we already know and have indicated a preference for. Ultimately, the filter bubble is ‘a cozy place, populated by our favourite people and things and ideas’ (Filter Bubble, p12). Pariser notes that while this personalisation flatters users who believe they are in a position of control because the prediction engine appears to be giving them what they want, it increasingly subjects users ‘to a kind of informational determinism in which what you clicked on in the past determines what you see next’ (Filter Bubble, p16). This mode of personalised access means that Google does have great significance for the post-historical university, but that significance does not lie in the claim that Google University is the future as Ernst & Young would have us believe. Rather, the Google model is significant because the two forces of impact and customer service suggest that the post-historical university will increasingly take on the character of a filter bubble. As **research is** increasingly **directed towards** what are described to be **the needs of the current system, and teaching is tailored to satisfying the existing desires and preferences of students refigured as customers**, the university’s role in the global knowledge economy will be to offer more of the same. **The** **university has always had a major role to play in maintaining the cultural status quo and policing knowledge, but it has also historically been a major site for the social production of dissensus which is irreducible to the promotional language of ‘innovation’** and ‘entrepreneurialism’ (or any historical equivalent thereof). Ultimately the sole purpose of the Ernst & Young report is to ensure that the university of the future plays an integral part in the production of an ‘identity loop’ (Filter Bubble, p127), or what we might call a thought bubble that reproduces the truth of market logic. In the face of this doctrinal onslaught the future of the university as a social institution looks bleak, but despite the heavy-handed ideological work that the Ernst & Young report epitomises, **the future cannot be closed off** in the way they hope. As was noted in the introduction, the rationality of markets was shown to be a pseudo-science by the persistence and the effects of what Besley and Hennessey called the ‘psychology of herding’. First of all this produced the hysterical delusion that the business cycle had been overcome, which was then counteracted by the global loss of confidence that brought about the greatest economic crisis in living memory. [End Page 85] The evident role played by these ‘animal spirits’ testifies to the importance of a non-theoretical, non-rational relation to the world, but also to a more profound ontological state of mind that Heidegger refers to as ‘attunement’ or ‘mood’.36 Ordinarily that attunement is an unremarkable and comfortable familiarity, but one that might become a concerted defence in times of crisis. Fluctuations in mood are usually accompanied by stories that tell us something about the world we live in. With regards to the world of economics these are stories that precipitate trust, confidence, euphoria, frenzy, fear, and anxiety.37 These spirits and the stories that shape them are evidence of the continuing hermeneutic condition set out above. Stories make a world of sense, but they are only ever interpretations and remain subject to the vagaries of mood. **The narrative of neoliberal post-history can claim** to be the **rightful representation** of human relations **only because it is underwritten by** gigantic economic, political and social **power that supports** and distributes **its stories, not because** it has discovered **the truth**. In such an environment, academics regularly articulate concern about the utilitarianif notinstrumental mood, of managers and students alike. While the discourses of impact and customer service further support such instrumentality and suggest that the university of the future will increasingly help lock down the narrative of post-history, there is still hope. In keeping with Heidegger’s (in)famous use of Hölderlin’s words: ‘But where danger is, grows/The saving power also’,38 the pressures on students to achieve a certain GPA or class of degree and the demands on them to be socially compliant, still does not eradicate their sense that the world is contestable. In many cases the mood of **students** remains one of scepticism and doubt towards the supposed common sense, coupled with a desire for change. They **remain interested in the big questions** and readily support courses that make great theoretical demands on them. Students tend to be of an age when the sedimented world they have inherited has not yet ossified and all kinds of malformations and reformations remain possible. This means that **an important role can still be played by the university**; not one that is reduced to increasing access to what is already given, but one **that** opens up spaces for this contestation and challenging of the world, for offering up radically alternative ways of living and being-with-others. As was noted in the introduction, the humanities have an especially important role to play in this regard. While traditional humanities disciplines such as philosophy, English, and history have all supported social and political conservatism through, amongst other things, the defence of a canon, these disciplines have also been traditionally concerned with that gap between the meaningful and meaninglessness that defines the human condition**.** Whether a philosophical treatise, a work of literature, or the recovery of a counter-history, work in the humanities has always occupied that space where **the** meaningful totality we call our world suffers a variety of disruptions and is revealed to be inadequate. The humanities are never more alive than when faced with the loss of an established truth and the slipping away of the world. Some of the greatest works in the humanities are riddled with anxiety. It therefore falls on the humanities **in a time of crisis to enable anxiety to work in the name of alternative visions, which is precisely why the humanities are under such** strident **attack within the marketised model**. This is also a role that ought to be taken beyond the campus to form the beginnings of a new contract with a public that has just bailed out private speculators at the expense of public welfare. Turning away from the anxiety generated by the crisis will only encourage more of the same. The public role of the university should be to ensure this anxiety**,** understood as the re-emergence of the questioning that neoliberal post-history continually seeks to suppress, is turned to creative use.

### 2AR

The nexus question of this debate is macro politics versus micro politics – the 2NR needs to win that we can only engage in macro politics to win this debate – if I have any reason why micro politics is also good, that is a sufficient net benefit to the permutation

Couple of conceded net benefits that make this debate really easy to resolve

1. Survival strategy – the alt is a method of liberation from the macro structure of capitalism, but we also need to be able to survive within those structures in the meantime – if a woman of color is impoverished and needs to work or can’t find childcare and thus can’t engage in boring politics, what are they supposed to do? Probably the aff method – its applicable to the rest of the world
2. We need all the possible strategies we can to deconstruct capitalism – you should not arbitrarily privilege macro politics and abandon micro politics – evaluate this debate modestly – we have 100% strength on link that we are a good micro political strategy, which means if you have any doubts that macro is the only politics that matters, you should vote on the permutation.

## A2 Decadence

1. No Link – we do not force you to take our performance as evidence or trust our identity – we provide a methodology which you can argue against which solves the impacts

2. No Internal Link to the Impact: The localization of Debate destroys the spread of ideas in ways that could rise to the level of disciplines. The particularity of the round does not spillover to institutions which their impact relies on.

3. Turn: The Debate round is the only way get at a new paradigm of knowledge in the round. The only way to study decadent communication is through actually communicating.

**Martinez 11[[3]](#footnote-3)**

**There is no way to study communication except for communicating, and this** fact **creates the problem of knowing the difference between the object of our study and the fact of our communication about it**.Within our Western cultural and scientific traditions **we have** often **grappled with this problem by trying to minimize our own human presence in the process of** scholarly or **research** practice. Gordon (2006) identifies this approach as a “form of naturalism that subordinates thinking to the natural sciences” (p. 2). **This** approach **falls** **within an “objectivist orientation” that relies on a rationality that aims toward knowledge of the human being wherein the human being engaged in the scholarly or research practice should be neutral** (i.e., not present) in the process of the scholarly or research practice itself. **Gordon’s work shows us how this kind of “retreat” from thinking permeates our social world and is not merely** the logic of the natural science **misapplied** to the study of human beings **but is also characteristic of contemporary thinking as it is** moved and **conveyed through our public discourses** (social, political, and personal).

4. Our aff advocates for Transdisciplinarity which solves the K’s impacts. Creative inquiry destroys the decadent conclusions held by traditional orders of knowledge.

**Montuori 13[[4]](#footnote-4)**

**We recall** Lewis **Gordon’s warning about the dominance of a single discipline** at this point (Gordon, 2006, p. 4): **Its assertion as absolute** eventually **leads to no room for other disciplinary perspectives**, the result of which is the rejection of them for not being one’s own. Thus, if one’s discipline has foreclosed the question of its scope, all that is left for it is a form of “applied” work. Such work militates against thinking. **Transdisciplinary research draws on a plurality of disciplines in an attempt to address the complexity of phenomena**. But does that mean we need to know everything about every discipline you’re using? No. But we can begin to understand how the different disciplines and perspectives we’re drawing on are shaped by different paradigmatic assumptions. **Transdisciplinarity focuses on the way knowledge is constructed. How does a particular disciplinary perspective construct its understanding of its subject matter?** In my courses on transdisciplinarity I have used an edited volume on Social Creativity (Montuori & Purser, 1999b). Students are invited to see how scholars in a number of different disciplines (philosophy, anthropology, various branches of psychology, evolutionary biology, etc.) construct their understanding of the social dimensions of creativity. The results are very different, informed by the authors’ disciplinary and paradigmatic assumptions. The contributions range from a hermeneutic history of the concept of imagination in philosophy (Kearney, 1999) to the relationship between the Biblical creation story and the Western image of the lone genius (Barron, 1999), the interaction of Romanticism and consumerism (Stigliano, 1999), and the childhood and educational experiences of eminent creative individuals (Mockros & Csikszentmhalyi, 1999). **The point is to explore how these different scholars constructed their understanding of creativity addressing the same fundamental topic based on different starting points with different assumptions.** Dean Keith Simonton illustrates how psychologists and sociologists/anthropologists constructed very different understandings of creativity, based on different assumptions, most obviously that for the former the individual is the unit of analysis, and for the latter, society as a whole (Simonton, 1999). In this way, **students can begin to see the creativity inherent in the construction of perspectives, interpretations, and frameworks to approach a topic.**

## A2 Deleuze

1. No Link – we do not create a static conception of the self – we say the self is constantly changing based on relationships to others and institutions – that’s Ahmed 07
2. Turn – The 1AC is a disorientation of the ways space operates to create orientation around habitual bodies which means we are an instance of the alternative because it resists the way current paradigms of intelligibility mark us.
3. Accessibility DA – Ahmed 07 indicates that spaces are oriented around certain bodies who become invisible and unintelligible because they are not forced to confront their whiteness. Bodies who do not fit the orientation of institutions are marked as different and cannot escape from this marking which means they cannot access the alternative – women will always be seen as women and people of color will still be seen as people of color, even if these intelligible categories are bad. Two Implications:
   1. The alternative cannot account for marginalized bodies which means it cannot solve the aff and cannot resolve its own links and impacts because the only bodies who can become unintelligible are the ones who fit in the operation of space. Embodiment is necessary to deconstruct markings of the body.
   2. Justifies **permutation do the aff and then the neg** – net benefit is that we need to resolve the instances of ‘marking’ within institutions by disorienting the ways spaces operate, before we can become unintelligible.
4. The aff is a survival strategy – while the 1N focuses on liberating us from the larger structure of faciality, only the aff method tells us a way to survive within that structure in the mean time

## A2 hooks

1. No Link – We don’t blame anyone – if our aff said “all white men suck and we should kill them”, that would link into the K, but our aff just analyzes how white supremacy operates without assigning blame to individuals
2. Turn – hooks concludes that instead of blame we need to embrace an ethic of love – that’s the aff – cross apply Ahmed 14 – we create affective spaces of solidarity that allow acts of self love and loving others to resolve psychological violence
3. Turn – the aff is a disorientation of the institution of white masculinity – not blaming individuals but the structures that sustain oppression.

**Ahmed 14** Sara Ahmed "White Men" feministkilljoys.com November 4, 2014 <https://feministkilljoys.com/2014/11/04/white-men/>

It was one of the funnier moments in my diversity research. I was interviewing a practitioner. She shared with me a story. She had been looking at the new webpage of the senior management team at her university. They had just put up photographs of each member of the team. Her friend looked over her shoulder and asked: “are they related?” When she relayed the story, we both burst into laughter. When we catch with words a logic that is often reproduced by not being put into words it can be such a relief. We recognised that each other recognized the logic. Laughter, peals of it; our bodies catching that logic, too. Are they related? Well perhaps they are not related in the sense of how we might usually use the word “related.” They are not kin. Or are they? Is each member of the team one of the same kind? Does the homogeneity of an appearance registered by or in this question point to another sense of being related: being in a relation; being as relation? They were, as it happens, you might not be surprised by this, “**white men**.” To use this expression is not to summarise a relation; the relation **is** itself a summary (**how the institution can be built around a** short **series of points**). The photograph give us a summary of a summary: **this is who is the organisation is**; this is **who the organisation is for**. Of course an image can change without changing a thing (this is why diversity is so often a poster, you can re-image the organisation as being colourful and happy as a way of holding onto whiteness: diversity as image management). When we talk of “white men” we are describing an institution. **“White men” is an institution**. By saying this, what I am saying? **An institution** typically **refers to a persistent structure or mechanism of social order governing the behaviour of a set of individuals** within a given community. So when I am saying that “**white men**” **is an institution** I am referring not only to what has already been instituted or built but **the *mechanisms* that ensure the persistence of that structure**. **A building is shaped by a series of regulative norms**. **“White men” refers** also **to conduct; it is not simply who is there, who is here, who is given a place at the table, but how bodies are occupied once they have arrived; behaviour as bond**. **But when you talk about “white men” you are heard as making an accusation against *him****.* Maybe the title of this post seems provocative: why make this all about *him*? Well maybe I am talking about *him*: **a pronoun is an institution**. Him: for some to become him is to pass into them. **“White men,”** then, **refers to what** as well as who **has already been assembled: a collective body**. This is not to say that white men are not constantly being reassembled; you can meet up in the present, you can have a future meeting, because of how the past splinters into resources. **“White men”** is between tenses: it is **how an inheritance is reproduced.** When **a body lines up, or is in line, you might only see one set of lines, or maybe you don’t see any; when things appear as they should, the right way up, they recede. When a body does not line up, things appear** queer or **wonky**. Blink. Nirmal Puwar’s book *Space Invaders: Race, Gender and “Bodies out of Place”* (2004) describes these processes very well: **some bodies are “somatic norms,” they become rightful occupants of spaces. Others not. Blink**. One diversity practitioner I interviewed called it “social cloning,” how organisations tend to recruit in their own image. In a diversity training session I attended someone talked about how members of her department would ask as a question about potential job candidates: would this person be “the kind of person you can take down the pub”? **To become relatable is to restrict a relation; someone you can relate to because they are at home not only in meeting rooms or the seminar rooms, but in social spaces, spaces that have their own histories**. **Norms** might **become more regulative the more casual the spaces**. This is why: **when rules are relaxed, we encounter the rules**. Flinch. **How then is “white men” built or even a building**? Think about it. One practitioner relayed to me how they named buildings in her institution. All dead white men she said. We don’t need the names to know how **spaces come to be organised so they can receive certain bodies**. We don’t need the naming to know how or who buildings can be *for.* **Behaviour as bond: you might walk into a room with a white male professor.** **You might notice how the collective gaze falls on him**. You walk in together but you aren’t seen as together. Maybe **they assume you are an assistant**. They see him as they expect a professor to appear this way. He might have a beard; grey hair. Of course there is more to him that that; no doubt there are things they do not see. Quite right; that’s the point. When he is seen as professor there is a way he too is not seen. **They are seeing what they expect to see; they are seeing one person and not another as professor because “white men” have already been assembled**. Here come the professors, here is the professor; hello professor. **When you fulfil an expectation of how they appear you do not have to work to appear. Being seen is about being *seen to*; receiving attention**. The quietness that might follow the words that are sent out; it is a solemn occasion. Sometimes I giggle. Because this has happened so often, you know what is happening when it is happening. Sometimes, of course, what we might be seeing what we are expecting. **But every now and then something happens that makes the flickering impression created by the turning of heads turn into something more tangible**.

## A2 Humanism / Affect Good

Our Affective emotional analysis is key to disrupt universal and transcendental notions of humanity – our creation of spaces of solidarity deconstruct the individualistic subjecthood

**Braidotti 06** Rosi; Utrecht University and Birkbeck College; Affirmation versus VuInerabiIity: On Contemporary Ethical Debates; 2006; <https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/12987BF52DF1C537852574800056A6F8/$FILE/symposium_2006_0010_0001_0245_0264.pdf>; accessed 12/3/16

At the core of this ethical project is **a positive vision of the subject as a radically immanent, intensive body,** that is, **an assemblage of forces or flows, intensities, and passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration commonly known as an "individual" self**. This intensive and dynamic entity is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and undergo constant though non-destructive fluxes of transformation. It is the body's degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation. **Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode. The emphasis on "existence" implies a commitment to duration and conversely a rejection of self-destruction**. Positivity is buHt into this program through the idea of thresholds of sustainability. Thus, **an ethically empowering option increases one's potentia and creates joyful energy in the process.** **The conditions that can encourage such a quest are not only historical; they concern processes of transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity.** Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground on which to negotiate the interests and the eventual conflicts. It is important to see that this fundamentally positive vision of the ethicaI subject does not deny conflicts, tension, or even violent disagreements between different subjects. The legacy of Hegel's critique of Spinoza is still looming large here, notably the criticism that a Spinozist approach lacks a theory of negativity, which may adequately account for the complex logistics of interaction with others. **It is simply not the case that the positivity of desire cancels or denies the tensions of conflicting interests. It merely displaces the grounds on which the negotiations take place.** The Kantian imperative of not doing to others what you would not want done to you is not rejected as much as enlarged. In terms of the ethics of conatus, in fact, the harm that you do to others is immediately reflected in the harm you do to yourself, in terms of loss of potentia, positivity, self-awareness, and inner freedom. **Moreover, the "others" in question are non-anthropomorphic and include planetary forces**. **This move away from the Kantian vision of an ethics that obliges people, and especially women, natives, and others to act morally in the name of a transcendent standard or universal rule is not a simple one.** I defend it as a forceful answer to the complexities of our historical situation; **it is a move towards radical immanence against all Platonizing and classical humanistic denials of embodiment, mater, and the flesh.** What is at risk, however, in nomadic ethics is the notion of containment of the other. This is expressed by a number of moral thinkers in the Continental tradition, such as Jessica Benjamin (1988) in her radicalization of Irigaray's horizontal transcendence, Lyotard in the "differend" (1983) and his notion of the "unattuned," and Butler (2004) in her emphasis on "precarious life." They stress that moral reasoning 10- cates the constitution of subjectivity in the interrelation to others, which is a form of exposure, availability, and vulnerability. This recognition entails the necessity of containing the other, the suffering and the enjoyment of others in the expression of the intensity of our affective streams. An embodied and connecting containment as a moral category could emerge from this, over and against the hierarchical forms of containment implied by Kantian forms of universal morality.

Conviviality net benefit – our method affirms the inherent vulnerabilities our experiences. Our politic destabilizes the notion of a stable individual subject and embraces fluid ways of being.

**Puar 9** {Jasbir K; Women's and Gender Studies , Rutgers University , Newark, NJ, USA; “Prognosis time: Towards a geopolitics of affect, debility and capacity”; Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory; Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK; Published online: 04 Oct 2010.; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07407700903034147>;

Out of the numerous possibilities that ‘‘assemblage theory’’ offers, much of it has already begun to transform queer theory, from Elizabeth Grosz’s crucial re-reading of the relations between bodies and prosthetics (which complicates not only the contours of bodies in relation to forms of bodily discharge, but also complicates the relationships to objects, such as cell phones, cars, wheelchairs, and the distinctions between them as capacity-enabling devices) (1994), to Donna Haraway’s cyborgs (1991), to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘‘BwO’’ (Bodies without Organs – organs, loosely defined, rearranged against the presumed natural ordering of bodily capacity) (1987). I want to close by foregrounding the analytic power of **conviviality** that may further complicate how subjects are positioned**, underscoring** instead more **fluid relations between capacity and debility. Conviviality, unlike notions of resistance**, oppositionality, subversion or transgression (facets of queer exceptionalism that unwittingly dovetail with modern narratives of progress in modernity), **foregrounds categories** such as race, gender, and sexuality **as events** – as **encounters – rather than as entities or attributes of the subject. Surrendering certain notions of revolution, identity** politics, **and social change** – the ‘‘big utopian picture’’ that Massumi complicates in the opening epigraph of this essay – **conviviality** instead **always entails an ‘‘experimental step.’’** Why the **destabilization of the subject of identity and a turn to affect matters** is **because affect** – as a bodily matter – **makes identity politics both possible and yet impossible**. In its conventional usage, conviviality means relating to, occupied with, or fond of feasting, drinking, and good company – to be merry, festive, together at a table, with companions and guests, and hence, to live with. As an attribute and function of assembling, however, **conviviality does not lead to a politics of** the **tuniversal or inclusive common**, nor an ethics of individuatedness, **rather the futurity enabled through the open materiality of bodies as a Place to Meet**. We could usefully invoke Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘‘encounter value’’ here, a ‘‘becoming with’’ companionate (and I would also add, incompanionate) species, whereby actors are the products of relating, not pre-formed before the encounter (2008, 16). **Conviviality is an ethical orientation** that rewrites a Levinasian taking up of the ontology of the Other by **arguing that there is no absolute self or other**,15 **rather bodies that come together and dissipate through intensifications and vulnerabilities,** insistently **rendering bare the instability of the divisions between capacity**-endowed **and debility**-laden bodies. These encounters are rarely comfortable mergers but rather entail forms of eventness that could potentially unravel oneself but just as quickly be recuperated through a restabilized self, so that the political transformation is invited, as Arun Saldhana writes, through ‘‘letting yourself be destabilized by the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her difference not as a threat but as a resource to question your own position in the world’’ (2007, 118). **Conviviality is** thus **open to its own dissolution and self-annihilation and less interested in a mandate to reproduce its terms of creation or sustenance, recognizing that political critique must be open to the possibility that it might disrupt and alter the conditions of its own emergence such that it is no longer needed – an openness to something other than what we might have hoped for**. This is my alternative approach to Lee Edelman’s No Future, then, one that is not driven by rejecting the figure of the child as the overdetermined outcome of ‘‘reproductive futurism’’ (2004),16 but rather complicates the very terms of the regeneration of queer critique itself. Thus the challenge before us is how to craft convivial political praxis that does not demand a continual reinvestment in its form and content, its genesis or its outcome, the literalism of its object nor the direction of its drive.

Affect is key – our method is a radical act of self love that opens up spaces – the question is not one of solvency but of possibility.

**Jordan 14** Taryn; Phd Candidate in women’s studies @ GSU; “The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage”; ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University

The **politics of impossibility is a way to name our era of neoliberal individualist**, postrace and post-feminist time. In other words we live in a post – post impossible political reality; **I see the possibility in impossibility as a larger political strategy that is interested in a strategic reorganization of society towards liberatory pursuits**. To understand **what is possible** in the impossibility **is to become comfortable with the possibility of failure. One must not think only of the outcome of an action instead the possibility** in impossible politics **is focused upon the decision to act, with the intention that action may result in something, but knowing deep inside it may result in failure or something else entirely. Hence the need for a politics of impossibility that is expansive in its interventions in our current moment**; it **requires a diversity of tactics for non-beings within a complex web of relationality and kinship**. I find our era of impossibility, with all of its sharp edges and devastating reality, hopeful; it is not too soon... or too late to begin to think of the implications of a politics that calls into question the very foundation of the nationstate.

Rage is good – it is a radical act of self-love which opens up a space to utilize rage as a tactic against impossibility

**Jordan 14** Taryn; Phd Candidate in women’s studies @ GSU; “The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage”; ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University

In my exploration of what black rage can do in response to social death therein lies a great possibility; the rest of the chapter will explore how **rage in concert with** the **affect of love disrupt the victim narrative of trans\* women must die**. In the case of CeCe McDonald, she utilized **rage as a two-fold device to protect herself, evoking notions of self-love to defend her black and trans\* body from white supremacist and transmisogynist attackers**. Women respond to racism. My **response to racism is anger. I have lived with** that anger, **on** that anger, **beneath** that anger, **on top of that anger. Ignoring that anger, feeding upon that anger, learning to use that anger before it laid my visions to waste**, for most of my life. **Once I did it in silence, afraid of the weight of that anger. My fear of that anger taught me nothing.** Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing, also. (Lorde, pg. 278) - Audre Lorde 1981 Audre Lorde’s words tell us that we should not be afraid of our anger, in fact she exhorts us to learn how to use it lest we ourselves may be destroyed in the process. Clearly in this quote Lorde is discussing the affect of anger specifically; however, what she describes more closely resembles my vision of the function of black rage. For black folks—and the same could be extended to trans\* people—**rage is a mode of survival, a tool of existence that radically shapes our realities**. CeCe utilized a tool most people of color must have in their proverbial back pocket and raged against the bigotry and violence pressed upon her. **To rage or commit violence against those who choose to destroy you is a liberating act, an act of love, to have love for oneself is to take care of the body mentally and physically**. So, the question that bubbles to the surface is, what does it mean for a non-being to radically love themselves, and what if that love means they must rage against those who seek to destroy them? This is the question that I want to interrogate. Thus, I argue that **rage is the affective vehicle for historically marginalized subjects to radically love themselves by disrupting historical narratives of otherness on the skin when faced with violence.** The **rage that ensues** from CeCe’s **confrontation with a white supremacist and transphobic crowd** presents a unique location of analysis of affect, queer, and transgender studies. My interrogation of CeCe McDonald’s case is not an attempt to speak for her; I am using CeCe **McDonald**’s case because it simultaneously **rips apart** the **narrative of a post racial and post feminist society where diversity reigns supreme and makes visible the contradictions and bias inherent to our judicial system with regard to black and transgender bodies**. Narrative of the events of June 5, 2011 in the Case of CeCe McDonald: Around 12:30 am on June 5, 2011, McDonald and four of her friends (all of them black) were on their way to Cub Foods to get some food. As they walked past the Schooner Tavern, at 2901 27th Ave S in Minneapolis, a man and two women (all of them white) began to yell epithets at them. They called McDonald and her friends 'faggots,' 'niggers,' and 'chicks with dicks,' and suggested that McDonald was 'dressed as a woman' in order to 'rape' Dean Schmitz, one of the attackers. As they were shouting, one of the women smashed her drink into the side of McDonald’s face, lacerating her salivary gland and slicing her cheek all the way through. A fight ensued, with more people joining in. What happened during the fight is unclear, but during the incident Dean Schmitz was stabbed; he later died of his injuries (Support CeCe Committee 1). Sara Ahmed’s work on the cultural politics of emotions provides a useful frame through which to think about CeCe’s altercation with Schmitz. She contends: The ordinary becomes that which is already under threat by the imagined other whose proximity becomes a crime against a person as well as place... They are assumed to ‘cause’ injury to the ordinary white subject such that their proximity is read as the origin of feelings (Ahmed 43 - 44). The appearance of CeCe within the proximity of Schmitz and crew rendered CeCe already guilty for merely appearing in space. CeCe’s blackness and trans\* body was immediately registered as an assault to the space of Schmitz, circulating a feeling of being under siege from the harmful others. Ahmed’s ideas of how the ordinary that can become a perceived object of harm is incredibly salient when thinking about CeCe and Schmitz’s encounter. Reading CeCe’s body through Ahmed’s notion of affect in relationship to object situates CeCe McDonald as non-being and not legible to heteropatriarchal power. CeCe’s objecthood was affirmed through the anti-black and transphobic epithets hurled at her that night. Schmitz’s subjectivity was under attack in relation to CeCe’s objecthood; in other words because CeCe is trans\*black and poor, she is not seen as human; instead she is seen as an object of harm to Schmitz who is a subject due to his white skin and cis-gender masculine identity. Ahmed states that “feelings instead take the ‘shape’ of contact we have with objects...,we do not love and hate because objects are good or bad, but rather they seem ‘beneficial’ or ‘harmful’” (Ahmed 5). Clearly in the instance of the attack, Dean Schmitz and crew felt that CeCe was a harmful object, she presented a threat not only to him personally but a blatant attack on his notions of white nationalism. I cannot speak for Dean Schmitz much like I am not the voice for CeCe, but what can be speculated is Schmitz’s insecurity about his white nationalism is connected to the declining wages of whiteness compounded by a shrinking economy. **The fabled promises of whiteness** in the past meant **that a white men would never face juridical charges for the killing of a black body**; white men had the choice of procuring a good job; access to the privileges and protections of the state; easier access to capital; and **the guarantee of social and spatial divisions between white and non white. Regardless of the decline of the informal promises of whiteness, white supremacy is alive and well but in our post-post reality it operates on differing registers and in combination with other forms of discourse based on the bodies of other non-beings.** Through this formulation CeCe became an object of harm—a physical manifestation of all the losses of a real and imagined white past. As a harmful object, CeCe is then incredibly sticky, to borrow Ahmed’s formulation: “[E]motions can move through the movement or circulation of objects. Such objects become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension” (Ahmed 11). The **social tensions attached to the epithets** that were used by Schmitz and crew that night — “'faggots,' 'niggers,' and 'chicks with dicks”— **stuck to CeCe, reinforcing** her **objectivity, and cementing her as an object of hate. She then became saturated with affect, the historical narrative flashing back to a time in American history where a white man controlled the nation and the body of the slave, thus his language solidified racial tensions that boil under the surface of the United States supposed post-racial piety. These abject narratives that equate blackness with criminality, blackness with disposability, and transgender with sexually depravity reinforced her harmfulness as an object, and stuck to CeCe that night.**

## A2 Queer Negativity

1. Permutation do both – queer folks and queer people of color can use the killjoy to disrupt exclusionary spaces

**Ahmed 13** Sara Ahmed "Black feminism as Life-Line" feminist killjoys August 27, 2013 https://feministkilljoys.com/2013/08/27/black-feminism-as-life-line/

**We might enter queer space**. And oh shit, that figure is already there! **How often queers of colour are heard as killjoys**: **as if talking about racism is what gets in the way of queer happiness**. I noted earlier how **queers might have to become insistent to be recognised as seated at a table**. And yet of course we do have queer tables. If **we talk about racism within queer politics, or if we use words like “gay imperialism” or “homonationalism” introduced by queers of colour scholars such as Jin Haritaworn,** [**Tamsila Tauqir**](http://www.google.com/search?q=Tamsila+Tauqir) **and** [**Esra Erdem**](http://www.umass.edu/economics/Erdem_cv.pdf) (2008) and **Jasbir Puar** (2007), **then that talk is heard as what stops us from being seated at that queer table**. Ok: let’s take this judgement on: **if speaking about racism stops us from being seated, then we won’t be seated.** **A queer feminist politics of colour might require we refuse to be a seated at any activist or scholarly table that does not permit an attention to racism.** Even attending to racism can be heard as obsession. I am speaking to one of my interviewees – a woman of color – about racism. It is off-tape, and we are talking of those little encounters, and their very big effects. It is off tape, we are just talking, recognising each other, as you do; in how we recognise racism in those everyday encounters you have with people who can’t handle it, the idea of it. She says, “They always say to me that you reduce everything to racism.” A similar judgment has been implied to me, or said to me, many times. Why are you always bringing racism up? Is that all you can see? Why do you keep going on about it! Racism becomes your paranoia. Of course, it’s a way of saying that racism doesn’t really exist in the way you say it does. It is as if we had to invent racism to explain our own feeling of exclusion; it is as if racism was our way of not being responsible for the places we do not or cannot go. It is a form of racism to say that racism does not exist. I think we know this. **We know this: but we still have to live with this. No wonder that an institutional duty can be a happiness duty: a duty not to dwell on negative experiences of racism**. Racism is increasingly heard as an injury to organizations and their reputation as being diverse. No wonder that anti-racism can feel like banging your head on the brick wall. The wall keeps its place, so it is you that gets sore. To become the sore points can mean doing things with these points. **The word racism is sticky**. Just saying it does things. Constantly, I am witnessing what the word racism does. I am speaking of racism in a seminar. Someone comes up to me afterwards and puts her arm next to mine. We are almost the same colour, she says. No difference, no difference. You wouldn’t really know you were any different to me, she says. The very talk about racism becomes a fantasy that invents difference. She smiles, as if the proximity of our arms was evidence that the racism of which I was speaking was an invention, as if our arms told another story. She smiles, as if our arms were in sympathy. I say nothing. Perhaps my arm speaks by withdrawing. **Racism becomes a willful word: going the wrong way, getting in the way. When racism recedes from social consciousness**, it **appears as if the ones who “bring it up” are bringing it into existence**. To recede is to go back or withdraw. To concede is to give way, yield. People of colour are often asked to concede to the recession of racism: we are asked to “give way” by letting it “go back.” Not only that: more than that. We are often asked to embody a commitment to diversity. We are asked to smile in their brochures. We are asked to put racism behind us as if racism is behind us. The narrative often exercised is not necessarily that we “invent racism,” but that we preserve its power to govern social life by not getting over it. The moraltask becomes to get over it, as if when we are over it, it is gone.

2. Permutation – do both – queer folks can use the figure of the killjoy to kill trans-exclusionary feminist joy – the trans-feminist killjoy solves

**Cowan 14** T. L. Cowan "Transfeminist Kill/Joys Rage, Love, and Reparative Performance" TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly \* Volume 1, Number 4 \* November 2014 Duke Press

T his essay considers an affective trope that I have come to recognize as “**the transfeminist kill/joy**”: **a set of proliferating dialectics expressed as the rage**1 **that comes into being through living the violent effects of transphobia and transmisogyny and the practice of transformational love as a struggle for existence**.2 While **the transfeminist kill/joy might certainly be understood as a politicize aesthetic and form of social action that extends well beyond (cis)gender feminist politics and social life,3 here I read for the poetics of killing trans-absent or transexcluding feminist joy**. In this discussion of recent transfeminist critical creative work, I trace how **the transfeminist kill/joy works both to spoil feelings of political and social well-being or pleasure that are contingent upon the tacit absence or explicit exclusion of trans women in feminist conceptual and physical spaces and to restructure, claim, and repair feminist happiness** through what Chela Sandoval (2000: 180) has called “a hermeneutics of love.” In my framing of the “**transfeminist kill/joy**,” I hope to signal, as does Sara Ahmed (2010) in her original framing of the feminist killjoy, that **the mere presence or arrival of perceived difference can be understood as “threaten[ing] the social bond” (68) within privileged feminist scenarios**.4 While Ahmed frames the killing of feminist joy (67) mostly in terms of women of color in white feminist spaces, and certainly racism and transphobia and trans-misogyny are not interchangeable,5 I suggest that **trans-absent or trans-excluding feminist political and social scenarios can be understood to experience a similar threat to the “organic enjoyment and solidarity”** (67) **of the** (perceived homogeneity of the) **group** **when forced to deal with the presence** or proximity of **trans women, since this arrival “exposes not only the unreliableness of the body as a source of their identities and politics, but also the fallacy of women’s universal experiences and oppressions**” (Koyama 2006: 704). Put in the terms of Ahmed’s earlier work (2006), **the transfeminist kill/joy is an assemblage of affects that reorients feminist happiness toward rather than against trans women**,6 and **uses anger and love to resist a feminism designed exclusively for non-trans women**, not necessarily feminism by all non-trans women.7 Central to my exploration of the transfeminist kill/joy are the following questions: How do I (or can I) inhabit a transfeminist criticality without falling into the patriarchal trap of “recycling the most threadbare of cliche´s: the angry, man-hating lesbian” (Salamon 2008: 125)?8 Is it possible to inscribe the trope of the transfeminist kill/joy without reinscribing the trope of the straw feminist as demonic other? Rather than holding steady in a paranoid position, assured that “no time could be too early for having-already-known, for its having alreadybeen-inevitable, that something bad would happen” (Sedgwick 2003: 132), can this essay, along with the work of the kill/joys I study here, imagine a different inevitability, a reparative temporality constituted by the hopeful inevitability of love?

1. Permutation do both Rage is a good method – it is a radical act of self-love which opens up a space to utilize resist white supremacist heteropatriarchy

**Jordan 14** Taryn; Phd Candidate in women’s studies @ GSU; “The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage”; ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University

In my exploration of what black rage can do in response to social death therein lies a great possibility; the rest of the chapter will explore how **rage in concert with** the **affect of love disrupt the victim narrative of trans\* women must die**. In the case of CeCe McDonald, she utilized **rage as a two-fold device to protect herself, evoking notions of self-love to defend her black and trans\* body from white supremacist and transmisogynist attackers**. Women respond to racism. My **response to racism is anger. I have lived with** that anger, **on** that anger, **beneath** that anger, **on top of that anger. Ignoring that anger, feeding upon that anger, learning to use that anger before it laid my visions to waste**, for most of my life. **Once I did it in silence, afraid of the weight of that anger. My fear of that anger taught me nothing.** Your fear of that anger will teach you nothing, also. (Lorde, pg. 278) - Audre Lorde 1981 Audre Lorde’s words tell us that we should not be afraid of our anger, in fact she exhorts us to learn how to use it lest we ourselves may be destroyed in the process. Clearly in this quote Lorde is discussing the affect of anger specifically; however, what she describes more closely resembles my vision of the function of black rage. For black folks—and the same could be extended to trans\* people—**rage is a mode of survival, a tool of existence that radically shapes our realities**. CeCe utilized a tool most people of color must have in their proverbial back pocket and raged against the bigotry and violence pressed upon her. **To rage or commit violence against those who choose to destroy you is a liberating act, an act of love, to have love for oneself is to take care of the body mentally and physically**. So, the question that bubbles to the surface is, what does it mean for a non-being to radically love themselves, and what if that love means they must rage against those who seek to destroy them? This is the question that I want to interrogate. Thus, I argue that **rage is the affective vehicle for historically marginalized subjects to radically love themselves by disrupting historical narratives of otherness on the skin when faced with violence.** The **rage that ensues** from CeCe’s **confrontation with a white supremacist and transphobic crowd** presents a unique location of analysis of affect, queer, and transgender studies. My interrogation of CeCe McDonald’s case is not an attempt to speak for her; I am using CeCe **McDonald**’s case because it simultaneously **rips apart** the **narrative of a post racial and post feminist society where diversity reigns supreme and makes visible the contradictions and bias inherent to our judicial system with regard to black and transgender bodies**. Narrative of the events of June 5, 2011 in the Case of CeCe McDonald: Around 12:30 am on June 5, 2011, McDonald and four of her friends (all of them black) were on their way to Cub Foods to get some food. As they walked past the Schooner Tavern, at 2901 27th Ave S in Minneapolis, a man and two women (all of them white) began to yell epithets at them. They called McDonald and her friends 'faggots,' 'niggers,' and 'chicks with dicks,' and suggested that McDonald was 'dressed as a woman' in order to 'rape' Dean Schmitz, one of the attackers. As they were shouting, one of the women smashed her drink into the side of McDonald’s face, lacerating her salivary gland and slicing her cheek all the way through. A fight ensued, with more people joining in. What happened during the fight is unclear, but during the incident Dean Schmitz was stabbed; he later died of his injuries (Support CeCe Committee 1). Sara Ahmed’s work on the cultural politics of emotions provides a useful frame through which to think about CeCe’s altercation with Schmitz. She contends: The ordinary becomes that which is already under threat by the imagined other whose proximity becomes a crime against a person as well as place... They are assumed to ‘cause’ injury to the ordinary white subject such that their proximity is read as the origin of feelings (Ahmed 43 - 44). The appearance of CeCe within the proximity of Schmitz and crew rendered CeCe already guilty for merely appearing in space. CeCe’s blackness and trans\* body was immediately registered as an assault to the space of Schmitz, circulating a feeling of being under siege from the harmful others. Ahmed’s ideas of how the ordinary that can become a perceived object of harm is incredibly salient when thinking about CeCe and Schmitz’s encounter. Reading CeCe’s body through Ahmed’s notion of affect in relationship to object situates CeCe McDonald as non-being and not legible to heteropatriarchal power. CeCe’s objecthood was affirmed through the anti-black and transphobic epithets hurled at her that night. Schmitz’s subjectivity was under attack in relation to CeCe’s objecthood; in other words because CeCe is trans\*black and poor, she is not seen as human; instead she is seen as an object of harm to Schmitz who is a subject due to his white skin and cis-gender masculine identity. Ahmed states that “feelings instead take the ‘shape’ of contact we have with objects...,we do not love and hate because objects are good or bad, but rather they seem ‘beneficial’ or ‘harmful’” (Ahmed 5). Clearly in the instance of the attack, Dean Schmitz and crew felt that CeCe was a harmful object, she presented a threat not only to him personally but a blatant attack on his notions of white nationalism. I cannot speak for Dean Schmitz much like I am not the voice for CeCe, but what can be speculated is Schmitz’s insecurity about his white nationalism is connected to the declining wages of whiteness compounded by a shrinking economy. **The fabled promises of whiteness** in the past meant **that a white men would never face juridical charges for the killing of a black body**; white men had the choice of procuring a good job; access to the privileges and protections of the state; easier access to capital; and **the guarantee of social and spatial divisions between white and non white. Regardless of the decline of the informal promises of whiteness, white supremacy is alive and well but in our post-post reality it operates on differing registers and in combination with other forms of discourse based on the bodies of other non-beings.** Through this formulation CeCe became an object of harm—a physical manifestation of all the losses of a real and imagined white past. As a harmful object, CeCe is then incredibly sticky, to borrow Ahmed’s formulation: “[E]motions can move through the movement or circulation of objects. Such objects become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension” (Ahmed 11). The **social tensions attached to the epithets** that were used by Schmitz and crew that night — “'faggots,' 'niggers,' and 'chicks with dicks”— **stuck to CeCe, reinforcing** her **objectivity, and cementing her as an object of hate. She then became saturated with affect, the historical narrative flashing back to a time in American history where a white man controlled the nation and the body of the slave, thus his language solidified racial tensions that boil under the surface of the United States supposed post-racial piety. These abject narratives that equate blackness with criminality, blackness with disposability, and transgender with sexually depravity reinforced her harmfulness as an object, and stuck to CeCe that night.**

1. The very idea of queer phenomenology and orienting spaces means there is a possibility for a ‘future’ – not a linear temporal future, but the possibility for changing directions and keeping us open to other ways of existing.

**Ahmed 06** Sara Ahmed "Queer Phenomenology Orientations, Objects, Others" Duke University Press Durham London 2006

**If orientations point us to the future**, **to what we are moving toward**, **then they also keep open the possibility of changing directions and of finding other paths**, perhaps those that do not clear a common ground, where we can respond with joy to what goes astray. So, **in looking back we also look a different** **way**; **looking back still involves facing**-it even involves an open face. **Looking back is what keeps open the possibility of going astray**. This glance also means **an openness to the future**, **as the imperfect translation of what is behind us**. **As a result, I would not argue that queer has "no future"** as Lee Edelmen (2004) suggests-though I understand and appreciate this impulse to "give" the future to those who demand to inherit the earth, rather than aim for a share in this inheritance. Instead, **a queer politics would have hope, not even by having hope in the future** (under the sentimental sign of the "not yet"), **but because the lines that accumulate through the repetition of gestures**, the lines that gather on skin, **already take surprising forms**. **We have hope because what is behind us is also what allows other ways of gathering in time and space, of making lines that do not reproduce what we follow but instead create wrinkles in the earth.** To resist an impulse to make deviation a ground for queer politics is not, then, to say that it does not matter which lines we follow. It does matter. **Some lines**, as we know, are lines that **accumulate privilege and are "returned" by recognition** and reward. **Other lines are seen as** ways out of an ethical life, as **deviations** from the common good. Despite this, **queer is not available as a line that we can follow**, and if we took such a line we would perform a certain injustice to those queers whose lives are lived for different points. For me, **the question is not so much finding a queer line but rather asking what our orientation toward queer moments of deviation will be**. **If the object slips away, if its face becomes inverted, if it looks** odd, strange, or **out of place, what will we do**? If we feel oblique, where will we find support? **A queer phenomenology would involve an orientation toward queer, a way of inhabiting the world by giving "support'' to those whose lives and loves make them appear** oblique, strange, and **out of place**. **Queer gatherings, where the objects we face "slip away," are disorientating**. For me, **the table is just such a supporting device for queer gatherings, which is what makes the table** itself **a** rather **queer device**. It is hence not surprising that a queer phenomenology, one that is orientated toward queer, will be full of tables. It is also not surprising that such tables will be full-inhabited by those who in gathering around have already made a rather queer impression.

## A2 Tuck and Yang

1. **NO LINK** – The aff says nothing about suffering – it focuses on the tools of oppression but the wounds which is what Tuck and Yang critique. We do not tie pain to identity – we just explain how oppression operates via spaces and how to resolve them. Our Ahmed 07 evidence indicates how institutions and structures sustain oppression, and our Ahmed 10 evidence explains how we engage with those structures.
2. They haven’t won uniqueness - Ahmed 07 says the academy is already exclusionary and commodifies suffering, only aff has chance to solve by disorienting the space
3. **Turn** – focusing on individual bodies is key to survive within structures of oppression – that’s Ahmed 14 – you are focusing on liberation from systems of oppression but first we need to survive in them.
4. Aff solves impact – commodification only happens in the current orientation of the instutition – we disrupt that paradigm of consumption of suffering which prevents that impact
5. **PERM** – Do Both – Use the figure of the killjoy as a way to disrupt the institutionalized politics of pain. Alt can’t solve without the aff because institutions will commodify pain without disorientations.

Tuck and Yang conclude that the solution is desire based research – that’s the aff and solves all impacts.

Tuck and Yang 14 Eve (Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz. Earned her Ph.D.in Urban Education at The Graduate Center, The City University of New York in 2008) and K Wayne (Ph.D., 2004, Social and Cultural Studies, University of California, Berkeley), “R-Words: Refusing Research, pg. 225-231

In my own autobiographical performance projects, I identify this chiasmatic shift in the possibility that all those performances I did about getting bashed only provided knowledge of subjugation, serving almost as an advertisement for power: ‘‘Don’t let this happen to you. Stay in the closet.’’ In large part motivated by Elizabeth Bell’s writings about performance and pleasure, I decided to write more about the gratifications of same-sex relationships, to depict intimacy and desire, the kinds of subjugated knowledges we don’t get to see on the after school specials and movies of the week that parade queer bruises and broken bones but shy away from the queer kiss. (p. 312) Participatory action research and other research approaches that involve participants in constructing the design and collection of voice (as data) are not immune to the fetish for pain narratives. It is a misconception that by simply building participation into a project—by increasing the number of people who collaborate in collecting data—ethical issues of representation, voice, consumption, and voyeurism are resolved. There are countless examples of research in which community or youth participants have made their own stories of loss and pain the objects of their inquiry (see also Tuck & Guishard, forthcoming). Alongside analyses of pain and damage-centered research, **Eve** (Tuck 2009, 2010) **has theorized desire-based research as** not the antonym but rather the antidote for damage-focused narratives*.* Pain narratives are always incomplete. They bemoan the food deserts, but forget to see the food innovations; they lament the concrete jungles and miss the roses and the tobacco from concrete. **Desirecentered research does not deny** the experience of tragedy, trauma, and **pain, but positions the knowing derived from such experiences as wise.** This is not about seeing the bright side of hard times, or even believing that everything happens for a reason. Utilizing a desire-based framework is about **working inside a more complex** and dynamic understanding of what one, or a community, comes to know in (a) lived **life**. **Logics of pain focus on** events, sometimes hiding structure, always adhering to a teleological trajectory of pain, brokenness, repair, or **irreparability**—from unbroken, to broken, and then to unbroken again**.** Logics of pain require time to be organized as linear and rigid, in which the pained body (or community or people) is set back or delayed on some kind of path of humanization, and now must catch up (but never can) to the settler/unpained/abled body (or community or people or society or philosophy or knowledge system). In this way, the logics of pain has superseded the now outmoded racism of an explicit racial hierarchy with a much more politically tolerable racism of a developmental hierarchy.2 Under a developmental hierarchy, in which some were undeterred by pain and oppression, and others were waylaid by their victimry and subalternity, damagecentered research reifies a settler temporality and helps suppress other understandings of time. **Desire-based frameworks**, by contrast, **look to the past and the future** to situate analyses. **Desire is about longing, about a present that is enriched by both the past and the future**; it is integral to our humanness. It is not only the painful elements of social and psychic realities, but also the textured acumen and hope. (Tuck, 2010, p. 644) In this way, desire is time-warping**. The logics** of desire is asynchronous just as it is distemporal, living in the gaps between the ticking machinery of disciplinary institutions. To be clear, again, we are not making an argument against the existence of pain, or for the erasure of memory, experience, and wisdom that comes with suffering. Rather, we see the collecting of narratives of pain by social scientists to already be a double erasure, whereby pain is documented in order to be erased, often by eradicating the communities that are supposedly injured and supplanting them with hopeful stories of progress into a better, Whiter, world. Vizenor talks about such “the consumer notion of a ‘hopeful book,’” and we would add hopeful or feel-good research, as “a denial of tragic wisdom” bent on imagining “a social science paradise of tribal victims” (1993, p. 14). **Desire interrupts this metanarrative of damaged communities and White progress.**

You exclude discussions of oppression. Pedagogies of suffering can be good – status quo institutions ignore violence because suffering is unintelligible –re-framing key.

Campbell 2K Nancy D. Campbell (Assoc. Prof. Science and Technology Studies @ Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute). “Using Women: Gender, Drug Policy, and Social Justice” (xo1)

A feminist postpositivism would differ from the “relativism” of which postpositivist analysts often stand accused. Normative commitments form the basis for a multivocal feminist ethics that slips neither into relativism nor moral absolutism. For instance, feminists recognize that the gendered materiality of suffering and subordination **may** **work through** cultural forms of representation **or** actual policies that harm vulnerable groups. As a “pedagogy of suffering,” **an analysis of gendered materiality is an “**antidote **to** administrative **systems that** cannot take suffering into account **because** **they** are **abstract**ed **from** the needs of **bodies**. **When the body’s vulnerability** **and pain are kept in the foreground, a new social ethic is required**. The challenge is to state **this** ethic in terms that remain multivocal. A multivocal ethic does not imply relativism; it suggests the recognition of difference...the need to recognize multiple voices and afford each full legitimacy.”17 **Multivocality is partly the product of a postmodern moment that has strained many modern administrative systems**, in which many voices speak multiple and conflicting stories from myriad social locations. However, **multivocality is also the outcome of the hard work of social movements organized to compel the recognition of cultural difference within modernity. Therein lies the potential** of postmodernity as a paradigm for social action and theory that promotes democratic participation. Feminists are dedicated to discerning, defining, and changing structures of exclusion, marginalization, social isolation, and subordination based on gender wherever and however they occur.18 **By attending to how social structures, cultural practices, and discursive formations impinge on individuals, they cast the desirability of much policy into doubt**. For example, although we might “know” that some drugs harm the developing human fetus, we can also see that pregnant women do not maliciously intend such harm. Thus we could conclude that supportive social policies—such as universal health insurance—better facilitate healthy births, and might decide that our democratic goals and responsibilities are better met through such measures. We would be forced to reconsider our current reliance on incarceration as a response to the widespread use of illicit substances in the U.S. population. Incarceration would no longer accord with our values or our facts, and thus could no longer be considered a viable solution. It might even come to be seen as a form of irrational vengeance that is counterproductive to our goals.

## \*A2 University

Case outweighs – creating spaces of solidarity within debate resolves psychological violence caused by the activity - Even if they win the thesis of the Kritik, they fail to answer the question of *how*, not *why –* the aff is a crucial starting point for understanding violence, which makes it a prior question to the alt

1. They have not won uniqueness – all of their links are nonunique – great, university controls and commodifies resistance – any risk that the aff changes the academy or debate is a reason to vote aff

## A2 Nietzsche

1. Not true – Nietzsche admits that any value requires absence of suffering – there’s a huge abstraction DA to the NC, Nietzsche assumes a comfortable bourgeois existence that abstracts away from the reality of poverty and oppression

Nussbaum 94 Martha Nussbaum (born Martha Craven on May 6, 1947) is an American philosopher with a particular interest in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, political philosophy and ethics.Nussbaum is currently Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, a chair that includes appointments in the Philosophy Department, the Law School, and the Divinity School. She also holds Associate appointments in Classics and Political Science, is a member of the Committee on Southern Asian Studies, and a Board Member of the Human Rights Program. She previously taught at Harvard and Brown where she held the rank of university professor. Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, By Richard

**We now turn to the heart of the matter, the role of "external goods" in the good human life**. And here we encounter a rather large surprise. There is **no philosopher** in the modern Western tradition who **is more emphatic than Nietzsche** is **about the** central **importance of the body, and about the fact that we are bodily creatures**. Again and again **he charges** Christian and **Platonist moralities with making a false separation between our spiritual and our physical nature; against them, he insists that we are physical through and through**. The surprise is that, having said so much and with such urgency, he really is very loathe to draw **the conclusion that is naturally suggested** by his position: that **human beings need worldly goods in order to function**. In all of Nietzsche's rather abstract and romantic praise of solitude and asceticism, we find no grasp of the simple truth that **a hungry person cannot think well; that a person who lacks** shelter, basic health care, and the **basic necessities** of life, **is not likely to be**come **a great philosopher** or artist, no matter what her innate equipment. **The solitude Nietzsche describes is** comfortable bourgeois solitude, whatever its pains and loneli- ness. Who are his ascetic philosophers? "Heraclitus, Plato. Descartes, Spi- noza, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer"—none a poor person, none a person who had to perform menial labor in order to survive. And because Nietzsche does not grasp the simple fact that **if our abilities are physical abilities they have physical necessary conditions**, he does not understand what the democratic and socialist movements of his day were all about. **The pro-pity tradition**, from Homer on, **understood that one functions badly if one is hungry**, that one thinks badly if one has to labor all day in work that does not involve the fully human use of one's faculties. I have suggested that such thoughts were made by Rousseau the basis for the modern development of democratic-socialist thinking. **Since Nietzsche does not get the** basic **idea, he does not see what socialism is trying to do**. Since **he probably never saw** or knew **an acutely hungry person, or a person performing hard physical labo**r, **he never asked how human self-command is affected by such forms of life**. And thus he can proceed as if it does not matter how people live front day to day, how they get their food. Who provides basic welfare support for Zarathustra? What are the "higher men" doing all the day long? The reader docs not know and the author does not seem to care. Now Nietzsche himself obviously was not a happy man. He was lonely, in bad health, scorned by many of his contemporaries. And yet, there still is a distinction to be drawn between the sort of vulnerability that Nietzsche's life contained and the sort we find if we examine the lives of truly impov- erished and hungry people. We might say. simplifying things a bit, that there are two sorts of vulnerability: what we might call bourgeois vulnerabil- ity—for example, the pains of solitude, loneliness, bad reputation, some ill health, pains that are painful enough but still compatible with thinking and doing philosophy—and what we might call **basic vulnerability,** which **is a deprivation of resources so central to human functioning that thought and character are themselves impaired** or not developed. Nietzsche, focuv ing on the first son of vulnerability, holds that it is not so bad; it may even be good for the philosopher.\*® The second sort. I claim, he simply ne- glects—believing, apparently, that even a beggar can be a Stoic hero, if only socialism does not inspire him with weakness.5"

Trying to stop suffering is good – it affirms life and allows people the choice of how they want to find meaning in life

**Smolkin 89** Mitchell, Understanding Pain, 1989, p75-79

For Camus, the absurdity of the human condition consists in the incongruity between what humans naturally desire, and the reality of the world. **Humans naturally desire not to be injured and killed. They desire to understand life and** to **find meaning in living.** They desire to feel at home in the universe. **Despite these** natural **needs, [humanity]** man is confronted with a silent universe that does not answer human questions about meaning. He **is surrounded by** irrational **destructiveness, and** by **the spectre of suffering and pain hurtling out of the void c**a**priciously at human recipients with no regard for their relative merits.** Man is estranged from a universe which seems so antagonistic to his natural needs. He feels homeless, in exile, a stranger in his own land. He **[Humanity] hears** his **“nights and days filled** always, everywhere **with the eternal cry of** human **pain.”**56 Man has been “sentenced, for an unknown crime to an indeterminate period of punishment. And while a good many people adapted themselves to confinement and carried out their humdrum lives as before, there were others who rebelled, and whose one idea was to break loose from the prison house.” Like Ivan Karamozov (Bk V, Chap 4), Camus refuses to accept the idea that future goods such as Divine salvation or eternal happiness “can compensate for a single moment of human suffering,”57 or a child’s tears. Both Ivan Karamozov and Camus believe that “if evil is essential to Divine creation, then creation is unacceptable.” They wish to replace “the reign of grace by the reign of justice.”58 They both assert that no good man would accept salvation on these terms. “There is no possible salvation for the man who feels real compassion,” because he would side with the damned and for their sake reject eternity.59 What is to be gained by rebellion, what are its dangers, and **how does one avoid** merely **“beating the sea with rods” in a nihilistic orgy?** With great perceptiveness, Camus discusses these issues in The Rebel. He begins by outlining the entire history of nihilistic rebellion. He admits that once God is declared dead and life meaningless, there is the tendency to rebel in anger by engaging in irrational acts of violence and destruction. Andre Breton has written that the simplest surrealistic act consists “in going out in the Street, revolver in hand, and shooting at random into the crowd.”6° Camus cites “the struggle between the will to be and the desire for annihilation, between the yes and the no, which we have discovered again and again at every stage of rebellion.”61 Citing numerous historical examples, he continually warns against this degeneration of rebellion into crime and murder. Another danger of rebellion which Camus discusses is the sub- stitution of human gods and concepts of salvation for the dead God. This error is more subtle than shooting at random into the crowd, but leads to much more killing and human suffering than the nihilist sniper. **Camus criticizes “Nietzsche**, at least **in his theory of super-humanity,** and Marx before him, with his classless society, **[who]** both **replace The Beyond by the Later On.”**62 In this respect, these thinkers have not abandoned the notion that history marches toward redemption in which some messianic goal will be realized. Camus urges moderation in the quest for distant goals. He writes, “the absolute is not attained nor, above all, created through history. Politics is not religion, or if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition.”63 **He contrasts rebellion, which he applauds with revolution which leads to murder** in the name of vague future goals. “**Revolution consists in loving[those]** a man **who does not yet exist,” and in murdering [those]** men **who do** exist.64 “He who dedicates himself to this history, dedicates himself to nothing, and in his turn is nothing.”65 In The Plague, the character Tarrou renounces his revolutionary past. He states, For many years I’ve been ashamed, mortally ashamed of having been, even with the best intentions, even at many removes, a murderer in my turn. . . All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and its up to us, so far as possible, not to join forces with the pestil- ences.66 Though obviously attuned to the dangers of rebellion, he insists that “these consequences are in no way due to rebellion itself, or at least they occur to the extent that the rebel forgets his original purpose.”67 What is the original purpose that has been forgotten? Rebellion begins because the rebel denounces the lack of justice in the world. He denounces the idea that the end, whether it be the coming of the messianic age, or the revo- lution, or eternal bliss, justifies means which involve so much suffering. **Once injustice and suffering are denounced, [people]** man **need**s **to exert all** his **effort against injustice and in solidarity with the sufferers** in the world. **Killing** existing men **for a ques- tionable future good, would not be a rational method of exhibi ting solidarity with** the **sufferers. Nor would solidarity be shown by** stoical **acceptance of the status quo. Camus urges his rebels to** renounce murder completely and **work for justice and** for **a decrease in suffering.** Like Dr. Rieux in The Plague, **one should take the victim’s side and “share with** his **fellow citizens the only certitude they have in common—love, exile, suffering.”**68 **What can be accomplished through rebellion? Camus**’ goals are modest. He **realizes that the rebel is doomed to “a never ending defeat,”**69 **in that** death, finitude and **suffering will always conquer** him. **He realizes that after [humanity]** man **has mastered everything in creation** that can be mastered and rectified everything that can be rectified, **children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society.** Even by his greatest effort man can only purpose to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice and the suffering will remain and, no matter how limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage.7° **However, there are ephemeral victories and rewards for the rebel.** He **[One] who dedicates [oneself]** himself for the duration of his life to the house he builds, **to the dignity of [hu]mankind,** dedicates himself the earth and **reaps from it the harvest that sows its seed** **and sustains the world again and again. Those whose** desires are limited to man and his humble yet formidable love, should enter, if only now and then, into their reward. They know that if there is one thing one can always yearn for and sometimes attain, it is human love. **Society must be arranged to limit injustice and suffering as much as possible so that each individual has the leisure and freedom to** pursue his own **search for meaning. Future utopias must be renounced, and “history can no longer be presented as an object of worship.”**74 **“It is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies,” and to aim for what is possible—more justice, solidarity, and love among [people]** men. **The rebel must** “reject divinity in order to **share in the struggles and destiny of all** men.”75 Redemption is impossible. **Human dignity and love can inter mittently be achieved with struggle and constant vigilance against the plague** bacillus **that “never** dies or **disappears** for good. .. [but can] rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”76

## A2 Policy Making

1. Our type of radical engagement with the institution of debate instead of fiating state action leads to real world change after we leave debate – the Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle prove

**Polson 12** 2012, Dana Roe Polson is a Co-Director, teacher, and founder of ConneXions Community Leadership Academy, ““Longing for Theory:” Performance Debate in Action”, http://gradworks.umi.com/3516242.pdf

think the Talented Tenth is actually the wrong metaphor for leadership in the performance debate community. Du Bois, later in his life, sharply criticized and disavowed a reliance on the Black elite to lead, believing that they were more preoccupied with individual gain than with group struggle, and willing to work within current structures rather than calling for radical change. They were becoming Americanized, Du Bois believed, and deradicalized. This deradicalization “occurs when more privileged African Americans (re) align themselves to function as a middle class interested in individual group gain rather than race leadership for mass development” (James, 1997, p. 24). Instead of his youthful belief in the Black elite, “Gradually, black working-class activists surpassed elites in Du Bois’s estimation of political integrity and progressive agency. He democratized his concept of race leaders through the inclusion of the radicalism of nonelites” (James, 1997, p. 21). The young people who have emerged as leaders in the performance debate community were definitely not those Du Bois would have identified as the Talented Tenth in 1903. **Du Bois was talking to and about the Black elite, the educated middle class. Earlier in Du Bois’s life, he assumed that those people, college-educated, were the natural leaders. My participants who might be seen as potential leaders do not come from such backgrounds**. Many do end up going to college and becoming potential leaders, but they are privileged through this process rather than prior to it. In addition, their focus is most definitely political as opposed to cultural. Nowhere in my research did I hear a Bill Cosby-esque injunction for Black people to shape up and work harder. Instead, **the critique is focused on “uplift as group struggle” for continued liberation**. Finally, **these young leaders are most definitely radicalized as opposed to interested in incremental change that rocks no boats**. **From CRT and their open critique of white supremacy to their willingness to call for change openly in debate rounds, these young leaders are contentious and bold**. **Two of my participants, and many of their former debate peers, are involved with a Baltimore group called Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle** (LBS). The website of the LBS establishes their identity: We are **a dedicated group of Baltimore citizens who want to change the city through governmental policy action. Our purpose is to provide tangible, concrete solutions to Baltimore’s problems and to analyze the ways that external forces have contributed to the overall decline of our city.** (“Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle,” n.d.) As we see in this statement of identity, then, LBS as one model of leadership is focused on the political and on an analysis of external influences; this focus is very different from a racial uplift position, and their model of leadership very different from the Talented Tenth. **LBS has developed platforms regarding jobs, education, incarceration, and many other issues facing Black people in the city**. They hold monthly forums for discussion of these topics, inviting guests and discussing the topics themselves. Further, one of the LBS members ran for City Council this year. He lost, but plans to run again. **The training my participants discuss, therefore, is not in the abstract: it is training for the real world, for their own empowerment and that of their communities**. This work is extending into local high schools, as well, and Paul Robeson High School now has students involved in LBS. They attend events and meetings not only to help out but as a form of leadership training.

1. The detached stance of the policy maker in debate divorces us from true advocacy. Simulations only serve to distance us from real world political participation.   
   Reid-Brinkley 08 **Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley DSRB 2008 (Shanara,"THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE," pg. 118-120)**

Mitchell observes that **the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment** associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, **its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like** torture, terrorism, **genocide** and nuclear war **without blinking**. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. **When we** blithely **call for U**nited **S**tates **F**ederal **G**overnment **policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the** horrific **atrocities** perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. **The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts.** As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, **the discursive practices of policy oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege.** Thus, **these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony.** So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same. Jones and Green argue that **debaters should ground their agency in what they are able to do as “individuals.”** Note the following statement from Green in the 2NC against Emory’s Allen and Greenstein (ranked in the “sweet sixteen”): “And then, another main difference is that our advocacy is grounded in our agency as individuals. **Their agency is grounded in what the US federal government, what the state should do.**”117 Citing Mitchell, Green argues further: We talk about, dead prez, talks about how the system ain’t gone change, unless we make it change. We’re talkin’ about what we as individuals should do. That’s why Gordon Mitchell talked about how when we lose our argumentative agency. **When we give our agency to someone else, we begin speaking of what the United States Federal Government should do, rather than what we do, that cause us to be spectators.** Its one of the most debilitating failures of contemporary education.118 As part of their commitment to the development of agency, each of the Louisville debaters engages in a recognition of their privilege, in an attempt to make their social locations visible and relevant to their rhetorical stance.

1. Agency Net Benefit – Our individual resistance strategy allows us to reclaim our agency and prevents us from being spectators to oppression

Polson 12 Dana Roe Polson, PhD in Language Literacy and Culture, UMBC, Baltimore city public and public charter schools high school teacher, “’Longing for Theory:’ Performance Debate in Action” Dissertain directed by Dr. Christine Mallinson, Assistant Professor, Language, Literacy, and Culture pp. 256-257

**One of the ways performance debaters see themselves doing something as opposed to just talking is a concept they call in-round solvency**. If something about a debater’s argument is addressed and solved for in the round, then she has in-round solvency. **The concept of in-round solvency only makes sense in non-traditional speeches;** traditional debaters would not claim in-round solvency for an argument that depends on the US government to enact. While fiat says that for the sake of the debate round, we will all pretend that there would be no barriers to enact the plan (the opponents cannot argue that there’s no way that would be approved in the real world; fiat says thast we assume the plan could be approved), no one is saying that the round itself does enact. **The power of discourse, then, is different in performance debate arguments because the actor is not the USFG, but, in some cases, the debaters themselves; the focus is often not the state but the state of debate. There is a radical shift in who has potential agency**. As Janice Cooper says, “We talk about specifically affirming... ourselves in this round, like that’s an act of actual in-round solvency, because we in this round are like the most oppressed....” The response of more traditional debaters to performance debate arguments is often to downplay or avoid them. **Janice says that she and her partner make “real” arguments, and she hopes that “the debate community will start to realize that, like, we’re not just talking, like we’re actually making real arguments they should actually try to prepare for and actually look out for”** (Cooper, interview, p. 15). **I heard more than once the argument that talking about issues of race during a debate round, where it could actually have an impact,** is different from talking about (in the sense of pretending to make) foreign policy changes. I think that individual agency is the key to the argument here. **The playing-the-game takes away from individual agency; not playing a game, i.e., performance debate, asserts individual agency and is therefore doing something**. Kenneth explained this position: A lot of teams like to participate in some hypothetical world where...the affirmative pretends to be the federal government, and ... when the judge signs his ballot affirmative, the plan gets passed, this problem gets solved, and, ... like we stop nuclear war. **When the judge signs the ballot, nuclear war gets stopped. And I guess the problem with that is like back to like the objectivity thing, it disconnects you from the real world. Like it takes away from what you as an individual person can do cause you’re constantly pretending to be something that you’re not. And so, like, like what [theorist] Carrie Crenshaw says, like using your individual agency to fix problems that you know you have control over. .... By us taking advantage of our individual agency and talking about whiteness and bringing it to the forefront of discussions, like, we [he and his debate partner] do more action than you [an opponent] do, even if you pretend to do something**. (Kenneth, interview, p. 19)

### A2 SSD

Switch side destroys conviction and advocacy for debaters.

Polson 12 Dana Roe Polson, PhD in Language Literacy and Culture, UMBC, Baltimore city public and public charter schools high school teacher, “’Longing for Theory:’ Performance Debate in Action” Dissertain directed by Dr. Christine Mallinson, Assistant Professor, Language, Literacy, and Culture pp. 256-257

**Switch-side debating as a debate norm is rooted in a liberal belief in hearing all sides of an issue, in suspending judgment,** etc**. Most debate community members believe that switch-side debating both increases argumentation skills and increases empathy** with other points of view (Warner & Bruschke (2001), Solt (2004), English et al (2007). In this view, **performance debaters who do not switch sides are somewhat provincial, tied to identity politics instead of conducting a wide-ranging search for truth; their critical project keeps them from truly critical thinking, as their minds are already made up**. **Performance debaters reject these assumptions, including the assumption that critical research in general is somehow political or ideological in opposition to some purer, more objective non-critical research.** The problem with this argument is that it denies us access to arguments about hegemony and power; **if each debate has to be argued switch-side**, tabula rasa, as if we didn’t hold some powerful insights into the nature of power through critical theory, **then we are denied the explanatory power of those theories. We are stuck in a liberalism of an imaginary policy world. In many ways, then, performance debaters challenge the standard policy debate paradigm of game-playing, through their insistence on authenticity in debate and through their performance of Blackness and of other identities counter to the mainstream performance of white maleness**. For many African American debaters, the **performance debate practice is kept more real than an assimilative practice would be, for them. Debaters depend on debate for scholarship**; they are not playing around. **Debaters speak from conviction and belief, rather than exclusively strategically; they are not role-playing** or trying out arguments for fun. **Debaters disrupt whiteness and genre norms; they are not playing within the standard rules of the game.**

## A2 Psychoanalysis

Embodiment is good

**Braidotti 06** Rosi; Utrecht University and Birkbeck College; Affirmation versus VuInerabiIity: On Contemporary Ethical Debates; 2006; <https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/12987BF52DF1C537852574800056A6F8/$FILE/symposium_2006_0010_0001_0245_0264.pdf>; accessed 12/3/16

If the point of ethics is to explore how much a body can do, in the pursuit of active modes of empowerment through experimentation, how do we know when we have gone too far? How does the negotiation of boundaries actually take place? This is where **the non-individualistic vision of the subject as embodied and** hence **affective and interrelational**, but also fundamentally social, **is of major consequence. Your body will thus tell you** if and **when you have reached a threshol**d or a limit. The warning can take the form of opposing resistance, falling ill, feeling nauseous, or it can take other somatic manifestations, like fear, anxiety, or a sense of insecurity. **Whereas the semiotic-Iinguistic frame of psychoanalysis reduces these to symptoms awaiting interpretation**, **I see them as corporeal warning signals** or boundary markers **that express a clear message: "too much!" One of the reasons why D**eleuze **and G**uattari are so interested in **study**ing **self-destructive** or pathological modes of behavior, **such as schizophrenia, masochism**, anorexia, various forms of addiction, and the black hole of murderous violence, **is** precisely in order **to explore their function as thresholds or boundary-markers**. This assumes a qualitative distinction between, on the one hand, the desire that propels the subject's expression of his/her conatus-a neo-Spinozist perspective is implicitly positive in that it expresses the essential best of the subject-and, on the other hand, the constraints imposed by society. The specific, contextually determined conditions are the forms in which the desire is actualized or actually expressed. **Bodily entities are** not passive, but rather **dynamic and sensitive forces forever in motion, which "form unities only through fragile synchronization of forces"** (Lloyd 1994, 23). **This fragility concerns** mostlythe pitch of the synchronization efforts, **the lines of demarcation between the different bodily boundaries, the borders that are the thresholds of encounter and connection with other forces,** the standard term for which is "limits." Because of his monistic understanding of the subject, Spinoza sees bodily limits as the limits of our awareness as weil, which means that his theory of affectivity is connected to the physics of motion. Another ward for Spinoza's conatus is therefore **self-preservation, not in the liberal individualistic sense** of the term, **but rather as the actualization of one's essence**, that is to say, **of one's ontological drive to become**. This is neither an automatie nor an intrinsically harmonious process, insofar as it involves interconnection with other forces and consequently also conflicts and clashes. Negotiations have to occur as stepping-stones to sustainable flows of becoming. **The bodily self's interaction with [the]** his/her **environment can either increase or decrease that body's** conatus or **potentia**. **The mind as a sensor that prompts understanding can assist by helping to discern and choose those forces that increase its power of acting and its activity in both physical and mental terms**. A higher form of self-knowledge by understanding the nature of one's affectivity is the key to a Spinozist ethics of empowerment. It includes a more adequate understanding of the interconnections between the self and a multitude of other forces, and it thus **undermines the liberal individual understanding of the subject**. It also implies, however, **the body's ability to comprehend and to sustain physically a greater number of complex interconnections**, and to deal with complexity without being overburdened. Thus, **only an appreciation of complexity** and of increasing degrees of complexity **can guarantee the freedom of the mind in the awareness of its true, affective, and dynamic nature**

Cisnormativity DA: Neg’s psychoanalysis pathologizes queer identity

**Musser 12** Amber Jamilla; Assistant Professor, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program @ Wash U and has a PhD History of Science, Harvard University, 2009; “Anti- Oedipus, Kinship, and the Subject of Affect Reading Fanon with Deleuze and Guattari”; Pg 80-82;

Fanon’s insistence on **focusing on nation** instead of family is not minor; it **serves as the basis for his counter to the Oedipus complex**. **Family is central to the Oedipal schema and is the structure that makes sexuality visible**. Through taboos against incest, the family structure enacts repressions, which Freud argues are necessary for the advancement of civilization: “The very incapacity of the sexual instinct to yield complete satisfaction as soon as it submits to the first demands of civilization becomes the source, however, of the noblest cultural achievements which are brought into being by ever more extensive sublimation of its instinctual components.”48 It is taken for granted that **sexuality** is both what **causes the family to cohere** and what acts as an agent of individual and societal change. **Without** the familial structure, without **Oedipus, sexuality** is dethroned as civilization’s reigning paradigm and **becomes a cultural effect**. Throughout Black Skin, White Masks, **Fanon** evinces a certain discomfort with attributing sexuality to black men. In part, I **argue** this is because he views sexuality (like the Oedipus complex) as the province of whiteness. Both the white woman and the white man desire the black man: “The Negrophobic woman is in fact nothing but a putative sexual partner—just as the Negrophobic man is a repressed homosexual.”49 **The Negro does not have sexuality**; he, specifically his penis, is a sex object. Moreover, **this reduction to objectivity is not only an erasure of subjectivity and its potential for desire and sexuality, but a replacement of those concepts with labor.** The black man’s penis produces pleasure for others through the black man’s work. The lack of access to **sexuality is another symbol of** the black man’s **objectification, anatomization, and commodification.** Fanon channels this erasure of subjectivity and sexuality into rage against women. This has the effect of marginalizing women in his text. He treats white and black women as commodities; they are exchanged between white and black men, but their own agency and desires are trivialized.50 In a harsh reading of Capécia’s Je suis martiniquaise**, Fanon illustrates what Rey Chow describes** as **an inability to reconcile female sexuality with community.**51 Capécia’s novel tells the story of a woman, Mayotte, who decides that she will marry a white man because of the hardships women of color face. She never marries, but is impregnated by her white lover, who then abandons her. Literary critics such as Cheryl Duffus, Jennifer Sparrow, and Susan Andrade argue that Capécia’s narrative is a historically accurate portrayal of the plight of the black Martinican woman, who has few avenues for success within the structures of colonialism.52 Fanon describes her novel as “a vast delusion.”53 He argues that Mayotte treats the white man with pathological deference—“she asks nothing, demands nothing, except a bit of whiteness in her life”—because she is obsessed with whiteness.54 He condemns this desire as “infantile” because it explicitly relates whiteness with financial and social success.55 Fanon’s quarrel with the black woman is that she rejects blackness—she rejects the overtures of the Negro or mulatto man and she rejects her own blackness. Fanon universalizes black women’s desire for whiteness and white men: “I know a great number of girls from Martinique, students in France, who admitted to me with complete candor—completely white candor—that they would find it impossible to marry black men (get out of that and then deliberately go back to it? Thank you, no). Besides, they added, it is not that we deny that blacks have any good qualities, but you know it is so much better to be white.”56 Even as Fanon himself rejects the black woman as a maternal figure, he portrays her as a mother who rejected her sons. **Chow argues that “Fanon’s admittance of the sexual agency of the woman of color signifies her inevitable expulsion from her community” because her tendencies** (real or imagined) toward miscegenation **threaten Fanon’s utopian vision.**57 **Fanon’s anti-Oedipal vision is a world of men, a world of radical solidarity. Importantly, it is also a world without homo- or heterosexuality. Against Fanon’s rejection of the Oedipus complex, we have his radical rescripting of kinship as solidarity.** In the introduction to Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon writes that this book is a way “toward a new humanism . . . / Understanding among men . . . / Our colored brothers . . . / Mankind, I believe in you.”58 Fanon’s turn toward brotherhood is one that goes beyond race toward the end of oppression, toward love: “I, the man of color, want only this: That the tool never possess the man. That the enslavement of man by man cease forever. That is, of one by another. That it be possible for me to discover and to love man, wherever he may be.”59 Though David Macey and Stuart Hall speak to the historical and geographic specificity of Black Skin, White Masks, it is important to recognize Fanon’s own attempts to forge bonds with other colonized black people. After he joined the Algerian resistance movement, he took on Algerian citizenship and considered himself part of the Algerian nation. Though this move has been either maligned by scholars (Gates) as a refusal of national identity or hailed as a step toward postcoloniality (Bhabha), I read it as a part of Fanon’s rejection of family and Oedipus.60 We see an imperfect version of this kinship at work when Fanon discusses the black man’s relations with the Jewish man. He writes that “colonial racism is no different from any other racism” and that “anti-Semitism hits me head-on: I am enraged. . . . I cannot disassociate myself from the future that is proposed for my brother.”61 Black Skin, White Masks contains many references to the plight of Jewish men and the commonalities between anti-Semitism and negrophobia. After a lengthy discussion comparing the two, Fanon writes, “Fault, guilt, refusal of guilt, paranoia—one is back in homosexual territory. In sum, what others have described in the case of the Jew applies perfectly in that of the Negro.”62 This is Fanon’s attempt to link blackness and Jewishness through the historical and social similarities of oppression. This is a fraught connection for Fanon because it is a connection based on what Pellegrini calls “the fantasy of shared powerlessness” and therefore resides in the sphere of ressentiment and reactivity.63 The relationship between Jewishness and blackness is mediated by whiteness and sexuality. Because his relationship with the Jewish man is premised on internalized self-hatred, Fanon writes that the Negro succumbs to “an unhealthy, conflictual solution, fed on fantasies, hostile, inhuman.”64 What he desires instead is “to rise above this absurd drama that others have staged around me, to reject the two terms that are equally unacceptable, and, through one human being, to reach out for the universal.”65 Fanon imagines a community based on mutual recognition. Since white men did not recognize black men, Fanon theorizes a community of men united by their blackness. A community of black men could subvert the workings of colonialism by actively choosing to work together, rather than be left to fight among themselves for marginal status. Rey Chow describes Fanon’s logic thus: “If the black man is not admitted by the white man because of his skin color, then this very skin color would now become the basis of a new community—the basis of entry into and recognition by the postcolonial nation.”66 Fanon imagines a masculine world of collaboration and action: “All I wanted was to be a man among other men [tout simplement être un homme parmi d’autres hommes]. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and to help to build it together.”67 The task of solidarity is “to educate man to be actional,” but more immediately solidarity could be found in decolonization.68 While Wretched of the Earth speaks more extensively to Fanon’s interest in decolonization, in the conclusion to Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon raises the question of practical solidarity. For Fanon, solidarity is a color-blind commitment to himself and his neighbor to “fight for all my life and with all my strength so that never again would a people on the earth be subjugated. It was not the black world that laid down my course of conduct. My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values.”69 **While we can see the ways that Fanon’s commitment to radical solidarity and decolonization came at the expense of women’s participation, this omission invites us to reconsider the ways that gender works in Deleuze and Guattari’s vision of the BwO and masochism**. Though there is the promise of a space outside the gender binary, as Elizabeth Grosz demonstrates in her article “A Thousand Tiny Sexes,” reading Deleuze and Guattari through Fanon uncovers a masculinist logic at work**.** We are again left with Chow’s question “Could female sexuality and sexual difference ever be reconciled with community or are these mutually exclusive events?”70 Deleuze and Guattari have already been subject to feminist critiques. In “Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others),” Alice Jardine criticizes Deleuze for his appropriation of femininity in his concept of becoming-woman. Jardine argues that Deleuze posits the feminine as a step toward transcendence but never a thing unto itself, thus making it difficult to use him for feminist scholarship. While the feminine is admired because it is a minority position, its own limitations and advantages are not explicitly discussed. Jardine’s critique deals with Deleuze and Guattari’s problematic erasure of the feminine. They speak, she argues, to an assumed and impossible neutral subject. Though Deleuze and Guattari were advocates of leftist causes in France, including feminism, this neglect of the feminine is thought to render their work difficult to appropriate for feminist philosophy, which has to understand the subject as gendered in particular ways and to show the ways in which this gendering matters particularly because it is seen to limit agency.71 Deleuze and Guattari’s rejoinder to this was that becoming-woman, which is part of the general process of becoming-minor, is about dismantling the established hierarchies of organization.72 The dynamic at work in Deleuze and Guattari’s articulation of masochism is different, however. They do not discuss the masochist in terms of becoming-woman, but becoming-animal, which fits in well with their argument about becoming-minor. **The problem with the masochist is actually with the position of the mistress. Deleuze and Guattari wax rhapsodic about the process of transformation, the flows of pain, and the emptiness; yet all of this requires the mistress as agent of transformation.** She is the forgotten feminine, what Grosz writes that Luce Irigaray will describe as the “ground, object or excuse for his own involvement.”73 She keeps her corporeal integrity so as to enable the masochist. It is true that Deleuze and Guattari posit other modes of transformation, but they also rely on a formula of social exclusion. For example, the hypochondriac body requires a doctor and the junkie’s body requires the drug trade. **Without these other elements, these assemblages do not work; there are always invisible hands at work in the creation of the BwO. Deleuze and Guattari write that “the BwO is the egg,” but who is responsible for its production?**74 Even if Woman, as the fixed sign, is not necessarily at stake, Deleuze and Guattari’s masculinism remains.

Traumatization DA: Their libidinal economy frames desire as always perpetuating antiblack traumas. This restrictive notion leads to cycles psychological and traumatic violence. Our rage is more than distress, it refuses the very notion that we are statistics to white supremacy

**Braidotti 06** Rosi; Utrecht University and Birkbeck College; Affirmation versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates; 2006; <https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/12987BF52DF1C537852574800056A6F8/$FILE/symposium_2006_0010_0001_0245_0264.pdf>;

What is negative about **negative affects** is not a value judgment (any more than it is for the positivity of difference), but rather the effect of arrest, **blockage**, and rigidification **that comes as a result of an act of violence, betrayal, a trauma-or which can be self-perpetuated through practices that our culture simultaneously chastises as self-destructive and cultivates as a mode of discipline and punishment: all forms of mild and extreme addictions, differing degrees of abusive practices that mortify and glorify the bodily matter, from binging to bodily modifications.** **Abusive, addictive, or destructive practices** do not merely destroy the self but **harm the self's capacity to relate to others**, both human and non-human others.Thus **they harm the capacity to grow in and through others and become others**. Negative passions diminish our capacity to express the high levels of interdependence, the vital reliance on others, which is the key to a non-unitary and dynamic vision of the subject. **What is negated by negative passions is the power of life itself, as the dynamic force, vital flows of connections and becomings.** This is why they should not be encouraged, nor should we be rewarded for lingering around them tao lang. Negative passions are black holes. An ethics of **affirmation involves the transformation of negative into positive passions: resentment into affirmation,** as Nietzsche put it. **The practice of transforming negative into positive passions is the process of reintroducing time, movement, and transformation into a stifling enclosure saturated with unprocessed pain. It is a gesture of affirmation of hope in the sense of affirming the possibility of moving beyond the stultifying effects of the pain, the injury, the injustice.** **This** is a gesture of **displacement of the hurt,** which fully contradicts the twin logic of claims and compensation. This **is achieved through** a sort of **de-personalization of the event**, which is the ultimate ethical challenge. **The displacement of the ego-indexed negative passions or affects reveals the fundamental senselessness of the hurt, the injustice, or injury one has suffered**. **"Why me?" is the refrain most commonly heard in situations of extreme distress**. This expresses rage as well as anguish at one's ill **fate**. **The answer is plain: for no reason at all**. Examples of this are the banality of evil in large-scale genocides like the Holocaust (Arendt,1963), and the randomness of surviving them (think of Primo Levi who could/not endure his own survival). **There is something intrinsically senseless about the pain or injustice: lives are lost or saved for all and no reason at all**. Why did some go to work in the WTC on 9/11 while others missed the train? Why did Frida Kahlo take that tram which crashed so that she was impaled by a metal rod, and not the next one? For no reason at all. Reason has nothing to do with it. That is precisely the point.

## A2 Feminism Bad

### A2 “Feminism” Term

**Criticisms of the word feminist and the history of feminism are not responsive to the aff. We use the term feminist killjoy as a term of art that means something entirely different from the historical connotation of the word feminist. Ahmed 10 explains what the term feminist killjoy entails:**

**Ahmed 10** Sara Ahmed "Feminist Killjoys (And Other Willful Subjects)" The Scholar and Feminist Online Published by The Barnard Center for Research on Women Summer 2010 sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/print\_ahmed.htm

**We can consider the relationship between the negativity of the figure of the feminist killjoy and how certain bodies are "encountered" as being negative**. Marilyn Frye argues that oppression involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find yourself. As she puts it, "it is often a requirement upon oppressed people that we smile and be cheerful. If we comply, we signify our docility and our acquiescence in our situation." To be oppressed requires that you show signs of happiness, as signs of being or having been adjusted. For Frye "anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as mean, bitter, angry or dangerous".[[6](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end6)] **To be** recognized as **a feminist is to be assigned to a difficult category and a category of difficulty**. **You are "already read" as "not easy to get along with" when you name yourself as a feminist**. You have to show that you are not difficult through displaying signs of good will and happiness. Frye alludes to such experiences when she describes how: "this means, at the very least, that we may be found to be "difficult" or unpleasant to work with, which is enough to cost one's livelihood."[[7](http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/ahmed_08.htm" \l "end7)] We can also witness an investment in feminist unhappiness (the myth that feminists kill joy because they are joy-less). **There is a desire to believe that women become feminists *because* they are unhappy**. This desire functions as a defense of happiness against feminist critique. **This is not to say that feminists might not be unhappy; becoming a feminist might mean becoming aware of *just how much* there is to be unhappy about**. **Feminist** **consciousness could be understood as consciousness of unhappiness, a consciousness made possible by the refusal to turn away**. My point here would be that **feminists are read as being unhappy, such that situations of conflict, violence, and power are read as *about* the unhappiness of feminists**, rather than being what feminists are unhappy *about*. Political struggles can takes place over the causes of unhappiness. We need to give a history to unhappiness. We need to hear in unhappiness more than the negation of the "un." The history of the word "unhappy" might teach us about the unhappiness of the history of happiness. In its earliest uses, unhappy meant to cause misfortunate or trouble. Only later, did it come to mean to feel misfortunate, in the sense of wretched or sad. We can learn from the swiftness of translation from causing unhappiness to being described *as* unhappy. We must learn.

### A2 White Fem

The theory of the 1AC is not white feminism

a. Our scholarship through phenomenology of spaces creating orientations is a theory by Sara Ahmed, a woman of color, who draws from various black feminist scholars and theories, including Audre Lorde and bell hooks.

b. We theorize the way orientations of institutions cohere around whiteness in order to create white supremacy which means our theory is not “sexism is the only thing that we should talk about” but gives an account of the way whiteness operates.

### \*A2 Feminism is white-washed

**1. Turn – feminism is key to create inclusive spaces of solidarity against white supremacy – historically proven**

**hooks 2k** bell hooks "FEMINISM IS FOR EVERYBODY Passionate Politics" South End Press, Cambridge, MA 2000 https://excoradfeminisms.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/bell\_hooks-feminism\_is\_for\_everybody.pdf

In many ways they were following in the footsteps of their abolitionist ancestors who had demanded that everyone (white women and black people) be given the right to vote, but, when faced with the possibility that black males might gain the right to vote while they were denied it on the basis of gender, they chose to ally themselves with men, uniting under the rubric of white supremacy. Contemporary white females witnessing the militant demand for more rights for black people chose that moment to demand more rights for themselves. Some of these individuals claim that it was working on behalf of civil rights that made them aware of sexism and sexist oppression. Yet if this was the whole picture one might think their newfound political awareness of difference would have carried over into the way they theorized contemporary feminist movement. They entered the movement erasing and denying difference, not playing race alongside gender, but eliminating race from the picture. Foregrounding gender meant that white women could take center stage, could claim the movement as theirs,even as they called on all women to join. **The utopian vision of sisterhood evoked in a feminist movement that initially did not take racial difference or anti-racist struggle seriously did not capture the imagination of most black women/women of color**. Individual black women who were active in the movement from its inception for the most part stayed in their place. When the feminist movement began racial integration was still rare. Many black people were learning how to interact with whites on the basis of being peers for the first time in their lives. No wonder individual black women choosing feminism were reluctant to introduce their awareness of race. It must have felt so awesome to have white women evoke sisterhood in a world where they had mainly experienced white women as exploiters and oppressors. A **younger generation of black females/women of color in the late '70s and early '80s challenged white female racism**. Unlike our older black women allies we had for the most part been educated in predominantly white settings. Most of us had never been in a subordinated position in relation to a white female. Most of us had not been in the workforce. We had never been in our place. We were better positioned to critique racism and white supremacy within the women's movement. Individual white women who had attempted to organize the movement around the banner of common oppression evoking the notion that women constituted a sexual class/ caste were the most reluctant to acknowledge differences among women, differences that overshadowed all the common experiences female shared. Race was the most obvious difference. In the '70s I wrote the first draft of Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. I was 19 years old. I had never worked a full-time job. I had come from a racially segregated small town in the south to Stanford University. While I had grown up resisting patriarchal thinking, college was the place where I embraced feminist politics. It was there as the only black female present in feminist classrooms, in consciousness-raising, that I began to engage race and gender theoretically. It was there that I began to demand recognition of the way in which racist biases were shaping feminist thinking and call for change. At other locations individual black women/women of color were making the same critique. In those days white women who were unwilling to face the reality of racism and racial difference accused us of being traitors by introducing race. Wrongly they saw us as deflecting focus away from gender. In reality, we were demanding that we look at the status of females realistically, and that realistic understanding serve as the foundation for a real feminist politic. Our intent was not to diminish the vision of sisterhood. **We sought to put in place a concrete politics of soli- darity that would make genuine sisterhood possible**. We knew that **there could no real sisterhood between white women and women of color** ifwhite women were not able to divest of white supremacy, **if feminist movement were not fundamentally anti-racist**. Critical interventions around race did not destroy the women's movement; it became stronger. Breaking through denial about race helped women face the reality of difference on all levels. And **we** were finally **put**ting **in place a movement that did not place the** class **interests of** privileged women, especially **white women**, **over that of all other women**. We put in place a vision of sisterhood where all our realities could be spoken. There has been no contemporary movement for social justice where individual participants engaged in the dialectical exchange that occurred among feminist thinkers about race which led to the re-thinking of much feminist theory and practice. **The fact that participants in the feminist movement could face critique** and challenge **while** **still remaining wholeheartedly committed to** a vision of justice, of **liberation**, **is a testament to the movement's** strength and **power**. It shows us that **no matter how misguided feminist thinkers have been** in the past, the will to change, **the will to create the context for struggle and liberation, remains stronger than the need to hold on to wrong beliefs** and assumptions. For years I witnessed the reluctance of white feminist thinkers to acknowledge the importance of race. I witnessed their refusal to divest of white supremacy, their unwillingness to acknowledge that an anti-racist feminist movement was the only political foundation that would make sisterhood be a reality. And **I witnessed the revolution in consciousness that occurred as individual women began** to break free of denial, **to break free of white supremacist thinking**. **These** awesome **changes restore my faith in feminist movement and strengthen the solidarity** I feel towards all women. Overall feminist thinking and **feminist theory has benefited from all critical interventions on the issue of race.** The only problematic arena has been that of translating theory into practice. While individual white women have incorporated an analysis of race into much feminist scholarship, these insights have not had as much impact on the day to day relations between white women and women of color. Anti-racist interactions between women are difficult in a society that remains racially segregated. Despite diverse work settings a vast majority of folks still socialize only with people of their own group. Racism and sexism combined create harmful barriers between women. So far feminist strategies to change this have not been very useful. **Individual white women and women of color who have worked through difficulties to make the space where bonds of love and political solidarity can emerge need to share the methods and strategies that we have successfully employed**. Almost no attention is given the relationship between girls of different races. Biased feminist scholarship which attempts to show that white girls are somehow more vulnerable to sexist conditioning than girls of color simply perpetuates the white supremacist assumption that white females require and deserve more attention to their concerns and ills than other groups**.** Indeed while girls of color may express different behavior than their white counterparts they are not only internalizing sexist conditioning, they are far more likely to be victimized by sexism in ways that are irreparable. **Feminist movement, especially the work of visionary black activists, paved the way for a reconsideration of race and racism that has had positive impact on our society as a whole**. **Rarely do mainstream social critiques acknowledge this fact**. As a feminist theorist who has written extensively about the issue of race and racism within feminist movement, I know that **there remains much that needs to be challenged and changed, but it is equally important to celebrate the enormous changes that have occurred**. **That celebration**, understanding our triumphs and using them as models, **means that they can become the sound foundation for the building of a mass-based anti-racist feminist movement.**

### A2 Need spirituality

Turn – the feminist movement embraces spirituality and has created spaces for alternate spirituality against Western religions.

**hooks 2k** bell hooks "FEMINISM IS FOR EVERYBODY Passionate Politics" South End Press, Cambridge, MA 2000 https://excoradfeminisms.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/bell\_hooks-feminism\_is\_for\_everybody.pdf

**Feminism** has been and continues to be a resistance movement which **valorizes spiritual practice**. Before I had feminist theory and practice to pull me fully into the awareness of the necessity of self-love and self-acceptance as necessary for self-actualization I walked on a spiritual path which affirmed those same messages. Despite the sexism of male-dominated religions females have found in spiritual practice a place of solace and sanctuary. Throughout the history of the church in Western life women have turned to monastic traditions to find a place for themselves where they can be with god without the intervention of men, where they can serve the divine without male domination. With keen spiritual insight and divine clarity the mystic Julian of Norwich would write long before the advent of contemporary feminism: "Our savior is our true Mother in whom we are endlessly born and out of whom we shall never come." Daring to counter the notion of our savior as always and only male Julian of Norwich was charting the journey back to the sacred feminine, helping to free women from the bondage of patriarchal religion. Early on feminist movement launched a critique of patriarchal religion that has had a profound impact, changing the nature of religious worship throughout our nation. Exposing the way Western metaphysical dualism (the assumption that the world can always be understood by binary categories, that there is an inferior and a superior, a good and a bad) was the ideological foundation of all forms of group oppression, sexism, racism, etc., and that such thinking formed the basis of Judeo-Christian belief systems. **To change how we worship then it was necessary to re-envision spirituality**. **Feminist critiques of patriarchal religion coincided with an overall cultural shift towards new age spirituality**. Within new age spiritual circles practitioners were turning away from the fundamentalist Christian thought that had for centuries dominated Western psyches and looking towards the East for answers, for different spiritual traditions. Creation spirituality replaced a patriarchal spirituality rooted in notions of fall and redemption. **In** Hinduism, Buddhism, V oudoun, and **diverse spiritual traditions women found images of female deities that allowed for a return to a vision of a goddesscentered spirituality**. Early on in feminist movement conflicts arose in response to those individual activists who felt the movement should stick to politics and take no stand on religion. A large number of the women who had come to radical feminism from traditional socialist politics were atheist. They saw efforts to return to a vision of sacred femininity as apolitical and sentimental. This divide within the movement did not last long as more **women began to see the link between challenging patriarchal religion and liberatory spirituality**. A huge majority of citizens in the United States identify themselves as Christian. More than other religious faith Christian doctrine which condones sexism and male domination informs all the ways we learn about gender roles in this society. Truly, there can be no feminist transformation of our culture without a transformation in our religious beliefs. Creation-centered Christian spiritual awakening linked itself with feminist movement. In Original Blessing Matthew Fox explains: "Patriarchal religions and patriarchal paradigms for religions have ruled the world's civilizations for at least 3,500 years. The creation-centered tradition is feminist. Wisdom and Eros counter more than knowledge or control in such spirituality." Speaking to the issue of tensions between feminists who are concerned with nature/ ecology and those concerned with working for civil rights, shows that this is an unnecessary dualism: Political movements for justice are part of the fuller development of the cosmos, and nature is the matrix in which humans come to their self-awareness and their awareness of their power to transform. **Liberation movements are a fuller development of the cosmos's sense of harmony, balance, justice, and celebration. This is why true spiritual liberation demands rituals of cosmic celebrating and healing, which will in turn culminate in personal transformation and liberation**. Liberation theologies see the liberation of exploited and oppressed groups as essential acts of faith reflecting devotion to divine will. Struggles to end patriarchy are divinely ordained. Fundamentalist patriarchal religion has been and remains a barrier preventing the spread of feminist thought and practice. Indeed, no group has demonized feminists more than right-wing religious fundamentalists who have called for and condoned the murder of feminist thinkers, especially those who support women having reproductive rights. Initially, feminist critiques of Christianity separated masses of women from the movement. When feminist Christians began to offer new and creation-centered critiques and interpretations of the Bible, of Christian beliefs, however, women were able to reconcile their feminist politics and sustained commitment to Christian practice. However these activists have yet to fully organize a movement that addresses masses of Christian believers, converting them to an understanding that no conflict need exist be tween feminism and Christian spirituality. The same is true for those feminists who are Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, etc. Until that happens organized patriarchal religion will always undermine feminist gains. Initially contemporary feminism placed emphasis on civil rights and material gains without giving enough attention to spiritualism. Mainstream mass media called attention to feminist critiques of religion but showed no interest in highlighting the spiritual awakening that occurred among diverse groups of feminist women. Masses of people still think that feminism is anti-religion. In actuality **feminism has helped transform patriarchal religious thought so that more women can find a connection** to the sacred and commit **to spiritual life**. Often **feminist spiritual practice found** acknowledgment and **acceptance in therapeutic settings where women were seeking to heal from wounds inflicted by patriarchal assaults**, many of which took place within the family of origin or in relationships. And it was in the context of feminist therapy that many women received affirmation for their spiritual quest. The private nature of this soul searching often means that the public is not informed about the degree to which feminist activists now acknowledge fully the necessity of attending to needs of the spirit - of spiritual life. In future feminist movement we will need better strategies for sharing information about feminist spirituality. **Choosing alternative spiritual paths has helped many women sustain commitment to spiritual life even as they continue to challenge and interrogate patriarchal religion**. **The institutionalized patriarchal church or temple has been changed by feminist interventions**. But in more recent years the church has begun to abandon strides made in the direction of gender equity. The rise in religious fundamentalism threatens progressive spirituality. Fundamentalism not only encourages folks to believe that inequality is "natural," it perpetuates the notion that control of the female body is necessary. Hence its assault on reproductive rights. Concurrently religious fundamentalism imposes on females and males repressive notions of sexuality which validate sexual coercion in many different forms. Clearly, there is still a need for feminist activists to highlight organized religion, to engage in ongoing critique and resistance. While a world of wonderful, feminist-affirming spiritual traditions abound now, masses of people have no access to knowledge about these practices. They often feel that patriarchal religion is the only place where anyone cares about their spiritual well-being. Patriarchal religion has successfully used mass media, particularly television, to spread its message. Alternative spiritual paths must do likewise if we are to counter the notion that patriarchal religion is the only path. **Feminist spirituality created a space** for everyone **to interrogate outmoded belief systems and created new** **paths**. **Representing god in diverse ways, restoring our respect for the sacred feminine, it has helped us find ways to affirm and/ or re-affirm the importance of spiritual life**. **Identifying liberation from any form of domination and oppression as essentially a spiritual quest returns us to a spirituality which unites spiritual practice with our struggles for justice and liberation**. A feminist vision of spiritual fulfillment is naturally the foundation of authentic spiritual life.

## A2 Language Ks

1. Deem 96 is a disad to your alt – you don’t take radical actions to disrupt norms, which means your actions will only be dismissed as nagging, and even if they aren’t they are not accessible to women as a strategy
2. Cross apply Deem 2 – you bear witness to suffering of womxn but ultimately your discussion won’t lead to anything and will only re-entrench squo discursive norms. You perpetuate the way public spheres exclude minorities – “you have to talk in this specific way in order to do anything” which allows the white male to become invisible

Turn – Policing individual words is bad, critiques of speech produce reactionary politics in which change is focused on language directly trading off with efforts to change material problems.

Brown 01**[[5]](#footnote-5)**

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *politi­cal* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institu­tions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and man­dates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility to­ward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legis­lated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspi­rations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rational­ization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here [is] we greet a persistent political para­dox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conserva­tive as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of histori­cally specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, [and] how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, vio­lence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to ad­dress those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorienta­tion [or] , rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

TURN - Preventing the use of representations precludes the possibility of giving them new meaning. You lock in oppressive power structures within language.

Butler 97[[6]](#footnote-6)

This story underscores the limits and risks of resignification as a strategy of opposition. I will not propose that the pedagogical recirculation of examples of hate speech always defeats the project of opposing and defusing such speech, but I want to underscore the fact that such terms carry connotations that exceed the purposes for which they may be intended and can thus work to afflict and defeat discursive efforts to oppose such speech. **Keeping** such **terms unsaid** and unsayable can also work to **lock them in place, preserving their power to injure, and arresting the possibility of a reworking that** might **shift their** context and **purpose. That** such **language carries trauma is not a reason to forbid its use. There is no purifying language of its traumatic residue, and no way to work through trauma except through** the arduous effort it takes to direct **the course of its repetition**. It may be chat trauma constitutes a strange kind of resource, and repetition, its vexed but promising instrument. After all, to be rained by another is traumatic: **it** **is an act that precedes my will, an act that brings me into a linguistic world in which I might** then **begin to exercise agency** at all. **A founding subordination, and yet the scene of agency, is repeated in the ongoing interpellations of social life.** This is what I have been called. Because I have been called something, I have been entered into linguistic life, refer to myself through the language given by the Other, but perhaps never quite in the same terms that my language mimes. **The terms by which we are hailed are rarely the ones we choose** (and even when we try to impose protocols on how we are to be named, they usually fail); **but these terms we never really choose are the occasion for something we** might still **call agency, the repetition of an originary subordination for another purpose, one whose future is** partially **open**.

### A2 Ableist Language

1. **Turn – The introduction of their critique of ableist language is a voting issue—calling me out for using an *unintentionally offensive term* might make them feel better for embarrassing us, but it doesn’t do anything to address ableist oppression. Rejecting their “call out” strategy is crucial to constructive activism—vote against them to facilitate productive dialogue about ableist language.**

**Kinzel 11** Lesley Kinzel, blogger and social justice writer, has written for *Newsweek* and *Marie Claire*, was named one of the Feminist Press’s “40 Feminists Under 40,” 2011 (“On our difficult language, and the calling-out of,” *Two Whole Cakes*—a blog about body politics, social justice activism, and pop-cultural criticism from a feminist perspective, March 30th, Available Online at http://blog.twowholecakes.com/2011/03/on-our-difficult-language-and-the-calling-out-of-same/, Accessed 03-02-2012)

**We throw “that’s ableist”** or “that’s racist” or “that’s fatphobic” **around**, I suspect, **in the hope that such heavy judgement-bearing words will shock and embarrass the speaker** out of using the offending language. And sometimes, it can work, at least in the short term, when we are merely thinking of our own self-preservation. But beyond that instant, **this is not constructive activism. Using** surprise, **guilt, or humiliation as negative reinforcement** to change behavior **does nothing** to instruct the person in question on why their behavior is causing problems; **they stop simply because they don’t want to get in trouble. While the power shift this approach employs may feel awfully satisfying** to those of us who have labored under some degree of oppression for much our lives—we get to dictate the terms of engagement, for once—**merely shifting the power from one hand to another does nothing to change the destructive use of said power against us.**¶ This practice of **shaming people** into behaving a certain way or using certain language **does not** truly **address the underlying inclination;** **it does not unpack the thinking that allowed that speaker to feel entitled to say those things in the first place. Fear can be an effective motivator, but it’s not often a productive** one, if our goal is broad and lasting cultural change. It is, after all, fear that motivates folks of all sizes to diet, that keeps queer folks in the closet, that makes women afraid to walk alone at night, that compels people of color to keep their heads down even in the face of overt discrimination and just get by. **It is fear and shame that locks the systems that marginalize us in place**, **and** as Audre Lorde has explained, in one of the most brilliant pieces of writing on social justice ever put to paper, **there is little we can do while still holding on to the master’s tools**.¶ Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s definition of acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of difference — those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, who are older — know that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to make common cause with those others identified as outside the structures in order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish. It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. And this fact is only threatening to those women who still define the master’s house as their only source of support.¶ Ideally, **people should stop using certain language because they have developed an understanding of why that language is oppressive, and how their use of it contributes to inequality and marginalization, and not because they are afraid or ashamed of confusing social repercussions they do not understand. What we need is a commitment to giving people clear explanations**—be they angry, or impassioned, or blunt—**of why their words or behavior are problematic, or upsetting, or damaging. We need to resist relying on comfortable jargon to call people out,** and to ditch the erroneous presumption that making someone feel stupid will encourage them to read more about a subject. **It doesn’t work. Fear and shame don’t help people to understand how the language we use and the actions we undertake**, even in our own small individual spheres, all **conspire to create a social environment that oppresses us. Fear breeds resentment and, sometimes, hatred. These are not things we need more of. These are the things that put us here in the first place**.¶

1. Turn—changing language doesn’t subvert ableism—their critique of language choices prevents genuine contestation of ableist oppression.

**Perpetually Myself 11[[7]](#footnote-7)**

**Language is important**, **but more important** still **are the underlying assumptions which shape** our **society**. Assumptions **about who is valuable and who isn’t**, **about what the proper way to behave is**, about what counts as “contributing” to to society/the economy/whatever…the list goes on and on. **Widespread use of “crazy” and “lame”** (etc.) **are but symptoms of the larger problem—society is full of ableist assumptions**, some of which are very obvious and some of which may be more subtle—but ableist nonetheless. **The elimination of ableist words is** **but a small part** of what needs to be done, and it frustrates and disappointments me that **so much “social justice” work has stopped at language**—which is in many ways the easiest part.¶ Take stigma against people with intellectual disabilities. I am glad that it’s no longer acceptable to use the r-word in many circles, and that other words are making some headway. (I struggle with ”idiot” and “crazy” and a lot of others myself in everyday speech.) But **I don’t think this has actually done all that much to promote[ed] the equality and worth of people with** intellectual **disabilities**. **There is still the assumption that** it is better to be “intelligent” (whatever that means), that mental illness (however you define that) is something to be pitied, and that, in short, **it’s better to be non-disabled** than not. **The** end **result is** a very **shallow** sort of **“social justice” discourse that keeps** all of the underlying problematic **assumptions** **in place while giving lip service to equality**. It’s very troubling.¶ **Truly examining one’s ableism does not mean renaming the tags on your blog** so that “lame” and “crazy” no longer appear. **It is not being the fifth person on a thread to self-righteously proclaim that “idiot” is ableist**, and then simply stopping at that. **That is** superficial, and oftentimes little more than **a way for** neurotypical and/or **able-bodied people to** publicly demonstrate their Good Ally status and **pat themselves on the back**. Examining one’s ableism means constantly questioning and re-formulating basic assumptions which are oftentimes so deeply ingrained that it’s hard even to see them, let alone disavow them. Take the assumption that “intelligence” is valuable, for instance. It’s so ingrained in our society, so hard to root out—I’ll not pretend to be perfect on this score—and yet doing so is vital if we are to create a world in which people with intellectual disabilities are equals—not simply people-seen-as-lesser whom are condescended to.¶

### A2 “Bodies”

1. No link - The aff is about embodiment – not using the word “bodies” to refer to “people” or “individuals” but the way bodies actually exist in space – also means the alt can’t solve case because it misunderstands how bodies literally engage in spaces

### A2 Word PIC

1. You can’t solve case – the performative aspect of the aff means we exist as the killjoy in debate which you cannot access
2. Evaluate this debate through a sufficiency framing – if I win impact mitigation then reject the PIC because it creates an impossible research burden and makes it impossible to affirm – the neg will PIC out of one of the thousands of words in our aff which we won’t be prepped for and that prevents us from engaging in material liberation strategies
3. No impact

## A2 Safe Space

Safe Spaces are a “White Fantasy” that only reinforce system oppressions on black and brown bodies

**McKittrick 14** Katherine; Gender Studies professor at Queen’s University; “Katherine McKittrick, author of Demonic Grounds, on Trigger Warnings”; Bully Bloggers; 12/17; <https://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2014/12/17/katherine-mckittrick-author-of-demonic-grounds-on-trigger-warnings/>; accessed 7/12/16

**PJH:** On twitter, **you** (depressingly, brilliantly) **wrote, “I’ve never glimpsed safe teaching (and learning) space. It is a white fantasy that harms.”** I’m wonder­ing if you could expand on that as it pertains to the Black student in Canada? How does such a vexed space inform your own pedagogical practice? **KM**: **Yes**. I wonder a lot about why **the classroom** should be safe. It isn’t **safe**. I am not sure what safe learning looks like **because the kinds of questions that need to be (and are) asked, across a range of disciplines and interdisci­plines, necessarily attend to violence and sadness and the struggle for life**. How could teaching narratives of sadness ever, under any circumstances, be safe!? And doubled onto this: which black or other marginalized fac­ulty is safe in the academy, ever? Who are these safe people? Where are they? But there is also, on top of this all, an underlying discourse, one that emerges out of feminism and other “identity” discourses, that assumes that the classroom should be safe. This kind of **“**safe space” thinking sometimes includes statements on course outlines about respect for diversity and how the class (faculty? students?) will not tolerate inappropriate behavior: rac­ism, homophobia, sexism, ableism. This kind of **hate-prevention is a fantasy to me.** **It is a fantasy that replicates, rather than undoes, systems of injus­tice because it assumes, first, that teaching about anti-colonialism or sexism or homophobia can be safe** (**which is an injustice to those who** have lived and **live injustice**!), **second, that learning about anti-colonialism or sexism or homophobia is safe, easy, comfortable, and**, third, **that silencing** and/or removing ‘bad’ and **‘intolerant’ students dismantles** systems of **injustice**. Privileged students leave these safe spaces with transparently knowable op­pressed identities safely tucked in their back pockets and a lesson on how to be aggressively and benevolently silent. **The only people harmed in this pro­cess are students of colour**, faculty of colour, and those who are the victims of potential yet unspoken intolerance. I call this a white fantasy because, at least for me, only someone with racial privilege would assume that the classroom could be a site of safety! **This kind of privileged person sees the classroom as, a priori, safe, and a space that is tainted by dangerous subject matters (race) and unruly (intolerant) students**. But **the classroom is**, as I see it, **a colonial site that was, and always has been, engendered by and through violent exclusion**! Remember Jamaica Kincaid’s Lucy?! How wretched are those daffodils!?! I am not suggesting that the classroom be a location that welcomes violence and hatefulness and racism; I am suggesting that learning and teaching and **classrooms are, already, sites of pain**. **We cannot protect or save ourselves or our students by demanding silence or shaming ignorance or ‘warning’ the class that difficult knowledge is around the corner** (as with “trigger” moments—the moment when the course director or teaching as­sistant says: “look out, I need to acknowledge a trigger moment that will make you uncomfortable: we are going to talk about whiteness!”) **All of this, too, also recalls the long history of silencing—subalterns not speaking and all of that. Why is silencing, now, something that protects or enables safety? Who does silence protect and who does silence make safe and who does silence erase? Who has the privilege to demand tolerance**? In my teaching, although this is a day-to-day skirmish for me because the site where we begin to teach is already white supremacist, I try very hard to create class­room conversations that work out how knowledge is linked to an ongoing struggle to end violence and that, while racist or homophobic practices are certainly not encouraged or welcome, when they do emerge (because they always do!) we need to situate these practices within the wider context of colonialism and anti-blackness. This is a pedagogy wherein the brutalities of racial violence are not descriptively rehearsed, but always already demand practical activities of resistance, encounter, and anti-colonial thinking.

# Frontlines – Ethical Theories

## General

1. Permutation do both – we don’t defend a fiated policy which means you don’t have offense under our ROB – method isn’t competitive
2. Reject abstract ethics - pretending that immoral entities are capable of moral action is abstraction that makes ethics impossible. Traditional ethics is an anti black system that only serves to re-entrench white supremacy.

**Curry 13** Dr. Tommy; “In the Fiat of Dreams: The Delusional Allure of Hope, the Reality of Anti-Black Violence and the Demands of the Anti-Ethical”

**Traditional**ly we have taken **ethics** to be, as Henry Sedgwick claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action” (1981:1). This rational procedure **is** however **at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue**, as is often done, **that the government**, its citizens, or white people **should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition.** If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In **ethical deliberations** dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to **attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated.** **This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, the only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be anti-ethical**, or a judgment **refusing to write morality onto immoral entities.** In the post-structuralist era, post-colonial thinking about racism specifically, and difference/otherness generally, has given a peculiar ameliorative function to discourse and the performance of “other-ed” identities. In this era, the dominant illusion is that discourse itself , an act that requires as its basis the recognition of the “other” as “similar,” is socially transformative—not only with regard to how the white subject assimilates the similitude of the “other-ed,” but as an actual activity gauged by the recognition by one white person or by a group of white people in any given scenario, is uncritically accepted and encouraged as anti-racist politics.. In actuality **such discourse** appeals, which **necessitate**—become **dependent on—(white) recognition**, function very much like the racial stereotype, in that the concept of the **Black** body being the **expression** **and** **source of** experience and **phenomena** (existential-phenomenological-theorization) **is incarcerated by the conceptualization created the discursive catalyst yearning to be perceived by the white thing seeing the Black**. **Such appeals lend potentiality-hope-faith to** the already present/demonstrated ignorance-racism-interest of the **white** individual, who in large part expresses the historical tone/epistemology of their racial group’s interest. **When morality is defined, not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch.**

1. Abstract ethics requires a view from nowhere which allows the white male body to take the dominant position. Embodied experience is necessary.

**Yancy 08** Prof of Philosophy Duquesne University “Black Bodies, White Gazes *THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 2008

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of knowledge connected to my "raced" body. Hence, I write froma place of lived embodied experience a site of exposure. **In philosophy**, the only thing that we are taught to expose is a weak argument, a fallacy, or someone’s “inferior” reasoning power. **The embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory**, superfluous and cumbersome in one's search for truth. It is best, or so **we are told**, **to reason from nowhere**. Hence, **the white philosopher/**author **presumes to speak for all of “us” without** the slightest **mention of his or her “raced” identity**. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin Sartwell observes:  Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the "**whiteness**" **of** my **authorship**. This whiteness of authorship **is,** for us**, a form of authority**; **to speak** (apparently) **from nowhere, for everyone, is empowering,** though one wields power here only by becoming lost to oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: **it yields the pleasure of self-forgetting** or apparent transcendence of the mundane and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the "comprehension" of a range of materials.(1998, 6)  To **theorize the Black body one must "turn to the** [Black] **body as the radix for** interpreting **racial experience**" (Johnson [1993, 600]). It is important to note that **this** particular strategy also **functions as a lens through which to** theorize and **critique whiteness**; for the Black body's "racial" experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the "raced" white body. However, there is no denying that my own "racial" experiences or the social performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this paper, my objective is to describe and theorize situations where **the Black body's** subjectivity, its ***lived* reality**, **is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary**, resulting in what I refer to as "the phenomenological return of the Black body." These instantiations are **embedded within** and evolve out of **the** complex **social and historical interstices of whites' efforts at self-construction** through complex acts of erasure **vis-à-vis Black people.** These acts of self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, "Mythification is the replacement of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a scale of human value"(Snead 1994,

Reject abstract ethics – it necessitates a view from nowhere which prevent embodied experience and can’t resolve oppression. Western rationality is a social construct created around the dichotomy between rational whiteness and irrational ‘savagery’ of non white people.

**Kincheloe 99**

{Joe L; Research chair at Faculty of Education at McGill University; “The Struggle to Define and Reinvent Whiteness: A Pedagogical Analysis”; College Literature 26 (Fall 1999): 162-; 1999; <http://www.virginia.edu/woodson/courses/aas102%20(spring%2001)/articles/kincheloe.html>; accessed 9/22/16}AvP

While no one knows exactly what constitutes whiteness, we can historicize the concept and offer some general statements about the dynamics it signifies. Even this process is difficult, as **whiteness** as a socio-historical construct **is constantly shifting in light of new circumstances and changing interactions with various manifestations of power**. With these qualifications in mind we believe that a dominant impulse of **whiteness took shape around the European Enlightenment’s notion of rationality with its privileged construction of a transcendental white, male, rational subject who operated at the recesses of power while concurrently giving every indication that he escaped the confines of time and space.** In this context **whiteness was naturalized as a universal entity** that operated as more than a mere ethnic positionalityemerging from a particular time, the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and a particular space, Western Europe. Reason in this historical configuration is whitened and **human nature itself is grounded upon this reasoning capacity. Lost** in the defining process **is the socially constructed nature of reason itself**, not to mention **its emergence as a signifier of whiteness**.Thus**, in its rationalistic womb whiteness begins to establish itself as a norm that represents a**n authoritative, delimited, and **hierarchical mode of thought**. **In the emerging colonial contexts** in which Whites would increasingly find themselves in the decades and centuries **following the Enlightenment**, **the encounter with non-Whiteness would be framed in rationalistic terms - whiteness representing orderliness, rationality, and self-control and non-whiteness as chaos, irrationality, violence, and the breakdown of self-regulation**. **Rationality emerged as the conceptual base around which civilization and savagery could be delineated** (Giroux 1992; Alcoff 1995; Keating 1995). This rationalistic modernist whiteness is shaped and confirmed by its close association with science. As a scientific construct **whiteness privileges mind over body, intellectual over experiential ways of knowing, mental abstractions over passion, bodily sensations, and tactile understanding** (Semali and Kincheloe 1999; Kincheloe, Steinberg, and Hinchey 1999). In the study of multicultural education such epistemological tendencies take on dramatic importance. In educators’ efforts to understand the forces that drive the curriculum and the purposes of Western education, modernist whiteness is a central player. The insight it provides into the social construction of schooling, intelligence, and the disciplines of psychology and educational psychology in general opens a gateway into white consciousness and its reactions to the world around it. Objectivity and dominant articulations of masculinity as signs of stability and the highest expression of white achievement still work to construct everyday life and social relations at the end of the twentieth century. Because such dynamics have been naturalized and universalized, **whiteness assumes an invisible power unlike previous forms of domination in human history. Such an invisible power can be deployed by those individuals and groups who are able to identify themselves within the boundaries of reason and to project irrationality, sensuality, and spontaneity on to the other.** Thus, European ethnic groups such as the Irish in nineteenth-century industrializing America were able to differentiate themselves from passionate ethnic groups who were supposedly unable to regulate their own emotional predispositions and gain a rational and objective view of the world. Such **peoples** **- who were being colonized**, exploited, enslaved, and eliminated **by Europeans during their Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment eras - were viewed as irrational and, thus, inferior in their status as human beings**. As inferior beings, they had no claim to the same rights as Europeans - hence, white **racism and colonialism were morally justified around the conflation of whiteness and reason**. In order for whiteness to place itself in the privileged seat of rationality and superiority, it would have to construct pervasive portraits of non-Whites, Africans in particular, as irrational, disorderly, and prone to uncivilized behavior (Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Stowe 1996; Alcoff 1995; Haymes 1996). As rock of rationality in a sea of chaos and disorder, whiteness presented itself as a non-colored, non-blemished pure category. Even a mere drop of non-white blood was enough historically to relegate a person to the category of "colored." Being white, thus, meant possessing the privilege of being uncontaminated by any other bloodline. A mixed race child in this context has often been rejected by the white side of his or her heritage - the rhetorical construct of race purity demands that the mixed race individual be identified by allusion to the non-white group, for example, she’s half Latina or half Chinese. Individuals are rarely half-white. As Michel Foucault often argued, reason is a form of disciplinary power. Around Foucault’s axiom, critical multiculturalists contend that reason can never be separated from power. Those without reason defined in the Western scientific way are excluded from power and are relegated to the position of unreasonable other. Whites in their racial purity understood the dictates of the "White Man’s Burden" and became the beneficent teachers of the barbarians. **To Western eyes the contrast between white and non-white culture was stark: reason as opposed to ignorance; scientific knowledge instead of indigenous knowledge; philosophies of mind versus folk psychologies; religious truth in lieu of primitive superstition; and professional history as opposed to oral mythologies**. Thus, **rationality was inscribed in a variety of hierarchical relations between European colonizers and their colonies** early on, and between Western multinationals and their "underdeveloped" markets in later days. Such **power relations** **were erased by the white claim of** cultural **neutrality** around the transhistorical norm of reason -in this construction rationality was not assumed to be the intellectual commodity of any specific culture. Indeed, colonial hierarchies immersed in exploitation were justified around the interplay of pure whiteness, impure non-whiteness, and neutral reason. Traditional **colonialism was grounded on colonialized people’s deviation from the norm of rationality**, thus making colonization a rational response to **inequality**. In the twentieth century thiswhite norm of rationality was extended to the economic sphere where the philosophy of the free market and exchange values were universalized into signifiers of civilization. Once all the nations on earth are drawn into the white reason of the market economy, then all land can be subdivided into real estate, all human beings’ worth can be monetarily calculated, values of abstract individualism and financial success can be embraced by every community in every country, and education can be reformulated around the cultivation of human capital.When these dynamics come to pass, the white millennium will have commenced - white power will have been consolidated around land and money. The Western ability to regulate diverse peoples through their inclusion in data banks filled with information about their credit histories, institutional affiliations, psychological "health," academic credentials, work experiences, and family backgrounds will reach unprecedented levels. **The accomplishment of this ultimate global colonial task will mark the end of white history in the familiar end-of-history parlance.** **This does not mean that white supremacy ends, but that it has produced a hegemony so seamless that the need for further structural or ideological change becomes unnecessary. The science, reason, and technology of white culture will have achieved their inevitable triumph** (MacCannell 1992; Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Alcoff 1995; Giroux 1992). Whatever the complexity of the concept, whiteness, at least one feature is discernible - **whiteness cannot escape the materiality of its history, its effects on the everyday lives of those who fall outside its conceptual net as well as on white people themselves.** Critical scholarship on whiteness should focus attention on the documentation of such effects.Whiteness study in a critical multiculturalist context should delineate the various ways such material effects shape cultural and institutional pedagogies and position individuals in relation to the power of white reason. Understanding these dynamics is central to the curriculums of black studies, Chicano studies, postcolonialism, indigenous studies, not to mention educational reform movements in elementary, secondary, and higher education. The history of the world’s diverse peoples in general as well as minority groups in Western societies in particular has often been told from a white historiographical perspective. Such accounts erased the values, epistemologies, and belief systems that grounded the cultural practices of diverse peoples. Without such cultural grounding students have often been unable to appreciate the manifestations of brilliance displayed by non-white cultural groups. Caught in the white interpretive filter they were unable to make sense of diverse historical and contemporary cultural productions as anything other than proof of white historical success. The fact that one of the most important themes of the last half of the twentieth century - the revolt of the "irrationals" against white historical domination - has not been presented as a salient part of the white (or non-white) story is revealing, a testimony to the continuing power of whiteness and its concurrent fragility (Banfield 1991; Frankenberg 1993; Stowe 1996; Vattimo 1992)

## A2 Skep

1. Skep is self defeating – skep would mean nothing is true but that would mean skep itself isn’t true which defeats itself
2. This is morally repugnant– our aff is trying to resolve material oppression and their response is that nothing matters – this is an independent reason to vote against you because saying things like psychological violence doesn’t matter makes debate unsafe and debate needs to care about the real world consequences of our discourse and outweighs theory because we are people before debaters
3. There is just no internal link for why proving the resolution incoherent means you negate. Skep triggers presumption because there is no way to evaluate offense – cross apply Adler which says its harder to affirm so you should presume aff

# Frontlines – DAs

1. No link – we don’t fiat a policy, we defend the method of the killjoy as a discursive affirmation to disorient the space of debate – we do not link to the DA
2. Even if we link to the DA, psychological violence from case outweighs –
   1. Scope – alienation and isolation within debate affect all minoritized bodies in this space whose bodies are marked as visible – X only applies to Y
   2. Reversibility – psychological violence causes internalized hatred and inferiority which can’t be changed
3. Case solves the impact – cross apply Ahmed 14 – we create affective spaces of solidarity to resolve the harmful impacts and trauma of X

## A2 Extinction

Reps DA – Emphasis on an impending apocalypse as the major danger to human life is a direct effacement of the everyday violence of institutionalized racism – the fiction of uniqueness for their extinction impact can only be establish through a genocidal forgetting of the historical world-ending violence of white supremacy

Omolade 891989, Barbara Omolade is a historian of black women for the past twenty years and an organizer in both the women’s and civil rights/black power movements, “We Speak for the Planet” in “Rocking the ship of state : toward a feminist peace politics”, pp. 172-176

Recent efforts by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan to limit nuclear testing, stockpiling, and weaponry, while still protecting their own arsenals and selling arms to countries and factions around the world, vividly demonstrate how "peace" can become an abstract concept within a culture of war. Many peace activists are similarly blind to the constant wars and threats of war being waged against people of color and the planet by those who march for "peace" and by those they march against. These pacifists, like Gorbachev and Reagan, frequently want people of color to fear what they fear and define peace as they define it. They are unmindful that our lands and peoples have already been and are being destroyed as part of the "final solution" of the "color line."It is difficult to persuade the remnants of Native American tribes**,** the starving of African deserts, and the victims of the Cambodian "killing fields" that nuclear war is the major danger to human life on the planet and that only a nuclear "winter" embodies fear and futurelessness for humanity. The peace movement suffers greatly from its lack of a historical and holistic perspective, practice, and vision that include the voices and experiences of people of color;the movement's goals and messages have therefore been easily coopted and expropriated by world leaders who share the same culture of racial dominance and arrogance. The peace movement's racist blinders have divorced peace from freedom,from feminism, from education reform, from legal rights, from human rights, from international alliances and friendships, from national liberation, from the particular (for example, black female, Native American male) and the general(human being). Nevertheless, social movements such as the civil rights-black power movement in the United States have always demanded peace with justice, with liberation, and with social and economic reconstruction and cultural freedom at home and abroad. The integration of our past and our present holocausts and our struggle to define our own lives and have our basic needs metare at the core of the inseparable struggles for world peace and social betterment. The Achilles heel of the organized peace movement in this country has always been its whiteness. In this multi-racial and racist society, no allwhite movement can have the strength to bring about basic changes. It is axiomatic that basic changes do not occur in any society unless the people who are oppressed move to make them occur. In our society it is people of color who are the most oppressed. Indeed our entire history teaches us that when people of color have organized and struggled-most especially, because of their particular history, Black people-have moved in a more humane direction as a society, toward a better life for all people.1 Western man's whiteness, imagination, enlightened science, and movements toward peace have developed from a culture and history mobilized against women of color.The political advancements of white men have grown directly from the devastation and holocaust of people of color and our lands. This technological and material progress has been in direct proportion to the undevelopment of women of color. Yet the dayto- day survival, political struggles, and rising up of women of color, especially black women in the United States, reveal both complex resistance to holocaust and undevelopment and often conflicted responses to the military and war. The Holocausts Women of color are survivors of and remain casualties of holocausts, and we are direct victims of war**-**that is, of open armed conflict between countries or between factions within the same country. But women of color were not soldiers**,** nor did we trade animal pelts or slaves to the white man for guns**,** nor did we sell or lease our lands to the white man for wealth. Most men and women of color resisted and fought back, were slaughtered, enslaved, and force marched into plantation labor camps to serve the white masters of war and to build their empires and war machines. People of color were and are victims of holocausts-that is, of great and widespread destruction, usually by fire. The world as we knew and created it was destroyed in a continual scorched earth policy of the white man. The experience of Jews and other Europeans under the Nazis can teach us the value of understanding the totality of destructive intent, the extensiveness of torture, and the demonical apparatus of war aimed at the human spirit. A Jewish father pushed his daughter from the lines of certain death at Auschwitz and said, "You will be a remembrance-You tell the story. You survive." She lived. He died. Many have criticized the Jews for forcing non-Jews to remember the 6 million Jews who died under the Nazis and for etching the names Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Terezin and Warsaw in our minds. Yet as women of color, we, too, are "remembrances" of all the holocausts against the people of the world. We must remember the names of concentration camps such as Jesus, Justice, Brotherhood, and Integrity,ships that carried millions of African men, women, and children chained and brutalized across the ocean to the "New World." **We must remember the Arawaks, the Taino, the Chickasaw, the Choctaw, the Narragansett, the Montauk, the Delaware, and the other Native American names of thousands of U.S. towns that stand for tribes of people who are no more. We must remember the holocausts visited against the Hawaiians, the aboriginal peoples of Australia, the Pacific Island peoples, and the women and children of Hiroshima and Nagasaki**. We must remember the slaughter of men and women at Sharpeville, the children of Soweto, and the men of Attica**. We must never, ever, forget** the children disfigured, the men maimed, and the women broken in **our holocausts-we must remember the names, the numbers, the faces, and the stories and teach them to our children and our children's children so the world can never forget our suffering** and our courage. Whereas the particularity of the Jewish holocaust under the Nazis is over, our holocausts continue. We are the madres locos (crazy mothers) in the Argentinian square silently demanding news of our missing kin from the fascists who rule. **We are the children of El Salvador who** see our mothers and fathers shot in front of our eyes. We are the Palestinian and Lebanese women and children overrun by Israeli, Lebanese, and U.S. soldiers. We are the women and children of the bantustans and refugee camps **and the prisoners of Robbin Island. We are the** starving in the Sahel, the poor in Brazil, the sterilized in Puerto Rico. We are the brothers and sisters of Grenada who carry the seeds of the New Jewel Movement in our hearts, not daring to speak of it with our lipsyet. Our holocaust is South Africa ruled by men who loved Adolf Hitler, who have developed the Nazi techniques of terror to more sophisticated levels. Passes replace the Nazi badges and stars. Skin color is the ultimate badge of persecution. Forced removals of women, children, and the elderly-the "useless appendages of South Africa"-into barren, arid bantustans without resources for survival have replaced the need for concentration camps. Black sex-segregated barracks and cells attached to work sites achieve two objectives: The work camps destroy black family and community life, a presumed source of resistance, and attempt to create human automatons whose purpose is to serve the South African state's drive toward wealth and hegemony. Like other fascist regimes, South Africa disallows any democratic rights to black people; they are denied the right to vote, to dissent, to peaceful assembly, to free speech, and to political representation. The regime has all the typical Nazi-like political apparatus: house arrests of dissenters such as Winnie Mandela; prison murder of protestors such as Stephen Biko; penal colonies such as Robbin Island. Black people, especially children, are routinely arrested without cause, detained without limits, and confronted with the economic and social disparities of a nation built around racial separation. Legally and economically, South African apartheid is structural and institutionalized racial war. The Organization of African Unity's regional intergovernmental meeting in 1984 in Tanzania was called to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women. The meeting considered South Africa's racist apartheid regime a peace issue. The "regime is an affront to the dignity of all Africans on the continent and a stark reminder of the absence of equality and peace, representing the worst form of institutionalized oppression and strife." Pacifists such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi who have used nonviolent resistance charged that those who used violence to obtain justice were just as evil as their oppressors. Yet all successful revolutionary movements have used organized violence. This is especially true of national liberation movements that have obtained state power and reorganized the institutions of their nations for the benefit of the people. If men and women in South Africa do not use organized violence, they could remain in the permanent violent state of the slave. Could it be that pacifism and nonviolence cannot become a way of life for the oppressed? Are they only tactics with specific and limited use for protecting people from further violence? For most people in the developing communities and the developing world consistent nonviolence is a luxury; it presumes that those who have and use nonviolent weapons will refrain from using them long enough for nonviolent resisters to win political battles. To survive, peoples in developing countries must use a varied repertoire of issues, tactics, and approaches. Sometimes arms are needed to defeat apartheid and defend freedom in South Africa; sometimes nonviolent demonstrations for justice are the appropriate strategy for protesting the shooting of black teenagers by a white man, such as happened in New York City. Peace is not merely an absence of 'conflict that enables white middleclass comfort**,** nor is it simply resistance to nuclear war and war machinery**.** The litany of "you will be blown up, too"directed by a white man to a black woman obscures the permanency and institutionalization of war, the violence and holocaust that people of color face daily. Unfortunately, **the holocaust does not only refer to the mass murder of Jews, Christians, and atheists during the Nazi regime; it** also **refers to** the permanent institutionalization of war that is part of every fascist and racist regime. The holocaust lives. It is a threat to world peace as pervasive and thorough as nuclear war.

# Cards to Add-On

## Hornsby

And, our method disrupts the individualist politics behind freedom of speech. White supremacist notions of freedom of speech assume minorities are emancipated from oppression, rather our politic exists outside of notions of rationality which creates a process of healing from the traumas of academic space.

**Hornsby 95** Jennifer Hornsby "Disempowered Speech" University of Arkansas Press Philosophical Topics, Vol. 23, No. 2, Feminist Perspectives on Language, Knowledge, and Reality (FALL 1995),

**Free speech is** often **conceived as a fundamental right**. The connections there are between the notions of "power" and of "right" suggest that an idea of disempowered speech would affect this conception. Powers (or abilities) provide for the exercise of rights, and rights provide for the legitimate use of powers. But how exactly are those who defend a right to free speech affected by the idea that some people's speech is disempowered? **To the extent to which someone is disempowered as a speaker** - to the extent to which there are things that that person cannot do with speech - **her right to free speech is** to that extent **unexercisable**. It might then be thought that **a right to free speech**, which may be supposed to ensure speech is protected, **should ensure also that no one's speech is silenced**. "If a person's right provides a reason to stop others from interfering with her speech, then, by the same token, everyone's right should provide a reason to eradicate whatever agencies result in the disempowerment of anyone's speech. Thus wherever an authority protects speech, it ought also to inter- vene in whatever ways might ensure that no one's speech is silenced." But this line of thought cannot be correct as it stands. Aright to do something is not the same as a right to the conditions in which the right could be exercised. Judith Jarvis Thomson made the point on the side of a pro-choice position on abortion.26 One can acknowledge that a fetus is human and that humans have a right to life; one does not thereby secure for any human a right to inhabit the body of another in order that life be maintained: A foetus's lack of power might simply mean that any right it possessed could not be exer- cised. Similarly, a speaker's lack of power might simply mean that her right to free speech, in some of its aspects, was not a right that she could exercise. The distinction used here - between (on the one hand) protecting activ- ities which are the exercise of a right and (on the other) facilitating or enabling those activities - is not always a sharp one (as we shall see below). But it is a distinction familiar in the free speech literature, where it can seem to have a ready application.27 It is one thing to say that where a public forum exists in which people can be heard, access to the forum should not be pre- vented and no one there should be allowed to stop others from speaking; but it would be quite another thing to say that would-be speakers should be helped to reach the forum, so that anyone who wants to speak there is owed the fare for transport to it. In the presence of an acknowledged right to free speech, a person's desire for a public audience is to be respected; but this does not mean that a commitment is incurred on anyone's part actually to facili- tate a would-be speaker to satisfy her desire. "Hard luck" is what it seems we now have to say to disempowered speakers: "No one denies you your right to free speech; but you must under- stand that having this right may be to no avail." SPEECH AS A NEGATIVE LIBERTY The "hard luck" answer cannot be the end of the story. And we see that there can be a different story when we notice that defenses of free speech as a fundamental right rely on the idea of speech as a negative liberty - as some- thing that a person has unless she is interfered with.28 **To uphold everyone's right to free speech, in the guise of a negative liberty, is to** draw a **veil over disempowered speech**. **On the negative-liberty account, someone who is unable to speak** when and where she wants, through lack of financial resources, say, **is at least recognized as someone who cannot** actually **exercise her right**. **But someone who is unable to speak because her language** **preclude that** - because her situation is diagnosed in terms of ineffability or inaudibility - **is** simply **overlooked. The disempowered speaker's inability to speak is not determined by a recognizable impediment which** intervenes to **prevent her from speaking. The forces that have been at work to silence her do not count as interference with her speech** in any ordinary sense. And how- ever real the phenomena of disempowerment might be, they could be safely set aside in upholding negative liberties. The idea of speech as a negative liberty can be connected with the idea that we started from - of speech as "easy." What is certainly easy (usually at least) is to produce meaningful things with the linguistic resources at one's disposal. If freedom of speech really did mean freedom to move one's mouth and make intelligible noises, then interference in a quite ordinary sense would be the only thing that curbed it, and a sharp distinction between protecting someone's speech (which her right to free speech demands) and enabling her speech (which is not required by her right) might be made. If speaking were merely a matter of producing meaningful sounds, then a person's being able to be taken to say what she meant would be neither here nor there, and it would be no wonder that disempowered speech should be left out of account. On this negative-liberty conception of it, speech may be thought of as a matter of locution, rather than of illocution: **A person's power of speech is seen as limited only by** such things as a quiet voice or a natural reticence, or by **literal obstacles** like gagging, drowning out, or arrest by the police. To someone who has no truck with the idea of disempowered speech,a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary conceptions of speech evi- dently will not matter very much. Where communication is guaranteed by the production of sounds, illocution is as "easy" as locution is. If everyone could always do any illocutionary thing she wanted to automatically - just by com- ing out with suitable words - it would make no actual difference to what counted as free speech whether one conceived of speech in locutionary terms or conceived of it in illocutionary terms. But whatever one thinks about dis- empowered speech, a locutionary conception of speech is not what one needs if one's concern is with free speech.29 At least it is not what one needs unless one thinks that all of the value of free speech resides in people's ability to make noises that are recognizable as speech. **The value of free speech surely resides in fact in people's ability** to be recognized as doing what they mean to be doing in making noises - **to be communicat[e]**ing. Caring about free speech is a matter of caring about people's powers of doing things with words, including illocutionary, communicative things (and this seems to be true whatever detailed account is offered of why free speech is valuable). But then if there is a reason to protect locution- to stop people from literally inter- fering with one another's speech - **there must be a reason to be concerned with cumulative processes of silencing of some groups' speech**. Of course it can be very unclear what might actually be done about cumulative processes of silencing. And where the only thing that could be done is to censor speech, probably nothing ought to be done. If one habitu- ally thinks about free speech in terms of U.S. First Amendment doctrine, it can seem as if the only practical question is, " Protect or censor ?" But we must be allowed to think about questions of free speech in such a way that the practical consequences of our reflections are not consequences exclu- sively for officers of the law (or for their counterparts in institutions smaller than the state). We can resist the assumption that any attempt to ensure that speech is not silenced would count as a piece of censorship.30 FREE SPEECH AND EQUALITY Free speech, or at any rate U.S. First Amendment doctrine, has come under attack from many quarters in recent years.31 A conception of speech as a negative liberty may be seen as the butt of some of the attacks. There is a familiar argument against the idea that it is always proper to promote negative liberties. The familiar argument sets liberalism's egalitar- ian (left) wing against its libertarian (right) wing. The egalitarian claims that the consequence of defending negative liberties in an unjust society is to sup- port an indefensible status quo. Since the relatively powerful have opportu- nities to bring pressures to bear against the powerless (opportunities which the powerless lack), the protection of everyone's negative liberties, which is a matter of letting everyone get on with it, as it were, is enabling for some but not for others and is thus bound to reinforce the unequal status quo.32 Such an argument is ordinarily presented in an economic context, where it may be aimed at showing that free market arrangements in an unequal soci- ety ensure injustices: Those who have the good fortune to be in a position actually to exercise their freedom in the market can promote their own wealth at the expense of those whose so-called rights are unexercisable. A parallel line of thought appears to be at work when it is said that we should not sup- pose that, qua speakers, everyone is equal. Proponents of free speech have meant us to think that "the discovery and spread of political truth"33 and the treating of everyone with "equal respect"34 are served by protecting every- one's speech equally. But in fact **people do not start out as equal parties** in some great debate; **upholding free speech works to the advantage of those whose speech least needs protection**. The conclusion of this argument about free speech comes in a more rad- ical version. In this version, so-called free speech is merely a rallying cry for those who can bring their own verbal behavior under its head (and thus, in the U.S.A., by the power of their rhetoric, under a constitutional head). This radical version goes much further than the application to free speech of the familiar argument against the promotion of negative liberties. Whereas tegalitarian about matters economic, who questions free markets, does not dispute the value of (at least some of) what is traded in markets, the radical conclusion in the case of free speech disputes that there is anything of value here at all, save for what powerful interest groups might deem "free speech." 'Free speech' stands for whatever activities are engaged in as "free speech" by those who succeed in defining the term; everyone else meanwhile loses out from the protection of those activities. No conception of free speech is available to anyone, according to this account, except for a conception of something that might be at the service of her own political agenda (or of her friends'). Well, such wholesale skepticism about free speech is not the inevitable result of hostility to accounts of free speech as an individual right.35 Indeed, if we are led to think about free speech by thinking about disempowered speech, we shall want to keep such skepticism at bay. We can agree with the skeptic that free speech is not properly circumscribed by those who conceive it as a negative liberty: **An understanding of disempowered speech reveals the inadequacy of that conception**. And we can agree with the skeptic that **there is no neutral vantage point outside of political debate from which speech can be deemed free**: Political thinking is introduced with the very idea of a group whose speech might count as disempowered. But our argu- ments can be brought against a tradition of free speech debate and need not be pitted against the whole idea of free speech.36 They cannot be arguments against the whole idea; for it is presumably by reference to an ideal of free speech that we consider people unequal in their speech, and it is by reference to such an ideal that we should find it regrettable if the speech of any group were disempowered. I have tried to show that there is space to be occupied, on questions of free speech, between those who are content to allow the notion of free speech to continue to be the property of the courts and those who urge us to banish the notion. It is another task to fill in such space, but a task, ag again, to which a social account of language use will be indispensible.

## Debate sucks for women ☹

Discrimination against women in debate is always hidden under the veil of “neutral debate” – we need to critically interrogate what types of arguments we value if we ever want to change debate.

**Bjork 92** Rebecca, debater and university coach, “Symposium: Women in Debate: Reflections on the Ongoing Struggle”, Effluents and affluence: The Global Pollution Debate, 1992”

While reflecting on my experiences as a woman in academic debate in preparation for this essay, I realized that I have been involved in debate for more than half of my life. I debated for four years in high school, for four years in college, and I have been coaching intercollegiate debate for nine years. Not surprisingly, much of my identity as an individual has been shaped by these experiences in debate. I am a person who strongly believes that debate empowers people to be committed and involved individuals in the communities in which they live. I am a person who thrives on the intellectual stimulation involved in teaching and traveling with the brightest students on my campus. I am a person who looks forward to the opportunities for active engagement of ideas with debaters and coaches from around the country. I am also, however, a college professor, a "feminist," and a peace activist who is increasingly frustrated and disturbed by some of the practices I see being perpetuated and rewarded in academic debate. I find that I can no longer separate my involvement in debate from the rest of who I am as an individual.Northwestern I remember listening to a lecture a few years ago given by Tom Goodnight at the University summer debate camp. Goodnight lamented what he saw as the debate community's participation in, and unthinking perpetuation of what he termed the "death culture." He argued that **the embracing of "big impact" arguments--nuclear war, environmental destruction**, genocide, famine, and the like-by debaters and coaches **signals a morbid and detached fascination** with such events, **one that views these real human tragedies as part of a "game" in which so-called "objective and neutral" advocates** actively **seek to find** in their research **the** "**impact to outweigh** all other impacts"--the round-winning argument that will carry them to their goal of winning tournament X, Y, or Z. He concluded that our "use" of such events in this way is tantamount to a celebration of them; our detached, rational discussions reinforce a detached, rational viewpoint**, when** emotional and moral outrage may be a more appropriate response. In the last few years, my academic research has led me to be persuaded by Goodnight's unspoken assumption; **language** is not merely some transparent tool used to transmit information, but rather **is** **an incredibly powerful medium**, the use of **which** inevitably **has** real political and material consequences. Given this assumption, I believe that **it is important** for us **to examine the** "**discourse of debate** practice:" that is, the language, discourses, and meanings that we, as a community of debaters and coaches, unthinkingly employ in academic debate. If it is the case that the language we use has real implications for how we view the world, how we view others, and how we act in the world, then it is imperative that we critically examine our own discourse practices with an eye to how **our language does violence to others**. I am shocked and surprised when I hear myself saying things like, "we killed them," or "take no prisoners," or "let's blow them out of the water." I am tired of **the "ideal" debater being defined as one who has** mastered the art of verbal assault to the point where **accusing opponents of lying, cheating, or being deliberately misleading is a sign of strength**. But what I am most tired of is how **women debaters are marginalized and rendered voiceless** in such a discourse community. **Women** who verbally assault their opponents **are labeled "bitches" because it is not socially acceptable for women to be verbally aggressive**. **Women who get angry** and storm out of a room when a disappointing decision is rendered **are labeled "hysterical"** **because**, as we all know, **women are more emotional then men**. I am tired of hearing comments like, "those 'girls' from school X aren't really interested in debate; they just want to meet men." We can all point to examples (although only a few) of women who have succeeded at the top levels of debate. But **I find myself wondering how many more women gave up because they were tired of negotiating the** mine field of discrimination, sexual harassment, and isolation they found in the debate community. As members of this community, however, we have great freedom to define it in whatever ways we see fit. After all, **what is debate except a collection of shared understandings and** explicit or **implicit rules for interaction?** What **I am calling for** is a critical examination **of** **how we**, as individual members of this community, **characterize our activity**, ourselves, and our interactions with others through language. **We must become aware of the ways in which our** mostly hidden and unspoken assumptions about what "good" debate is function to exclude not only **women,** but ethnic minorities from **the** amazing intellectual opportunities that training in debate provides. Our nation and indeed, our planet, faces incredibly difficult challenges in the years ahead. I believe that it is not acceptable anymore for us to go along as we always have, assuming that things will straighten themselves out. If the rioting in Los Angeles taught us anything, it is that complacency breeds resentment and frustration. We may not be able to change the world, but we can change our own community, and if we fail to do so, we give up the only real power that we have.

## Safe Space

Restriction of speech is based on the idea that emancipation comes from not hearing certain language. Racism manifests itself structurally and produces language which means that restricting language does not restrict the inherent violent of the institution. Restriction of hate speech creates complicity – Safe Spaces are a “White Fantasy” that only reinforce system oppressions on black and brown bodies.

McKittrick 14 Katherine; Gender Studies professor at Queen’s University; “Katherine McKittrick, author of Demonic Grounds, on Trigger Warnings”; Bully Bloggers; 12/17; <https://bullybloggers.wordpress.com/2014/12/17/katherine-mckittrick-author-of-demonic-grounds-on-trigger-warnings/>

**PJH:** On twitter, **you** (depressingly, brilliantly) **wrote, “I’ve never glimpsed safe teaching (and learning) space. It is a white fantasy that harms.”** I’m wonder­ing if you could expand on that as it pertains to the Black student in Canada? How does such a vexed space inform your own pedagogical practice? **KM**: **Yes**. I wonder a lot about why **the classroom** should be safe. It isn’t **safe**. I am not sure what safe learning looks like **because the kinds of questions that need to be (and are) asked, across a range of disciplines and interdisci­plines, necessarily attend to violence and sadness and the struggle for life**. How could teaching narratives of sadness ever, under any circumstances, be safe!? And doubled onto this: which black or other marginalized fac­ulty is safe in the academy, ever? Who are these safe people? Where are they? But there is also, on top of this all, an underlying discourse, one that emerges out of feminism and other “identity” discourses, that assumes that the classroom should be safe. This kind of **“**safe space” thinking sometimes includes statements on course outlines about respect for diversity and how the class (faculty? students?) will not tolerate inappropriate behavior: rac­ism, homophobia, sexism, ableism. This kind of **hate-prevention is a fantasy to me.** **It is a fantasy that replicates, rather than undoes, systems of injus­tice because it assumes, first, that teaching about anti-colonialism or sexism or homophobia can be safe** (**which is an injustice to those who** have lived and **live injustice**!), **second, that learning about anti-colonialism or sexism or homophobia is safe, easy, comfortable, and**, third, **that silencing** and/or removing ‘bad’ and **‘intolerant’ students dismantles** systems of **injustice**. Privileged students leave these safe spaces with transparently knowable op­pressed identities safely tucked in their back pockets and a lesson on how to be aggressively and benevolently silent. **The only people harmed in this pro­cess are students of colour**, faculty of colour, and those who are the victims of potential yet unspoken intolerance. I call this a white fantasy because, at least for me, only someone with racial privilege would assume that the classroom could be a site of safety! **This kind of privileged person sees the classroom as, a priori, safe, and a space that is tainted by dangerous subject matters (race) and unruly (intolerant) students**. But **the classroom is**, as I see it, **a colonial site that was, and always has been, engendered by and through violent exclusion**! Remember Jamaica Kincaid’s Lucy?! How wretched are those daffodils!?! I am not suggesting that the classroom be a location that welcomes violence and hatefulness and racism; I am suggesting that learning and teaching and **classrooms are, already, sites of pain**. **We cannot protect or save ourselves or our students by demanding silence or shaming ignorance or ‘warning’ the class that difficult knowledge is around the corner** (as with “trigger” moments—the moment when the course director or teaching as­sistant says: “look out, I need to acknowledge a trigger moment that will make you uncomfortable: we are going to talk about whiteness!”) **All of this, too, also recalls the long history of silencing—subalterns not speaking and all of that. Why is silencing, now, something that protects or enables safety? Who does silence protect and who does silence make safe and who does silence erase? Who has the privilege to demand tolerance**? In my teaching, although this is a day-to-day skirmish for me because the site where we begin to teach is already white supremacist, I try very hard to create class­room conversations that work out how knowledge is linked to an ongoing struggle to end violence and that, while racist or homophobic practices are certainly not encouraged or welcome, when they do emerge (because they always do!) we need to situate these practices within the wider context of colonialism and anti-blackness. This is a pedagogy wherein the brutalities of racial violence are not descriptively rehearsed, but always already demand practical activities of resistance, encounter, and anti-colonial thinking.

## Deem 96

This creates friction – bodies are stopped and interrogated when they do not fit in the orientation of the space. Feminine speech in spaces of white supremacy becomes the incessant nag, producing a powerless text that either forces women to speak and be made powerless or voluntarily fall silent.

Deem 96 Deem 96 Melissa, Prof of Comm. at Univ. of New Hampshire, “From Bobbitt to SCUM:  Re-memberment, Scatological Rhetorics, and Feminist Strategies in the Contemporary United States” Public Culture p.513-515

The fascination of the national political imaginary with the transgressive practices of women that render visible the male body is evidenced by the spectacles attaching both to Valerie Solanas and the SCUM Manifesto after she shot Andy Warhol and to Lorena Bobbitt’s dismemberment of her husband John Wayne Bobbitt. These events were points of articulation for a variety of feminist discourses which circulated in the public sphere. While the Bobbitt incident (hereafter referred to as Bobbitt) was not a discursive event, it was transformed into one by feminists and antifeminists, and the structure of its accumulated significations descends from the once disavowed and recently reclaimed legacy of the SCUM Manifesto. While the discursive formations surrounding Bobbitt and the initial eruption of SCUM following Solanas’s shooting of Warhol are in no way identical, both engaged the political imaginary through the specularization, i. e., the propelling into public view, of the male body, and both contributed to **the erosion** and questioning **of previously established boundaries of the public, the category of the political agent, and modes of decorum.** Through contemporary rearticulations, anomalous texts such as the SCUM Manifesto, which have never been adequately captured by the political narratives of Second Wave feminism, offer possibilities for transforming the almost totalizing discursive constraints of the complaint in its U.S. context. Making connections between contemporary public discourses and historically marginal texts allows for a different kind of critical performance which demonstrates the necessity of grasping at fragments. I am arguing here that through Bobbitt, the SCUM Manifesto is reinvested with political import. And through SCUM, Bobbitt is given a history which can expand the field of reference for feminist political discourses operating in a cramped space. Grasping at fragments is necessary given the modes of conservatism which dominate the fields of reference for contemporary public discourse and painfully restrict the space of feminism within the political. The nostalgic and neoconservative texts that have purchase today shift the “theoretical battleground” onto representation itself, evoking a fictional past whose main function is to denigrate the present (Doane and Hodges 1987; Braidotti 1991). Feminists need to be ready to claim the history of the women’s movement in the United States, if not, there will always be the incarnation of an Allan Bloom ready to do SO.^ Importantly, several writers have used Bobbitt as an argument against feminists and the women’s movement (Limbaugh 1994; Hazlett 1994; Sachs 1994; Berns 1994). Berns has argued that teaching the SCUM Manifesto in women’s studies at Georgetown University contributes to women supporting dismemberment as a viable politics. This **rejection of enraged polemical forms of women’s resistances and practices betrays the institutional, political, and discursive forces which not only silence or marginalize women, but also operate as “modes of containment’’ in the public** (Berlant 1988:244; see also Lesage 1988). Bobbitt: The Phallus Re-membered Preceding Bobbitt, the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings focused attention on sexual harassment in the workplace. Feminist discourses on the Hill/Thomas hearings concerning women’s lack of power, marginal status, and silence circulated and were consumed within the political imaginary in the genre of the complaint.4 More recently, the discourses surrounding the brutal murder of Nicole Brown Simpson have supplanted Bobbitt and brought a renewed focus upon the problem of violence against women and the failure of the criminal justice system to discipline perpetrators of domestic violence. Women are situated as victims, powerless, at the mercy of both the men who brutalize them and the criminal justice system which seems blind to the atrocities committed against them. Taken together , the discourses surrounding the spectacles of the Hill/Thomas hearings and the Simpson murder trial illustrate what Berlant terms the “paradox in the social construction of female marginality” (1988:238). **Women are expected to not only live with, but to also desire those “who have traditionally and institutionally denied them legitimacy and autonomy**” (p. 238). Most **contemporary feminist politics function largely through the public testimony** and witnessing **of female struggle**, founded upon this contradictory tendency.’ Functioning through public testimony, in which the bodily experience of the speaker is made explicitly present in discourse, **the complaint leaves the minoritarian subject in a majoritarian public sphere to “re-experience on her body , what her rhetoric describes”** (Berlant 1993b551). From this perspective, the paradigm of **female speech becomes the incessant nag, always complaining about sexual difference and female marginality. This nag**, contained within the genre of the complaint, produces the lament-the powerless text that **leaves women with either no place from which to speak or with nothing to say** (Freadman 1983; Morris 1988). **Nagging is a mode of repetition which fails to produce the desired change and hence end the complaint**. Morris describes this trap through a conventional comic scenario: “she nags, he stops listening, nothing changes, she nags” (1988: 15). However, a change is always implied in repetition: “in this case, **her ‘place’ in speech becomes**, if not strictly **nonexistent,** then **insufferable - leaving frenzy or silence as the only places left to go”** (p. 15). While for both Berlant and Morris the complaint is often the last attempt at voicing an injustice when no hope for changing the author’s misery is left, there are also important distinctions. In the scenario sketched by Morris, change is limited by the claustrophobic confines of the complaint, invariably crushing women in a discursive straight jacket: escape is desirable but seems impossible. For Berlant, however, **the complaint** is a genre which **can be revitalized and can threaten a discursive order built upon male privilege**. The combination of these two approaches suggests possibilities for both transforming the discursive norms of the complaint and enhancing its capacity to reinvigorate feminist politics in the United States. This strategy demands a critical practice which both engages the problematic of the limited speaking positions open to women because of the discursive death sentence of the complaint and invests the complaint, as a genre of female speech, with new perils for a discursive order built upon the marginalization and degradation of women. In opposing Bobbitt and SCUM as two spectacles that play themselves out on the bodies of women, I examine the way feminist discourses that enact a spectacle of transgressive female practices can dislodge constraints on women’s speech. By putting the male body on the line, both Bobbitt and SCUM render the male body visible and displace the logics of witnessing and testimony. This transgression does not work through the reinscription of previously disrupted norms, but through the transformation of the very normative constraints which inscribe gender hierarchies and female containment. **The hyperembodiment of the male** performed by this redistribution displaces the logics of a compulsory heterosexual culture, thereby transforming the very discursive norms which produce the complaint. It is in this way that Bobbitt and SCUM **can open up the possibility of speaking positions which reconfigure or evade the complaint**, while simultaneously making the complaint - as a mode of containment - dangerous.

## Affect Good/Conviviality

Affective emotional analysis key to disrupting humanism-

**Braidotti 06** Rosi; Utrecht University and Birkbeck College; Affirmation versus VuInerabiIity: On Contemporary Ethical Debates; 2006; <https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/12987BF52DF1C537852574800056A6F8/$FILE/symposium_2006_0010_0001_0245_0264.pdf>; accessed 12/3/16

At the core of this ethical project is **a positive vision of the subject as a radically immanent, intensive body,** that is, **an assemblage of forces or flows, intensities, and passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time, within the singular configuration commonly known as an "individual" self**. This intensive and dynamic entity is rather a portion of forces that is stable enough to sustain and undergo constant though non-destructive fluxes of transformation. It is the body's degrees and levels of affectivity that determine the modes of differentiation. **Joyful or positive passions and the transcendence of reactive affects are the desirable mode. The emphasis on "existence" implies a commitment to duration and conversely a rejection of self-destruction**. Positivity is buHt into this program through the idea of thresholds of sustainability. Thus, **an ethically empowering option increases one's potentia and creates joyful energy in the process.** **The conditions that can encourage such a quest are not only historical; they concern processes of transformation or self-fashioning in the direction of affirming positivity.** Because all subjects share in this common nature, there is a common ground on which to negotiate the interests and the eventual conflicts. It is important to see that this fundamentally positive vision of the ethicaI subject does not deny conflicts, tension, or even violent disagreements between different subjects. The legacy of Hegel's critique of Spinoza is still looming large here, notably the criticism that a Spinozist approach lacks a theory of negativity, which may adequately account for the complex logistics of interaction with others. **It is simply not the case that the positivity of desire cancels or denies the tensions of conflicting interests. It merely displaces the grounds on which the negotiations take place.** The Kantian imperative of not doing to others what you would not want done to you is not rejected as much as enlarged. In terms of the ethics of conatus, in fact, the harm that you do to others is immediately reflected in the harm you do to yourself, in terms of loss of potentia, positivity, self-awareness, and inner freedom. **Moreover, the "others" in question are non-anthropomorphic and include planetary forces**. **This move away from the Kantian vision of an ethics that obliges people, and especially women, natives, and others to act morally in the name of a transcendent standard or universal rule is not a simple one.** I defend it as a forceful answer to the complexities of our historical situation; **it is a move towards radical immanence against all Platonizing and classical humanistic denials of embodiment, mater, and the flesh.** What is at risk, however, in nomadic ethics is the notion of containment of the other. This is expressed by a number of moral thinkers in the Continental tradition, such as Jessica Benjamin (1988) in her radicalization of Irigaray's horizontal transcendence, Lyotard in the "differend" (1983) and his notion of the "unattuned," and Butler (2004) in her emphasis on "precarious life." They stress that moral reasoning 10- cates the constitution of subjectivity in the interrelation to others, which is a form of exposure, availability, and vulnerability. This recognition entails the necessity of containing the other, the suffering and the enjoyment of others in the expression of the intensity of our affective streams. An embodied and connecting containment as a moral category could emerge from this, over and against the hierarchical forms of containment implied by Kantian forms of universal morality.

Conviviality net benefit – our method affirms the inherent vulnerabilities our experiences. Our politic destabilizes the notion of a stable individual subject and embraces fluid ways of being.

**Puar 9** {Jasbir K; Women's and Gender Studies , Rutgers University , Newark, NJ, USA; “Prognosis time: Towards a geopolitics of affect, debility and capacity”; Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory; Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK; Published online: 04 Oct 2010.; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07407700903034147>;

Out of the numerous possibilities that ‘‘assemblage theory’’ offers, much of it has already begun to transform queer theory, from Elizabeth Grosz’s crucial re-reading of the relations between bodies and prosthetics (which complicates not only the contours of bodies in relation to forms of bodily discharge, but also complicates the relationships to objects, such as cell phones, cars, wheelchairs, and the distinctions between them as capacity-enabling devices) (1994), to Donna Haraway’s cyborgs (1991), to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘‘BwO’’ (Bodies without Organs – organs, loosely defined, rearranged against the presumed natural ordering of bodily capacity) (1987). I want to close by foregrounding the analytic power of **conviviality** that may further complicate how subjects are positioned**, underscoring** instead more **fluid relations between capacity and debility. Conviviality, unlike notions of resistance**, oppositionality, subversion or transgression (facets of queer exceptionalism that unwittingly dovetail with modern narratives of progress in modernity), **foregrounds categories** such as race, gender, and sexuality **as events** – as **encounters – rather than as entities or attributes of the subject. Surrendering certain notions of revolution, identity** politics, **and social change** – the ‘‘big utopian picture’’ that Massumi complicates in the opening epigraph of this essay – **conviviality** instead **always entails an ‘‘experimental step.’’** Why the **destabilization of the subject of identity and a turn to affect matters** is **because affect** – as a bodily matter – **makes identity politics both possible and yet impossible**. In its conventional usage, conviviality means relating to, occupied with, or fond of feasting, drinking, and good company – to be merry, festive, together at a table, with companions and guests, and hence, to live with. As an attribute and function of assembling, however, **conviviality does not lead to a politics of** the **tuniversal or inclusive common**, nor an ethics of individuatedness, **rather the futurity enabled through the open materiality of bodies as a Place to Meet**. We could usefully invoke Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘‘encounter value’’ here, a ‘‘becoming with’’ companionate (and I would also add, incompanionate) species, whereby actors are the products of relating, not pre-formed before the encounter (2008, 16). **Conviviality is an ethical orientation** that rewrites a Levinasian taking up of the ontology of the Other by **arguing that there is no absolute self or other**,15 **rather bodies that come together and dissipate through intensifications and vulnerabilities,** insistently **rendering bare the instability of the divisions between capacity**-endowed **and debility**-laden bodies. These encounters are rarely comfortable mergers but rather entail forms of eventness that could potentially unravel oneself but just as quickly be recuperated through a restabilized self, so that the political transformation is invited, as Arun Saldhana writes, through ‘‘letting yourself be destabilized by the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her difference not as a threat but as a resource to question your own position in the world’’ (2007, 118). **Conviviality is** thus **open to its own dissolution and self-annihilation and less interested in a mandate to reproduce its terms of creation or sustenance, recognizing that political critique must be open to the possibility that it might disrupt and alter the conditions of its own emergence such that it is no longer needed – an openness to something other than what we might have hoped for**. This is my alternative approach to Lee Edelman’s No Future, then, one that is not driven by rejecting the figure of the child as the overdetermined outcome of ‘‘reproductive futurism’’ (2004),16 but rather complicates the very terms of the regeneration of queer critique itself. Thus the challenge before us is how to craft convivial political praxis that does not demand a continual reinvestment in its form and content, its genesis or its outcome, the literalism of its object nor the direction of its drive.

The Killjoy creates a line of flight away from the machinic apparatuses of the structures of society.

Cohen and Ramlow 6 Jeffrey J. Cohen, Professor of English and Department Chair at George Washington University, Todd R. Ramlow, women's studies professor at George Washington University, “Pink Vectors of Deleuze: Queer Theory and Inhumanism,” Rhizomes, Issue 11/12, Fall 2005/Spring 2006

I owe you lot nothing, nothing more than you owe me. I don't need to join you in your ghettoes, because I've got my own ... **We have to counter people who think 'I'm this, I'm that' ... by thinking in strange, fluid, unusual terms: I don't know what I am ... no gay can ever definitively say 'I'm gay.' It's not a question of being this or that sort of human, but of becoming inhuman**. [1] [1] The evidence for the queerness of Gilles Deleuze is scant. He collaborated passionately with Félix Guattari, radical psychoanalyst and activist for the rights of gays and lesbians. He shared his work and interpenetrated ideas with Michel Foucault, the founding figure of contemporary queer theory. Yet the philosopher spent his life happily married to his wife, Fanny. They raised two children in what looks to us like the predictable structure of a bourgeois family. He was not even an especially spiffy dresser. [2] Yet we find in Gilles Deleuze's work a provocative reconceptualization of subjecthood and desire, a becoming-queer lucidly evident when he refused the lonely authority of a single voice and hybridized with Guattari and Claire Parnet through writing. This essay explores the trajectories of the queer-in-motion of queer studies and of Deleuze. His greatest challenge to queer theory is something that seems almost recidivist in his work: his animism, his belief that **the entire world constitutes a non-anthropomorphic, infinitely connective machinery of desire.** There is a capaciousness to Deleuze and Guattari's exuberant conception of sexuality, a boundary-breaking that cannot be reduced to the merely human frame within which queer theory has sometimes allowed its ambit to be circumscribed. [2] We will therefore speak of Deleuze's inhumanism. Throughout his philosophical opus **assemblages proliferate by means of which the human disaggregates, scattered across a molecular field of animals, objects, intensities in ceaseless movement**. Even in his death, we find, Deleuze **refuse**d **the weary categories of the merely human** and sought **some path** that **might lead away from the sedimentation(s) of decline, sickness, redemption**. As the philosopher of middles Deleuze **reject**ed **determinative endings, especially when they** were used to **fix in place and thereby devalue** what had been a **vagrant** and **affirmative life**. [3] Like one of his favorite classical philosophers, Lucretius, **Deleuze discerned in the cosmos movements of desire that intermingle our bodies, our intensities, our particles with the tropisms of the vegetal world, the ardor of stars, the passions of animals, a grand and molecular vitalism. At the farthest side of this process of radical dispersion might lurk death**: in Lucretius's case, a ghastly demise borne of plagu**e.** To invoke mortality in a discussion of the queer is, we realize, to risk the pernicious linking of the queer to the fatal. [3] This heteronormative conjoining of queer sexuality to morbidity (especially post-AIDS) conceptualizes death as an individualized, judicial event. The queer trajectories we'll follow dismantle the notion of identity that buttresses such a conception, and will (in those famous words of Antonin Artaud that Deleuze loved so much) "have done with the judgment of God," [4] will attempt not to reinscribe mortality back into some reductive system of justice or tragedy. **Deleuzian inhumanism opens up the queer to spaces that suddenly cease to stand as final resting places filled only by silence**. Pink Paint **The Pink Panther imitates nothing, it reproduces nothing, it paints the world its color, pink on pink; this is its becoming-world, carried out in such a way that it becomes imperceptible itself, asignifying, makes its rupture, its own line of flight**. (ATP 11) [4] **The becoming-world of the Pink Panther might also be understood,** in an appropriately deleuzian manner, **as the becoming-world of the queer, the becoming-pink of the Panthers and the becoming-panther of the "pinks."** Not the Pink Panther originally cited by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, the Blake Edwards-spawned series of fumbling detective movies starring Peter Sellers, bookended by the animated antics of a queer cat. Rather, **the Pink Panthers as imagined and produced by the unruly queers of the 1990s. Fed up with homophobic violence in New York and San Francisco, activists coming out of ACT-UP and Queer Nation organized neighborhood watch patrols in the pink ghettoes they'd fought so hard for in order to "take back the streets." The Pink Panthers spread rhizomatically to other metropolitan centers. Multiple becomings, multiple queerings. The Pink Panthers** "imitated" nothing, "reproduced" nothing, although the groups did **assemble and deploy tactics and identity particles connecting to** a variety of **minoritarian** and urban-based **political projects**. [5] **The Pink Panthers represent one instantiation of** what Deleuze and Guattari call **the war machine, an assemblage produced in/through/from multiple connections across "smooth space" and time. [5] The war machine proliferates speeds, affects and desiring relations/productions to constitute a line of flight away from the State Apparatus at the same time that it takes that apparatus as object of attack: "It is always the assemblage that constitutes the weapons system"** (ATP 399). But the attack and the violence are always secondary. **The war machine functions** primarily **by producing new relationships among bodies**, objects and groups **in excess of institutional** authority or control**. The Pink Panthers, as war-machine assembled out of and within multiple minoritarian social and political movements, created novel coalitions and affects across identitarian boundaries that could react**, sometimes violently, **to institutional violence against queers. The Guardian Angels. The Pink Panthers. The Black Panthers. Black Power. Brown Power. Pink Pride. "Black is Beautiful." "Take Back the Night." "Take Back the Streets." "Out of the Closets and into the Streets." Multiple becomings-minoritarian of queer politics.** But for all the paramilitary connotations, including fabulous pink berets, **we must not mistake the Pink Panther war machine as a simple extension of** patriarchal militarism and **the** American **military-industrial complex.** As D&G point out, **we must not conceive of this war machine within the logic of the State and institutional power, for "it seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere"** (ATP, 352). **This pink war machine comes out of minoritarian politics, rhizomatics, assemblages, and becomings; otherwise it would be just another army.**

## Speech Acts

**Assuming that debate is a game rather than a performance allows debaters to be disconnected from the speech act, but you should be held culpable for the arguments you make.**

**Vincent 13** Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate. Christopher J. Vincent. 10/26/13. <http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate>)

It is becoming increasingly more apparent in Lincoln Douglas debate that students of color are being held to a higher threshold of proving why racism is bad, than white students are in being forced to justify their actions and in round discourse. The abstractness of philosophical texts being used in LD and **the willingness of judges** and coaches alike **to endorse** that **abstractness has fostered a climate in which students are** allowed to be **divorced from the discourse they are producing**. **Debate should** first and foremost **be viewed as a performance**. Every action taken, every word said, and **every speech given reflects a performance of the body**. Yet **in an age where debate is about how many arguments a student can get on the flow**, white students’ performances are consistently allowed to be detached from their bodies, performance by the body, while students of color must always embody their discourse. As a result **universal theories are allowed to be viewed as detached from any meaning outside of being just an argument**. My argument is three-fold. First, **debaters have adopted a “universal principle,” which has allowed them to be detached from the practical implications of what they said**. Second, is that **we must re-conceptualize the** role of speech and **the speech act to account for the in round performances of the body**. The final part is that **judges must begin to view their roles as educators and must be accountable for the discourse they endorse with their ballot**. In his chapter on “Non Cartesian Sums,” in Blackness Visible, Charles Mills argues that “white experience is embedded as normative, and the embedding is so deep that its normativity is not even identified as such.” Historically, universal theories never intended to include black bodies into the cannon. Mills argues that in philosophy: "A reconceptualization is necessary because the structuring logic is different. The peculiar features of the African American experience—racial slavery, which linked biological phenotype to social subordination, and which is chronologically located in the modern epoch, ironically coincident with the emergence of liberalism’s proclamation of universal human equality—are not part of the experience represented in the abstractions of European and Euro-American philosophers." We generate **universal theories** and assume they can be applied to anyone. These abstractions assume a conception of universality that never intended to account for the African American experience. This **drowns out the perspectives of students of color that are historically excluded from the conversation**. Normativity becomes a privilege that historically students of color do not get to access because of the way we discuss things. These same **philosophical texts have served as a cornerstone in Lincoln Douglas and in turn have been used to justify exclusion**. **That is why it is easy for a white student to** make claims that we do not know whether racism is bad, or even **question whether oppression is bad, since after all it is just another argument on the flow**. **They never have to deal with the practical implications of their discourse**. These become manifestations of privilege in the debate space because for many students of color, who have to go back to their communities, they still have to deal with the daily acts of racism and violence inflicted upon their homes, communities, and cultures. To question or even make a starting point question for the debate to be about justifying why racism is bad ignores the reality of the bodies present in the room. Our justification of western philosophy has allowed us to remain disconnected from reality. Philosophy, as Mills argues, justifies particular way of knowing under free and rational thought, through a universal way of knowing, believing, and discussing. We have embedded white ways of knowing as normative without ever challenging how it replicates oppressive structures. The question then becomes how does our discourse justify what we believe? **For many debaters it is the gaming aspect of debate that allows us to assume that our speech can be disconnected from the speech act.** The speech can be defined as the arguments that are placed on the flow, and is evaluated in the context of what is the most logical and rational argument to win the round. The critical distinction is the speech act, which is the performance of that discourse. **It’s not what you say, but what you justify**. Understanding the speech act requires critically assessing the ramifications of the debaters discourse. Debate is in and of itself a performance. To claim that it is not is to be divorced from the reality of what we do. We must evaluate what a debaters performance does and justifies. For white debaters it is easy to view the discourse as detached from the body. **For those with privilege in debate, they are never forced to have their performance attached to them but instead their arguments are viewed as words on paper. They are taught to separate themselves** from any ideologies and beliefs, and **feel that there is no consequence to what they say**. It becomes the way in which they justify what is deemed as “rational” and “logical” thought. The argument sounds like it will be competitive so it is read but it is deemed as just an argument. Judges evaluate this as just a speech. This becomes what I deem as a performance by the body, rather than a performance of the body. Performances by the body allow debaters to not be held accountable to the words they say. **Words are seen as divorced from any meaning outside of the flow, versus the performance of the body where the words are attached to the body itself**. Debaters often insert the performance by the body, when they make arguments that they claim that they do not believe, but think it is the best strategy for the round. This is a false assumption, since for black debaters meaning is always connected to their bodies. The best strategy should never be one that at the same time justifies acts of racism. Charles Mills argues that “the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview.” For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities. In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate. This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill’s argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said. Again for debaters of color, their performance is always attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in relation to the speech act. Whites are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. **It is never a question of “should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies,” it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold**. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities. As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution

## Cruel Optimism

**Productivity is a fantasy -- the promise of debate keeps us working within a liberal institution, wasting our time in this place with the naïve hope that we will someday become policy makers or change the world. When marginalized bodies bring up oppression, they are told to “just keep working”. The more we think debate can do something for us if we just affirm a plan text one more time, the more the fantasy grows and the crueler the relationship of optimism will be. Investing affective energies in the fantasy of political progress cements us in the safe intellectural spaces of liberalism – only a refusal of this productivity can solve.**

Berlant 11 Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, *Cruel Optimism*, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 223-8

Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy**. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology**, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to face. In these times, even **politicians imagine occupying a post–public sphere public where they might just somehow make an unmediated transmission to the body politic**. “Somehow you just got to go over the heads of the filter and speak directly to the people,” then- President George W. Bush commented in October 2003, echoing a long tradition of sentimental political fantasies and soon followed by condemnations of the “filter” by the Republican National Committee and the presidential campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin.1 What is “the filter” that demands circumnavigation? Bush seems to be inverting the meaning of his own, mixed, metaphor. A filter, after all, separates out noise from communication and, in so doing, makes communication possible. Jacques Attali and Michel Serres have both argued that there is no communication without noise, as noise interferes from within any utterance, threatening its tractability.2 **The performance of distortion** that constitutes communication therefore demands discernment, or filtering. However steadfast one’s commitment to truth, there is no avoiding the noise. Yet **Bush**’s wish to skirt the filter points to something profound in the desire for the political. He wants to transmit not the message but the noise. He **wants the public to feel the** funk, the live intensities and **desires that make messages affectively** immediate, **seductive, and** binding.3 In his head **a public’s binding to the political is best achieved** neither **by** policy nor ideology but the affect of feeling political together, an effect of having communicated true feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.4 **The transmission of noise performs political attachment as a** sustaining intimate relation, without which great dramas of betrayal are felt and staged. In The Ethical Soundscape, Charles Hirschkind talks about the role of “maieutic listening” in constructing the intimate political publics of Egypt.5 There, the feeling tones of the affective soundscape produce attachments to and investments in a sense of political and social mutuality that is performed in moments of collective audition. **This process involves taking on listening together as itself an object/scene of desire. The attainment of that attunement produces a sense of** shared worldness**, apart from whatever** aim or **claim the** listening **public might** later **bring** to a particular political world because of what they have heard. From Hirschkind’s perspective **the** social **circulation of** noise, of **affective binding, converts the world to a space of moral action that seems** juxtapolitical— **proximate to**, without being compromised by, the instrumentalities of power that govern **social** **life**.6 **Speaking** above the filter **would confirm** to Bush’s whole listening audience that **they already** share an affective environment; mobilizing “the ethical and therapeutic virtues of the ear”7 would accomplish the visceral transmission of his assurance not only that he has made a better good life possible for Americans and humans around the globe, but that, affectively speaking, there is already a better sensorial world right here, right now, more intimate and secure and just as real as the world made by the media’s anxiogenic sensationalist analysis. **This** vision **locates** the **desire for the political in an** alternative commons **in the present that the senses** confirm and **circulate** as though **without mediation**. What exactly is the problem with “the filter”? **The contemporary** filtered or **mediated political sphere** in the United States **transmits news** 24/7 from a new ordinary **created by crisis, in which life seems reduced to** discussions about tactics for survival **and** who is to blame**.** The filter tells you that the public has entered a historical situation whose contours it does not know. It impresses itself upon mass consciousness as an epochal crisis, unfolding like a disaster film made up of human- interest stories and stories about institutions that have lost their way.8 It is a moment on the verge of a postnormative phase, in which fantasmatic clarities about the conditions for enduring collectivity, historical continuity, and infrastructural stability have melted away, along with predictable relations between event and effect. Living amidst war and environmental disaster, people are shown constantly being surprised at what does and does not seem to have a transformative impact. Living amid economic crisis, people are shown constantly being surprised at the amount, location, and enormity of moral and affective irregulation that come from fading rules of accountability and recognition. What will govern the terms and relations of reliable reciprocity among governments, intimates, workers, owners, churches, citizens, political parties, or strangers? What forms of life will secure the sense of affective democracy that people have been educated to expect from their publics? Nobody knows. The news about the recent past and the pressures of the near future demand constant emergency cleanup and hyperspeculation about what it means to live in the ongoing present among piles of cases where things didn’t work out or seem to make sense, at least not yet. There are vigils; there is witnessing, testimony, and yelling. But there is not yet a consensual rubric that would shape these matters into an event. **The affective structure** of the situation **is** therefore **anxious and the political emotions attached to it** veer wildly **from recognition of the enigma that is clearly there to explanations that make sense**, the kind of satisfying sense that enables enduring. Uncertainty is the material that Bush wished to bracket. His desire for **a politics of ambient noise**, prepropositional transmission, and intuitive reciprocity **sought to displace** the filtered story of **instability** and contradiction from the center of sociality. **He** also wishfully **banished** self- reflexive, **cultivated opinion** and judgment **from their** central **public- sphere** function. In short, as Jacques Rancière would put it, Bush’s wishful feeling was to separate the political from politics as such.9 In so doing he would cast the ongoing activity of social antagonism to the realm of the epiphenomenal, in contrast to which **the affective feedback loop of the political would make stronger the true soul- to- soul continuity between politicians and their public.** Foucault used to call “sexuality” that noisy affectivity that Bush wanted to transmit from mouth to ear, heart to heart, gut to gut.10 From his perspective, at least, the political is best lodged in the appetites. These are not politically tendentious observations. Perhaps **when Bush uttered his desire for affective communication** to be the medium of the political, **he was trying cynically to** distract the public gaze **from some of his particular actions.** But the wish to inhabit a vaguely warm sense of alreadyestablished, autonomic, and atmospheric solidarity with the body politic is hardly his special desire. Indeed, in his preference for the noise of immediacy, he has many bedfellows in the body politic with whom he shares little else politically, namely, the ones who prefer political meetings in town halls, caucuses, demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies to the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes mass publics. He also joins his antagonists in the nondominant classes who have long produced **intimate publics** to **provide the feeling of immediacy and solidarity by establishing in the public sphere an** affective register of belonging to inhabit when there are few adequate normative institutions to fall back on, rest in, or return to. Public spheres are always affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by affective projections of a constantly negotiated common interestedness. **But** an intimate public is more specific. **In an intimate public one senses that** matters of survival are at stake and that collective mediation through narration and audition might provide some routes out of the impasse and the struggle of the present, or at least some sense that there would be recognition were the participants in the room together.11 **An intimate public promises the sense of being held** in its penumbra. You do not need to audition for membership in it. Minimally, you need just to perform audition, to listen and to be interested in the scene’s visceral impact.12 You might have been drawn to it because of a curiosity about something minor, unassociated with catastrophe, like knitting or collecting something, or having a certain kind of sexuality, only after which it became a community of support, offering tones of suffering, humor, and cheerleading. Perhaps an illness led to seeking out a community of survival tacticians. In either case, any person can contribute to an intimate public a personal story about not being defeated by what is overwhelming. More likely, though, participants take things in and sometimes circulate what they hear, captioning them with opinion or wonder. But they do not have to do anything to belong. They can be passive and lurk, deciding when to appear and disappear, and consider the freedom to come and go the exercise of sovereign freedom. Indeed, **in liberal societies, freedom includes freedom from the obligation to pay attention to much**, whether personal or political—no- one is obliged to be conscious or socially active in their modes and scenes of belonging. For many this means that political attention is usually something delegated and politics is something overheard, encountered indirectly and unsystematically, through a kind of communication more akin to gossip than to cultivated rationality.13 But there is nothing fundamentally passive or superficial in overhearing the political. What hits a person encountering the dissemination of news about power has nothing to do with how thorough or cultivated their knowledge is or how they integrate the impact into living. **Amidst all of the chaos**, crisis, and injustice in front of us, **the desire for alternative filters that produce the sense**—if not the scene—**of a more** livable and **intimate sociality is another name for the desire for the political**. **This is why** an intimate attachment **to the political can amount to** a relation of cruel optimism. I have argued throughout this book that an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it: but its life- organizing status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes. It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of activity among elites, members of the body politic return periodically to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes. Voting is one thing; collective caring, listening, and scanning the airwaves, are others. **All of these modes of orientation** and having a feeling about it **confirm our attachment to the system** and thereby confirm the system and the legitimacy of the affects that make one feel bound to it, **even if the manifest content of the binding has the negative force of cynicism or the dark attenuation of political depression**. How and why does this attachment persist? Is it out of habit? Is it in hopes of the potentiality embedded in the political as such? Or, from a stance of critical engagement, an investment in the possibility of its repair? **The** exhausting repetition of the **politically depressed position that seeks repair of what may be constitutively broken can eventually split the activity of optimism from expectation and demand**.14 Maintaining this split enables one to sustain one’s attachment to the political as such and to one’s sense of membership in the idea of the polity, which is a virtual—but sensual, not abstract—space of the commons. And so, detaching from it could induce many potential losses along with new freedoms. Grant Farred calls fidelity to the political without expectation of recognition, representation, or returna profoundly ethical act.15 His exemplary case derives from voting patterns of African Americans in the 2004 presidential election, but the anxiety about the costs of this ethical commitment has only increased with the election of Barack Obama as the President of the emotional infrastructure of the United States as well as of its governing and administrative ones.16 What is the relation between the “Yes We Can!” optimism for the political and how politics actually works? What is the effect of Obama’s optimization of political optimism against the political depression of the historically disappointed, especially given any President’s limited sovereignty as a transformative agent in ordinary life? How can we track the divergences between politically orchestrated emotions and their affective environments? Traditionally, political solidarity is a more of a structure than a feeling—an identification with other people who are similarly committed to a project that does not require affective continuity or warm personal feeling to sustain itself. But maintaining solidarity requires skills for adjudicating incommensurate visions of the better good life. **The atrophy of these skills is at risk when** politics is reduced to the demand for affective attunement, insofar as the sense of belonging is threatened by the inconvenience of antagonistic aims. Add to this the possibility that “the political” as we know it in mass democracy requires such a splitting of attachment and expectation. Splitting off political optimism from the way things are can sustain many kinds of the cruelest optimism.

**Productivity is a fantasy -- the promise of debate keeps us working within a liberal institution, wasting our time in this place with the naïve hope that we will someday become policy makers or change the world. When marginalized bodies bring up oppression, they are told to “just keep working”. The more we think debate can do something for us if we just affirm a plan text one more time, the more the fantasy grows and the crueler the relationship of optimism will be.**

**Berlant 07** Lauren Berlant “Cruel Optimism: On Marx, Loss and the Sense” 33-36 2007

**When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking** **about** a cluster of **promises we want someone** or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea - whatever. To phrase 'the object of desire' as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what's incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as **proximity to the object means proximity to** the cluster of things that the object **promises**, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. **In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean** that **they** all **feel optimistic**: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent's typical misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form. In optimism, **the subject leans toward promises contained within the** present moment of the encounter with their **object**.' 'Cruel optimism' names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility whose realisation is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. **What's cruel** about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, **is** that the **subjects** who have x in their lives **might** **not well endure the loss** **of** **their** **object** or scene of desire, even though **its presence threatens their well-being**, **because** whatever **the** content of the **attachment** is, the continuity of the form of it **provides** something of the continuity of **the** **subject's sense of** **what it means to keep** on living on and to look forward to **being in the world**. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject's desire to temporise an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. **Cruel optimism is** the condition of **maintaining** an **attachment** to a problematic object. One more thing: the cruelty of an optimistic attachment is, I think, usually something an analyst observes about someone's or some group's attachment to x, since usually that attachment exists without being an event, or even better, seems to lighten the load for someone/some group.^ But if the cruelty of an attachment is experienced by someone/some group, even in disavowed fashion, the fear is that the loss of the object/scene of promising itself will defeat the capacity to have any hope about anything. Often this fear of loss of a scene of optimism as such is unstated and only experienced in a sudden incapacity to manage startling situations, as we will see below. One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are problematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about what cluster of desires and affects we can manage to keep magnetised to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad, just as the threat of the loss of x in the scope of one's attachment drives can feel like a threat to living on itself. But some scenes of optimism are clearly crueller than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalising or animating potency of an object/ scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, working for a living, patriotism, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one's attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition. This means that a poetics of attachment always involves some splitting off of the story I can tell about wanting to be near x (as though x has autonomous qualities) from the activity of the emotional habitus I have constructed by having x in my life in order to be able to project out my endurance as proximity to the complex of what x seems to offer and proffer. To understand cruel optimism, therefore, one must embark on an analysis of rhetorical indirection, as a way of thinking about the strange temporalities of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson's work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indirection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of fantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because this object is something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I'll describe a bit the shape of my transference with her thought. In 'Apostrophe, Animation, and Abortion,' which will be my key referent bere, Johnson tracks the political consequences of apostrophe for what has become foetal personhood: a silent, affectively present but physically displaced interlocutor (a lover, a foetus) is animated in speech as distant enough for a conversation but close enough to be imaginable by the speaker in whose head the entire scene is happening.' But **the condition of projected possibility**, of a hearing that cannot take place in the terms of its enunciation ('you' are not here, 'you' are eternally belated to the conversation with you that I am imagining) **creates a fake** present **moment of intersubjectivity** in which, nonetheless, a performance of address can take place. The present moment is **made** **possible by the** **fantasy** of you, laden with the x qualities I can project onto you, given your convenient absence. Apostrophe therefore appears to be a reaching out to a you, a direct movement from place x to y, but it is actually a turning back, an animating of a receiver on behalf of the desire to make something happen now that realises something in the speaker, makes the speaker more or differently possible, because she has admitted, in a sense, the importance of speaking for, as, and to, two: but only under **the** condition, and **illusion**, that the two is really (in) one. Apostrophe **is** thus **an** indirect, unstable, physically **impossible** but phenomenologically vitalising **movement** of rhetorical animation **that permits subjects to suspend themselves** in the **optimism of** a potential **occupation of the same psychic space of others**, the objects of desire who make you possible (by having some promising qualities, but also by not being there).'' Later work, such as on 'Muteness Envy,' elaborates Johnson's description of the gendered rhetorical politics of this projection of voluble intersubjectivity.'^ The paradox remains that the conditions of the lush **submerging** of **one consciousness into another require a double negation**: **of the speaker's boundaries**, so s/he can grow bigger in rhetorical proximity to the object of desire; **and of the spoken of, who is** more or less a powerful mute placeholder **providing** an **opportunity for the speaker's imagination** of her/his/their flourishing. Of course **psychoanalytically speaking all intersubjectivity is impossible**. **It is** a wish, a desire, and a demand for an enduring sense of being with and in x, and is related to that big knot that marks the indeterminate relation between a feeling of recognition and misrecognition - recognition is the misrecognition you can bear, **a transaction that affirms you without**, again, **necessarily feeling** **good** or accurate (it might idealise, **it might affirm** your **monstrosity**, it might mirror your desire to be nothing enough to live under the radar, it might feel just right, and so on).'' Johnson's work on projection shows that scenes of impossible identity, rhetorically rendered, open up meaning and knowledge by mining the negative - projective, boundary dissolving - spaces of attachment to the object of address who must be absent in order for the desiring subject of intersubjectivity to get some traction, to stabilise her proximity to the object/scene of promise. In free indirect discourse, a cognate kind of suspension, the circulation of this kind of merged and submerged observational subjectivity, has less pernicious outcomes, at least when Johnson reads Zora Neale Hurston's practice of it.' In a narrator's part-merging with a character's consciousness, say, free indirect discourse performs the impossibility of locating an observational intelligence in one or any body, and therefore forces the reader to transact a different, more open relation of unfolding to what she is reading, judging, being, and thinking she understands. In Jobnson's work such a transformative transaction through reading/speaking 'unfolds' the subject in a good way, despite whatever desires they may have not to become significantly different." In short, Johnson's work on projection is about the optimism of attachment, and is often itself optimistic about the negations and extensions of personhood that forms of suspended intersubjectivity demand from the reader. What follows is not so buoyant: this is an essay politicising Freud's observation that 'people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, indeed, when a substitute is already beckoning to them'.^ It comes from a longer project about the politics, aesthetics, and projections of political depression. **Political depression persists in affective judgments of** the world's **intractability** - evidenced in affectlessness, apathy, coolness, cynicism, and so on - **modes of** what might be called **detachment that are really not detached at all but constitute ongoing relations of sociality.'" The politically depressed position is manifested in** the problem of **the difficulty of detaching from life-building modalities** that can **no longer** be said to be **doing their work**, and **which** indeed **make obstacles to the desires that animate them**; my archive tracks practices of self-interruption, self-suspension, and self-abeyance that indicate people's struggles to change, but not traumatically, the terms of value in which their life-making activity has been cast." **Cruel optimism** **is**, then, like all phases, a deictic, a phrase that points to a proximate location: as **an analytic lever** it is an incitement to inhabit and **to track** the affective **attachment to** what we call **'the good life,' which is for so many a bad life that wears out the subjects who nonetheless**, and at the same time, **find their conditions of possibility within it**. My assumption is that the conditions of ordinary life in the contemporary world even of relative wealth, as in the US, are conditions of the attrition or the wearing out of the subject, and that the irony - that the labour of reproducing life in the contemporary world is also the activity of being worn out by it - has specific implications for thinking about the ordinariness of suffering, the violence of normativity, and the 'technologies of patience' or lag that enable a concept of the later to suspend questions of the cruelty of the now.'^ **Cruel optimism is** in this sense a concept pointing toward a mode of lived imminence, one that grows from a perception about the reasons people are not Bartlehy, do not prefer to interfere with varieties of immiseration, but choose **to ride the wave of the system** of attachment that they are used to, to syncopate with it, or to be held in a relation of reciprocity, reconciliation, or resignation that does not mean defeat by it. Or perhaps they move to normative form to get numb with the consensual promise, **and** to **misrecognise that** promise **as** an **achievement**. This essay traverses three episodes of suspension - from John Ashhery, Charles Johnson, and Ceoff Ryman - of the reproduction of habituated or normative life. These suspensions open up revelations about the promises that had clustered as people's objects of desire, stage moments of exuberance in the impasse near the normal, and provide tools for suggesting why these exuberant attachments keep ticking not like the time bomb they might be but like a white noise machine that provides assurance that what seems like static really is, after all, a rhythm people can enter into while they're dithering, tottering, bargaining, testing, or otherwise being worn out by the promises that they have attached to in this world.

**The aff induces a sense of affective togetherness that sustains a fantasy of intimate political relation – investing affective energies into these fantasies further atrophies our ability to gesture towards an ethical becoming-otherwise, and instead cements us squarely within the safe intellectual spaces of liberalism**

Berlant 11 Lauren, George M. Pullman Professor, Department of English, University of Chicago, *Cruel Optimism*, Routledge: Duke University Press, 2011, p. 223-8

Intensely political seasons spawn reveries of a different immediacy**. People imagine alternative environments where authenticity trumps ideology**, truths cannot be concealed, and communication feels intimate, face-to face. In these times, even **politicians imagine occupying a post–public sphere public where they might just somehow make an unmediated transmission to the body politic**. “Somehow you just got to go over the heads of the filter and speak directly to the people,” then- President George W. Bush commented in October 2003, echoing a long tradition of sentimental political fantasies and soon followed by condemnations of the “filter” by the Republican National Committee and the presidential campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin.1 What is “the filter” that demands circumnavigation? Bush seems to be inverting the meaning of his own, mixed, metaphor. A filter, after all, separates out noise from communication and, in so doing, makes communication possible. Jacques Attali and Michel Serres have both argued that there is no communication without noise, as noise interferes from within any utterance, threatening its tractability.2 **The performance of distortion** that constitutes communication therefore demands discernment, or filtering. However steadfast one’s commitment to truth, there is no avoiding the noise. Yet **Bush**’s wish to skirt the filter points to something profound in the desire for the political. He wants to transmit not the message but the noise. He **wants the public to feel the** funk, the live intensities and **desires that make messages affectively** immediate, **seductive, and** binding.3 In his head **a public’s binding** to the political **is best achieved** neither **by** policy nor ideology but the affect of feeling political together, an effect of having communicated true feeling without the distancing mediation of speech.4 **The transmission of noise performs political attachment as a** sustaining intimate relation, without which great dramas of betrayal are felt and staged. In The Ethical Soundscape, Charles Hirschkind talks about the role of “maieutic listening” in constructing the intimate political publics of Egypt.5 There, the feeling tones of the affective soundscape produce attachments to and investments in a sense of political and social mutuality that is performed in moments of collective audition. **This process involves taking on listening together as itself an object/scene of desire. The attainment of that attunement produces a sense of** shared worldness**, apart from whatever** aim or **claim the** listening **public might** later **bring** to a particular political world because of what they have heard. From Hirschkind’s perspective **the** social **circulation of** noise, of **affective binding, converts the world to a space of moral action that seems** juxtapolitical— **proximate to**, without being compromised by, the instrumentalities of power that govern **social** **life**.6 **Speaking** above the filter **would confirm** to Bush’s whole listening audience that **they already** share an affective environment; mobilizing “the ethical and therapeutic virtues of the ear”7 would accomplish the visceral transmission of his assurance not only that he has made a better good life possible for Americans and humans around the globe, but that, affectively speaking, there is already a better sensorial world right here, right now, more intimate and secure and just as real as the world made by the media’s anxiogenic sensationalist analysis. **This** vision **locates** the **desire for the political in an** alternative commons **in the present that the senses** confirm and **circulate** as though **without mediation**. What exactly is the problem with “the filter”? **The contemporary** filtered or **mediated political sphere** in the United States **transmits news** 24/7 from a new ordinary **created by crisis, in which life seems reduced to** discussions about tactics for survival **and** who is to blame**.** The filter tells you that the public has entered a historical situation whose contours it does not know. It impresses itself upon mass consciousness as an epochal crisis, unfolding like a disaster film made up of human- interest stories and stories about institutions that have lost their way.8 It is a moment on the verge of a postnormative phase, in which fantasmatic clarities about the conditions for enduring collectivity, historical continuity, and infrastructural stability have melted away, along with predictable relations between event and effect. Living amidst war and environmental disaster, people are shown constantly being surprised at what does and does not seem to have a transformative impact. Living amid economic crisis, people are shown constantly being surprised at the amount, location, and enormity of moral and affective irregulation that come from fading rules of accountability and recognition. What will govern the terms and relations of reliable reciprocity among governments, intimates, workers, owners, churches, citizens, political parties, or strangers? What forms of life will secure the sense of affective democracy that people have been educated to expect from their publics? Nobody knows. The news about the recent past and the pressures of the near future demand constant emergency cleanup and hyperspeculation about what it means to live in the ongoing present among piles of cases where things didn’t work out or seem to make sense, at least not yet. There are vigils; there is witnessing, testimony, and yelling. But there is not yet a consensual rubric that would shape these matters into an event. **The affective structure** of the situation **is** therefore **anxious and the political emotions attached to it** veer wildly **from recognition of the enigma that is clearly there to explanations that make sense**, the kind of satisfying sense that enables enduring. Uncertainty is the material that Bush wished to bracket. His desire for **a politics of ambient noise**, prepropositional transmission, and intuitive reciprocity **sought to displace** the filtered story of **instability** and contradiction from the center of sociality. **He** also wishfully **banished** self- reflexive, **cultivated opinion** and judgment **from their** central **public- sphere** function. In short, as Jacques Rancière would put it, Bush’s wishful feeling was to separate the political from politics as such.9 In so doing he would cast the ongoing activity of social antagonism to the realm of the epiphenomenal, in contrast to which **the affective feedback loop of the political would make stronger the true soul- to- soul continuity between politicians and their public.** Foucault used to call “sexuality” that noisy affectivity that Bush wanted to transmit from mouth to ear, heart to heart, gut to gut.10 From his perspective, at least, the political is best lodged in the appetites. These are not politically tendentious observations. Perhaps **when Bush uttered his desire for affective communication** to be the medium of the political, **he was trying cynically to** distract the public gaze **from some of his particular actions.** But the wish to inhabit a vaguely warm sense of alreadyestablished, autonomic, and atmospheric solidarity with the body politic is hardly his special desire. Indeed, in his preference for the noise of immediacy, he has many bedfellows in the body politic with whom he shares little else politically, namely, the ones who prefer political meetings in town halls, caucuses, demonstrations, and other intimate assemblies to the pleasure of disembodied migratory identification that constitutes mass publics. He also joins his antagonists in the nondominant classes who have long produced **intimate publics** to **provide the feeling of immediacy and solidarity by establishing in the public sphere an** affective register of belonging to inhabit when there are few adequate normative institutions to fall back on, rest in, or return to. Public spheres are always affect worlds, worlds to which people are bound, when they are, by affective projections of a constantly negotiated common interestedness. **But** an intimate public is more specific. **In an intimate public one senses that** matters of survival are at stake and that collective mediation through narration and audition might provide some routes out of the impasse and the struggle of the present, or at least some sense that there would be recognition were the participants in the room together.11 **An intimate public promises the sense of being held** in its penumbra. You do not need to audition for membership in it. Minimally, you need just to perform audition, to listen and to be interested in the scene’s visceral impact.12 You might have been drawn to it because of a curiosity about something minor, unassociated with catastrophe, like knitting or collecting something, or having a certain kind of sexuality, only after which it became a community of support, offering tones of suffering, humor, and cheerleading. Perhaps an illness led to seeking out a community of survival tacticians. In either case, any person can contribute to an intimate public a personal story about not being defeated by what is overwhelming. More likely, though, participants take things in and sometimes circulate what they hear, captioning them with opinion or wonder. But they do not have to do anything to belong. They can be passive and lurk, deciding when to appear and disappear, and consider the freedom to come and go the exercise of sovereign freedom. Indeed, **in liberal societies, freedom includes freedom from the obligation to pay attention to much**, whether personal or political—no- one is obliged to be conscious or socially active in their modes and scenes of belonging. For many this means that political attention is usually something delegated and politics is something overheard, encountered indirectly and unsystematically, through a kind of communication more akin to gossip than to cultivated rationality.13 But there is nothing fundamentally passive or superficial in overhearing the political. What hits a person encountering the dissemination of news about power has nothing to do with how thorough or cultivated their knowledge is or how they integrate the impact into living. **Amidst all of the chaos**, crisis, and injustice in front of us, **the desire for alternative filters that produce the sense**—if not the scene—**of a more** livable and **intimate sociality is another name for the desire for the political**. **This is why** an intimate attachment **to the political can amount to** a relation of cruel optimism. I have argued throughout this book that an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it: but its life- organizing status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes. It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of activity among elites, members of the body politic return periodically to its recommitment ceremonies and scenes. Voting is one thing; collective caring, listening, and scanning the airwaves, are others. **All of these modes of orientation** and having a feeling about it **confirm our attachment to the system** and thereby confirm the system and the legitimacy of the affects that make one feel bound to it, **even if the manifest content of the binding has the negative force of cynicism or the dark attenuation of political depression**. How and why does this attachment persist? Is it out of habit? Is it in hopes of the potentiality embedded in the political as such? Or, from a stance of critical engagement, an investment in the possibility of its repair? **The** exhausting repetition of the **politically depressed position that seeks repair of what may be constitutively broken can eventually split the activity of optimism from expectation and demand**.14 Maintaining this split enables one to sustain one’s attachment to the political as such and to one’s sense of membership in the idea of the polity, which is a virtual—but sensual, not abstract—space of the commons. And so, detaching from it could induce many potential losses along with new freedoms. Grant Farred calls fidelity to the political without expectation of recognition, representation, or returna profoundly ethical act.15 His exemplary case derives from voting patterns of African Americans in the 2004 presidential election, but the anxiety about the costs of this ethical commitment has only increased with the election of Barack Obama as the President of the emotional infrastructure of the United States as well as of its governing and administrative ones.16 What is the relation between the “Yes We Can!” optimism for the political and how politics actually works? What is the effect of Obama’s optimization of political optimism against the political depression of the historically disappointed, especially given any President’s limited sovereignty as a transformative agent in ordinary life? How can we track the divergences between politically orchestrated emotions and their affective environments? Traditionally, political solidarity is a more of a structure than a feeling—an identification with other people who are similarly committed to a project that does not require affective continuity or warm personal feeling to sustain itself. But maintaining solidarity requires skills for adjudicating incommensurate visions of the better good life. **The atrophy of these skills is at risk when** politics is reduced to the demand for affective attunement, insofar as the sense of belonging is threatened by the inconvenience of antagonistic aims. Add to this the possibility that “the political” as we know it in mass democracy requires such a splitting of attachment and expectation. Splitting off political optimism from the way things are can sustain many kinds of the cruelest optimism.

Affective investment in the maintenance of sentimental public spheres lubricates the wheels of liberalism, mobilizing fantasies of collective desires that undergird neoliberal regimes of governance

**Berlant 8** [Lauren Berlant, Professor of English at the University of Chicago, Introduction of *THE FEMALE COMPLAINT: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture*, Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2008]

Sentimentality: Love, Then Repeat As the preface suggested, the intimate public of femininity has always conjoined the very act of consumption to a powerful hunger to know and adapt the ways other people survive being oppressed by life. **The therapeutic intensity of this drive is so conventional to sentimentality it comprises a story that barely needs to be told, a** promise of aesthetic recognition and redemption whose consumption is its own reward. **Such an economy is an important part of the sense of belonging an intimate public provides: the cliché** and the convention represent “insider knowledge.” It would be easy to dismiss the social productivity of this kind of reward, as it associates subjective confirmation with fundamental changes of the sort the privileged rarely want to risk. But the mechanism of **sentimental saturation** of the intimate sphere with materials and signs of consumer citizenship **has been crucial to** what Mark Seltzer has called **the** “pathological public sphere” **of the contemporary United States**, which Karen Halttunen locates in the sensationalism of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century.43 The Uncle Tom genealogy is notable precisely because its **sensationalism was a politically powerful** suturing device **of a** bourgeois revolutionary aesthetic. **The contradictions evoked by that phrase will be played out variously throughout each chapter: what links them is the centrality of affective intensity and emotional bargaining amid structural inequity, and the elaboration and management of ambivalent attachments to the world as such, the as-suchness of the world**.44 I have been speaking of conventions, of stereotypes, and forms, the diacritics of congealed feeling that characterize the cultural scene of sentimentality: behind this is a desire to see the sentimental itself as a form—a dynamic pattern—not just a content with scenic themes, like that of weeping, sacrifice, and sanctified death. As when a refrigerator is opened by a person hungry for something other than food, the turn to sentimental rhetoric at moments of social anxiety constitutes a generic wish for an unconflicted world, **one wherein structural inequities, not emotions and intimacies, are epiphenomenal.**45 In this imaginary world the sentimental subject is connected to others who share the same sense that the world is out of joint, without necessarily having the same view of the reasons or solutions: historically, the sentimental intervention has tended to involve mobilizing a fantasy scene of collective desire, instruction, and identification that endures within the contingencies of the everyday. The politico-sentimental therefore exists paradoxically: **it seeks out the monumental time of emotional recognition, a sphere of dreaming and memory, and translates that sense into an imaginary realm of possible acting, where agency is somehow unconstrained by the normative conventions of the real as it presents itself**; and it holds the real accountable to what affective justice fantasy has constructed. This is to say that where sentimental ideology is, **so will there be** a will to separate **and** compartmentalize **fundamental** psychically felt social ambivalences, so that **a sense of potentiality can be experienced enduringly**, motivatingly, **and even** utopianly. The downside is that, often, **all of the forces in play can seem** formally equivalent. For example, **the critique of patriarchal familialism that sentimental texts constantly put forth can be used to argue against the** normativity of the family; at the same time, t**he sacred discourse of family values** also **sustained within this domain works to preserve the fantasy of the family as a space of sociability in which flow, intimacy, and identification across difference can bridge life across generations and model intimate sociability for the social generally**. Likewise, at the same time that **bourgeois nationalism** promotes a sentimental attachment among strangers that is routed through the form of the nation, it also **abjures the sentimental when the idiom of certain claims is inconvenient**. (**Sentimentalists talk about the emotional costs of injustice, not the material ones; the personal impacts of not changing, not the structural benefits of continuity**.) **Arguments for rationality and individual affective** and appetitive self-**management** in the everyday have also been used to build and to critique identity discourses associated with historically subordinated U.S. populations;46 at the same time sentimental rhetoric is mobilized to describe everything from the timeless psychic unity of citizens possessing a national identity to the fragility of normal culture itself when faced with challenges to it.47 Meanwhile, social progressives have for over a century represented the ordinary effects of structural suffering in tactically sentimental ways—modes of testimony, witnessing, visual documentation about the personal impact of structural subordination—to critique the racist/patriarchal/capitalist world; now that same world has assimilated those genres to describe the psychic effects of feminism/multiculturalism on those who once felt truly free, nationally speaking. What conclusions can we reach from this jumble of ambitions to use and refuse sentimentality in the political sphere? That politics, mediated by publics, demands expressive assurance, while political subjectivity is, nonetheless, incoherent; that ideological incoherence or attachment to contradictory ethics and ways of life is not a failure but a condition of mass belonging; that ambivalent critique produces domains (such as intimate publics) to one side of politics that flourish insofar as they can allow the circulation of the open secrets of insecurity and instability without those revelations and spectacles engendering transformative or strongly resistant action in the idiom of political agency as it is usually regarded. Tracking mass-mediated norms of belonging in the affective register and conventions of engendering emotional solidarities helps us to understand the reproduction of normative life amid serious doubts about the probability that anyone, except the lucky, will be able to forge durable relations of reciprocity among intimates or strangers; such fractures produce the complaint as a register not merely of a stuckness but of the conditions of bargaining that allow people to maintain both their critical knowledge and their attachments to what disappoints

Extend Berlant 11 – the political system forces us to invest affective energy into the hope that the political will change something for us – this keeps us in a viscous cycle of cruel optimism – our aff resolves this by refusing to place hope in the political and create community modes of healing

## ROB Spec

To clarify, under our model of debate, the 1AC affirms the resolution through a discursive method to resist oppression and the negative can read a counter method to resist oppression and read reasons why our methodology is bad or read a counter kritik to our methodology. Fiat is illusory, no magic wand passes a bill through Congress once the ballot is signed, thus the only offense that matters is discursive. The debate is determined by the flow.

# Random other Cards

#### Feminist rage is a way to produce new, empowering forms of energy that motivate us to create change and to join together in solidarity. Rage is a necessary tool to resist oppression – although our struggles are not the same, women can come together through anger. We must forefront the different manifestations of rage in order to produce change. Rage is more than just anger, but is an affective way of engaging in political spaces that stem from self care in order to disrupt the narratives placed on us. We refused to become the quiet women. We refuse to leave.

Kaplow 73Susi, 1973. “Getting Angry” Radical Feminism. [http://www.feminist-reprise.org/docs/kaplow.htm //](http://www.feminist-reprise.org/docs/kaplow.htm%20//)

Two scenarios: An angry man: someone has infringed on his rights, gone against his interests, or harmed a loved one. Or perhaps his anger is social--against racism or militarism. He holds his anger in check (on the screen we can see the muscles of his face tighten, his fists clench) and then, at the strategic moment, he lets it go. We see him yelling, shouting his angry phrases with sureness and confidence--or pushing a fist into his opponent's stomach with equal conviction. In either event, the anger is resolved; our hero has vented it and is content with success or accepts what he knows to be unmerited defeat.¶ Dissolve to scene two. An angry woman: angry at her man for cheating on her or (more likely) at the other woman. If we're in the good old days, she stomps up to her man and begins to scream wildly, he holds her down with his pinky, her anger melts in his embrace. After the fade-out, we find a puzzled heroine wondering how she could have been angry at such a good man. Or she marches over to the local saloon, hurls a few choice epithets at her rival, and then the hair-pulling begins. This ludicrous scene is always broken up by the amused and slightly scandalized gentlemen on the sidelines. In modern dress the same episode would be played differently. Discovering her husband's or lover's infidelity, the woman would smolder inwardly until the anger had burned down to a bitter resentment or becomes such a pressurized force that it could only come out in a rage so uncontrollable that the man (and the audience) can dismiss it as irrational. "I can't talk to you when you're like this." Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned.¶ For **a woman in our society is denied the** forthright **expression of her** healthy **anger**. Her **attempts at physical confrontation seem ridiculous**; "ladies" do a slow burn, letting out their anger indirectly in catty little phrases, often directed against a third party, especially children. **A woman has learned to hold back her anger**: It's unseemly, aesthetically displeasing, and against the sweet, pliant feminine image to be angry. And **the woman fears her own anger**: **She the great conciliator**, the steadier of rocked boats, **moves**, out of her fear, **to quiet not only others' anger but also her own**. Small wonder that **when the vacuum-sealed lid bursts off, the angry woman seems either like a freaked-out nut or a bitch on wheels**. Her **frenzy is intensified by the shakiness of her commitment to her own anger. What if she's really wrong? What if the other person is right? --Or worse** (and this is the greatest fear) hits back with, "**You're crazy**, I don't know what you're so mad about."¶ **Why can't women allow themselves the outlet of their contained anger?** Why do **those around them find an angry woman so frightening that they must demoralize and deflate her into a degraded, inauthentic calm**? **Healthy anger says "I'm a person. I have certain human rights which you can't deny**. I have a right to be treated with fairness and compassion. I have a right to live my life as I see fit, **I have a right to get what I can for myself without hurting you. And if you deprive me of my rights, I'm not going to thank you, I'm going to say 'fuck off' and fight you if I have to."** **A person's anger puts** him or **her on center stage. It claims attention for itself and demands to be taken seriously**, or else. (Or else I won't talk to you, I won't work with you or be friendly toward you, or else, ultimately, our association is over.)¶ Expressing anger means risking. Risking that the other person will be angry in return, risking that he or she will misunderstand the anger or refuse to deal with it, risking that the anger itself is misplaced or misinformed. So **you need strength to say you're angry**--both the courage of your convictions and the ability to accept that your anger may be unwarranted without feeling crushed into nothingness. **You must not have your total worth as a person riding on the worth of each individual case of anger**.¶ Thus **anger is self-confident, willing to fight for itself even at the jeopardy of the status quo, capable of taking a risk** and, if necessary, of accepting defeat without total demise. Above all, **anger is assertive**. The traditional woman is the polar opposite of this description. Lacking confidence in herself and in her own perception, she backs away from a fight or, following the rules of chivalry, lets someone else do battle for her. Strong emotions disturb her for the disruption they bring to things-as-they-are. So shaky is her self-image that every criticism is seen as an indictment of her person. She is a living, walking apology for her own existence--what could be more foreign to self-assertion?¶ Although the reality has changed somewhat, most women will recognize themselves somewhere in this description. And society clings to this model as its ideal and calls an angry woman unfeminine. **Because anger takes the woman out of her** earth **mother role** as bastion of peace and calm, **out of her familial role as peacemaker, out of her political role as preserver of the status quo, out of her economic role as cheap labor, out of her social role as second-class citizen. It takes her out of roles altogether and makes her a person.¶** It is no accident, then, that the emotion which accompanies the first steps toward liberation is, for most women, anger. Whatever sense of self-worth you have been able to emerge with after twenty or thirty years of having your mind messed with, gives you the vague feeling that your situation is not what it should be and sends you looking tentatively at the world around you for explanations. Realizations are, at first, halting, and then begin to hit you like a relentless sledge hammer, driving the anger deeper and deeper into your consciousness with every blow.¶ Your fury focuses on the select group of individuals who have done you the most damage. You are furious at your parents for having wanted a boy instead; at your mother (and this fury is mixed with compassion) for having let herself be stifled and having failed to show you another model of female behavior; at your father for having gotten a cheap bolster to his ego at your and your mother's expense.¶ You are furious at those who groom you to play your shabby role. At the teachers who demanded less of you because you were a girl. At the doctors who told you birth control was the woman's responsibility, gave you a Hobson's choice of dangerous and ineffective devices, then refused you an abortion when these failed to work. At the psychiatrist who called you frigid because you didn't have vaginal orgasms and who told you you were neurotic for wanting more than the unpaid, unappreciated role of maid, wet nurse, and occasional lay. At employers who paid you less and kept you in lousy jobs. At the message from the media which you never understood before: "You've come a long way, baby" -- down the dead-end, pre-fab street we designed for you.¶ Furious, above all, at men. For the grocer who has always called you "honey" you now have a stiff, curt "don't call me honey." For the men on the street who visit their daily indignities on your body, you have a "fuck off," or, if you're brave, a knee in the right place. For your male friends (and these get fewer and fewer) who are "all for women's lib" you reserve a cynical eye and a ready put-down. And for your man (if he's still around), a lot of hostile, angry questions. Is he different from other men? How? And when he fails to prove himself, your rage explodes readily from just beneath the surface.¶ This is an uncomfortable period to live through. **You are raw with an anger that seems to have a mind and will of its own**. Your friends, most of whom disagree with you, find you strident and difficult. And you become all the more so because of your fear that they are right, that you're crazy after all. You yourself get tired of this anger--it's exhausting to be furious all the time--which won't even let you watch a movie or have a conversation in peace.¶ But from your fury, you are gaining strength. **The exercise of your anger gives you a sense of self and of self-worth**. **And the more this sense increases, the angrier you become. The two elements run in a dialectic whirlwind, smashing idols and myths all around them**. You see, too, that **you can get angry and it doesn't kill people, they don't kill you, the world doesn't fall apart.**¶ Then this anger, burning white hot against the outside world, suddenly veers around and turns its flame toward you. Sure, they fucked you up and over, sure, they oppressed you, sure they continue to degrade and use you. But--why did you let it happen? Why do you continue to let it happen? All of a sudden you are up against the part you played in your own oppression. You were the indispensible accomplice to the crime. You internalized your own inferiority, the pressing necessity to be beautiful and seductive, the belief that men are more important than women, the conviction that marriage is the ultimate goal. Seeing this, **you are violent against yourself for every time you were afraid to try something for fear of failing**, for all the hours lost on make-up and shopping, for every woman you missed because there was a man in the room, for getting yourself stuck as a housewife or in a job you hate because "marriage is your career."¶ This phase of anger turned inward is terrifying. You are alone with your own failed responsibilities toward yourself, however much you can still blame others. It is this phase that some women find unbearable and flee from, returning to the first phase of anger or dropping out altogether. Because this inturned anger demands action--change--and won't let go until its demands begin to be satisfied. You can fall back on your inability to control others and their behavior toward you. But you can't comfortably claim powerlessness over your own conduct. Nor can you, at least for long, go on being furious at others (the forty-five-year-old who still blames mommy, flounders) if you don't even try to get yourself together.¶ This inturned anger is a constructive or rather reconstructive catalyst. For what you can do under its impetus is to restructure yourself, putting new images, patterns and expectations in place of the old, no longer viable ones. As you use your anger, you also tame it. **Anger becomes a tool which you can control, not only to help you make personal changes but to deal with the world outside as well**. You can mobilize your anger to warn those around you that you're not having any more bullshit, to underscore your seriousness, to dare to drive your point home.¶ **Through the exercise of your anger**, as you see its efficacy and thus your own, **you gain strength**. And the growing feeling that you control your anger and not vice versa adds to this strength. As you gain this control, become surer of yourself, less afraid of being told you're crazy, your anger is less enraged and, in a sense, calmer. So it becomes discriminating. You reserve it for those individuals and groups who are messing with your mind--be they men or other women.¶ This progression of anger finds its ultimate meaning as an experience shared with other women. All striving to understand their collective situation, **women in a group can help each other through the first, painful phase of outward-directed anger. Through consciousness-raising each woman can** (at least ideally) **find sufficient confirmation of her perceptions to be reassured of her own sanity--and can find growing strength to do without such confirmation when necessary.**¶ In the second phase of inturned anger, women can support one another in their attempts at self-definition and change, change which others will try to forestall. And, at the same time, **they can start to move together to create new social forms and structures in which individual changes can come to fruition.** **Controlled, directed, but nonetheless passionate, anger moves from the personal to the political and becomes a force for shaping our new destiny.**

#### Naming oppression is a necessary type of freedom of speech to disrupt the ways speech operates in places like the university.

**Nguyen 14** Nicole Nguyen and R. Tina Catania The Feminist Wire August 5 2014 "On Feeling Depleted: Naming, Confronting, and Surviving Oppression in the Academy" thefeministwire.com/2014/08/feeling-depleted-naming-confronting-surviving-oppression-academy/

**We write because we cannot remain silent**. And the “we” that we envision is more than our own impulses. It is **a collective we that cannot be and will not be silent in the face of oppression**. As Audre Lorde writes, “Your silence will not protect you.” **The silence**[7] **of individuals who are “waiting to get a job” or “waiting to get tenure”** or “keeping their heads down and doing their own thing” **does not protect them from microaggressions, from oppression, from depletion**.[8] What **it** does do is **continue to** reify and **entrench the oppressive** nature of **the** **academy**; **it disciplines us to stay silent, to reinforce oppression, and to participate in its reproduction**. Thus, **we urge every-body**, but especially those in positions of power (i.e., tenure-track and tenured faculty) **to** **name oppression**. To name sexism. To name ableism. To name racism. **To be cognizant of how these -isms intersect to violently oppress and privilege particular bodies and identities**. **We must name instances, call attention to the ways that the academy’s daily practices are multiply oppressive**. And we should do so whether we experience them through someone like Stuart, a prototypical, privileged, white male, or through anyone else whether white feminists, able-bodied people of color, or male “allies.” **These violences**, from whomever they come and through whatever structures make such encounters possible, must be named. They **must be resisted**. And they must be transformed. We recognize that, as Sara Ahmed warns, “exposing a problem is to become a problem.”[9] Yet, **we refuse to be disciplined. We refuse to have our words, actions, and experiences foreclosed for fear of being** read as **the** **“problem,”** always “stirring up trouble.” **Fuck the fear that the discipline, field, department, administration, university, society tries to instill in us so that we do not speak up, so that we do not name our oppressions**. **We recognize the academic institution** and its practices **for what they are**: inherently oppressive. We recognize that **many have no desire to critique the academy because they do not want to jeopardize their privilege within it**. **We recognize that critiques of academia are necessarily limited by those who make them when they are invested in maintaining its structure**, a structure that works for them. **We seek to radically reshape** and remake **the institution** in more equitable ways. **True solidarity cannot pay lip service to feminist, de-colonial, anti-racist projects while maintaining individual investments in a system that works for only the most privileged bodies**. Marginalized **individuals cannot but participate in the oppression of other marginalized people if they are invested in academia’s current structure**. **Increased “representation” merely reifies the system rather than expands the possibilities for solidarity**, for change. We see our colleagues, our cohorts, our faculty, our peers, and even ourselves as colluding in these oppressions when they (we) ignore them, when they ignore us, when they remain silent at their occurrence, when they are oblivious to their daily repetition. When your colleague does not plan an accessible, inclusive event from the beginning, they actively reproduce ableism and create exclusionary spaces. And our naming that problem, and therefore your collusion in ableist oppression, makes us the problem, rather than you or the institution. When the violent actions of white, male students not only go unpunished, but undiscussed and unrecognized by faculty, you actively participate in our racialized and gendered oppression. Within a deeply inequitable institution, **we strive to navigate a space for ourselves**, for understanding. **We understand that we are a part of the academy and that our actions can also work to sustain it**. Yet we strive for a different academy. **We seek to transform the institution**. For us, **this includes naming** the **violences** of those like Stuart and rejecting the common call to discipline ourselves into not writing or voicing radical critiques of the academy. So we begin here, with a naming of sorts. We write to name what we should not name. Yet **writing also serves as a way to carve out alternative spaces. Spaces that contribute to our survivability and to our resistance against these structural and everyday forms of oppression**. **These spaces are where we “recognize each other, find each other, create spaces of relief, spaces that might be breathing spaces, spaces in which we can be inventive.**”[10] We write together to claim our intersectional identities and recognize that for us, **the academy must include the stories of our bodies, our exclusions, our resistances, our politics, our activism**. **We write to document our exhaustion in surviving, resisting, and reshaping this deeply violent institution even as we, as graduate students, occupy particularly precarious positions**. Given these oppressions in the academy, **this is a call for different, transnational, cross-border, and accessible forms of solidarity**. **We write**, ultimately, **as an invitation to those other depleted-yet-vibrant bodies, bodies who imagine another kind of academy**. **An academy that is collaborative, feminist, and inclusive. It is an invitation to strategize, to survive, to heal**

1. (1) **Macmillian dictionary** <http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/affirm> “to [support](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/support_1) something or [make](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/make_1) it [stronger](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/strong)” (2) **vocabulary.com** https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/affirm "establish or strengthen as with new evidence or facts" (3) **The Oxford Dictionary** https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/affirm "Declare one's support for; uphold; defend:" (4) **yourdictionary** <http://www.yourdictionary.com/affirm#dlKHXdoSAXRi0WHo.99> "The definition of affirm is to state something to be true." (5) **Collins Dictionary** <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/affirm> "to make valid; confirm; uphold; ratify" (6) **Dictionary.com** <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm> “to express agreement with or commitment to uphold; support” (7) **The Law Dictionary** thelawdictionary.org/affirm/ "To ratify, make firm, confirm, establish, reassert" (8) **Mnemonic dictionary** www.mnemonicdictionary.com/word/affirm "establish or strengthen as with new evidence or facts" (9) **the Free Dictionary** www.thefreedictionary.com/affirm “To declare support for or belief in:” (10) **Word Reference** www.wordreference.com/definition/affirm "to express agreement with; support; uphold:" (11) **the Fine Dictionary** www.finedictionary.com/affirm.html "To declare or assert positively." (12) **Word Game Dictionary** https://www.wordgamedictionary.com/dictionary/word/affirm/ "To state positively" [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. (1) **Macmillian dictionary** <http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/affirm> “to [support](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/support_1) something or [make](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/make_1) it [stronger](http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/strong)” (2) **vocabulary.com** https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/affirm "establish or strengthen as with new evidence or facts" (3) **The Oxford Dictionary** https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/affirm "Declare one's support for; uphold; defend:" (4) **yourdictionary** <http://www.yourdictionary.com/affirm#dlKHXdoSAXRi0WHo.99> "The definition of affirm is to state something to be true." (5) **Collins Dictionary** <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/affirm> "to make valid; confirm; uphold; ratify" (6) **Dictionary.com** <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm> “to express agreement with or commitment to uphold; support” (7) **The Law Dictionary** thelawdictionary.org/affirm/ "To ratify, make firm, confirm, establish, reassert" (8) **Mnemonic dictionary** www.mnemonicdictionary.com/word/affirm "establish or strengthen as with new evidence or facts" (9) **the Free Dictionary** www.thefreedictionary.com/affirm “To declare support for or belief in:” (10) **Word Reference** www.wordreference.com/definition/affirm "to express agreement with; support; uphold:" (11) **the Fine Dictionary** www.finedictionary.com/affirm.html "To declare or assert positively." (12) **Word Game Dictionary** https://www.wordgamedictionary.com/dictionary/word/affirm/ "To state positively" [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Martinez—2011 (Jacqueline M, Assoc. Prof of Communication, Lewis Gordon’s Contribution to the Study of Communication: Beyond Disciplinary Decadence,” Atlantic Journal of Communication 19: 17-27, 18). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Alfonso Montuori California Institute of Integral Studies 2013 "The Complexity of Transdisciplinary Literature Reviews" [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Wendy, Professor Political Science UC Berkeley, Politics Out of History, pg. 35-37 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Butler, 97, Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature – University of California-Berkeley, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative p. 38 Judith [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Perpetually Myself—a blog by an anonymous author self-described as “a historian, cat lover, autistic woman, Yankee fan, neurodiversity advocate, feminist, Harry Potter fan, Hunger Games fan, fantasy/science fiction reader, and general supporter of social justice,” 2011 (“It’s not enough to call out ableist language,” *Perpetually Myself*—a blog, May 2nd, Available Online at http://allies-person.tumblr.com/post/5141183778/its-not-enough-to-call-out-ableist-language, Accessed 03-02-2012) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)